Monthly Archives: July 2006

AUR#741 Jul 31 Declaration Of National Unity, Four Areas Unresolved; St Dept’s David Kramer In Kyiv: Interior Minister’s Death Not Suicide;

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ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

DRAFT TEXT OF
DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 741

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., MONDAY, JULY 31, 2006

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Some news services do not publish in August, not the AUR.

——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. DRAFT TEXT OF DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

2. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT SAYS WORKING GROUP
REACHES AGREEMENT ON MOST PROVISIONS IN DECLARATION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

3. UKRAINE: IVAN VASYUNYK OF PRESIDENT’S STAFF NAMES
FOUR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO SIGNING UNITY DECLARATION
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1437 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

4. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S CHIEF OF STAFF OLEH RYBACHUK
PLAYS DOWN LACK OF PROGRESS IN CRISIS TALKS
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1710 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

5. REGIONS PARTY DOES NOT ACCEPT ‘OUR UKRAINE’ BLOCS
POSITIONS IN NATIONAL UNITY COALITION TALKS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

6. UKRAINE’S PRO-RUSSIAN PARTY OF REGIONS REJECTS
“BLACKMAIL, THREATS” DURING CRISIS TALKS
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 29, 2006

7. PARTY OF REGIONS OFFICIAL TARAS CHORNOVIL SAYS PARTY
IS READY TO UNITE WITH THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNISTS
IN CASE OF A NEW EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

8. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER YURI YEKHANUROV SAID ROUND-
TABLE TALKS ‘COMPLICATED’ NO COMPROMISE ON FOUR ISSUES
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0834 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

9. LEADER OF PARTY OF REGIONS YANUKOVYCH MEETS WITH A
TOP U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER
Kramer also meets with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1219 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

10. ALL-UKRAINIAN ‘ROUND-TABLE’ A POTEMKIN VILLAGE
CREATED BY PRES YUSHCHENKO FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR
Regnum, Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 28, 2006

11. UKRAINIAN INTERIOR MINISTER LUTSENKO WILL NOT WORK
IN A CABINET CHAIRED BY VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
I am against candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite Ukrainian society.
INTERVIEW: With Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
By Ivan Leonov, Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 28 Jul 06, p 4, 5
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

12. THE MANY CHOICES OF YUSHCHENKO
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: by Tammy Lynch, Boston
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

13. YUSHCHENKO PREFERS AKHMETOV TO YANUKOVYCH
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 26, 2006

14. “YURIY KRAVCHENKO – SUICIDE RULED OUT”
Suicide verdict in death of former Ukrainian Interior Minister questioned
“We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them. This

situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present one, too.”
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY:
By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 29 Jul 06, p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

15. CARTE BLANCHE FOR VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website in Ukrainian, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Jul 24, 2006

16. RUSSIANS REFUSE TO RAISE UKRAINIAN FLAGS ON SHIPS

DURING RUSSIAN NAVY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN CRIMEA
Ukrainian TV critical of Russian Navy Day festivities in Crimea
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

17. MILITARY SERVICE FOR GRADUATES OF HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE NOT REQUIRED AFTER 2010
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1439 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

18. POLISH PRESIDENT APPOINTS POLISH-UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE
Sister committee to be appointed on the Ukrainian side
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2120 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, July 28, 2006

19. COUNCIL OF EUROPE OFFICIAL URGES MOLDOVA TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable
Infotag news agency, Chisinau, in Russian 0935 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

20. UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON ‘PAUSE’
INTERVIEW: With Prof. Robert Legvold
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 28, 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 21
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

22. JACQUES HNIZDOVSKY AT UKRAINIAN MUSEUM IN NYC
Acclaimed Ukrainian painter and printmaker (1915-1985)
ArtDaily.com, USA, Sunday, July 23, 2006

23. POLEMICS: MYKOLA RIABCHUK REPLY TO MS TARANEC
LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Riabchuk
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 23
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

24. WORLD FORUM OF UKRAINIANS TO FOCUS ON UNITED NATIONS
RECOGNITION OF 1932-1933 FAMINE IN UKRAINE AS GENOCIDE
AGAINST UKRAINIAN PEOPLE
UNIAN, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

25. UKRAINE 3000 CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LAUNCHES WEBSITE
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 25
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 31, 2006
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1
. DRAFT TEXT OF DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

The Ukrayinska Pravda web site has published the draft text of the
declaration of national unity that President Viktor Yushchenko presented to
participants in the round table that began on 27 July.

The talks, which are aimed at ending the political deadlock, are attended by
Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, parliament speaker Oleksandr Moroz, the
leaders of parliamentary factions, and a number of public figures.

The following is an excerpt from the report by Ukrainian Ukrayinska Pravda
website on 27 July; subheadings as published:

The text of the draft declaration of national unity that President
Yushchenko proposed to the round table participants. The final version,
which is to be signed by political leaders, is to be agreed by a working
group on Friday [28 July].

DECLARATION [UNIVERSAL] OF NATIONAL UNITY
Being conscious of [our] responsibility to the Ukrainian people and the
exceptional nature of the current political situation,

Respecting the will of the people expressed in an honest and democratic
manner in the election to the Supreme Council of Ukraine [parliament] on
26 March 2006,

Wishing to resolve the political problems that have arisen in the Supreme
Council of Ukraine in a considered and responsible manner,

Wishing to bring about a general national reconciliation, which we believe
to be the key to Ukraine’s future and an instrument for resolving our
society’s current problems,

Introducing the tradition of national political and social dialogue for
resolving the inherited and acquired problems in the life of the state,

Attesting that the core of the people’s consolidation is the unconditional
observance of the principles of democracy and respect for human rights
and freedoms, social justice and Ukraine’s European choice,

Confirming that Ukraine’s foreign policy course is unchanged and
irreversible, and with the purpose of enhancing its international authority,

And unswervingly guided in acts and deeds by Ukraine’s national interests,

We, representatives of the political forces in parliament, declare those
principles that manifest our common political will to join forces for the
good of Ukraine and its citizens.

In order to realize such priorities of national development as the high
quality of life of citizens, a competitive and knowledge-based economy,
effective and just authorities, a state that is respected in the world and
integrated into global processes, we agree to the priority execution of

A Plan of Action of National Unity:

1. To preserve Ukraine as a unitary and united state.

2. To continue and improve constitutional reforms, to create a balanced
system of “checks and balances” between the president of Ukraine, the
Supreme Council of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,
and to re-establish a functional Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

3. To bring the decisions of all bodies of state power and local
self-government into line with the Constitution of Ukraine.

4. To create the political and judicial conditions for the unimpeded
activity of the opposition in elective bodies of power at all levels.

5. To reform executive power structures and to render impossible the
politicization of state service through the priority adoption of the laws of
Ukraine “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” and “On State Service”
(new edition), prepared and submitted by the president of Ukraine.

6. To continue reform of the courts in accordance with the approved
conception for improvement of the judiciary for the consolidation of just
courts in Ukraine.

7. To reform the system of law enforcement bodies to European standards, to
bring criminal law and criminal justice into line with the standards and
recommendations of Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the
European Union, and the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.

8. To stimulate the development of local self-government by ensuring its
financial means and the reform of the administrative-territorial order. To
reject federalism in favour of decentralization.

9. To tame corruption at all levels of power, in particular, by supporting
the president’s legislative initiatives in this area.

10. To ensure the status of Ukrainian as the single state language and the
language of official communication of power bodies, while simultaneously
guaranteeing the rights of the languages of national minorities in line with
the European Charter.

11. To develop the culture and restore the spiritual life of the multiethnic
Ukrainian people, to ensure the integrity of the linguistic-cultural sphere.

12. To observe the freedom of religion. To support efforts to form a single
national Ukrainian Orthodox church.

13. To improve the welfare of Ukrainian citizens, to overcome poverty
through effective and targeted social security and just pension provision.

14. To form a middle class by increasing the accessibility of higher
education and transforming public incomes policy, to guarantee decent wages,
to develop entrepreneurship and stimulate job creation.

15. To campaign for a healthy lifestyle, to redirect the health care system
towards the patient, and found a National Centre for Fighting Tuberculosis
and HIV/AIDS, a National Heart Centre, a National Cancer Centre, a
Nationwide Centre for Mother and Child Health Care.

16. To achieve an annual rate of GDP growth of at least 5 per cent with
inflation no more than 10 per cent, to stimulate the creation of at least 1m
jobs a year.

17. To conduct tax reform, that includes, in particular, introduction of a
real estate tax and a single social deduction from payroll.

18. To increase the effectiveness of natural resource use, especially fuels,
to introduce energy saving technologies.

19. To make agriculture more efficient by putting land into economic
circulation.

20. To provide state guarantees of the inviolability of property rights.

21. To raise the effectiveness of utilities through the creation of
competition in the housing and utilities sector.

22. To urgently adopt the amendments to legislation required for Ukraine’s
WTO entry and to join this organization by the end of 2006.

23. To implement unswervingly the Ukraine-EU action plan, to urgently start
talks on creation of a free-trade zone between Ukraine and the EU, and to
join a NATO Membership Action Plan.

24. To establish effective economic partnership with all Ukraine’s
interested foreign partners, guided by interests of mutual advantage.

We, the undersigned, are convinced that the implementation of the priorities
described should become the decisive criteria for the formation and activity
of the coalition and the system of power as a whole, whose activity will be
founded on new mechanisms of public-political cooperation, in particular:

1. To develop and introduce regular procedures for public consultation on
important issues of social development and state building, with the
inclusion in the dialogue of, in particular, non-parliamentary political
forces, public associations and other participants in the social-political
process.

2. To form effective mechanisms for social control over the authorities’
activity, ensuring the transparency and accountability of state management
bodies and local self-government bodies.

3. To ensure that the activity of power bodies conforms to Ukraine’s
national interests, strategic development priorities, the interests of
particular communities and citizens, by means, in particular, of the
participation of political parties and public forces in improving the
effectiveness of the state’s personnel policy.

We are convinced that the implementation of the principles of this
declaration, which will provide the basis for the majority coalition
agreement, are possible only if a coalition of national unity is formed in
the Supreme Council of Ukraine of the 5th convocation [current parliament],
and we support such a step. [Passage omitted: the list of round table
participants]
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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2. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT SAYS WORKING GROUP
REACHES AGREEMENT ON MOST PROVISIONS IN DECLARATION

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – The presidential secretariat says that the working group has reached
agreements on most provisions in the National Unity Declaration. Ukrainian
News has learned this from the president’s press service.

