AUR#781 Oct 26 EU: A Guiding Star/ Lighthouse For Ukraine; IMF Says Cancel Grain Controls; Waiting For Russia On WTO?; Russia Attacks Genocide/Holodomor

                  An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
                       In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

                        Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
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                             OR A LIGHTHOUSE FOR UKRAINE,
                            TO HELP STEER ITS SHIP OF STATE

         “A Ship Must Always Know What Its Destination Harbour Is”
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor  
               –——-  INDEX OF ARTICLES  ——–
              Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.               
    Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article
              “A Ship Must Always Know What Its Destination Harbour Is”
: With Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine
INTERVIEW BY: Kaija Virta in Kiev
Helsigin Sanomat International Edition Online
Helsinki, Finland, Sunday, October 22, 2006

                  “We are not neighbors of Europe, we are part of Europe.”
Paul Ames, Associated Press (AP), Brussels, Belgium, Wed, October 25, 2006


Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 25, 2006
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1124 gmt 25 Oct 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 25, 2006


Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Wed, October 25, 2006

Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 26, 2007

       Will PM Yanukovych move swiftly or will his foot-dragging continue?
EIU Economy – News Analysis
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited
New York, New York, Tuesday, October 24, 2006


Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1728 gmt 25 Oct 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006


By Tony Halpin in Moscow, The Times Online
London, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006

INTERVIEW: With Steven Pifer, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
INTERVIEW BY: Jan Maksymiuk, Belarus, Ukraine, & Moldova Report
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1545 gmt 25 Oct 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Oct 25, 2006


                              The question “To join, or not to join.”
ICPS Newsletter Bulletin # 338
International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 25, 2006

                              SOVIET-ERA FAMINE A GENOCIDE 
Associated Press, Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, October 25, 2006 

15.                   WE CANNOT LIVE WITHOUT THE TRUTH
         A roundtable on the Holodomor in Ukraine held at Ukrainian House
             “Let us not forget: there is no statute of limitations on crimes
                             against humanity – above all, genocide.”
By Ihor Siundiukov, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English #33
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

                                    AS AN ACT OF GENOCIDE?
COMMENTARY: By Oleksandr Kramarenko
The Day Weekly Digest in English #33
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

           Current Prospects and Challenges, Viewpoints from US & Canada
                 You are invited to attend. Washington, D.C., Mon, Oct 30
Andrew Bihun, Director, Business Development Forum
The Washington Group, Wash, D.C., Wed, Oct 25, 2006

U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF), Washington, D.C., October, 2006

                   2007 CONVENTION IN NYC: CALL FOR PAPERS
                       “NATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE”
               Proposal Deadline Reminder: Thursday, 2 November 2006
Dominique Arel, ASN President
12th Annual World Convention of the Association
for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) in 2007, New York, NY
Harriman Institute, Columbia University, NY, NY, Oct 25, 2006

              US Holocaust Memorial Museum thanks the Security Service
                         of Ukraine for a “stellar level of co-operation.”
Embassy of Ukraine to the USA
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 24, 2006
                “A Ship Must Always Know What Its Destination Harbour Is”

INTERVIEW: With Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine
INTERVIEW BY: Kaija Virta in Kiev
Helsigin Sanomat International Edition Online
Helsinki, Finland, Sunday, October 22, 2006

Ukraine is not asking the European Union for a specific day or year when it
might be accepted into the European Union. However, it would like to have
the light of a guiding star or a lighthouse to help steer its ship of state
in the right direction.

This is how Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko describes his
expectations in advance of his country’s summit with the EU, which will be
held in Helsinki on Friday.

He was interviewed in the Presidential Palace in Kiev by two Finnish
newspapers: Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet.

The EU was a strong supporter of Yushchenko and his so-called Orange
Revolution movement in the fight for an honest Presidential election in late

After the election, the EU has nevertheless refused to open the door to
Ukrainian membership, even though Turkey and the remote Balkan countries
have been allowed to embark on this road.

“A ship must always know what its destination harbour is”, Yushchenko says,
metaphorically. Only then, he feels, can the wind speed, direction, and
other realities be sensibly taken into consideration.

Lighthouses are needed in navigation. “The same holds true for our strivings
for Europe. We would like to see the shine, the light, that shows our
country and our people what the destination is.”

“Please note that we are not asking when”, the President says. “We are only
talking about the aim, the goal, that should stay more or less in place.
Everything else is the responsibility of my people and my country.”

Yushchenko speaks in a pensive, calm, and even voice, even though the day
of the interview is not the calmest possible.

In the morning the President persuaded the reform-minded interior Minister
Yuri Lushenko to stay in the government, even though the Our Ukraine Party,
which is the main supporter of Yushchenko himself, had declared that it
would go into opposition.

At noon he gave moral support to a widow at the funeral of a close
supporter – a Member of Parliament who had died unexpectedly.

In the evening the EU’s Foreign Policy envoy Javier Solana was arriving in
Kiev, apparently to ask for clarification of Ukraine’s foreign policy line,
over which there was some uncertainty.

Yushchenko hardly smiles at all, and his grey eyes are extremely serious.
Nevertheless, the President’s face is much smoother than at the worst times
in 2004 after the shocking case of dioxin poisoning.

People have hardly ever been poisoned in that way before”, he says in a
detached and matter-of-fact manner. “I must be some kind of guinea pig.”

The crime has not yet been tried in court. The President says that the
investigation has taken a long time because the case is so unprecedented.

“The investigations must answer many, many questions if the criminal is to
be apprehended. What kind of a toxic compound was used, who
manufactured the poison, how it got into the system, and the most important
question is, what its effects are, what kinds of signs it has, what kinds of
symptoms it causes, and how soon does it show.”

The President says that international and Ukrainian experts have been
working hard on the case. “I could probably already answer the question of
who was behind the poisoning.”

He says that he knew the answer “already a long time ago”. “I have an idea
of who did it. But it is the task of the public prosecutor to make it

Ukraine’s foreign policy has not been easy to predict this autumn, now that
power is being shared by decision-makers who differ on the matter.

The President and the Foreign and Defence Ministers appointed by him
represent the Western orientation of the orange revolution. Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovich and a large part of the government want to have closer
ties with Russia.

Viktor Yushchenko insists that the EU orientation does not vary according
to political cycles. In his view it corresponds with the Ukrainian way of
life. “Modern Ukraine is a European country. This is undeniable. We do not
need others to specifically recognise this fact.”

The President feels that under the EU’s own treaties, Ukraine has the
undeniable right to apply for membership. “Naturally, we must also speak
about the meeting of certain criteria. This is also required of other
countries, and therefore of Ukraine as well.”

He hopes that Ukraine and the countries in the west of Europe would develop
practical interaction regardless of political discussions. Ukraine has much
to offer in the energy industry, for instance, or in the building of ships
and planes, the President pointed out.

Under the constitution, the President also decides on Ukraine’s policy
toward Russia, under guidelines determined by Parliament, Yushchenko says.

“We understand how important it is to establish good and stable relations
with Russia, but relations must be based on equal partnership, in which
there is mutual respect for national independence.”

 “I am not saying that this kind of policy is easy to carry out, and I do
not say that the history of relations between Ukraine and Russia would have
been simple”, he admits.

However, he is conspicuously eager to demonstrate that Ukraine does not
seek to push the EU and Russia into a conflict with each other.

“We understand completely that it is a big country which has an important
role in both European and global politics. And because we feel that our
relations with the EU are strategically important, we understand that we
should find the right kinds of arrangements and right kind of harmony in our
policy toward Russia.”

In Yushchenko’s view, Ukraine has not made a single move during his
Presidency that would “weaken or destroy” relations with Russia.

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
               “We are not neighbors of Europe, we are part of Europe.”

Paul Ames, Associated Press (AP), Brussels, Belgium, Wed, October 25, 2006

BRUSSELS – The European Union must offer Ukraine the prospect of full
membership and not to exile it from the European mainstream along with
nations in North Africa and the Middle East, the country’s envoy to Brussels
said Wednesday.

“We are not neighbors of Europe, we are part of Europe,” said ambassador
Roman Shpek, head of the Ukrainian mission at the E.U. “For us, it is not
pleasant to be in the same basket as Morocco, Libya or Israel,” he said
ahead of Friday’s E.U.-Ukraine summit.

Shpek also rejected suggestions that a gas deal signed with Russia Tuesday
would give Moscow a say on Ukraine’s aspirations to join the World Trade
Organization in the coming months.

“Next year Ukraine will become a full member of the WTO,” Shpek told
reporters. “Russians they have their own agenda and for us it’s not the
issue to compete with Russia.”

Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko will meet European Union leaders in
Helsinki, Finland, for the annual E.U.-Ukraine summit. The talks are
expected to launch negotiations on a new economic and political cooperation

The Ukrainians hope that will include the prospect of eventual membership.
The E.U. is noncommittal, reflecting growing wariness about expanding the
bloc which admitted 10 new countries in 2004, is about to take in Romania
and Bulgaria and is engaged in negotiations with Croatia and Turkey.

Shpek insisted under the treaty which underpins the Union, the E.U. must
keep its doors open to European nations that share its values of democracy,
human rights and free market economy.

“You cannot change values,” Shpek said. “European politicians should
recognize that Ukraine has the same rights as all European states.”

So far, the E.U. has refused to grant Ukraine a “membership perspective,”
including the former Soviet republic in its “neighborhood policy” along with
Belarus, Israel, the south Caucasus countries and several Arab nations
around the Mediterranean Sea.

Governments from the 25 EU nations are currently mulling a proposal from the
European Commission to open negotiations on a new cooperation agreement to
deepen relations with Ukraine by setting up a free trade zone, strengthening
diplomatic ties and boosting collaboration in areas such as energy, justice,
nuclear safety, and environment protection.                 -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 25, 2006

KYIV – Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko has left on a two-day official
visit to Finland, where he is to take part in a Ukraine-EU summit.

On October 26, Yuschenko is to meet with Finnish President Tarja Halonen,
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and Parliamentary Speaker Paavo Lipponen.

The officials are to discuss economic, investment and energy ties between
Ukraine and Finland, the presidential press service reported.

During his visit, the Ukrainian president will open a business forum
“Ukraine: New Opportunities for Business and Investment,” organized by the
Confederation of Finnish Industry. He will also attend a ceremony to
establish a joint venture Budfarfor-Sanitek and visit the headquarters of
mobile phone giant Nokia.

On October 27, the president is to take part in the Ukraine-EU summit. He
will meet with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and
Secretary General of the EU Council Javier Solana.