According to the message, during the talks, the sides agreed on most
priority questions concerning the state development.

Implementation of the state policy in regards to [1] languages, [2]
preservation, integrity and unity of Ukraine, as well as the [3] country’s
integration with Europe and the [4] Common Economic Area, are among
questions that need further discussions.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr
Moroz claimed that the working group on the wording of the National Unity
Declaration included a paragraph in the draft document that Ukraine may join
NATO only after a relevant national referendum.

The working group on the wording of the National Unity Declaration comprised
Regions Party MPs Mykola Azarov, Olena Lukash, Our Ukraine bloc MPs Petro
Poroshenko, Roman Zvarych, Socialist Party faction MPs Vasyl Tsushko,
Yaroslav Mendus, and Communist Party MP Leonid Hrach.

The presidential secretariat delegated Ivan Vasiunik, the first deputy head
of the presidential secretariat, Mykola Poludionnyi, the head of the chief
service for legal policy of the presidential secretariat, Ihor Koliushko,
the head of the chief service for institutional development of the
presidential secretariat, and Zhanna Doktorova, the head of the chief state
legal service. -30-
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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3. UKRAINE: IVAN VASYUNYK OF PRESIDENT’S STAFF NAMES
FOUR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO SIGNING UNITY DECLARATION

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1437 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

KIEV – In the talks on signing the declaration of national unity, the
political formulation of tasks concerning [1] language, [2] the unity of
Ukraine, [3] European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as [4] future
activity within the Single Economic Space [with Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan] require additional discussion, the first deputy head of the
presidential secretariat, Ivan Vasyunyk, said on Saturday [29 July].

He said that during the talks, they kept to President Viktor Yushchenko’s
firm line on refusing to change the country’s domestic and foreign policy
course.

“The president confirms his consistent position on the need for a
consolidation of the country’s responsible political forces, the rejection
of far-fetched political aims that don’t have a future, and the achievement
of a consensus on the resolution of the issues that artificially divide
society, that involve guarantees of state security and ensuring the welfare
and security of citizens,” the president’s press service quotes Vasyunyk as
saying.

The press service also reported that the presidential secretariat would be
working on Saturday, 29 July, and Sunday, 30 July. -30-

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[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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4. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S CHIEF OF STAFF OLEH RYBACHUK
PLAYS DOWN LACK OF PROGRESS IN CRISIS TALKS

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1710 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

Oleh Rybachuk, the head of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s
secretariat, has played down the lack of progress in crisis talks between
the president and parliamentary faction leaders.

In a live interview with private TV 5 Kanal on 30 July, Rybachuk praised
negotiators’ attitude to the talks and said they were set to continue on
Monday 31 July.

“Tomorrow morning, the president expects results of negotiations in
working groups and a continuation of the round table’s work, in particular
the approval of the declaration (of national unity),” Rybachuk said.
“Practically all parties have agreed with the spirit and letter of the
declaration.”

Rybachuk said he “would have been surprised if the Party of Regions had
signed the declaration so quickly”. He said the declaration does not
necessarily have to be signed by all five major parties involved in the
talks – the pro-Russian Party of Regions, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc,
propresidential Our Ukraine, the Socialists and the Communists.

He recalled that President Viktor Yushchenko still had the option of
dissolving parliament, but said the president “realizes that this would not
solve the problem”.

“I can’t imagine the situation whereby the declaration would not be signed.
This would force the president to call a fresh election,” he said. “This is
not blackmail. This is the way things are.”

Rybachuk said Yushchenko had until 2 August to decide whether to back
MPs’ nomination of his arch rival Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister.

Rybachuk rejected the assumption that Yushchenko called the round table to
show the politicians’ inability to reach any agreement and thus obtain more
grounds to dissolve parliament. -30-
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5. REGIONS PARTY DOES NOT ACCEPT ‘OUR UKRAINE’ BLOCS
POSITIONS IN NATIONAL UNITY COALITION TALKS

Ukrainian News Agency, Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – The Party of Regions says it doesn’t accept positions expressed by
the Our Ukraine Bloc during the talks on the National Unity Declaration
draft and creation of the coalition.

This follows from a statement by the presidium of the Regions Party’s
political council, a copy of which was made available to Ukrainian News.

As the statement reads, during the talks, the Our Ukraine Bloc is trying to
thrust its ideology on the possible wide coalition and govern the majority
by blackmailing and threatening to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada.

The Party of Regions says that it would not turn down its election program,
calling such propositions as disgraceful.

It is also calling on President Viktor Yuschenko to submit the candidature
of Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych to the post of premier, which was
proposed by the majority.

Member of the Regions Party faction Yevhen Kushnariov said that
representatives of the anti-crisis coalition cannot agree to three positions
in the declaration draft proposed by the president: [1] on NATO, [2] the
Russian language and [3] Common Economic Area.

“If our position is taken into account, we are ready to continue talks and
search for compromise solutions,” Kushnariov said.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, on July 29, the presidential secretariat
said that the working group had reached agreements on most provisions in the
National Unity Declaration.

The open meeting of the roundtable won’t take place before Monday, July 31.
July 29 through July 30, the Socialist Party and Party of Regions planned to
hold meting of their political councils and discuss the National Unity
Declaration drafted by the working group.

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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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6. UKRAINE’S PRO-RUSSIAN PARTY OF REGIONS REJECTS
“BLACKMAIL, THREATS” DURING CRISIS TALKS

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 29, 2006

KIEV – A key figure in the pro-Russian Party of Regions has accused
propresidential Our Ukraine of not being flexible enough during crisis talks
between President Viktor Yushchenko and the leaders of major political
parties.

In a live TV interview, MP Yevhen Kushnaryov said Our Ukraine was trying to
impose its ideology on others and rejected what he described as blackmail
and threats during the talks.

He said Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych does not want to become
a prime minister at the price of sacrificing his party’s principles.

Kushnaryov also said that the main stumbling blocks during the talks were
relations with NATO and Russia, and the status of the Russian language. The
following is an excerpt from a report by Ukrainian One Plus One TV on 29
July, subheadings have been inserted editorially::

[Presenter] A strongly-worded statement by the Party of Regions’ political
council was posted on the party website an hour ago. It accuses Our Ukraine
of trying to impose its ideology on the Party of Regions by threatening it
with dissolving parliament.

It also says that [Party of Regions leader] Viktor Yanukovych would not agree
to become a prime minister at the price of compromises mentioned in the
declaration [of national unity, which is discussed at the crisis talks called by
President Yushchenko].

We can now ask our guest, deputy Party of Regions faction leader Yevhen
Kushnaryov, about the party’s position. Good evening, Mr Kushnaryov.

[Kushnaryov, in Russian throughout] Good evening.

[Presenter] The previous report in our programme said that the main reason
why the [unity] agreement has not been signed is the fact that there is no
guarantee that Viktor Yanukovych will become prime minister. Do you think
this is true?

[Kushnaryov] I am surprised by this kind of statement. To start with, I’d
like to see them as nothing but a simple misunderstanding. Our party’s
position has been described in no uncertain terms in the statement by the
political council presidium, which you have quoted.

“BLACKMAIL AND THREATS”
In a few words, indeed, we do not accept negotiations based on blackmail and
threats. In essence, what we have been offered is – although there are 240
MPs in the coalition [in the 450-seat parliament] – to agree to Our Ukraine
imposing its own ideology on us all and, in effect, running the majority if
a grand coalition is set up. We have been asked to give up the basic
stipulations of our election programme which was backed by over 8m of our
compatriots.

Therefore, we do not accept this tone and these conditions. I’d like to
briefly quote from what our leader Viktor Yanukovych said at the political
council meeting. They contain a full and clear answer to all these
insinuations. Quote –

[Presenter, interrupting] I’d like to ask you something, if I may – top
representatives of your party said that a compromise has been found on all
issues. This is what they said yesterday. If this is so, which compromises
contained in the agreement are you not happy with? What are they about?

[Kushnaryov] I’ll answer your question after the quote. So, Viktor
Yanukovych said: I do not want to become prime minister at the price of
shame and of betraying our voters. I find it humiliating to hear this let
alone to agree to this.

To me, the premiership is not the goal but rather a means to an end. My goal
is to unite Ukraine and to improve the life of every Ukrainian family and to
make the world respect us. This is the essence of the Party of Regions’ position.

Now to the compromises. We have shown our ability to reach compromises
during the two weeks of talks with Our Ukraine – talks which, by the way,
they have repeatedly denied [were taking place]. We found compromise
wordings of all the difficult issues.

But on coming to the round table we were handed a completely different
document. In it, the wording of these issues was tough and uncompromising,
which is what split Ukraine a year-and-a-half ago [i.e. after the 2004 presidential
election].

If we had signed this document, we would not know how to hide our eyes for
shame. Naturally, we did not agree to this version. We have proposed a version
of our own. We are ready to look for a compromise, but let me say this again:
we do not accept blackmail or threats, because there is not legal basis to
them.

[Presenter] Mr Kushnaryov, thanks. But can you specify to our viewers what
are these compromises about?

STUMBLING BLOCKS
[Kushnaryov] We are arguing over three things. [1] First, NATO – we are not
against cooperating with NATO, but it is only the Ukrainian people who can
resolve the accession issue, and it is through a referendum. But they are
trying to force us to sign a formula for a NATO accession accord.

[2] The Russian language. They are trying to impose a formula upon us whereby
Russian will drag out an increasingly miserable existence in our country. We
want the Ukrainian and Russian languages to have equal rights.

[3] And lastly, we are being offered to go to Europe and forget that Russian
exists at all. What we are proposing is that the document should mention a
clear position on good-neighbourly relations with Russia and on continued
talks about the Single Economic Space [alliance backed by Russia].

[Presenter] It appears as though no agreement has been reached after more
than two days of round-table talks.

[Kushnaryov] That’s right. But if our position is taken into account, we are
ready for more talks and to look for compromises. -30-
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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7. PARTY OF REGIONS OFFICIAL TARAS CHORNOVIL SAYS PARTY
IS READY TO UNITE WITH THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNISTS
IN CASE OF A NEW EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION


Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – Member of the Regions Party faction in the Verkhovna Rada Taras
Chornovil says the party is ready to set up an election bloc with the Socialist
and Communist parties in case the president disbands the parliament and
announces an early parliamentary election.

Chornovil was speaking in an interview with the Fifth Channel. “We’re ready
to unite with our present coalition partners in a single bloc, but we understand
that this may split the state even more. I would not like them to push us into
that,” he said.

He also said that representatives of the Regions Party are planning to
attend the roundtable meeting on July 31 if it is held. However, leaders of
the party have doubts as to the fruitfulness of the talks.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, on July 29, the Party of Regions said it
had not accepted positions expressed by the Our Ukraine Bloc during the
talks on the National Unity Declaration draft and creation of the coalition.
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8. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER YURI YEKHANUROV SAID ROUND-
TABLE TALKS ‘COMPLICATED’ NO COMPROMISE ON FOUR ISSUES

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0834 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

KIEV REGION – Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov has described
the situation around the signing of a declaration of national unity [as a result
of the round-table talks among the president and leaders of major political
parties] as “complicated”.

“As of this minute, the situation is complicated,” the prime minister told
journalists in the village of Velyka Oleksandrivka (Kiev Region) today.

Yekhanurov added that the participants in the round-table talks focused on
four issues regarding which they have not reached a compromise yet –

[1] the federalization and integrity of Ukraine,
[2] the language issue,
[3] Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration
[4] and cooperation with the Single Economic Space [an economic

alliance of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine].

The prime minister, however, remains optimistic about the possibility of
reaching a compromise on these issues.

[At 0859 gmt on 29 July, Interfax-Ukraine quoted the leader of the Socialist
Party’s parliamentary faction, Vasyl Tsushko, as saying that the signing of
a declaration of national unity has been delayed because President
Yushchenko could not guarantee that he would submit the candidacy of the
Party of Regions leader, Viktor Yanukovych, to parliament for approval as
prime minister.

“Yushchenko does not trust Yanukovych today and Yanukovych under-
standably does not trust Yushchenko,” he said. “This is the name of the game.”]
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9. LEADER OF PARTY OF REGIONS YANUKOVYCH MEETS WITH A
TOP U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER
Kramer also meets with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1219 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – The leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, has met the US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, David
Kramer, Yanukovych’s personal website has said.

Yanukovych and Kramer discussed the domestic political situation in Ukraine,
ways of solving it and ways of reaching stability in society. Moreover, they
discussed prospects for foreign investment in Ukraine, the development of
economic relations between Ukraine, Europe and Russia and ways of deepening
US-Ukraine relations.

[UNIAN news agency also said in another report on 28 July at 1221 gmt that
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, David Kramer, also met Ukrainian
Foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk.

Tarasyuk informed Kramer of the recent political developments in Ukraine, in
particular, about the round-table discussion between representatives of
major political forces and members of the public initiated by Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko. Tarasyuk also stressed that Ukraine’s foreign
policy aimed at European and Euro-Atlantic integration remains unchanged.]

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10. ALL-UKRAINIAN ‘ROUND-TABLE’ A POTEMKIN VILLAGE

CREATED BY PRES YUSHCHENKO FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR
Regnum, Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 28, 2006
“All-Ukrainian ’round table’ is a unique and highly senseless measure. The
sitting created an impression that main personages knew something, were
close to reaching an agreement, not-so-actively participated in the event,
and refrained from engaging in serious discussions.

The whole event looked like a camouflage of agreements unknown to
spectators,” Kiev Political and Conflict Research Center Director Mikhail
Pogrebinskiy stated to REGNUM correspondent, commenting on the national
’round table’ with participation of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko
and parliamentary factions’ leaders held July 27.

“Timoshenko who evidently lost the event, worked for the audience,’ the
analyst continued. ‘Her behavior was entirely inadequate; she tried to
frighten Yushchenko without actually saying anything new, referring to some
falsified polls.”

The president, according to Mikhail Pogrebinskiy, demonstrated a strong
determination to join NATO. The event was a good and impressive show for

the US ambassador to Ukraine: “President demonstrated that he had done the
utmost in order to persuade even communists that all should agree with the
plan concerning NATO membership.”

On the options of the situation development, the analyst commented: “The
first option is that Our Ukraine will succeed in persuading the Regions
Party to agree with the formulation concerning the plan on NATO membership.

Then, Ukrainian Communist Party will not sign. It will possibly mean the
faction’s leaving parliamentary majority. Our Ukraine will replace it.

The other option is a neutral wording of the issue will emerge, something
about ‘mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO and access to it based on
referendum results.’ Generally speaking, the second formulation does not in
any way impede implementing the alliance accessing plan.

In such a case, the CPU may stay in the coalition, part of Our Ukraine may
join it in some format, and Yushchenko will try to position himself as the
national unifier.” -30-

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LINK: www.regnum.ru/english/680608.html
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12. UKRAINIAN INTERIOR MINISTER LUTSENKO WILL NOT WORK
IN A CABINET CHAIRED BY VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
I am against candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite Ukrainian society.

INTERVIEW: With Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
By Ivan Leonov, Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 28 Jul 06, p 4, 5
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has said that he will not work in the
Cabinet chaired by Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych. Speaking in an
interview with a propresidential newspaper, Lutsenko said that Yanukovych
cannot unite the nation.

Lutsenko also said that he quit the Socialist Party of Ukraine in protest
against the party’s joining a coalition of the Party of Regions and the
Communist Party of Ukraine, an act which Lutsenko called betrayal of the
party’s history.

The following is an excerpt from the first part of Lutsenko’s two-part
interview with Ivan Leonov, published in the Ukrainian newspaper Ukrayina
Moloda on 28 July under the title Yuriy Lutsenko: I am ruling out a violent
scenario, subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Leonov] Mr Lutsenko, today’s meeting of the president with top
law-enforcement officials (the interview took place Wednesday [26 July]
evening – Author) has already been dubbed by some Party of Regions MPs as
Bankova’s [street where presidential office is located] preparations for a
violent scenario. What was the meeting really about?

[Lutsenko] The meeting with the president was of working nature, we
exchanged information about ensuring the rule of law and order in this
country, with an emphasis on the duty of the police to protect the right to
free and peaceful expression of opinions by citizens of all political views.

NO USE OF FORCE AGAINST PROTESTORS
[Leonov] There were no discussions of a violent scenario?

[Lutsenko] It is possible that the state will need to be protected from
unconstitutional actions of revenge-seekers. Certain members of parliament
have taken the liberty to propose a vote on the candidacy of the prime
minister without it being submitted by the president, which is a blatant
violation of the Criminal Code, in particular Article 109: Actions aimed at
forceful change or overthrowing the constitutional order or capture of state
power.

In addition, Part 3 of this article says the following: public calls for
such actions using mass media. This means that even an act of announcing
these intentions is a crime. Today the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine]
issued an appropriate statement, calling on politicians and citizens to
refrain from unconstitutional ways of forming government bodies.

If someone attempts to storm or tries to limit in some way the jurisdiction
of the president, we will enforce the law, but without unnecessary
demonstration of power – peaceful protesters will not be limited in their
rights. The police will stop those who break the law, while the
Prosecutor-General Office and the SBU will assess these actions from a legal
standpoint.

Even though the law-enforcement bodies are seriously, even theoretically,
evaluating the possible threat from extremists, I think it will not come to
that. Like in the song, which, in my opinion, is close to the majority in
parliament today – “Our armoured train is parked on the side track”.

[Leonov] What was the need for today’s meeting with law-enforcement
officials and governors?

[Lutsenko] This was not an emergency meeting but a working one. Even though
we, of course, discussed our cooperation in the event of worsening political
situation. But this worsening is happening not because of people’s wishes,
but through politicians’ attempts to gain revenge at any cost. This concerns
politicians from various camps.

Only two viewpoints exist for them – theirs and the wrong one. That is why
they use arguments like public confrontation, some of them are already
picturing tanks storming, bloodshed. In reality, none of this exists in
society. I am constantly travelling to different regions, and I assure you
that people are not jumping on the barricades for the interests of fat cats
in parliament.

The governors confirmed this. But this is a special period, when the
authorities must coordinate their actions to preserve the rule of law and
order in the country. Other topics discussed with the governors included
smuggling, illegal migration, judicial system and so on.

[Leonov] A possible dissolution of parliament by the president is being
actively discussed in political and legal circles. Assuming it happens, but
[parliamentary speaker Oleksandr] Moroz does not comply with this decision
and MPs fail to leave parliament. Your actions? Are you going to kick them
out, or on the contrary – not let them in?

[Lutsenko] I cannot even imagine who may give such orders. If they want to
assemble in some building, let them assemble. MPs have this right, because
the dissolution of parliament does not mean that MPs lose their powers. But
I suspect that most of them will immediately run back to their
constituencies to prepare for a new election.

[Passage omitted: Reiterates that police will not use force against peaceful
protesters]

[Leonov] What about [youth party] Pora, which has moved towards the Cabinet
of Ministers building in order to prevent Yanukovych from taking the prime
minister’s seat in the event that he is appointed illegally?

[Lutsenko] I am not trying to hide my sympathy for Pora, but I must say that
despite my sympathy, last week we confiscated the chains, which they
intended to use to chain themselves to the parliament building, and huge
logs, which they apparently wanted to use to lock the entrances for MPs. We
wanted to make sure that these tools are not used for some extremist
purposes.

I can recall how we were kicked out of the Independence Square during the
Ukraine without Kuchma events [protests against President Kuchma in 2001] –
we were told that the square was closed for repairs. These working methods
of the authorities are in the past, because the Cabinet of Ministers is
already been repaired (laughing).

In reality, this is not so funny, because Pora can possibly be intuitively
feeling the danger to the state and democracy, and acting, albeit somewhat
childishly, but they are feeling where they need to be. With its actions in
front of the cabinet building, Pora reacted to anti-state calls for possible
usurpation of power, and showed that some people in Ukraine are prepared to
defend the constitutional order without waiting for law-enforcement bodies
to react. That is why I responded very calmly to this picket.

[Leonov] You sympathize with Pora and deny rumours that you may head a new
party called European Left. Some people are saying that you could be a good
candidate to head the Our Ukraine [propresidential party], this would
refresh the party and draw attention away from certain controversial
individuals in its leadership, would boost its ratings.

A recent opinion poll indicated that a good number of Ukrainians see you as
a leader of some political force. How does Yuriy Lutsenko himself see his
political future in the event of dismissal?