The summit will focus on the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan
and plans to sign a new framework agreement. Its participants are also going
to discuss the creation of a free trade zone and ways to complete the
Odesa-Brody-Plock oil pipeline project. They will sign agreements on
readmission and the liberalization of visa requirements.

The president is accompanied by Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk, Deputy
Secretariat Chief of Staff Oleksandr Chaly and National Bank Chairman
Volodymyr Stelmakh.                               -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1124 gmt 25 Oct 06

BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006

KIEV – Kiev expects to endorse the readmission agreement and the
agreement on the simplification of visa procedures [with the European Union]
at the Ukraine-EU summit in Helsinki on 27 October, deputy presidential
secretariat head Oleksandr Chalyy has told journalists at a briefing.

One of Ukraine’s main expectations from the summit is the beginning of
negotiations on a new framework agreement on cooperation between Ukraine

and the European Union, on its structure and content.

Another key issue will be the beginning of negotiations on the creation of a
free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU, Chalyy said.

Ukraine also expects that a new action plan will be signed at the summit in
the field of justice and internal affairs. Passage omitted: background information]

[UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 0917 gmt 25 Oct 06 said that Ukraine
wanted to start talks on associated membership of the EU. The report said
quoting Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy Veselovskyy that Kiev
planned to sign a relevant agreement which would contain preconditions for
Ukraine’s political and economic integration into the EU.]       -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 25, 2006

KYIV – The International Monetary Fund has recommended that the Cabinet

of Ministers cancel the quotas for export of grain. The IMF announced this
in a statement.

“The temporary introduction of a quota for export of grain and the
reappearance of the problem involving timely refund of VAT are negative
signals that need to be reversed in order to persuade investors that the
business climate is being corrected,” the statement said.

The IMF stresses that despite the Cabinet of Ministers’ declared intention
to create a market economy that is open and really works, several of the
steps that have been taken in the past few months do not correspond to the
declared intentions.

The IMF believes that improvement of the investment climate in Ukraine is
one of the main tasks of the government. In this context, the IMF believes
that adoption of non-market decisions in various sectors is inappropriate.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the Cabinet of Ministers recently
introduced a mechanism for setting quotas for export of grain. The

mechanism came into effect on October 17.

The total export quotas for 2006 are 400,000 tons for wheat and
wheat-and-rye mixture, 600,000 tons for barley, and 600,000 tons for

corn, and 3,000 tons for rye.

Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych has said that the Cabinet of Ministers
intends to cancel the restrictions on export of grain after completing grain
purchases into government and regional government reserves.

The Cabinet of Ministers introduced licenses for export of wheat and
wheat-and-rye mixtures in September until the end of 2006.

Grain-market experts have said that grain prices are falling on the domestic
market due to the introduction restrictions on grain exports.     -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Wed, October 25, 2006
KIEV – Ukraine’s government is unlikely to abolish grain export limits
introduced last week to protect local millers and feed and meat producers
from a possible shortage, analysts said on Monday.

Ukraine, having cut 7 percent from its 2006 crop forecast, will allow only
1.6 million tonnes of grain to be exported from mid-October to year-end.

The government said it could also boost control over exports and help to
keep bread prices stable.

“The export restrictions are profitable for all parties – except traders,”
UkrAgroConsult agriculture consultancy said. [Restrictions are also not

profitable for thousands of grain producers who badly need more income. 
Agricultural producers should not have to subsidize bread prices for sure.
If the government wants to subsidize bread prices they should do this out
of the budget not the pockets of farmers. AUR EDITOR]

The consultancy said traders’ appeals for unlimited sales would probably be
rejected and that the new trade regime might be enforced until the end of
the 2006/07 season and even beyond.

Several years ago, Ukraine introduced a 17 percent export duty on sunflower
seed. The limit is still in force, despite protests from traders and foreign
trade organisations. “It could be the same situation as with the sunseed
export ban,” UkrAgroConsult said.

Ukraine is likely to harvest about 34.7 million tonnes of grain in 2006 and
the government has said it would do its best to limit exports to about 9.0
million tonnes in the 2006/07 season, ending June 2007.

Ukraine exported about 13.5 million tonnes of grain in 2005/06. Traders and
analysts said the country exported about 4.0 million tonnes of grain in
July-September, while the government sees sales at about 5.5 million tonnes
so far this season.                            -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Interfax-Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 26, 2007

KYIV – Ukrainian presidential secretariat deputy head Oleksandr Chaly has
branded as illogical the suggestion that Ukraine’s accession to the World
Trade Organization should be synchronized with that of Russia.

“There is no logic today in raising the question of synchronizing our
joining the WTO [with] Russia. The position of the Ukrainian president is
clear on that,” Chaly said at a briefing in Kyiv on Wednesday.

During a meeting between Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko and Russian
Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov on Tuesday, Russia raised the issue of
possible negative consequences of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO ahead of
Russia in terms of re-export of products from third countries.

Chaly said Yuschenko was trying to convince Fradkov that there are enough
modern trade and economic policy mechanisms and tools to avoid this. “If
Ukraine joins the WTO earlier, this accession will not pose any danger to
the Russian Federation,” Yuschenko said.

The Ukrainian president and the Russian premier agreed to continue working
to alleviate Russia’s concerns on this score, Chaly said. “This dialogue was
positive,” he said.

Chaly recalled that President Yuschenko deems it strategically important to
complete all internal and external procedures within the next two months to
secure Ukraine’s WTO entry.

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
     NOTE: Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
      Will PM Yanukovych move swiftly or will his foot-dragging continue?

COUNTRY BRIEFING: EIU Economy – News Analysis
The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited
New York, New York, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

Ukraine is facing pressure from Russia to synchronise the two countries’
accession to the WTO-a move that would slow or stall Ukraine’s entry

and the start of a free-trade deal with the EU.

On balance, despite his pro-Russian leanings, Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych is unlikely to agree, for it is scarcely in his interests to do

Still, there is considerable doubt over whether Ukraine will now move
swiftly to join the WTO or whether Mr Yanukovych’s foot-dragging will

In the wake of signing an agreement on October 24th on the price Ukraine
will pay for imported gas in 2007, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov
urged Ukraine to hold talks with Russia over its accession to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) and even to synchronise the two countries’ entry.

In practice this would amount to Ukraine slowing down its WTO entry, as

the country has an opportunity to wrap up this process by December.

Russia is a few steps behind Ukraine and while it could complete
negotiations and preparations in late 2006 or at some point in 2007-as the
Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts-there is a risk that the process could
be extended, or that Russia’s government could halt the process because it
doesn’t like the terms on offer.
                              RUSSIAN FRADKOV’S GAME
There are three main elements to Mr Fradkov’s proposal.

[1] First, there is a matter of prestige: Russia would prefer to “lead”
Ukraine (and Kazakhstan) into the WTO, rather than to follow its fellow
former Soviet states into the organisation.

[2] Second, Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the WTO would be followed
by the start of EU-Ukrainian talks on a free-trade agreement (FTA); this
would strengthen Ukraine’s Western ties and so run counter to Russia’s
foreign policy goals.
[3] Third, there is a threat to Russia’s leverage over Ukraine.

If Ukraine entered the WTO first, it could conceivably seek to influence the
terms of Russia’s entry. At present Russia has considerable leverage over
Ukraine, primarily because the latter depends on imports for around 75% of
its gas consumption and the pipelines delivering this gas are under Russian

(Russia’s leverage is not absolute, however, as it depends on Ukrainian
pipelines to deliver 80% of its gas exports to Europe.)

If Ukraine were in a position to influence the terms of Russia’s WTO entry,
its leverage vis-à-vis Russia would improve. In an attempt to avoid this,
Russia seems to have persuaded WTO member the Kyrgyz Republic to

withhold its approval for Ukrainian accession to the WTO.
                                  SAYING “NO” NICELY
Mr Yanukovych is often described as pro-Russian, but this is only partly
correct. He enjoyed Russian support during Ukraine’s 2004 presidential
election and is certainly more favourably inclined towards Russia than the
election’s eventual winner, Viktor Yushchenko.

At the same time, under the rule of Eastern Ukrainian politicians such as Mr
Yanukovych, prior to 2005 Russian business was largely shut out of Ukraine.
So it does not follow that Mr Yanukovych, although he is from
Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine, will grant Mr Fradkov’s wish.

Indeed, synchronisation of accession with the WTO has major drawbacks for

Mr Yanukovych. Domestically it would drive a huge wedge between his party,
Regions of Ukraine, and President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine.

Accelerated WTO accession was a key element of the common agenda that

Messrs Yushchenko and Yanukovych agreed before the former named the
latter as prime minister.

For the president, swift WTO accession is vital because it increases Ukraine’s
international economic integration and paves the way for the start of talks
in February 2007 on an FTA with the EU.

Although Mr Yanukovych wields considerable power as a result of
constitutional changes that took effect at the start of 2006, he still has a
strong interest in good relations with Mr Yushchenko and Our Ukraine.

Synchronisation with Russia would also work against the interests of Ukraine’s
steel oligarchs, most of whom are Mr Yanukovych’s allies, as WTO accession
would increase export opportunities for Ukrainian steel.

For these reasons, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect Mr
Yanukovych to agree to synchronise WTO accession with Russia. The main
threat to this forecast is the question of gas prices.

At the start of 2006 Ukraine’s government agreed to buy Central Asian gas
from RosUkrEnergo-a venture owned jointly by Ukrainian businessmen and
Russian gas monopoly Gazprom-at a price of US$95 per 1,000 cubic metres,
which was nearly double the previous price.

However, this is still far below the “market price” prevailing in Western
Europe, which has been around US$240 per 1,000 cu metres for much of 2006,
and Russia has indicated its intention to push gas prices for all CIS states
towards European levels.

At their October 24th meeting, Messrs Fradkov and Yanukovych agreed that
Ukraine would pay US$135 per 1,000 cu metres for gas in 2007.

The Ukrainian government is confident that, at this price, industry will
continue to prosper. However, the authorities were hoping to fix the gas
price for several years rather than just 2007.

If Russia explicitly links future gas pricing to the issue of WTO accession,
it is possible that Mr Yanukovych might be swayed in favour of Mr Fradkov’s
Although Mr Yanukovych is unlikely to accede to the Russian request, it does
not follow that Ukraine will now move rapidly to gain entry to the WTO.

The prime minister has called for a thorough analysis of the impact of WTO
membership on Ukrainian industry and has hinted that some manufacturers

will be adversely affected by it.

For this reason, he has slowed down accession preparations and has raised
the prospect of further negotiations by requesting extended transition
periods with some WTO states.