[Lutsenko] As long as I am the minister, I am not preparing any back-up
landing strips. At some point I decided not to run for parliament, trust me,
this was a principled decision for me. I came here to clean up the police,
to make it more effective. I have no other goals right now.

On the other hand, I am an active politician, and I like the fact that the
people are interested in my plans and seeing the possibility of my energy
being used in some direction. But I must disappoint you – I am not making
any political plans. [Passage omitted: repetition]

WILL NOT WORK WITH YANUKOVYCH
[Lutsenko] The only thing I can say is that I will not be involved in any
political force, especially not the one that had discredited itself and is
now serving the interests of oligarchs’ money. The president has also asked
me about my vision of the political situation, and I have informed him about
my decision not to work in the cabinet if it is headed by Yanukovych.

I stress that in this case the problem is not simply citizen Yanukovych, who
has some managerial experience, but Yanukovych as the symbol of a political
camp with the opposite views. It is unacceptable for me to endorse such a
cabinet with my presence.

Of course, weaklings can find a host of reasons: not to give up the seat to
others or to prove that even in those conditions I can work. But I think
that politics is not a game of who can fool the voters the most and who can
scam their own partners for the sake of portfolios, but adhering to stable
principles both in power and in opposition.

It is disgusting to see politicians bargaining for comfy chairs and
attempting to monopolize power instead of dividing it evenly , finding a
balance and having a cabinet of national reconciliation.

[Leonov] Are you also in favour of a grand coalition?

[Lutsenko] I think Ukraine today needs a cabinet of national reconciliation.
Because the people of Ukraine voted evenly for different political forces.
To form a cabinet headed by a bright symbol of one of the sides will mean a
victory for one side over the other.

There will be no reconciliation, no constructivism. The cabinet of national
reconciliation cannot be headed by someone who is afraid of meeting students
in Ivano-Frankivsk or coal miners in Donetsk.

That is why I am against the candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite
Ukrainian society from the Carpathian Mountains to the Black Sea, and I do
not wish to work in this cabinet of revenge against the principles that I
live by.

[Leonov] Judging by your words, you see a possibility of heading the
Interior Ministry in a cabinet of reconciliation, or am I mistaken?

[Lutsenko] Speaking of cooperation between parliament and the president, it
is desirable to find a constructive candidate for the post of prime minister
other than Yanukovych. Including, possibly, from the Party of Regions. If I
receive an offer to work with another members of the Party of Regions as
prime minister, then yes, I will work. But only in a cabinet of national
compromise.

If this unifying figure for the whole society is a member of the Party of
Regions – good, if he is from Fatherland, Our Ukraine or the Socialist
Party – not bad too. Of course, better yet would be a candidacy of an
unaffiliated policeman, but this is…[ellipsis as published] (laughing
sincerely) not foreseeable in the near future.

[Leonov] Is this option being considered even by the Regionals? Have you
received some propositions?

[Lutsenko] I had a conversation with the most serious player in the Party of
Regions on this issue, who was not against me staying as minister, but some
officials in key regional police directorates will need to be changed. I
said that this is unacceptable to me, and if I remain a member of the
cabinet, I do not plan to subordinate the Interior Ministry’s personnel
policy to the interests of any faction in parliament.

Similar attempts have been made before, when I was first appointed to this
post, but everyone understood very quickly that appointments would be made
only based on professionalism and honesty. Because this ministry is special,
and it cannot be under any political or business influence.

I consider de-politicization and de-commercialization of police the main
goal of this part of my life, and I have spent much effort and health on
this. It is impossible to put a price tag on this seat that would make me
change my beliefs. This was my answer. So in reality all these
talks…[ellipsis as published]

I understand very clearly that it may be desirable to keep Lutsenko in this
job to cover up some actions, which may be incompatible with the ideals of
democracy and freedom that we fought for. But I will not cover up this
policy, this is my right.

[Leonov] Which player in the Party of Regions are you talking about?

[Lutsenko] It does not matter who voiced this position, especially because
earlier some MPs from the Party of Regions voiced it during talks with the
leaders of the presidential secretariat.

Mr Yushchenko also asked me about my attitude to this possibility, and I
told him that I had publicly announced my decision, and that it was a matter
of principle. A politician must be predictable. [Passage omitted: Reiterates

that police must stay out of politics]

[Leonov] What do you think about the new tape scandal in parliament? [MP
Oleh] Lyashko of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has said that he has recordings
of phone conversations where MP Andriy Klyuyev boasts that the Regionals had
bought your teacher Oleksandr Moroz and the Socialist MPs for 300m dollars.

Taking into account that the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has turned to not only
the Prosecutor-General’s Office but also all other law-enforcement bodies,
the president and the National Security and Defence Council, how will the
Interior Ministry react to this and will it investigate the reports of
bribery? I understand that this issue is painful to you…[ellipsis as
published]

[Lutsenko] It is painful because the Socialist Party has changed radically.
But thank God, the request was sent not to the Interior Ministry but to the
Prosecutor-General’s Office and the SBU, this is their jurisdiction, and I
am most of all interested in an objective investigation.

The only problem is that the information on bribery was reported by Lyashko,
and I consider him a journalist who does not mind spreading untruthful data.

On the other hand, rumours of outrageous amounts of bribes in parliament
today are becoming more and more persistent. Today we discussed with the
head of the SBU, Mr [Ihor] Drizhchanyy, possible directions of
investigations into not only this but many other reports.

I will not announce our intentions, but in this case we are talking about a
professional inquiry into possible financial rewards given to MPs for voting
a certain way or taking a certain position. I mean not only the scandal
surrounding the speaker, but other suspicions as well.

In general, if the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has some evidence, it should be
send to the SBU and the Prosecutor-General’s Office. Because I am afraid
that politicians may be again slinging mud at each other, and the people
will stop reacting to these serious allegations.

I am afraid that in an effort to sling more mud at the opponent, it will
come down to a point where no-one can be trusted. This is serious, because
then politicians will stop fearing public accountability.

If someone cries Wolf! five times, in the end they will eat the whole herd,
and no-one will react. One must cry only when the wolf has eaten and there
is evidence that it was the wolf, not mice.

QUIT PARTY IN PROTEST
[Leonov] Has your request to quit the Socialist Party been reviewed, or are
you still a member of the party? Moroz is saying that until a decision is
made concerning your request, Lutsenko remains a Socialist.

[Lutsenko] I am not a member of the Socialist Party, because I suspended my
membership in accordance with the law when I became minister. Now I cannot
keep the party ticket of the political force which betrayed its history.

I would prefer not to say any names, because it is difficult…[ellipsis as
published] to judge the actions of the Socialist Party leaders, the people
whom I stood with shoulder-to-shoulder for 15 years, when the threats and
temptations were much bigger, but we went through it all. [Passage omitted:
repetition]

[Leonov] Has it been long since you last spoke with Moroz? Are you aware of
his motivation for the union with Yanukovych and [Communist leader Petro]
Symonenko?

[Lutsenko] A long time ago. This is a very difficult period for me,
obviously, and that is why it is hard. We did not talk about his actions.
You see, the motto of uniting Ukraine is obviously good. But it cannot be
implemented by helping yesterdays take revenge.

Maybe, in order to achieve complete unity, we need to bring back [former
President Leonid] Kuchma and [former presidential administration chief
Viktor] Medvedchuk? But Heorhiy Gongadze [murdered journalist] cannot be
brought back, unfortunately…[ellipsis as published]

When this anti-crisis coalition appeared, I went to Rivne Region for my
brother’s birthday. To be honest, I drank a lot of vodka, because it was
very difficult psychologically. I do not want to compete at presenting
images, the main assessment will be given by voters. Our paths with Moroz
have split, but it does not mean that I will look for nasty labels for these
people.

In my request to quit the party, I listed the reasons, and on the bottom I
added that I remain thankful for the victorious 15-year history of
cooperation with the Socialist Party, all the way to the Orange Revolution.
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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11. THE MANY CHOICES OF YUSHCHENKO

COMMENTARY
: by Tammy Lynch, Boston
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

Tuesday marks the first day when Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko can
legally dismiss the parliament for failing to produce a government. Such a
move would trigger new parliamentary elections in a country that has already
seen four rounds of elections (three presidential and one parliamentary) in
less than two years.

Since the creation of a majority coalition encompassing the Party of
Regions, the Socialists and the Communists, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
(BYUT) has been urging President Yushchenko to take just that step.

In contrast, the coalition members, and the majority of Yushchenko’s own Our
Ukraine Bloc, are calling on the president to avoid new elections, with Our
Ukraine either joining the government or forming an opposition.

The elections, they say, would produce disaster for Our Ukraine and the
President, since Our Ukraine’s popularity has decreased in recent months.
But is this absolutely certain? Or might they provide a way out?

What are the arguments? What are the possibilities?
President Viktor Yushchenko reportedly favors the idea that Our Ukraine
will officially join a majority coalition with the Party of Regions in order
to
maintain control of a number of ministries. Current Prime Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov and Anatoliy Kinakh also support this option.

It is not a simple option, however, which no doubt explains the President’s
hesitance. Yushchenko must be wondering just how much influence his
ministers would have in a Yanukovych government, with a parliament
dominated by the Party of Regions. Will they be ministers in name only?

Even more, will they continue to support the will of the president as the
center of power shifts in the country? Some individuals currently lobbying
Yushchenko for places in the Yanukovych government have not always
been loyal to the president’s ideals and goals.

For example, it is no secret that, during the acrimonious debates over WTO
reform in 2005, Anatoliy Kinakh worked against a number of the measures
introduced, suggesting they were harmful for Ukrainian business. On several
measures, his faction voted against the then-government of Yulia Tymoshenko,
as did a number of businessmen in Our Ukraine. What will they do now?
Yushchenko must also think of the response of voters to any partnership with
Yanukovych .

But whether Our Ukraine officially remains in opposition or joins the
coalition, the President must understand that both of these options will
likely lead to the same outcome – Our Ukraine splits, leaving roughly half
of the party in the opposition and half in the coalition. The “political
wing” of the party, or those who would be classified “democrats” in the
closest Western sense, is unlikely to agree to join the coalition.

Meanwhile, the “business wing,” which values close economic ties with both
the Party of Regions and Russia, is unlikely to agree to remain in
opposition. The inevitable result will be a split in the party, if not in
the immediate short-term, than within several months.

Therefore, no matter what choice he makes, Viktor Yushchenko will be faced
with a drastically changed bloc (and party) under a Yanukovych government.