On Mr Yushchenko’s initiative, the final 20 bills needed to meet the WTO’s
requirements were sent to parliament in October. However the prime minister
and Oleksandr Moroz, the parliamentary speaker, have dragged their feet on
passing the necessary legislation.

Mr Yanukovych has done this partly to protect Ukrainian business and
financial interests-although other business interests have been harmed by
this action-and partly in order to placate Russia ahead of the gas-price

The question now is whether, with the gas price agreed for 2007, Mr
Yanukovych will push ahead with WTO accession.

Mr Yanukovych’s public stance on the WTO question gives little reason for
optimism-but continued delay could threaten his relationship with Mr
Yushchenko, and thus his ability to govern, and will do little to endear him
to the owners of the steel sector that form the backbone of Ukraine’s
economy.                                             -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1728 gmt 25 Oct 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006

KIEV – .Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko believes that gas
price and gas issues can in no way be linked to geopolitical issues like,
for instance, accession to NATO or the World Trade Organization

Yushchenko said this at a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Andriy

Klyuyev, Energy and Fuel Minister Yuriy Boyko and the management of
the state joint-stock company Naftohaz Ukrayiny, the presidential press
service reported on Wednesday [25 October].

At the meeting they discussed the signing of gas contracts by Ukraine for

The Ukrainian president thinks it is important to sign a bilateral
intergovernmental protocol between Ukraine and Russia as stipulated by a
relevant interstate agreement.

During the meeting, Yushchenko raised the issue of the role of the [Russian]
Gazprom open joint-stock company in gas supplies, of what gas will be
supplied to Ukraine in 2007, as well as of how the transit payment for
Gazprom will be calculated.

The president pointed to the importance of establishing a gas transport
consortium, but he believes that this consortium should be set up on solely
transparent terms with the involvement of the European Union, Ukraine and

Yushchenko also noted the importance of discussing energy supplies and

rates for both supplied energy and transit services in the CIS and the Single
Economic Space [a common market agreement involving Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus].

The meeting took place at Boryspil airport on Wednesday before the
president’s departure on an official visit to Finland where a Ukraine-EU
summit is to be held.                                -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]


By Tony Halpin in Moscow, The Times Online
London, United Kingdom, Wednesday, Oct 25, 2006

UKRAINE yesterday avoided a repeat of last winter’s gas crisis by agreeing
a new deal with Russia to secure fuel at heavily discounted prices.

But the agreement to supply Ukraine with gas at no more than $130 (£70) per
1,000 cubic metres appeared to come with strings attached that would
strengthen Moscow’s influence over its former Soviet satellite.

Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych announced the deal after meeting his
Russian counterpart Mikhail Fradkov in Kyiv. He said that Ukraine would
receive at least 55 billion cubic metres of gas from Central Asia in 2007.

Mr Yanukovych was Moscow’s favoured candidate in the disputed presidential
election of 2004 that brought his rival Viktor Yushchenko to power in
Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. He has sought to rebuild relations with the
Kremlin since Mr Yushchenko appointed him Prime Minister in August.

The gas agreement was seen as a victory for Mr Yanukovych’s efforts, but it
appeared to have given Russia a voice in Ukraine’s drive to join the World
Trade Organisation and Nato.

Mr Fradkov said that the two neighbours should consult each other over their
entry into the trade body. He said: “I would say quite openly that we need
to synchronise the negotiation process of our countries on WTO.”

Ukraine still faces a sharp increase in energy costs this winter, since it
currently pays $95 per 1,000 cubic metres of gas. However, it had feared
that Moscow would insist on the price of $230 that the Russian energy giant
Gazprom had sought at the height of the “gas war” last January.

Mr Yanukovych said that gas supplies had been overly politicised and that
both sides were keen to move the issue into the commercial arena. He said
that Ukraine would guarantee gas import volumes and reliable transit “so
that European partners do not feel any discomfort”.

Russia stunned European Union countries earlier this year when it turned off
the supply tap to Ukraine in a bitter stand-off over gas pricing. Eighty per
cent of Russian gas supplies to Europe pass through Ukrainian pipelines and
the dispute exposed the EU’s vulnerability to economic pressure from Moscow.

The demand for a doubling of gas prices to Ukraine was seen as the Kremlin’s
revenge for Mr Yushchenko’s attempts to move his country closer to Europe
and out of Russia’s embrace.

Mr Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party accused Mr Fradkov of seeking to put
“pressure on Ukraine aimed at influencing its foreign policy”. But Mr
Yanukovych said that there was no alternative to close cooperation between
Moscow and Kiev.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the leading opposition politician, accused the Government
of “treason” in signing the deal with Russia and said that Ukraine was
losing its independence.
November 30, 2005: Russia declares that it wants to impose a sharp increase
in the price of gas it sells to Ukraine, starting from January

December 15: The showdown escalates as Gazprom, Russia’s state gas
monopoly, demands that the former Soviet republic agrees to a fourfold
rise in prices

December 31: The European Union calls an emergency meeting of energy
officials amid fears that its gas supplies could be disrupted by the dispute
between Russia and Ukraine. The meeting comes as Gazprom turns down
Ukraine’s offer to continue talks and repeats its threat to cut off the
country’s supplies

January 2, 2006: Russia cuts supplies to Ukraine, triggering fears of an
energy shortage across Europe. Britain’s Energy Minister warns that the
Kremlin’s decision to disconnect its former Soviet bloc ally could hit
prices here. The United States says it regrets Russia’s decision. Gazprom
accuses Ukraine of retaliating by stealing Russian gas destined for the EU.
(A quarter of all EU gas is piped from Russia via Ukraine)

January 3: Russia begins restoring gas flows to Europe after a suspension of
deliveries to Ukraine devastates supplies across the Continent. Gazprom
pledges to pump more gas through Ukraine to make up for shortfalls in
Germany, France, Italy, Austria and at least seven central and eastern
European countries

January 5: Russia declares a truce in the gas war with a complex, five-year
deal with Ukraine. However fears remain that it may prove to be only a
temporary solution.                                   -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]


INTERVIEW: With Steven Pifer, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
INTERVIEW BY: Jan Maksymiuk, Belarus, Ukraine, & Moldova Report
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

PRAGUE – Steven Pifer served from January 1998 to October 2000 as
the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.

On the sidelines of the Prague Energy Forum, organized by Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty in partnership with the Warsaw-based Institute for
Eastern Studies, Pifer spoke to RFE/RL’s Jan Maksymiuk about the
aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s gas price rise, and the state
of the proposed Russia-Belarus union.

RFE/RL: How do you assess the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004
from the perspective of the nearly two years that have since passed?

Are there any practical results of the revolution for ordinary Ukrainians
today? Are you disappointed with the turn of political events in the country
following this year’s parliamentary elections?

Steven Pifer: Well, I think the turn in political events in Ukraine has
probably surprised many — the fact that [Prime Minister Viktor]
Yanukovych has returned. But he returned basically as a result of a free
and fair democratic process.

So, that’s hard to argue with. In the longer term, though, if you look at
the Orange Revolution, the impact is going to be seen in things such as a
media that I think today is stronger, feels more independent, and is
prepared to challenge the government, and a stronger
nongovernmental-organization sector.

You will have, I believe, a strong and vocal opposition in [former Prime
Minister and opposition leader Yuliya] Tymoshenko as an opposition
leader, unlike the kind that Ukraine has had in the past. So I think there
are different manifestations now that are good for Ukrainian democracy.

And, again, with regards to Mr. Yanukovych’s return, his party won in March
in a free and fair election; hopefully now it doesn’t bring some of the
baggage back from the [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kuchma years.
But I think there will be a lot of people watching very carefully on this.

RFE/RL: The coming of President Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2004
became possible through the introduction of a constitutional reform that
limited presidential powers in favor of the prime minister and parliament.

Ukraine has moved from a presidential republic, which is characteristic of
most post-Soviet states, to a parliamentary-presidential system, which is
more typical of European democracies.

But this shift has triggered a bitter confrontation between Yushchenko and
Yanukovych over who should be the real ruler of the country. Don’t you
think that Ukrainians are not yet ready to break with their political
thinking in terms of the authoritarian power system established by Kuchma?

Pifer: I’d say, [1] first of all, that this change, the fact that Ukraine
has moved from a supra-presidency model to a parliamentary-presidential
model, is probably a good thing. Certainly one of the problems of the
Kuchma era was that you had too much authority in the president, with no
real checks and balances.

So now you have more serious checks and balances, first of all between the
Ukrainian executive branch and the legislative branch, and also between the
president and the prime minister.

Ukrainian large industry already understands that the price of energy is
going up, probably eventually to world market prices. And therefore, large
businesses are making decisions now in investing in energy-efficient
technologies, decisions that they didn’t make four or five years ago because
gas was so cheap and there was no economic reason.

[2] Second, I would point out, if you look at the countries in Central
Europe and the Baltic states that have successfully made the transition
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, after the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact, those countries that joined NATO and the European Union in 1999 and
2004, they all had the parliamentary-presidential model. This has been a
successful model in Central Europe.

Now, the problem that we’ve seen, and we saw it for example in the debate in
September, over whether Ukraine would seek a NATO membership action
plan, was that although there are new constitutional arrangements now in
effect, there’s some ambiguity, there’s not total clarity on issues such as
the NATO membership action plan.

Or on other questions, there may no precise guide as to what happens when
the president and the prime minister are in disagreement. I’m not sure that
this is something that can be fixed easily or quickly by looking at the
Ukrainian Constitution.

In the end, it may be very important that the two Viktors — President
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych — are going to have to come to
terms together if they want to produce coherent policy that moves Ukraine
forward. And that’s going to be a challenge for both of them. But it’ll be
important for Ukraine that they meet that challenge.
RFE/RL: Today Kyiv and Moscow are expected to sign a deal on gas supplies
for 2007. What is your prediction regarding the price Ukraine will have to
pay for imported gas next year? And what impact may this new price have on
Ukraine’s economy?

Pifer: Based on what I’ve seen, the expectation is that in 2007, Ukraine
will have to pay something on the order of $100-$135 per 1,000 cubic meters
of gas, which is an increase from the $95 per 1,000 cubic meters that
Ukraine has paid for imported gas in 2006.

What struck me when I was in Kyiv in September was when I talked to various
people, both in the government and also in industry, nobody seemed to see
that this would be a huge problem.

They seemed to understand that the price was going up, and they seemed to
believe that this would not be a huge blow to the Ukrainian economy.

And what I heard from multiple sources was that in fact, Ukrainian large
industry already understands that the price of energy is going up, probably
eventually to world market prices.

And therefore, large businesses are making decisions now in investing in
energy-efficient technologies, decisions that they didn’t make four or five
years ago because gas was so cheap and there was no economic reason.
So they’re making decisions now.

And several people said that if Ukraine has two or three years to make this
transition, they should be able to accommodate this, introducing new
energy-efficient technologies, and be able to absorb the price increases.

Now certainly it won’t be without some pain, but I was surprised in
September that most people talked about it as if Ukraine could manage it in
a way that people weren’t talking about managing energy price increases say
eight or 10 months ago.

RFE/RL: Yanukovych has said that Ukraine should be prepared for an even
more painful gas price hike beyond 2007. And Yushchenko has recently
signaled that Ukraine should return to talks on forming an international
consortium, with the participation of Russia, to run his country’s gas
transit pipelines.

Do you think Ukraine can ensure its energy security without giving control
over its gas transit infrastructure to Russia?

Pifer: There are two different questions here. [1] The first question is,
Ukraine ultimately needs to be prepared that it’s going to have pay world
market prices for energy.

I think it’s also fair for Ukraine to expect that there’ll be a certain
transition period, just as for example Russia, when it negotiated its WTO
bilateral agreement with the European Union, negotiated with the EU a
five-year transition in terms of raising domestic prices for energy within

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov arriving in Kyiv today for energy
talks (Ukrinform)But it makes sense both from an economic point of view,
but also from the point of view of energy security, that Ukraine plan that
it’s going to ultimately have to pay world market prices, and therefore
begin adapting toward that.

Because once Ukraine is paying global prices, it reduces the amount of
political leverage that Russia may have over Ukraine. If Ukraine’s getting a
special deal, there will be that temptation for the Russians to exploit that

[2] The second question on the international consortium — this is something
that five or six years ago, when I was still in the American government, we
were very interested in, because we saw an international consortium to
manage the pipeline as a way to promote win-win solutions, both for Ukraine
and for the producers and shippers in Russia, but also for the consumers.

I think the consortium idea still has some merit. But it’s going to be very
important that Ukraine look at the exact terms of what the consortium looks

The concern here is that when designing the consortium with Russia involved,
and they usually also talk about a consumer, maybe [German gas company]
Ruhrgas or somebody on the consumer side being involved.

Ukraine has to bear in mind that there always may be a convergence of
interests between the producer and the shipper in Russia, and the consumer
in Western Europe. And that convergence of interests is, of course, that the
shipper and the consumer want to minimize the transit costs.

So there is that alliance of interests which could work against Ukraine. So
Ukraine has to make sure that the consortium is designed in such a way that
its interests do not get short-changed.
                            THE RUSSIA-BELARUS UNION
RFE/RL: Belarus is a country that pays for Russian gas deliveries not so
much with money as with political loyalty.

In your opinion, for how long may Belarus expect to receive gas from Russia
at such a discount as now, when it pays just $47 per 1,000 cubic meters of
gas? Will Russia increase its gas price to Belarus next year? If so, by how

Pifer: I’m a little bit less familiar with the gas and energy scene in
Belarus than in Ukraine, but I think it would be awfully optimistic for
Belarusians to continue to expect to enjoy that kind of deal. If you look
around, Ukraine will be paying $130, and in the Baltics it’s already $120
and it’s likely to go up.

Forty-seven dollars seems to be fairly much of a gift. And indeed, Gazprom
has already been making noises that they would like to raise the prices of
energy, because Gazprom also is a partially commercial entity, at least.

There’s a mixture there because it’s state owned, but Gazprom is also
looking to maximize its revenues, and it’s hard to see how Gazprom can
afford to continue to provide energy at that low price to Belarus. So I
think Belarus would be wise to begin thinking about what happens when the
prices of energy go up there.

RFE/RL: Some Russian and Belarusian analysts believe that Moscow has no
clear vision of what to do with Belarus.

Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to Belarusian President Alyaksandr
Lukashenka three integration scenarios in 2002: (a) political absorption of
Belarus by Russia; (b) integration similar to that between the EU countries;
(c) putting into operation the 1999 union state treaty that has so far
remained mostly on paper.

Lukashenka rejected the first two options, stressing the equality of both
sides in a common state. What is your opinion about the future shape of the
Belarus-Russia Union? Could it be a viable political formation?

Pifer: That ultimately is going to depend upon Russia and Belarus. What has
struck me is that although the two countries have talked about a political
union since the mid-1990s, you really haven’t seen much in the way of real

Part of my assumption has always been that while the Russians talk about a
political union with Belarus, they didn’t want to make the practical steps,
because actually bringing Belarus into a union with Russia would probably
impose some significant economic costs, not only in terms of the energy
subsidies that Russia is already providing, but also other types of
subsidies to make that work.

It seems to me that up until now, Russia has been unwilling to make that
economic investment to make a political union. I also found it interesting
that when President Putin posed those two alternatives, either absorption or
an EU-type arrangement, it was almost designed as if he was trying to give
Mr. Lukashenka two alternatives that were very unpalatable.

It seems to me that while there may be talk about this political union, I
haven’t really seen much evidence that either side is moving to make that a
reality, which suggests that both sides may be comfortable with talking
about a union, but neither is really prepared to make the investment in the
costs, or the sorts of real changes that would be necessary to make that
happen. Both may be in fact comfortable with the current situation. -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

 If you are receiving more than one copy of the AUR please contact us.

ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1545 gmt 25 Oct 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Oct 25, 2006

KIEV – [Presenter] It has become dangerous to smile during the cabinet
meetings. [Ukrainian Foreign Minister] Borys Tarasyuk paid for this today.
He allowed such a frivolity during [Prime Minister Viktor] Yanukovych’s
opening remarks.

Later, Tarasyuk said that he smiled as he was wishing happy birthday to
Defence Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko. At that moment, Prime Minister

Viktor Yanukovych was repeatedly asking the cabinet ministers to visit the
Ukrainian regions in order to resolve all issues related to the heating
season. He could not understand why the minister was smiling.

[Yanukovych] Tarasyuk, your sense of humour – [changes tack]. I will later
tell you what kind of sense of humour it is going to be. You’d better listen
when I am speaking. If I were you, I would not smile.       -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
             Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
                              The question “To join, or not to join.”

ICPS Newsletter Bulletin # 338
International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, October 25, 2006

KYIV – The question “To join, or not to join” has overshadowed the entire
debate on integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The vast majority of supporters and opponents of NATO membership alike
have strong views on this issue, often formed on the basis of political,
foreign policy preferences or persistent stereotypes.

Instead of agreeing a list of national security issues and looking for
solutions based on this list, both camps seem to often work backwards from
set views, and formulating problems to matched pre-determined solutions.

The International Centre for Policy Studies believes that in order to get
beyond this current impasse, two key things are needed:
[1] rational, unbiased analysis and [2] open, constructive dialog.

For this purpose, ICPS organized and held an international conference called
“Intensified Ukraine-NATO Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits of
Accession to the Membership Action Plan,” with the financial support of the
NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv and the Embassy of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Ukraine
The main theme of the conference was a phrase formulated by ICPS
specialists: “Clarifying the present and deciding the future.”

As a matter of fact, experts and some politicians and Government officials
are working already to clarify what is going on in the relations between
Ukraine and the Alliance.

The rest and the overwhelming part of Ukrainian voters do not have enough
information and only pick up on messages in the media that are frequently
politically biased or incomplete.

This is all happening at a time when Ukraine’s accession to NATO and joining
the European Union have been declared the main strategic goals of Ukraine’s
foreign policy.

ICPS specialists say Ukrainian society needs rational, unbiased analysis and
open, constructive dialog. This cannot establish 100% consensus among the
country’s politicians or the general public about the single right decision.

What it can do, however, is to build consensus about the criteria according
to which such decisions should be made and to ensure that both voters and
policy-makers are able to make well-informed decisions.
                                   ACCESSION TO NATO
For much of 2006, Ukraine’s Government was preparing for the next stage in
Ukraine’s integration into NATO-accession to the Membership Action Plan

The very title of this document made it the focus of political controversy.
As a result, the new Government refused to implement the Plan, referring to
weak support for NATO membership among Ukrainian voters.

The Premier did not bother to mention the fact that, although the MAP is a
preliminary stage to NATO membership, it does not automatically lead to
membership and that only after implementing the MAP will the country be
able to make a decision to join or not join the Alliance.

ICPS specialists say that Ukraine needs the MAP primarily as the country’s
internal roadmap to political, economic and social reforms, internal
security, reinforcement of democratic institutions, protection of human
rights, and reform of the judiciary, the military and internal security. The
MAP does not provide for mandatory accession to NATO upon

Yet, the MAP is NATO’s program for providing consultations, assistance

and practical support in implementing what are often costly internal

Speaking at this conference, ICPS Director Viktor Chumak said that NATO’s
Membership Action Plan could play an important role for the Ukrainian
Government in both stimulating change and keeping it on track and making the
country’s reforms systematic.
According to Serhiy Dzherdzh, president of Demokratychna Diya [Democratic
Action], an All-Ukrainian community organization, the assurance that a
public awareness campaign will succeed is its actual implementation.

Although UAH 5mn were allocated in the 2006 State Budget to carry out such
a campaign regarding NATO, there has been practically no effect.

A clear example of what can happen in an information vacuum was the events
in June around to the Sea Breeze 2006 military exercises. An ambiguous
situation over the fact that permission to actually conduct military
exercises in Ukraine had not yet been passed by the VR became the excuse
for a large-scale public campaign against NATO.

Although NATO has no direct relationship to these exercises and at that
point, Ukraine was acting in accordance with existing legislation, the
Yekhanurov Government had failed to explain its position effectively to
voters so that the public would properly know what was going on.

These protests showed just how totally ineffective Ukraine’s Governments
have been in promoting the idea of NATO among Ukrainians.

At the root of the NATO information campaign fiasco are both political
factors- on the eve of the Verkhovna Rada elections, the Government was
afraid to explain unpopular decisions-and institutional ones-the lack of a
working system in the Government to inform voters about its decisions.

In addition, the old Government program for informing voters is hardly
suitable for implementation in an environment where the media are free and
privately owned.

The most important thing is that responsibility for carrying out a public
awareness campaign is not clearly defined. Meanwhile, the main lesson of
democracy is that any political decision must be public, while the
appropriate minister carries personal responsibility.

The Ukrainian Government must understand one thing: NATO should not
and will not take responsibility for informing Ukrainian voters about
relations between Kyiv and Brussels.

It is the task of Ukraine’s own politicians to explain and to deliver their
intentions to Ukrainian citizens. Speaking at this conference, NATO
Headquarters Press Officer Robert Pszczel emphasized that a country
interested in joining the Alliance must focus as much as possible on
domestic public opinion.