The argument over the likely scenario of a new election reportedly is one of
Yushchenko’s greatest concerns. If polls are to be believed, Our Ukraine’s
support has disintegrated to under 10%, while BYUT’s has remained stable
or slightly increased and the Party of Regions has gained at least 5 points.
These results could mean that the Party of Regions alone would control a
majority of at least 226 deputies in parliament.

However, it should be noted that polls leading up to March’s 2006 election
were, in general, very wrong on specific numbers, although they did express
trends. The last polls before election-day suggested, for example, that Our
Ukraine would win over 20%, that BYUT would win under 15% and that
Yanukovych would win over 35%. One poll from a respected agency (KIIS),
listed BYUT’s support at 11%. The party received almost 23%.

Nevertheless, there is no ignoring the fact that support for the Party of
Regions has increased while support for Our Ukraine has decreased.

But let us play devils advocate for a moment. Is it possible that a new
election – even with decreased support for Our Ukraine – may not produce as
disastrous a result for the “orange” parties as it would seem on the
surface.

Most importantly, the Party of Regions stands today on the verge of
controlling a constitutional majority (301 deputies) in the parliament. Both
the leaders of BYUT and Our Ukraine fear that the official confirmation of a
Yanukovych government will produce massive defections from their ranks.

The leadership of both parties privately suggests that up to 40 deputies
from each faction could join the majority, thanks to various overlapping
interests and incentives. These votes, plus the 186 from Regions, 29 from
the Socialists and 21 from Communists, would put the new coalition well over
the number needed for a constitutional majority. It would, in fact, be able
to over-rule any presidential veto.

If Our Ukraine officially joins the coalition, the numbers would be similar,
also putting the decisions on presidential vetoes in the hands of the
parliament. What would these Our Ukraine deputies do as members of the
Party of Regions coalition, with the power centered in Yanukovych’s hands?
Could they withstand the various “incentives” provided? Are they as loyal
as Yushchenko would like? Will they support the president’s initiatives?
This must be a concern.

A new election is unlikely to provide Yanukovych with 300 deputies,
particularly if the Socialists and Communists do not return, as is possible.
In fact, while Regions likely would increase its plurality, the number of
BYUT deputies may also increase. A constitutional majority may be averted
in this way.

Let us suppose, for example, that Yanukovych gains a majority of 230
deputies (they now have 186), BYUT gains 135 (129 today) and Our Ukraine
gains 70 (down from 81) in a new election. It is likely that the number of
BYUT defectors – those who will most likely vote where the money is
located – will have been drastically reduced on a new list.

It is also likely that Our Ukraine, in a worse case scenario, would remain
split. Yanukovych could create a 270 deputy majority fairly easily. But, he
would not have 300 votes, and a unified, ideological opposition would have
been created. Ukraine would have achieved a real party structure in its
parliament.

The wildcards, of course, are the results of the Communist and Socialist
Parties, as well as the Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko. Our Ukraine could also do
far worse, and BYUT could do far better.

In the best case scenario, BYUT would increase its number of deputies to
150, by winning 30% of the vote, thereby assuring the lack of a
constitutional majority for Yanukovych. This is not probable, but also not
impossible.

It would take a real, organized political campaign, focusing on identifying
and activating voters. It is unknown whether Tymoshenko can produce such
a campaign, but such a result would clearly justify a new election.

Obviously, there are numerous “ifs,” and significant risks to a new
election. The two most difficult to estimate are the effect on an
increasingly tired and apathetic voting public, and the response of the
Party of Regions and its supporters to the announcement of a new election.

Will the Party of Regions understand that they could gain in parliament and
accept the election, or will they question the legality of the choice,
calling for court and street protests? Can a conflict be averted through
discussion before an announcement is made?

A new election, of course, also would increase the influence of Tymoshenko,
possibly at the President’s expense. The President no doubt understands
this well. Yushchenko, then, must decide who he believes is more dangerous
to him – Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Who is more dangerous to his goals
and ideals? Who is more dangerous to his legacy? To his international
reputation?

Yushchenko also has said that he must consider the unity of the country.
But, while concerns about the risks of a new election are clear and valid,
the claim that a Yanukovych -Our Ukraine government would unite the country
is difficult to understand.

The government in question would be led by representatives from Eastern
Ukraine – many of whom were the subject of past criminal charges and many
of whom worked actively against the orange revolution.

It likely would include the least trusted and least charismatic members of
Our Ukraine (the businessmen), and may have to endure criticism from Our
Ukraine’s most committed democratic reformers.

Even more, it would leave out representatives from the Bloc of Yulia
Tymoshenko, which won 14 out of 27 regions in the country during the
election. These regions include the entire central area and a good portion
of the West. Our Ukraine’s only regional victories came in the country’s
three most Western oblasts.

In essence, geographically speaking, a Party of Regions-Our Ukraine
government would unite the 10 Eastern and Southern regions of the country
(won by the Party of Regions) with the three most Western regions, skipping
everything in central and central-Western Ukraine.

However, even this scenario is questionable, since all indications from the
three Western regions suggest that voters there do not support a Party of
Regions-Our Ukraine coalition. From Lviv, Our Ukraine’s government
ministers could be viewed as nothing more than tools of the Party of
Regions. Therefore, in the end, the only real supporters of this “unifying”
government may be voters in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Clearly, there is no choice that provides Yushchenko with victory. The safe
choice would be to unify part of Our Ukraine with Yanukovych and hope that
he is unable to produce a constitutional majority.

Or, if a constitutional majority is formed, to hope that its members from
Our Ukraine remain loyal to the President and committed to the goals of
European integration, free market, competitive economics and Western ideals.

The risky choice is to call elections, either supporting a unified
“democratic forces” list, or coordinating the efforts of BYUT and Our
Ukraine. The results likely won’t provide a majority for the democratic
forces. They also will probably increase the influence of the Party of
Regions in parliament.

But the results may forestall a constitutional majority for Yanukovych ,
decrease the influence of money, more accurately represent the will of
voters, and create an opposition that is unified and that truly can
influence parliament.

The choice, as always, belongs to the President. -30
——————————————————————————————–
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/25/5886.htm
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========================================================
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13. YUSHCHENKO PREFERS AKHMETOV TO YANUKOVYCH

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Our Ukraine has repeatedly refuted information on the negotiations with
Party of Regions (PRU). Most probably, they will do it once again when
signing agreement that will allow Our Ukraine members to work in
Yanukovych’s government.

Political situation in Ukraine is still balancing between dissolution of the
parliament and singing an agreement with anti-crisis coalition.

The option of getting oppositional status for a pro-presidential party has
become unattractive.

Last week President Yushchenko made the right choice having chosen a new
negotiating partner. Now, instead of Viktor Yanukovych, Rynat Akhmetov will
reason with Yushchenko.

Akhmetov was there on Friday, he came to the president on Monday. They say,
he spent almost half a day with the president. Ukrainian billionaire spoiled
family vocation – his beloved ones have been waiting for him in Monte Carlo
for almost two months, but he has to breathe a hot capital smog instead of
enjoying Cote d’-Azur.

Akhmetov’s meetings with the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine show that he is
solving the problem of his private legitimacy in the West as well as his
position in Forbes.

This makes Akhmetov a more flexible negotiating partner than Yanukovych.

Something happens between Our Ukraine Block (NU) and PRU twice a day.
They seclude in the well-conditioned rooms. Since it is forbidden to call
such meetings ‘negotiations’ we can say they ‘share viewpoints’.

The meeting is attended by Petro Poroshenko (claims the First Vice-Minister
in Yanukovych’s government), Roman Zvarych (claims the Minister of Justice)
and Oleksandr Tretyakov (claims the Head of President’s Secretariat).

Acting National Security and Defense Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin
actively joined the negotiation process. Horbulin seems to go on working as
an acting NSDC Secretary forever, since his age will not allow him to be
fully and properly appointed.

The only subject of negotiations is participation of Our Ukraine in the
coalition with PRU.

[1] Yushchenko’s most desired option is to change Yanukovych’s nomination
for a more neutral personality. Besides, President’s Secretariat received
letters and appeals from central region communities to bring in the
nomination of Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

But Yanukovych does not accept any variants of retreat. It is the matter of
principle for him and Akhmetov: “We’ve got the first place at the elections,
the premier is ours.”

That’s their logic: “You had to agree when we offered you premier’s office
and half of the government in exchange for Yanukovych’s speakership. But
Our Ukraine chose orange coalition.”

Yanukovych’s stability in this matter seemed to make Yushchenko and Our
Ukraine give up.

[2] There is another condition for Our Ukraine to join the coalition – to
alter Coalition Agreement even with the Communists if they consent to basic
principles. Yushchenko’s only goal is to keep influence in the country.

It is all about spheres of influence for Yushchenko: security services,
coalition regulations and action plan.

According to some sources, Yanukovych even agreed to sign the government
letter to Brussels stating Ukraine’s readiness to join Membership Action
Plan.

Other sources claim Borys Tarasyuk accepts Yanukovych’s nomination if
“the vector of foreign remains unchanged.”

[3] The third condition set by Our Ukraine is the offices.

“What an appetite! We will go on a diet!” said PRU MP about negotiations
with Our Ukraine. There is a new word in political lexicon – ‘compensator’.

Our Ukraine wants to compensate the offices of premier and speaker (taken by
anti-crisis coalition) with three minister’s portfolios (the First
Vice-Premier, Interior Minister and Minister of Justice).

The rest of portfolios will be proportionally divided, as a result of which
Our Ukraine gets another 5-6 minister’s portfolios.

The thing is that some president’s ‘dear friends’ will not be pleased with
the Ministry of Culture or Ministry of Family, Youth and Sport. They want
an economic block which is logically to be controlled by Yanukovych.

Early election is unwanted scenario for all the players: expenses for
Akhmetov, all-national tour for Yanukovych and extremely high risk for
Yushchenko.

President’s analytics admit low ratings of their chief. Probably they hope
for unification of the ‘orange’ electorate and making up a ‘black-and-white
picture’: either Maidan (Yushchenko-Tymoshenko) or Anti-Maidan
(Yanukovych).

Under such conditions they forecast the same result as received at the
presidential elections 2004: 52% against 44% in favor for Yushchenko.

“Our slogan will be: “Save Ukrainian sovereignty!” revealed official from
Yushchenko’s staff. Yanukovych’s dependence from Moscow will become
the anti-thesis.