                            CAMPAIGN THAT WORKS
EURISC Project Director Dr. Septimiu Caceu and LATO Secretary General
Murnieks Martins shared their experience in running public awareness
campaigns in Romania and Latvia. Romania set up a special center was set
up responsible for informing the public about NATO.

In addition to holding special seminars and conferences, this center also
organized workshops for young people. Among the factors that led to the
success of the public awareness campaign in Latvia were Government
financing and the active involvement of NGOs.

According to ICPS experts, there are two problems in Ukraine.

[1] Firstly, very little baseline data is available about the level of
knowledge about and attitudes towards the Alliance among different groups
of voters. This makes it difficult to plan opinion surveys effectively or to
measure possible changes after public awareness campaigns.

[2] Secondly, if a public awareness campaign is perceived as overtly
pro-NATO, it is unlikely to have the desired effect.

In Ukraine, a standard public awareness campaign may be insufficient. In
addition to informing the public, there needs to be a national debate on
security and defense issues in Ukraine.

Politicians and voters who have different attitudes towards NATO not only
need to hear objective information about problems and threats in this area,
but also to participate in a dialog on how to handle these problems, with
membership in NATO presented as one of several options.

At this conference, experts concluded that the success of any public
awareness campaign in Ukraine would depend on the application of new

As Government arguments do little to raise confidence among voters, policy
centers need to be involved in this public awareness campaign. As a rule,
such experts provide relatively unbiased, objective information, so their
opinions are more likely to be heard.

The international conference called “Intensified Ukraine-NATO Cooperation:
Challenges and Benefits of Accession to the Membership Action Plan” was
held as part of the “Public Campaign to Increase Public Awareness of
Government Defense and Security Policy” project.

This project is being implemented by the International Centre for Policy
Studies (ICPS) with financial support from the MATRA KAP Program, the
NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, and the Royal
Embassy of the Netherlands to Ukraine.

For additional information, contact ICPS Director Viktor Chumak
via e-mail at
Andriy Starynsky, Client Relations Manager, International Centre for
Policy Studies; 13-a Pymonenka Street Kyiv 04050, Ukraine
E-mail:; Web-site:
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
                       SOVIET-ERA FAMINE A GENOCIDE 

Associated Press, Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, October 25, 2006 

MOSCOW – Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday bristled at Ukrainian
officials’ push for declaring a Soviet-era famine that killed up to 10
million people as genocide, saying it was part of Communist repressions

that also affected other ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union.

Up to 10 million Ukrainians died in the 1932-33 Great Famine, which was
provoked by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin as part of his campaign to force
peasants to join collective farms. Ukrainian officials have called for an
official recognition of the famine as genocide.

The Russian Foreign Ministry on Wednesday criticized Ukrainian authorities
for what it called a “unilateral interpretation” of the famine. “It was
wrong to apply the notion exclusively to Ukraine, because it deals with a
sad page in our common history,” the ministry said in a statement.

Countries including the U.S., Canada, Austria, Hungary and Lithuania have
recognized the famine as genocide, but the issue remains highly charged in
Ukraine, since declaring the famine as genocide would amount to an
indictment of Soviet policies – something that Communists, Socialists and
many pro-Russian politicians are loathe to do.           -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
         A roundtable on the Holodomor in Ukraine held at Ukrainian House
              “Let us not forget: there is no statute of limitations on crimes
                                against humanity – above all, genocide.”

By Ihor Siundiukov, The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English #33
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

When a person dies, the whole world dies with him. When an entire nation
is annihilated deliberately, systematically, with infernal cruelty, what
tempestuous scream of the soul will be commensurate with such a tragedy?

There may be no appropriate words for this in the Ukrainian language – or
any language for that matter. Even the words “doomsday,” “apocalypse,”
and “Last Judgment” sound feeble.

There are people in the world that know what genocide is. Humanity will
never forget the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews or the mass annihilation of the
Armenians by the Ottoman authorities in 1915.

Ukrainians, who experienced a planetary-scale catastrophe, which the
Holodomor of 1932-1933 was, also have the indisputable right to declare
that our nation has gone through genocide.

Understanding this manifest fact is an absolute imperative for us, who are
living in 2006. For we cannot live without the truth about the past, no
matter how horrific it was – nor can we live without the truth about the
Holodomor. Only then we will comprehend what a (post-genocidal) society
we are.

The main purpose of the roundtable, held at Ukrainian House under the
patronage of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine and with the
assistance of the Institute of National Memory, was not just to organize a
public discussion of President Yushchenko’s initiative concerning the
political and legal assessment of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine.

The president has already submitted a corresponding draft law that will
recognize this terrible catastrophe as an act of genocide against the
Ukrainian nation. It was also a search for consensus on the main question:
how to prevent the repetition of anything similar in the future.

Before the discussion began, the participants watched the documentary
film Holodomor: Ukraine (The Technology of Genocide).

This film is only 10 minutes of restrained, severe narration, a sorrowful
seething memory, but these 10 minutes are truly shocking. The directors
of the film recount the famine terror only in one Ukrainian village –
Kapustyntsi, in Kyiv oblast.

In the village stands an obelisk in honor of the heroic natives of
Kapustyntsi who perished in the Second World War. Over a period of
four years 170 such obelisks were erected (all named individually).

During a five-month period, from November 1932 to April 1933, the Great
Holodomor claimed the lives of 1,124 people in this village alone.

Elderly people who still remember the Holodomor unhesitatingly answer the
question: what was more terrible, the famine or the war? – The famine. The
same answer is even given by an elderly woman who was in Auschwitz.

Opening the roundtable, the first deputy head of the Presidential
Secretariat, Ivan Vasiunyk, declared that in view of the 75th anniversary of
the Holodomor in 2008 the Ukrainian government wants to repay the debt
to its people and finally give a proper state-level political and legal
assessment of the events of 1932-1933 in Ukraine.

The parliaments of 10 countries (Australia, Estonia, Italy, Canada,
Lithuania, Georgia, Poland, the US, Hungary, and Argentina) have officially
recognized the Ukrainian Holodomor as our nation’s genocide.

But the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has not done this yet, even though more
than half of all Ukrainians polled by sociologists would definitely support
such an action.

The goal of the roundtable, Vasiunyk underlined, is not the struggle against
the shadows of the past, but the most drastic separation from the practices
of totalitarianism, Stalin’s regime, which annihilated up to one-quarter of
Ukraine’s population in the 1930s.

The specialists’ discussion at the roundtable, President Yushchenko hopes,
will help the Verkhovna Rada finally to carry out its duty to the Ukrainian
people and facilitate its recognition of the fact of the totalitarian

According to the assessment of academic Ihor Yukhnovsky, the director of
the Institute of National Memory, the Holodomor was the logical completion
of a certain chain of events dating to 1918, not a sudden, instantaneous

This was the opinion of all the scholars, who later presented papers: the
historians Vasyl Marochko, Ruslan Pyrih, Vladyslav Verstiuk, and Valentyna

Dr. Marochko quoted a key statement of the well-known United Nations
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
December 1948, according to which genocide is “acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious

This speaker underlined that the key thing is concrete actions, not intent;
nevertheless there was undoubtedly intent – it is enough to mention Stalin’s
rabid “class struggle” against “the kurkul” (a Ukrainian peasant in fact),
“the blacklists” of “unreliable” villages (which in reality meant isolation
and the total annihilation of the majority of the population), detachments
that hemmed in the peasants, etc.

Thus, all the features of genocide are present; the question is only the
political will of the Verkhovna Rada. [See Footnote from the AUR
Editor on this subject after the next article.]

In his brief speech Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasiuk
mentioned his recent journey to Poltava and his polemics with a convinced
communist, who stated the following: “Why are you, the government, duping
the people – all the way to the UN – with your Holodomor and genocide?”

Borys Tarasiuk asked rhetorically whether one can imagine a Jew or an
Armenian having such an attitude to his own nation’s catastrophe.

The foreign minister reminded his listeners about the 2003 Joint Declaration
of the General Assembly of the UN, supported by 63 countries, concerning
the Holodomor in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, as a result of harsh resistance from the Russian Federation
and a number of other countries, the word “genocide” does not appear in
this document.

In April 2006 Russia opposed a discussion of this question during a meeting
of the foreign ministers of the CIS states. Thus, exceptionally difficult
but absolutely crucial work is ahead.

The roundtable’s participants emphasized that there is a huge body of
documents that indisputably prove both the fact of the genocide and its
organized character (documents of the Moscow and Ukrainian republican
party bosses, secret directives of the OGPU and the People’s Commissariat
of Internal Affairs, population census data for 1926 and 1937, diaries of
eyewitnesses of these events, their oral testimonies).

But, as the historian Ruslan Pyrih remarked, none of these documents taken
individually or altogether give exact figures of the number of victims,
which is why these figures range from 3.8 to 12 million.

He repeated his emphasis that all the hallmarks of genocide, according to
the fundamental UN Convention, can be systematically substantiated by

This is a scholar-historian’s view. Here are the recollections of a person
who witnessed all this horror. The floor was taken by 87-year-old Hryhorii
Haraschenko, a war veteran who was wounded 12 times, a courageous and
honest man, and a long-standing CPSU member.

This old but marvelously energetic man declared firmly: “It is a lie when
people say that there was a poor harvest in 1932-1933, which then led to
the tragedy. I say with all dependability: on the contrary, in our village
in Polissia we didn’t know what to do with the harvest!

But there was an absolutely merciless order of the GPU and local party
authorities: do not touch a gram of “state” grain – literally not a gram,
otherwise you could be arrested or even killed. The threshing was done
under the personal strict control of a GPU lieutenant …”

The words of the outstanding German Friedrich Schiller were repeatedly
mentioned during the roundtable: “World history is the world’s court of

But this is true if you speak the language of conscience. In juridical
language, all those present at Ukrainian House insistently called upon
Ukraine’s parliamentarians to repay the debt to the sacred memory of those
who were unjustly killed and to recognize the fact of the genocide of

Let us not forget: there is no statute of limitations on crimes against
humanity – above all, genocide.                   -30-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]


COMMENTARY: By Oleksandr Kramarenko
The Day Weekly Digest in English #33
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

This article was prompted by Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasiuk’s
recent appeal to the international community to recognize the Holodomor of
1932-1933 in Ukraine as an act of genocide. As with his previous appeals,
the world did not react to this one.

I think that Mr. Tarasiuk, who is an experienced diplomat, was not counting
on the success of that hopeless endeavor, just as he had not expected that
last year’s appeals to step up Ukraine’s integration into NATO would have
any positive effect.

Vivid proof of the unpreparednesss of the minister’s measures is the fact
that our own Verkhovna Rada still has not recognized the Holodomor as an
act of genocide.

So, it was no surprise that in response to some Ukrainian parliamentarians’
appeal to the Israeli Knesset to recognize the Holodomor as an act of
genocide, the Israeli parliament said it did not know anything about this

This happened when Kyiv was marking the 65th anniversary of the Babyn
Yar tragedy, so our MPs must have expected the Jews, moved as they were
by the hospitality of the Ukrainian establishment during the ceremonies, to

I think that those gentlemen from the Verkhovna Rada not only have a rather
vague idea about the Holodomor, they also failed to closely follow the
events in Babyn Yar.

They must have missed the speech delivered by Viacheslav Kantor, the leader
of the Jewish communities in Russia, who angrily rejected all attempts to
identify the Holodomor with the Holocaust because, in his opinion, the
famine of 1932-1993 was not genocidal and that many peoples of the former
USSR had also suffered.

We have heard statements like this before, haven’t we? Another possibility
is that Kantor, as a representative of such a democratic country as Russia,
simply had no choice.

Yet his sharp condemnation of Ukrainians who had allegedly massacred
Jews in Babyn Yar is evidence that he was voicing his own view.

Miracles do not happen in this world. The world will never recognize an act
of genocide that is not perceived as such by the absolute majority of the
people who suffered as a result of it.

The question does not concern just the Verkhovna Rada’s procrastination
(despite the fact that the parliamentarians are elected by those very

Kantor’s speech in Kyiv must have been heard by our entire political
leadership, including the president, by people who are supposed to be at the
head of the movement to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide.

Yet we have not heard a single response to the Moscow guest’s insolent
statement. You must agree that against this background Ivan Dziuba’s speech
during the ceremony (published in The Day) was like Don Quixote fighting

At the same time, there is an essential methodological error in statements
made by Tarasiuk and other politicians concerning the recognition of the
Holodomor as an act of genocide.

They all demand recognition of genocide with regard to Ukrainians in
Ukraine, whereas this tragedy affected all Ukrainians who lived in the USSR
at the time. Moreover, the consequences of that genocide were even more
horrifying for Ukrainians who lived outside Ukraine.

When the Russian opponents of the Ukrainian genocide declare today that the
famine took place not just in Ukraine but also in certain regions of Russia
(the central Chernozem area, the North Caucasus, Central Volga region) and
Kazakhstan, the Ukrainian side has no counterevidence.

The impression is that our leaders either lack information about the
Holodomor or are simply afraid to cross the Rubicon in their relations with
the “elder brother” because he may react unfavorably.

Be that as it may, one could respond to the Russians in different ways, for
example, by quoting Lenin’s right-hand man, Leon Trotsky, who can hardly
be described as a Ukrainophile:

     “Nowhere else did repressions, purges, suppressions, and all other
     kinds of bureaucratic hooliganism in general acquire such horrifying
     scope as in Ukraine, in the struggle against powerful forces concealed
     in the Ukrainian masses that desired more freedom and independence.”

True, this is an opinion voiced by a person who held a grudge against
Stalin, but one can introduce more objective evidence of the Ukrainian
genocide. Let us consider statistics-Soviet statistics, of course, but this
very fact is what makes them more eloquent.

The 1926 census points to 81,195,000 Ukrainians in the USSR, roughly the
same number as the Russian population in this period. In 1939 the Soviet
population showed an overall increment. There were considerably more
Russians, but almost three times fewer Ukrainians: 28.1 million.

Even if we take the Holodomor death toll according to the maximum research
figures (14 million victims), a big question remains. What happened to the
other 39,095,000 Ukrainians? There were no world or civil wars in the Soviet
empire between 1926 and 1939, and it was practically impossible to emigrate
from the USSR.

It is impossible to answer this question immediately. No matter how you try,
you have to begin looking for an answer from a distance.

I will start by quoting Andrei Sakharov, the world-renowned Russian

     “A large country was under communist control. Most of the population
     was hostile to the system. Representatives of the national culture and
     even a considerable part of the communists accepted Moscow’s rule
     only conditionally. From the party’s point of view, this was bad
     enough, but also because it represented a great danger for the regime
     in the future.”

The great scientist said this precisely in regard to those 81,195,000
Ukrainians (as a humanist, Sakharov was hardly likely to regard Ukraine as
only the territory determined by the Bolsheviks) of the 1920s, who, much to
the chagrin of Comrade Stalin and his milieu, had no problems with national

At the time the Russian Bolsheviks had to carry out Ukrainization in all
ethnic Ukrainian lands. They were able to conquer Ukraine during the Civil
War only on the third try.

They succeeded only because none other than Ulyanov-Lenin, the evil genius
of Bolshevism, realized in a timely fashion the mistakes of his chauvinistic
policy and granted Ukrainians throughout the whole empire (not only the
Ukrainian SSR) linguistic and cultural autonomy that would exist until the
early 1930s.

Hence, there were more than 80 million people who were anything but Soviet,
and on whom, strange as it may seem, the future of the Soviet empire
depended, with its collectivization and industrialization campaigns, owing
to the industrial and agricultural potential of the territories they

To understand this geopolitical discrepancy better, here is what V.
Ovsiienko, a human rights champion from Kharkiv, has to say on the

     “Ukrainians as an ethnos, with their profound religiosity,
     individualism, tradition of private property, and devotion to their
     plots of land, were not suited to the construction of communism, and
     this fact was noted by high-ranking Soviet officials.

     Ukraine had to be erased from the face of the earth, with the remainder
     of the Ukrainian people serving as material for a ‘new historical
     community,’ the Soviet people, the bulk of which were Russians and
     the Russian language and culture. Ukrainians as such could not enter
     communism in principle.”

But that is not all. Toward the end of the 1920s the Red Army did not have
enough tanks, aircraft, and artillery for this materiel to play a decisive
role in combat. In these conditions human resources and their combat
experience counted for more, and cavalry was the main factor of success
in battles.

All this was in the hands of the Ukrainians, who then occupied a large
swathe of territory (300-400 km north of the Black Sea and over 1,500 km
from the Zbruch River to the Terek. There were still Ukrainian veterans who
had fought in elite tsarist units during the First World War.

There were practically as many of them as the entire mobilization resource
of the Red Army. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) almost every
Ukrainian family had horses.

There were also the Kuban and Terek Cossacks. At the time ethnic Ukrainians
made up 83 percent of the Kuban population; 75 percent together with
Stavropole; and 64 percent in the Russian part of Slobidska Ukraine (Kursk,
Voronezh, and Belgorod oblasts).

The Don area, part of this Ukrainian danger zone for the empire, would
hardly have supported the Reds after the repressions against the White

Moreover, various kinds of otamans who terrorized Bolshevik grain delivery
detachments would not lay down their arms until 1929, so in the event of an
all-Ukraine uprising they would serve as battle-hardened field officers.

All that such an uprising was missing was an organizer of the caliber of
Symon Petliura. Such a personality could have emerged from among the
nationally conscious Ukrainian communists or national intelligentsia, as
some of these intellectuals had a classical military education.

That was why Stalin and his henchmen annihilated the Ukrainian
intelligentsia and nationally conscious party members, dekulakized all
potential leaders of a possible Ukrainian uprising under the guise of
collectivization, and killed half the Ukrainian peasantry by famine.

The other half suffered moral and psychological damage during the
Holodomor, which has not healed to this day. This assumption is
confirmed by the fact that there was no Holodomor in compact Ukrainian
settlements in the Far East.

They had the same mentality that was unacceptable to the regime, but they
were safely isolated from the Ukrainian danger zone in the southwestern part
of the empire by vast distances and means of communication of those days.

Of course, the Cossack population of the Kuban and Stavropole suffered the
worst during that Bolshevik genocide. Those people were better organized in
military terms and, naturally, fought the Red terror with all their might.

Also, the Cossacks were forcefully Russified by a resolution of the CC AUCP
(B) and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of Dec. 14, 1932.

The level of national consciousness of the Kuban people is attested by the
fact that, starving as they were, they rebelled against the campaign of
Russification, but were crushed by GPU troops.

The Bolsheviks shot and sent to concentration camps a total of 200,000
Ukrainians. All 17,000 residents of the Cossack village (stanytsia) of
Poltavska were deported. The stanytsia was then renamed Krasnoarmeiskaia
and resettled with Russians.

However, famine is one thing, but the Holodomor is another. The latter’s
peak dates to the second half of 1933. After that even the proud Cossacks
turned into miserable people without family or clan.

Thus, when they and other Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian SSR were
invited to register themselves as Russians during the 1939 census, they did
not object.

Moreover, after the Holodomor a number of Kuban Ukrainians and those in

the Russian part of Slobidska Ukraine, after realizing why they had been killed,
voluntarily Russified their surnames.

That is how we now have Garbuzov instead of Harbuz, Matvienkov instead of
Matviienko, Zozulin instead of Zozulia, Primakov instead of Pryimak,
Chepurnov instead of Chepurny.

Ask some of your friends with such distorted surnames whether their
grandparents and great-grandparents were Russian. In most cases they will
reply in the negative. Ask them why they consider themselves Russian, and
you will hear something like, Kakaia raznitsa? (What difference does it

So here are your answers to the questions of what happened to the majority
of Ukrainians after the Holodomor in the USSR; why the population of the
Kuban has a low percentage of Ukrainians, what was that famine in the North
Caucasus and Central Chernozem region, and how this genocide,
unprecedented in the history of mankind, destroyed national consciousness.

The Stalinist totalitarian regime tried hard to ensure that everyone kept
silent about the Holodomor, even people who had survived it, as well as
their children and grandchildren; so that no one knew about this genocide
abroad, and if they found out about it, they would keep silent.

This is precisely what the Nazi regime did to conceal its genocide of the
Jews from the international community. Sad but true, the international
community pretended not to notice what was happening in both cases.

Nazi Germany was defeated by that community, and the bankrupt communist
regime in the USSR was transformed into an oligarchic regime, as instructed
by its leaders, doing so painlessly, primarily for those leaders.

That was why there was a Nuremberg for fascism but no Nuremberg for
communism. That is what the whole world knows about the Holocaust, while
even most of those whose relatives died a most horrible death by starvation
know nothing about the Holodomor.

I have visited villages in Luhansk oblast alone and as a member of a group
of representatives of the Association of Holodomor Researchers. This area is
inhabited by Ukrainians and Russians (mostly Don Cossacks).

In Russian villages old people were eager to talk about the famine of
1932-1933, and they mentioned fellow villagers who had not survived it.
They were all buried in village cemeteries, in accordance with tradition, in
separate graves. No one could remember a single case of cannibalism.