At the same time PRU has its own of Gallup Poll data: last week their rating
reached 42% which will get them 226 votes in the parliament in case of the
‘orange’ failure.

In such case Yushchenko is helpless – the parliament elected at early
election can not be dissolved for a period of a year.

Early election is not Yushchenko’s bluff, his staff claims. Moreover, his
recent meeting with Yanukovych, who proved to be absolutely uncomplying,
made dissolution of the parliament look even more real.

Recently Yushchenko got expert legal analysis from the Institute for State
and Law which also serves for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

Lawyers backed Yushchenko’s logic which aroused Moroz’s indignation. The
Law Institute of the Verkhovna Rada came up with a completely different
decision. Obviously no other legal establishment dared to do the job within
such time limits.

Now Moroz is in a very difficult situation when he can’t have any influence
on his own future career. No one negotiates with him.

Moroz will not play on his own since a capitalist will never understand a
socialist. The only thing Moroz can do is to vote for Yanukovych without
Yushchenko’s submission.

Such variant is absolutely unacceptable for Akhmetov who needs to take care
of his foreign business partners and the country’s investment image. It is
easier for him to live through another election. Besides, American
consultants and spin doctors are sure to back him in this matter.

Yushchenko might be interested in early elections to get his speaker in the
parliament. Even if Yanukovych has an overall majority, it is the president
who brings in premier’s nomination for parliament’s approval. And Yushchenko
sets only one condition for that – he nominates HIS Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada.

Friday afternoon was determined the best time to dissolve the parliament. It
does not matter what Friday, this one or next. The thing is that there will
be a 3-day break in the work of the Verkhovna Rada. Two days off and
miserable vocations are the main demoralizing factors for a Ukrainian MP.
———————————————————————————————-
Translated by Eugene Ivantsov for UP

LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/27/5928.htm
—————————————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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14. “YURIY KRAVCHENKO – SUICIDE RULED OUT”
Suicide verdict in death of former Ukrainian Interior Minister questioned

“We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them. This

situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present one, too.”

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 29 Jul 06, p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

Despite official findings to the contrary, former Interior Minister Yuriy
Kravchenko was killed rather than committed suicide, an influential
Ukrainian weekly has said.

Kravchenko, who died of two gunshot wounds, lost consciousness after the
first shot and would not have been able to inflict the second would himself,
former Health Minister Mykola Polishchuk, who is also an expert in firearms
injuries, told the paper in an interview.

The weekly bitterly criticized the Ukrainian police and concluded that the
current administration was interested in covering up the murder. Kravchenko,
who had been accused of involvement in the murder of journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze, was found dead in March 2005.

The following is an excerpt from an article by Oleksandra Prymachenko,
entitled “Yuriy Kravchenko – suicide ruled out”, published in the Zerkalo
Nedeli newspaper on 29 July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Newspaper introduction] “The penetrating gunshot wounds suffered by Yuriy
Fedorovych Kravchenko were caused by his own hand,” wrote a specialist who
carried out the official examination of the body of Ukrainian Interior
Minister Yuriy Kravchenko.

Let us hope that this expert is still alive. Despite the doubts about
suicide which have always existed and have been expressed on a number of
occasions, including in Zerkalo Nedeli.

Despite the fact that Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko voiced his own doubts
on this score a long time ago. And even despite the fact that on the basis
of the very same material evidence a recognized authority in firearms
studies has reached a totally different conclusion. The official expert may
still remember who it was that made his hand tremble as it wrote the lines
quoted at the beginning.

We asked Mykola Polishchuk to help “decipher” for the uninitiated the
official conclusion of the expert who carried out the investigation to
establish the cause of Kravchenko’s death.

The first book to be published in the former USSR about this type of
injury – “Firearms injuries to the head” – was edited by V. Polishchuk [as
published] and V. Storch. Mykola Polishchuk is the author of the part which
refers to peacetime. A second paper written by Polishchuk was called
“Firearms injuries to the central nervous system”.

This, among other things, examines bullet and shrapnel wounds. Furthermore,
Mykola Polishchuk was for over 10 years a consultant at regional, municipal
and then republican forensic examinations into skull and brain injuries and
injuries to the central nervous system, including firearms injuries. This
gentleman is better known to the general public as health minister.

Acquainted with the documents provided by Zerkalo, including the expert’s
official findings, Mykola Polishchuk agreed to answer our questions and to
provide his own conclusion.

KRAVCHENKO PASSED OUT AFTER FIRST SHOT
[Prymachenko] Mr Polishchuk, let’s begin with the findings. You have studied
the results of the external and internal examination of the body, the
results of the laboratory examination and the expert’s conclusions. What is
your conclusion?

[Polishchuk] Going by the nature of the injuries described in the documents,
it is quite clear that this was a violent death and the injuries could not
have been inflicted by the person’s own hand. The possibility that this
could have been suicide has to be ruled out.

There were two firearms wounds on the body (the front surface of the neck
and the right temple). The first was lethal and could have led to death
through loss of blood without immediate medical attention. The first
firearms wound was at close range from a weapon pressed against the body.

The direction of the wound is uncharacteristic of a wound inflicted by the
person himself, because it travels from bottom to top and from inside to
outside. It is extremely difficult to believe that a person would be capable
of injuring himself in this way – it would be too awkward.

As a result of this firearms wound he sustained several fractures of the
lower jaw, seven teeth were broken (traumatic amputation), a fracture of the
upper jaw and nasal cartilages and damage to the tongue. Thus, he had to
lose consciousness as a result of such a trauma.

[Prymachenko] Do you admit there is a hypothetical possibility, albeit one
in a thousand, that with such an injury a person could not lose
consciousness?

[Polishchuk] I don’t think that is possible, however strong-willed he might
be. After such an injury he could only have grown weak and feeble and he
would have to have let a pistol fall from his hands. Nobody could have held
a weapon in his hands after such an injury.

He was sitting not in an armchair, in which he could have propped himself up
on his elbows, but on a high chair. With his height (over 190 cm) and
weight, it is also ruled out that after such a shot he would not have fallen
from the chair.

Unfortunately, the question of whether he could have lost consciousness was
not put to the experts.

The second injury – to the temple – was the fatal one. It was delivered at
close range, but it left no contact imprint. That would have been
characteristic of a suicide, and especially bearing in mind the previous
injury, if he had shot himself he would have had to press the barrel against
his temple.
FIRST SHOT SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY SECOND
[Prymachenko] In the official findings it says that the gap between the
first and the second shot could have been from several seconds to a dozen or
more minutes. What’s your opinion?

[Polishchuk] The period between the first and second injuries was very
short – we are talking about seconds. It could not have been a dozen or more
minutes, or even a few minutes. This is borne out by the lack of blood in
the lungs, the bronchial tubes and the stomach.

If a person had remained alive with such an injury, he would had to have
taken several breaths. That means blood would have passed into the lungs,
the gullet and the stomach.

A person in such a condition would undoubtedly have swallowed mucus with
blood, and perhaps fragments of tooth and bone. The internal examination
shows clearly that this did not happen.

[Prymachenko] The examination officially concludes that, after the first
firearms wound Kravchenko could have made certain movements of his own.
Do you agree with that?

[Polishchuk] Unfortunately, the question was not raised before the forensic
examination as to whether a person could have made not just independent, but
precise deliberate actions after the first injury and within a certain
period of time.

I maintain that after the first injury he would not have recovered
consciousness. I do not agree with the experts’ claims that the first injury
was a moderately severe one, because the number of extracted teeth alone
shows that this was a serious injury.

I maintain that a few seconds after the first injury this person was
incapable of carrying out any deliberate precise actions. That is
impossible.
WHO COVERED UP THE TRUTH?
[Prymachenko] According to Zerkalo’s information, which Mr Polishchuk
declined to comment on, the above information was brought to the attention
of the heads of the law-enforcement bodies immediately following
Kravchenko’s death and after the external examination by the appropriate
agencies. And subsequently we reminded the law-enforcement bodies about
this a number of times.

Which unseen hand concealed this crime at all stages of its investigation by
the law-enforcement agencies? Why did the Orange authorities not make sure
that it was properly investigated?

Why does it lead us to think that there is no proper authority in our
country or that it had something to fear in connection with Kravchenko’s
murder, although we have always been assured that the opposite was the case?

Why have Kravchenko’s family had to bear the cross of his “suicide” as well
as the loss of a loved one? Why have they been forced to think that he left
them of his own volition? They most probably have always believed that his
martyrdom redeemed a lot.

There are more questions now than there were on the day Kravchenko died.
And the “suicide note” – a charge in which only one specific name has been
mentioned – [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kuchma – has quite a
different ring about it.

It cannot be ruled out for certain that those who gave the order to the
murderers did not make any special effort to conceal the real reason for
Kravchenko’s death. What they did understand was that pinpointed
intervention is required, but our so-called law-enforcement system has its
own way of operating – automatically, by reflex action.

After all, everyone knew who Kravchenko was, and the last thing anyone
needed was a headache in the form of a “cold case”. Nobody needed the truth,
starting with external surveillance which was shadowing Kravchenko and at
best neglected its duties, and ending with the top people at the
Prosecutor-General’s Office.

And it is possible that in this whole disgraceful investigation the
organizers of the murder put the screws only on the expert. And later
everybody closed their eyes and, forgetting about professional honesty,
lied, lied and lied again.

The chronology of this lie is immense, like the list of those who turned
over the pages of this case who could and should have said: this was not
suicide. And yet this was obvious even to a non-professional examining the
dead body.

[Passage omitted: Only Yuriy Lutsenko doubted this was suicide]

We do not know who killed Kravchenko or [murdered journalist Heorhiy]
Gongadze, or what happened to Kyrpa [former transport minister who was
found dead in December 2004] and we have been unable to get answers to
these and many other questions.

We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them.
This situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present
one, too.

And it is clear that each serious criminal case in the future will be
investigated exclusively from the point of view of political expedience. The
decision to close the Kravchenko case, which was investigated by the
Prosecutor-General’s Office, has now been revoked by it.

The reason is Yuriy Lutsenko’s statement that he has information that
rejects the suicide version.

Will not these “new circumstances” be the basis for a new investigation in
the shape of a proper experts’ examination? -30-
———————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
15. CARTE BLANCHE FOR VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website in Ukrainian, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Jul 24, 2006

Tonight at 0:01 Yushchenko will get the chance to dissolve the parliament.
Very few politicians will sleep well on this night. In fact, they may sleep
like babies. At the first point, they will look pretty miserable on TV with
livid rings under the eyes.