Ukrainian villages presented an altogether different picture. It was hard to
find a person willing to talk about the famine, as most old men and women
treated those who were asking questions with suspicion and distrust.

Those who agreed to answer our questions talked about the Holodomor as a
disaster and wept. None of them demanded justice for the murderers of their
parents, grandparents, brothers, and sisters.

There are also stories about cannibalism. The main difference between
Ukrainian and Russian villages was that elderly Ukrainians pointed to a
place, usually near a graveyard, where several hundred fellow villagers who
had starved to death lay buried. Crosses had been erected in some of these
places only recently.

In Luhansk oblast the distance between Ukrainian and Russian villages is
sometimes only several kilometers. I consider this vivid proof of the
Bolshevik genocide against the Ukrainians.

However, to prove this to the international community, I think our state
must open all these common graves in the presence of law enforcement
officials, historians, ethnographers, forensic medical experts, and
especially foreign journalists.

Only then will the world learn that in Ukrainian villages and at Soviet
railroad stations (and nowhere else) half the Ukrainian population died in
1933 alone (in some cases whole villages died). In fact, every Ukrainian
village, except in western Ukraine, has its small Bykivnia.

The state must implement such measures on a daily basis and for many a year.
Those who say that the famine encompassed all of the USSR at the time are
right, of course. Yet, unlike the Holodomor, the peoples of the USSR
survived that famine without such horrible losses.

Only Ukrainians have such horrifying common graves that must be shown to
the world. The presence of historians and ethnographers will be required in
case Russia also wishes to show such graves in its “Russian” villages in the
Chernozem region and in Cossack villages in the Kuban and Stavropole.

When all this happens, the international community will have no more
arguments to refute the Bolshevik genocide of the Ukrainians. Of course,
there will be no Nuremberg (there is no one left to stand trial), there will
be no compensations from Russia – we don’t need them anyway.

But perhaps the most important thing will happen; its historical memory will
finally be restored to the Ukrainian nation, and after that it will
understand many things and will not allow outsiders to treat it the way they
are doing now.

This is now understood by a handful of Ukrainians who already know the
truth about the Holodomor.                         -30-

FOOTNOTE: The writer of the article above says: “Vivid proof of
the unpreparednesss of the minister’s measures is the fact that our own
Verkhovna Rada still has not recognized the Holodomor as an act of
genocide.” This statement is not entirely accurate. 
The Rada, in May of 2003, in a strong worded resolution, did recognize
the Holodomor as an act of genocide. The Rada did not pass an actual 
law stating the Holodomor was a genocide. The legislative bodies of
other countries have also passed resolutions about the Holodomor
being a genocide, not actual laws.
You can click on the following links for information about what the 
Rada actually did in May of 2003 in regards to declaring the Holodomor
a genocide:
In addition, the U.S. Congress, according to my understanding, has
only indirectly stated that the Holodomor was a genocide, contrary to
what it says in the article above.  There is considerable misinformation
being passed around by Ukrainian government officials about what the
legislative bodies of other countries have actually done in regards to
declaring the Holodomor a genocide.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
should distribute accurate information on this matter as soon as possible.
AUR Editor Morgan Williams
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, October 24, 2006

KYIV – Victor Yushchenko has written a letter to Kyiv Mayor Leonid
Chernovetsky with a request to help honor the Holodomor victims.

The President said a memorial commemorating the seventy-year anniversary
of the manmade famine should be constructed in Kyiv in accordance with
his decrees.

He added that a group of artists led by A. Haidamaka had won a contest
held to choose the best memorial project.

Mr. Yushchenko requested the mayor to help find a proper site for the
memorial.                                             -30-

FOOTNOTE: This is a rather strange letter President Yushchenko has
just sent to the mayor of Kyiv.  It sounds exactly like letters he used to
send to the previous mayor of Kyiv.  But this was before the Institute of
Memory was established and before it was fully recognized it was the
responsibility of the national government of Ukraine and not the city of
Kyiv to build the Holodomor Complex. 
This was also before the site where the Holodomor Complex would be
built had been officially decided and confirmed by the President.
So it is a total mystery as to why President Yushchenko is suddenly,
once again, asking the mayor of Kyiv for help to find a proper site for
the Holodomor Memorial. Looks like it could be very poor Presidential
staff work to me or decisions have been made that have not yet been 
publicly announced.  AUR EDITOR Morgan Williams
[return to index] Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
     You are welcome to send us names for the AUR distribution list.
          Current Prospects and Challenges, Viewpoints from US & Canada
               You are invited to attend. Washington, D.C., Mon, Oct 30

Andrew Bihun, Director, Business Development Forum
The Washington Group, Wash, D.C., Wed, Oct 25, 2006

WASHINGTON – The Business Development Forum of The Washington
Group is sponsoring a roundtable and you are invited to attend.  The
roundtable is on:

                             Trade and Investment in Ukraine
                            Current Prospects and Challenges
                  Viewpoints from the United States and Canada
                                  Johns Hopkins University
                      School of Advanced International Studies
                           1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW,
                           Rome Auditorium, Washington, DC
                     Monday, October 30, 2006, 7:00 – 9:00 PM

FORMAT: Roundtable with a moderator and six-eight panelists – three-
four from the United States and Canada each.

The moderator and each panelist would take 5-7 minutes to present their
business experiences and views/assessments of prospects/challenges of
conducting international trade and investment in Ukraine in the
near/mid-term future.

The Embassy of Ukraine in Washington will welcome the participants with
opening remarks, and, along with relevant attending officials form the U.S.
government, will take an active role in our discussions.

Lively Q’s & A’s and discussions among panelists and the audience will

TOPICS: practical experiences in conducting business in Ukraine (pro’s
and con’s), most promising sectors for development, trade promotion
efforts and possibilities (missions and exhibitions), existence and access
to market information, effectiveness of investment facilitation mechanisms,
and anti-corruption campaigns.

Additional topics will include: dealing with central and local governments,
growth of trade associations in Ukraine, sufficiency and effectiveness of
business-related foreign technical assistance, and other topics as raised by
the panelists.

OBJECTIVES: hopefully, this roundtable will yield significant suggestions
on enhancing the development of Ukraine business support networks in
Canada, the United States, and Ukraine, and proposals for further Ukraine
business-related conferences, seminars, visits, trade exhibits, and other
events in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, or other venues.

Contact: Andrew Bihun, Director
Business Development Forum of The Washington Group
Or Adrian Pidlusky, President,
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF), Washington, D.C., October, 2006

WASHINGTON, DC – The U.S.-Ukraine Foundation and its partners
hosted the third working session of the U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue in
Washington, DC from September 25 – 29, 2006.

Funded by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue
is designed to supplement and deepen the official bilateral dialogue between
leaders in Ukraine and the United States.

More than 60 policy makers from the United States and Ukraine met to
discuss U.S.-Ukraine relations through the prism of foreign policy and
national security; politics and governance; media and information; and
business and economics.
                           PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
Program participants included deputies from Ukraine’s Parliament,
representatives of the U.S. Department of State, National Security and
Defense Council of Ukraine, the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine,
Ministry of the Economy of Ukraine, U.S. and Ukrainian think tanks,
non-governmental organizations, and media and business representatives.

The Opening Plenary Session, which was webcast live, commenced with
welcoming remarks by Nadia McConnell, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
President, and Damon Wilson, Director for Central and Eastern Europe
at the National Security Council (NCS).

Noting the importance of the project Mr. Wilson stated “I appreciate very
much the role of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation supporting this Policy
Dialogue.  It is a particularly opportune moment to have it here in
Washington and to be talking about U.S.-Ukraine relations.

After prolonged uncertainty there is a government and we have a partner to
work with in Ukraine.  It is the right moment for us in Washington to be
thinking through the next steps in the relationship and therefore the work
that you will be doing in this group over the coming days I think is very

“Over the years, Policy Dialogue has been constructive in feeding into the
thinking here in Washington and hopefully in Ukraine as well among the
policy makers.  I think this is particularly relevant right now during the
stage we’re at,” stated Mr. Wilson.
                            FOUR POLICY TASK FORCES
Throughout the week, participants were divided according to their expertise
into four Task Forces:  Politics and Governance; Foreign Policy and
National Security; Economics and Business; and Media and Information.

Each of these Task Forces held numerous meetings with senior officials of
the U.S. government, representatives of NGOs, congressional committees,
and think tanks in Washington, DC, which provided further insight on
U.S.-Ukraine related issues.
Co-chaired by high-level American and Ukrainian experts, the Task Forces are
managed by U.S. and Ukrainian partner organizations such as The Atlantic
Council of the United States, Razumkov Center for Economic & Political
Studies, International Center for Policy Studies, Kennan Institute at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, SigmaBleyzer Private
Equity Investment Group, and Europe XXI Foundation.

The U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue concluded with a Closing Plenary Session
on September 28 at which Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United States Oleh
Shamshur gave closing remarks, and each Task Force presented its policy
recommendations for the U.S. and Ukrainian governments.

Afterwards, a reception to commemorate the U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue
and to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation was
held at the Embassy of Ukraine hosted by Ambassador Oleh Shamshur.

Commenting on this special occasion, Nadia McConnell expressed that she
hopes “the Foundation’s next fifteen years will be as enjoyable and
productive as these first fifteen.  We know this will be so if we continue
to receive the kind of support that we have received thus far.

In particular, we recognize our partner institutions and all of the task
force members who have so generously donated their time and energy to
make Policy Dialogue a success. “

To learn more about the U.S.-Ukraine Policy Dialogue or to view webcasts
of the Policy Dialogue events and the 15th anniversary celebration, please
visit:        -30-
CONTACT: Marta Matselioukh, Project Coordinator, U.S.-Ukraine
Foundation, 1701 K Street NW, Suite 903, Washington, DC 20006,,
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
                 2007 CONVENTION IN NYC: CALL FOR PAPERS
                     “NATION, COMMUNITY, AND THE STATE”
              Proposal Deadline Reminder: Thursday, 2 November 2006

Dominique Arel, ASN President
12th Annual World Convention of the Association
for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) in 2007, New York, NY
Harriman Institute, Columbia University, NY, NY, Oct 25, 2006

NEW YORK – The 12th Annual World Convention of the Association
for the Study of Nationalities (ASN) will be held in the International
Affairs Building, Columbia University, NY, 12-14 April, 2007.  The
Convention is sponsored by the Harriman Institute.

There will be 100 panels on the Balkans, the Baltics, Central Europe,
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey,
Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kurdistan, China, and Mongolia. There
will also be a Special Section on Theoretical Approaches to Nationalism.

There will also be THEMATIC panels on Islam and Politics, Genocide
and Ethnic Violence, Anthropology of Identity, Citizenship and Nationality,
Conflict Resolution, Autonomy, Gender, EU Integration, and many more.

AWARDS will be presented for the best doctoral student papers and
there will also be the screening and discussion of new films and
The ASN Convention, the most attended international and inter-disciplinary
scholarly gathering of its kind, welcomes proposals on a wide range of
topics related to national identity, nationalism, ethnic conflict,
state-building and the study of empires in Central/Eastern Europe, the
former Soviet Union, Eurasia, and adjacent areas.

Disciplines represented include political science, history, anthropology,
sociology, economics, geography, socio-linguistics, psychology, and
related fields.

For a fifth consecutive year, the 2007 Convention will feature a section
devoted to theoretical approaches to nationalism, from any of the
disciplines listed above.

The papers in this section need not be grounded in an area of the former
Communist bloc usually covered by ASN, provided that the issues examined
are relevant to a truly comparative understanding of nationalism-related

In this vein, we are welcoming theory-focused and comparative proposals,
rather than specific case studies from outside Central/Eastern Europe and

Since 2005, the ASN Convention has acknowledged excellence in graduate
studies research by offering Awards for Best Doctoral Student Papers in five
sections: Russia/Ukraine/Caucasus, Central Asia/Eurasia, Central Europe,
Balkans, and Nationalism Studies.

The winners at the 2005 Convention were Kelly O’Neill (Harvard U, History,
Russia/Ukraine/Caucasus), Yuriy Malikov (History, U of California, Santa
Barbara, Central Asia/Eurasia), Andrew Demshuk (U of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, History, Central Europe), and Tamara Pavasovic
(Harvard U, Sociology, Balkans).

Doctoral student applicants whose proposals will be accepted for the 2007
Convention, who have not defended their dissertation by 1 November 2006,
and whose paper is delivered by the deadline, will automatically be
considered for the awards.

The 2007 Convention is also inviting submissions for documentaries or
feature films made within the past year and available in VHS or DVD format.
Most videos selected for the convention will be screened during regular
panel slots and will be followed by a discussion moderated by an academic
The 2007 Convention invites proposals for INDIVIDUAL PAPERS or
PANELS. A panel includes a chair, three presentations based on written
papers, and a discussant. Proposals using an INNOVATIVE format are
also particularly encouraged.

Examples of new formats include a roundtable on a new book, in which the
author is being engaged by three discussants; a debate between two panelists
over a critical research or policy question, following rules of public
debating; or special presentations based on original papers where the number
of discussants is equal or greater than the number of presenters. Other
innovative formats are also welcome.
The 2007 Convention is also welcoming offers to serve as DISCUSSANT
on a panel to be created by the program committee from individual paper
proposals. The application to be considered as discussant can be
self-standing, or accompanied by an individual paper proposal.

There is NO APPLICATION FORM to fill out in order to send proposals
to the convention. All proposals must be sent by email to Dominique Arel at (backup address:

INDIVIDUAL PAPER PROPOSALS must include the name, email and
affiliation of the author, a postal address for paper mail, the title of the
paper, a 500-word abstract and a 100-word biographical statement that

includes full bibliographic references of your last or forthcoming publication,
if applicable (graduate students must indicate the title of their dissertation
and year of projected defense. They can also submit the full bibliographic
references of a recent or forthcoming publication).

PANEL PROPOSALS must include the title of the panel, a chair, three
paper-givers with the title of their papers, and a discussant; the name,
affiliation, email, postal address and 100-word biographical statements of
each participant and include full bibliographic references of their last or
forthcoming publication, if applicable (graduate students can indicate the
title of their dissertation and year of projected defense).

PROPOSALS FOR FILMS OR VIDEOS must include the name, email and
affiliation of the author, a postal address for paper mail, the title, a
500-word abstract of the film/video and a 100-word biographical statement.

of the panel, the names, emails, affiliations, postal addresses, 100-word
biographical statements of each participant (same specifications as above)
and a discussion on the proposed format.

the name, email, affiliation, postal address, and areas of expertise of the
applicant, and a 100-word biographical statement (same specifications as

All proposals must be included IN THE BODY OF A SINGLE E-MAIL.
Attachments will be accepted only if they repeat the content of an email
message/proposal, and if all the information is contained IN A SINGLE

DEADLINE: for proposals: 2 November 2006 (,
backup address:

Participants are responsible for covering all travel and accommodation
costs. ASN has no funding available for panelists.

An international Program Committee will be entrusted with the selection of
proposals. Applicants will be notified in December 2006 or early January
2007. Information regarding registration costs and other logistical
questions will be communicated afterwards.

The full list of panels from last year’s convention, for the geographical
and thematic sections, and the section on Theories of Nationalism, can be
accessed at
The film/video lineup can be accessed at The
programs from past conventions, going back to 2001, are also online.

Several dozen publishers and companies have had exhibits and/or
advertised in the Convention Program in past years.

Due to considerations of space, advertisers and exhibitors are encouraged
to place their order early. For information, please contact Convention
Executive Director Gordon N. Bardos (

Participants are invited to join ASN by logging in to A yearly membership to
ASN is $65 ($35 for students).

Members receive the journal Nationalities Papers quarterly, a subscription
discount to ASN’s new journal, Ethnopolitics, a registration discount at
the ASN Annual World Convention, and other perks.

We look forward to seeing you at the convention!

The Convention organizing committee: Dominique Arel, ASN President;
Gordon N. Bardos, Executive Director; David Crowe, ASN Chair of
Advisory Board; Sherrill Stroschein, Program Chair

The ASN convention’s headquarters are located at the: Harriman Institute,
Columbia University, 1216 IAB, 420 W. 118th St., New York, NY 10027
212 854 8487 tel, 212 666 3481 fax;
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           US Holocaust Memorial Museum thanks the Security Service
                     of Ukraine for a “stellar level of co-operation.”

Embassy of Ukraine to the USA
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, October 24, 2006

WASHINGTON – The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in
Washington and the Security Service of Ukraine have extended their
co-operation agreement for another 5 years.

During the signing ceremony the Director of the Museum, Sara Bloomfield,
thanked Ukraine for bringing their co-operation in the field of the exchange
of historic documents to a “truly stellar level”. Ukraine can serve as a
showcase for other European countries, she said.

The SBU archive director Serhii Bohunov and the head of the SBU
Information department Valerii Holod stressed that over last 5 years
Ukraine has shared with the United States more than 150 thousand files
on the history of the Holocaust.

Both sides expressed their hope to maintain the current level of
co-operation in the years to come.                   -30-
CONTACT: Volodymyr Samofalov, Embassy of Ukraine to the USA,
Washington, D.C.,
US Holocaust Memorial Museum website:
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                                   (Folk Art) MAGAZINES
For information on how to subscribe to the “Welcome to Ukraine” magazine
in English, or the Ukrainian Folk Art magazine “Narodne Mystetstvo” in
Ukrainian, write to Complete information is
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1.  THE BLEYZER FOUNDATION, Dr. Edilberto Segura,
Chairman; Victor Gekker, Executive Director, Kyiv, Ukraine;
    Additional supporting sponsors for the Action Ukraine Program are:
Chairperson; Vera M. Andryczyk, President; Huntingdon Valley,
3. KIEV-ATLANTIC GROUP, David and Tamara Sweere, Daniel
Sweere, Kyiv and Myronivka, Ukraine, 380 44 298 7275 in Kyiv,
4.  ESTRON CORPORATION, Grain Export Terminal Facility &
Oilseed Crushing Plant, Ilvichevsk, Ukraine
5. Law firm UKRAINIAN LEGAL GROUP, Irina Paliashvili, President;
Kiev and Washington,,
6. BAHRIANY FOUNDATION, INC., Dr. Anatol Lysyj, Chairman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
7. VOLIA SOFTWARE, Software to Fit Your Business, Source your
IT work in Ukraine. Contact: Yuriy Sivitsky, Vice President, Marketing,
Kyiv, Ukraine,; Volia Software website: or Bill Hunter, CEO Volia Software,
Houston, TX  77024;
8. ODUM– Association of American Youth of Ukrainian Descent,
Minnesota Chapter, Natalia Yarr, Chairperson
Dr. Susanne Lotarski, President/CEO; E. Morgan Williams,
SigmaBleyzer, Chairman, Executive Committee, Board of Directors;
John Stephens, Cape Point Capital, Secretary/Treasurer
Antony, South Bound Brook, New Jersey,
Ihor Gawdiak, President, Washington, D.C., New York, New York
12. U.S.-UKRAINE FOUNDATION (USUF), Nadia Komarnyckyj
McConnell, President; John Kun, Vice President/COO; Vera
Andruskiw, CPP Wash Project Director, Washington, D.C.; Markian
Bilynskyj, VP/Director of Field Operations; Marta Kolomayets, CPP
Kyiv Project Director, Kyiv, Ukraine. Web:
13. WJ GROUP of Ag Companies, Kyiv, Ukraine, David Holpert, Chief
Financial Officer, Chicago, IL;
14. EUGENIA SAKEVYCH DALLAS, Author, “One Woman, Five
Lives, Five Countries,” ‘Her life’s journey begins with the 1932-1933
genocidal famine in Ukraine.’ Hollywood, CA,
15. ALEX AND HELEN WOSKOB, College Station, Pennsylvania
16. SWIFT FOUNDATION, San Luis Obispo, California
17. TRAVEL TO UKRAINE website,,
A program of the U.S-Ukraine Foundation, Washington, D.C.
18. BUYUKRAINE.ORG website,
A program of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation, Washington, D.C.
If you would like to read the ACTION UKRAINE REPORT- AUR,
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and e-mail contact information to Information about
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SPAM BLOCKER maintained by your server or by yourself on your
computer. Spam blockers are set in very arbitrary and impersonal ways
and block out e-mails because of words found in many news stories.
Spam blockers also sometimes reject the AUR for other arbitrary reasons
we have not been able to identify. If you do not receive some of the AUR
numbers please let us know and we will send you the missing issues. Please
make sure the spam blocker used by your server and also the one on your
personal computer, if you use a spam blocker, is set properly to receive
the Action Ukraine Report (AUR).

                          PUBLISHER AND EDITOR – AUR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs
Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer, The Bleyzer Foundation

Emerging Markets Private Equity Investment Group
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013, Tel: 202 437 4707
Mobile in Kyiv: 8 050 689 2874;
        Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely. 
                           TRUTH IS A REVOLUTIONARY ACT
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