At the second point, anyway the decision is expected in the morning since at
this time our president is either watching Discovery Channel or dreaming of
something nice but not issuing decrees.

At the third point, Our Ukraine Block (NU) keeps negotiating with Party of
Regions (PRU) on formation of an orange government chaired by.Viktor
Yanukovych.

This Tuesday morning Viktor Yushchenko meets leaders of parliamentary
factions in his Secretariat. This meeting may be always called a
‘consultation’ which according to the Fundamental Law precedes calling early
election.

July 25 is the day half of Ukrainian politicians call the deadline or the
date of parliament dissolution. The logic is quite simple: since
Yekhanurov’s government resigned on May 25 today is the 60th day Ukraine
is living without new Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 90 of the Fundamental Law is a true present for Tymoshenko: “The
President is empowered to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada in case a new Cabinet
of Ministers is not formed after the 60 days from the resignation of the
previous government.”

However, humorist lawyers from Yanukovych’s staff do not consider July 25
Time-X. They believe Yekhanurov’s government did not resign but abdicated to
the newly elected Verkhovna Rada.

Ukraine has no Constitutional Court which can clear up the whole matter. PRU
deputies from the previous Verkhovna Rada and personally Oleksandr Moroz
dragged the procedure of adjuring judges of the Constitutional Court.

Now the parliament rests on juridical hexogen since the amended Fundamental
Law contains numerous holes for Yushchenko to squeeze in.

In particular, the Fundamental Law implies no obligation for the president
to bring in the nomination of the prime minister proposed by the coalition
for parliament’s approval. Moreover, he is granted 15 days to consider the
nomination, i.e. the president may hesitate. Otherwise he would be deprived
of such time-out.

Well, if only Medvedchuk knew what heritage he left for Yushchenko when
writing the Fundamental Law. Now Viktor Volodymyrovych can only sunbathe in
Monte Carlo and try to interpret the Constitution of Ukraine explaining what
exactly he meant by certain provisions and articles.

But now Medvedchuk’s viewpoint is absolutely insignificant. As known,
Medvedchuk is prosperous in business but not too successful in politics.

Now Yushchenko gets carte blanche to blackmail Yanukovych. If the latter
does not accept the president’s terms the former may dissolve the
parliament.

Here goes the scenario: Yushchenko waits till the end of a 15-day term
(August 2nd or 3rd), takes his sit in front of a camera on the background of
a library and the national flag. He records the following speech:

“Dear fellow citizens, dear friends. As a guarantor of the Fundamental Law I
will not risk to bring in the nomination of Viktor Yanukovych (whom I
respect) for parliament’s approval since half of Ukraine just curses at him.
Only Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to decide if I have the right
not to submit premier’s nomination. That’s why I appeal to the
Constitutional Court and call to form this body of legitimate power in the
country.”

Months will pass till the court is completely formed. The decision of the
Constitutional Court may be expected on the eve of Maidan anniversary. And
that’s the most optimistic forecast!

Obviously, appeal to the Constitutional Court is the way to win the time and
space to reform Our Ukraine, get Yuriy Lutsenko head the party list and face
future parliamentary elections.

Figuratively saying, the court will be a football player who is dragging a
game while Yushchenko chooses an appropriate time for the final whistle to
announce a new game.

While the time works for Yushchenko, Tymoshenko will lose her electorate
since Our Ukraine gets back its voters. That’s why Tymoshenko stands for
immediate dissolution of the parliament even if she has to run for the
parliament under one list with Our Ukraine.

Evidently, Oleksandr Moroz has nothing to lose. Early election is a
political death for him. If Socialist Party runs for the parliament by
itself they will never get into the Verkhovna Rada. If Socialists join PRU
Moroz is sure to play the second fiddle. He can forget about speaker’s
office since Akhmetov has lots of young and ambitious friends who will learn
Ukrainian language.

Moroz has no other choice but to make Yanukovych the prime minister now. He
is ready to vote for his nomination even without Yushchenko’s submission.
Yushchenko in his turn will not recognize Yanukovych a legitimate premier.
But who said there wouldn’t be 150 indefeasible MPs who would try to smash
down the doors of the Cabinet of Ministers building and get Yanukovych in
there?

Another important factor is that Yushchenko has no influence in the
Prosecutor General’s Office. But those guys from Donetsk do have it.

Yushchenko should be alarmed by Moroz’s live performance on the National TV
Channel: “Even if such decree were issued the Verkhovna Rada would never
yield to such legal mayhem,” Moroz started to use Khazbulatov’s lexicon.

So, historical spiral forms a ring now. There were three presidents in
Ukraine in 2004: Kuchma in Koncha Zaspa, Yushchenko who had given an oath
in a half-empty session hall and Yanukovych who had recorded his greeting
broadcast appeal and who had received greetings from Moscow, Minsk and
Tashkent.

Now we might have three premiers: Yekhanurov as an acting PM, Yanukovych who
was elected without Yushchenko’s consent and.Tymoshenko as people’s premier
supported by Kyiv Maidan.

However, this medal has its reverse. Yushchenko makes Party of Regions
consent to his terms. According to sources of Ukrayinska Pravda, Yushchenko
is ready to bring in Yanukovych’s nomination in case Our Ukraine gets at
least six offices:

the First Vice-Prime Minister, Interior Minister, Minister of Justice,
Minister of Industrial policy, Economics Minister, Finance Minister.

“Having heard that, our delegation stood up, shook hands and went away. It
is easier for us to get ready for early election and to bury ‘the orange’
forever!” said PRU representative. Another day of negotiations brought no
results.

However offering his ministers to Yanukovych, Yushchenko has to keep in
mind that any minister may be sacked by a simple voting in the parliament.

Our Ukraine desperately needs to have influence on Yanukovych without
forming a coalition since Yushchenko can blackmail PRU threatening them
with leaving the coalition which will result in its collapse. That’s why PRU
needs a cooperation agreement with Our Ukraine.

.Meanwhile 5 buses with a special police squad Berkut were noticed at
President’s Secretariat. Kyiv police has reassured it is not Yushchenko’s
guards but reserve subunits to prevent fights and disorder near the
Verkhovna Rada. -30-
—————————————————————————————————
Translated by Eugene Ivantsov for UP.
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/25/5890.htm
———————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
16. RUSSIANS REFUSE TO RAISE UKRAINIAN FLAGS ON SHIPS
DURING RUSSIAN NAVY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN CRIMEA
Ukrainian TV critical of Russian Navy Day festivities in Crimea

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

A private Ukrainian TV channel has broadcast a critical report about Russian
Navy Day celebrations in Crimea. The Russians rejected Kiev’s demands to
raise Ukrainian flags on ships taking part in the festivities, the TV said.

It added that this was the first time that Ukrainian sailors had not been
invited to attend the event. The TV also showed deputy Russian Duma speaker
Sergey Baburin saying that Russian troops should be “the masters” in Crimea.
The following is the text of a report by Ukrainian One Plus One TV on 30
July:

[Presenter] For the first time over the past eight years, the Russian Black
Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine’s Sevastopol has not invited Ukrainian
sailors to take part in the Navy Day celebrations. The holiday itself was
marred by the crash of a jet taking part in the [Russian] Baltic Fleet
parade. Two pilots were killed. However, some Russian guests did not like
restrictions on flights in Crimea.

[Correspondent] A traditional parade is the only event that remained
unchanged on Russian Navy Day. However, this was the first time it was
celebrated without Ukrainian sailors. They were not invited. The Russians
also rejected a demand to raise Ukrainian flags on their ships.

[Serhiy Kunitsyn, head of the Sevastopol city administration, in Russian]
The Bora ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet hoisted the Ukrainian flag. I
think this is normal. One should not see politics here and be indignant
about this. This shows respectful relations between the two countries.

[Correspondent] However, Russian Black Sea Fleet commanders agreed to the
Ukrainian authorities’ demand to cancel missile launches during a water
sports show. The aviation participation was limited for safety purposes as
well.

[Vladimir Masorin, Russian navy commander] Missiles and bombs were once
launched from this bay, but we do not do this any more. And probably this is
right. Because there are so many people here and the holiday should first of
all be safe and nice.

[Correspondent] Visiting politicians were more outspoken. They do not lose
hopes to be masters in some of Ukraine’s territory.

[Sergey Baburin, deputy speaker of the Russian Duma] I am upset with
restrictions that are taking an increasing toll on the parade. The ban on
missile launches, the limited use of aviation during the parade as well as
other demands by Ukraine certainly make me upset. My wish is modest: the
Russian troops should be the masters here.

[Correspondent] The same day, the head of the Sevastopol city administration
dismissed rumours that it was the last time that the Russian navy celebrates
its day in Sevastopol. The Russians will celebrate it until their term of
deployment in Crimea expires.

[Video shows people watching ships and a submarine on the parade, sailors
shooting an old canon placed onboard, amphibious personnel carriers leaving
the ships, parachuting tricks in the sky, sailors aligning on a ship’s
deck.] -30-
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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17. MILITARY SERVICE FOR GRADUATES OF HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE NOT REQUIRED AFTER 2010

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1439 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – Graduates of higher education institutions in Ukraine will not have
to do their military service after 2010, Ukrainian Defence Minister Anatoliy
Hrytsenko has told a meeting with rectors of institutions of higher
education.

The meeting took place at the Ministry of Defence. The Ukrainian Minister of
Science and Education, Stanislav Nikolayenko, also took part in the meeting.

[Currently a number of state-owned civil institutions of higher education in
Ukraine provide military training to their male students, after which the
graduates obtain the rank of junior officers in reserve and do not have to
join the army. Those who do not undergo military training during their
course are obliged to join the army after graduation.]

The press service of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry has said that the state
programme for development of armed forces in Ukraine for 2006-2011 initially
included a provision for a significant reduction of the number of military
training departments in institutions of higher education, including those
which train officers in reserve. [Passage omitted: students in Ukraine were
very upset about this provision of the programme.]

The Ministry of Science and Education reached an agreement with the Ministry
of Defence about the gradual reduction of military training departments at
civil institutions of higher education. Another decision was taken by the
government to start this reduction in 2008, while earlier it was planned for
2006.

[Passage omitted: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a decree to reduce
the number of military training departments at civil institutions of higher
education on 25 July 2006.] -30-
———————————————————————————————–
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18. POLISH PRESIDENT APPOINTS POLISH-UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE
Sister committee to be appointed on the Ukrainian side

Source: PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2120 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, July 28, 2006

WARSAW – President Lech Kaczynski on Friday [28 July] appointed a
Polish-Ukrainian Presidential Committee. A sister committee is also to be
created on the Ukrainian side. “Such a committee has sense, because it can
counteract ‘storms’,” feels member of the main council of the Union of
Ukrainians in Poland [ZUwP], Miron Sycz.

As has been stated on the presidential website, the appointment of the new
body is “an expression of the weight that Lech Kaczynski attaches to the
development of Polish-Ukrainian political and economic relations”.

The head of L. Kaczynski’s staff, Elzbieta Jakubiak, has become the
committee’s chairwoman, while a deputy head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Pawel Kowal, has become its deputy head.

The composition of the newly-appointed body also includes: two deputy
ministers of internal affairs and administration, Wladyslaw Stasiak and Pawel
Soloch, an undersecretary of state at the Presidential Chancellery, Andrzej
Krawczyk, and the deputy ambassador of the Republic of Poland in
Washington, Boguslaw Winid.

As the presidential press services have written, in accordance with an
agreement at the Polish and Ukrainian presidential level a sister
Presidential Committee is also to be appointed on the Ukrainian side. Its
composition is also to include experts on Polish-Ukrainian relations and
ministry representatives.

In the view of member of the main council of the Union of Ukrainians in
Poland [ZUwP] Miron Sycz, Poland and Ukraine are mutually “strategic
countries”. “Let us put it bluntly: a ‘storm’ in one country or the other
means a serious destabilization in the whole of Europe. Such a committee has
sense, because it can counteract such ‘storms’,” Sycz stressed in an
interview for PAP.

In his view, although the appointed committee will serve both Poland and
Ukraine in equal degree, at the moment it is nonetheless “needed more by
Ukraine”. -30-

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19. COUNCIL OF EUROPE OFFICIAL URGES MOLDOVA TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable

Infotag news agency, Chisinau, in Russian 0935 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

CHISINAU – It is very important for Moldova to improve its relations with
the Russian Federation, without which it is impossible to solve many serious
problems in this region of Europe, the chairman of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Rene van der Linden, told a
news conference in Chisinau on Thursday [27 July] evening.

Rene van der Linden said that Moldova and Europe should work with Russia,
which is also part of Europe and a member of the Council of Europe and it
should meet its commitments.

“The reform process is taking place in Moldova much easier than in Russia
because of historic, political and geographical reasons. However, building
good relations with Russia is in Moldova’s and Europe’s interests,” the PACE
chairman said.

He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable, but
mentioned Moldova’s good relations with this neighbour.

Rene van der Linden also said that the PACE has asked the parliamentary
committee for appointments and immunity to prepare a report on the case of
former Moldovan Defence Minister Valeriu Pasat who is now in prison. Valeriu
Pasat has been sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for selling MiG-29
fighters to the USA in 1997. -30-

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20. UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON ‘PAUSE’

INTERVIEW: With Prof. Robert Legvold
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 28, 2006

PRAGUE – For four months, Ukraine has been in the grips of a political
deadlock. Robert Legvold, a professor of political science at New York’s
Columbia University, says that recent constitutional changes granting new
powers to the Verkhovna Rada have created a situation where lawmakers are
fighting over power, not policy.

RFE/RL: It’s been four months since parliamentary elections in Ukraine. How
would you describe the political climate there, given the protracted
struggle to form a government?

Robert Legvold: I think Ukraine has now moved into a very difficult period,
because in many ways the underlying trends that had been there for some
time — notwithstanding the November-December Orange Revolution in 2004 —
have now really settled in and created a kind of paralysis or political
stasis within the system that I think is likely to be there for some time. I
don’t see an easy way out.

RFE/RL: To what degree are the current difficulties a result of the new
constitutional shift in power away from the presidency toward the
parliament?

“This struggle to get a government already proves the difficulty that any
government that would be formed will have in actually conducting a national
political and economic agenda.”

Legvold: The new arrangements, by weakening the presidency and empowering
both the Rada and the prime minister’s slot, virtually guaranteed that with
an election as close as the March election, that there would be this
incredible struggle among the different political groups, particularly since
the results of the elections were not decisive and it created the grounds
for the struggle.

RFE/RL: Why have the various political factions been unable until now to
form a government? Is this a clash of personalities, or a battle over more
substantive policy issues?

Legvold: That struggle was more intense because the stakes in the political
contest are essentially only over power and influence within institutions
and they’re not fundamental conflicts over policy. And in any political
system that’s well-functioning, normally you want political differences and
political contests to be about political alternatives, policy alternatives,
and that’s not what’s happening in Ukraine.

RFE/RL: Ahead of the elections, many were anticipating the possibility of a
partnership between Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions. It seemed like a compromise that Yushchenko could accept — but
only as long as Yanukovych was not made prime minister. Four months later,
does Yushchenko still have the political clout he needs to say no to
Yanukovych?

Legvold: I think his ability to say no and stick by it is very considerably
weakened. It doesn’t mean he won’t attempt to do it. When I first thought
about what might happen coming out of the election, one of the possibilities
did seem to me to be an alliance between the Yushchenko group and the Party
of Regions.

But we got to it in a very cluttered fashion, not the least because of this
imponderable that emerged at a critical stage — that is, the Socialists’
and [party head Oleksandr] Moroz’s decision to defect from the other
coalition. And that’s what caused all of this to unravel, and pushed
Yushchenko into what was certainly something he didn’t want, which was

to take seriously a cooperation with the Party of Regions.

RFE/RL: So what now? Will Ukraine get a working government?

Legvold: I think the future is not terribly promising in terms of clear and
progressive, coherently pursued policy. This struggle to get a government
already proves the difficulty that any government that would be formed will
have in actually conducting a national political and economic agenda.

We have seen now for some years inefficiency in policymaking because of the
makeup of the Rada and the changing nature of the government even before
Yushchenko came to power in 2004. So I think that situation that we’ve
associated with Ukraine is likely to remain or even get worse in the near
term. But it need not produce a crisis.

RFE/RL: Will a new parliament dominated by the Party of Regions mean a
complete shift toward Russia, and away from the pro-Western policy that
Yushchenko has made the keystone of his presidency?

An anti-NATO, pro-Russia demonstration in Crimea last month (RFE/RL)Legvold:
I don’t think that Ukraine is going to engage in political donnybrook at the
top level over the question of, say, Ukraine’s entry into NATO, or
alternatively on the other side, enormous cleavages over the question of the
relationship to be built with the Russians, or even over domestic policy.

That, however, doesn’t add up to an efficient agenda — that adds up to an
agenda that I would describe as lowest common denominator.

RFE/RL: After the Orange Revolution, support for Yushchenko and Ukraine

wasvery high in the West. How much has this protracted crisis hurt Ukraine in
terms of Western goodwill?

Legvold: It has not lost international goodwill, but it leaves Brussels and
Washington in a quandary, because it appears that any straightforward
progress on Ukraine’s part that would qualify them for either the EU or the
next steps on NATO are under a cloud at the moment.

I think what it does is put a kind of pause in Ukraine’s relationship with
the West, raising question marks about Ukraine. But I don’t think it changes
their basic attitude, hopes for Ukraine — including hopes that it can make
movement toward integration with the West.

RFE/RL: What about Russia? Moscow is sure to welcome a Yanukovych-led
parliament. Does this mean a situation where Russia eases its pressure on
Ukraine?

Legvold: With the Russians, it may have actually eased the situation,
because I think the Russians have stopped worrying about the so-called
colored revolution. I think it’ll therefore ease the question of Ukraine as
an issue in Russia’s relations with the West.

And I think given this makeup — this stalemate in politics — it also means
that the lowest common denominator on the question of Russia and Ukraine
is going to favor a civil relationship with Russia, but not one where the
Ukrainians roll over, because even Yanukovych and his people are not
about to concede everything to Gazprom on a gas deal. -30-
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http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/fb14de87-5d75-4e4c-8d48-46ba42242e6a.html
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[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
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21. MUSEUM OF COMMUNISM IN PRAGUE

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 21
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

PRAGUE – The Museum of Communism is the first museum in Prague
(since the Velvet Revolution) exclusively devoted to a system established
in the sphere of the former Soviet Union. The Museum of Communism
will allow for the display and interpretation of objects and historic
documents.

It stands as an authoritative historical narrative relating to this 20th
century phenomenon and is in no way intended by the organisers as a
filter for contemporary political issues in the Czech Republic.

The original items and meticulous installations containing authentic
artefacts will be displayed in the three main rooms, while the adjacent
projection room will provide a space for regular film screenings,
educational activities, occasional lectures and temporary displays
pertaining to the subject of the permanent exhibition.

Highlights from the displays include rare items from the Museum’s own
comprehensive archive as well as material obtained by the organisers
from major collections, both public and private.

To read a series of news articles about the museum click on:
http://www.muzeumkomunismu.cz/eng_articles.html

Museum of Communism, Legacy s.r.o., Na prikope 10
110 00 Prague 1, The Czech Republictel.: +420 224 21 29 66
email: muzeum@muzeumkomunismu.cz
LINK: http://www.muzeumkomunismu.cz/
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22. JACQUES HNIZDOVSKY AT UKRAINIAN MUSEUM NYC
Acclaimed Ukrainian painter and printmaker (1915-1985)

ArtDaily.com, USA, Sunday, July 23, 2006

NEW YORK CITY.- The Ukrainian Museum presents the exhibit ‘Jacques
Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White’ through September 27. The
works of critically acclaimed painter and printmaker Jacques Hnizdovsky
(1915-1985) will be on view at The Ukrainian Museum in New York City
from June 11 to August 27, 2006.

Titled ‘Jacques Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White,’ the exhibition
showcases a body of work by the artist spanning a nearly fifty-year career
that had its origins in Ukraine and culminated in the United States.

The canvases and prints in the exhibition range from the early works
produced prior to Hnizdovsky’s arrival in the U.S., such as Displaced
Persons (oil, 1948), to multiple examples of the superb woodcuts – the
genre in which he was the most prolific. Included among the latter are the
cherished rams, sheep, and depictions of still-life objects that often show
traces of Hnizdovsky’s subtle sense of humor.

This show provides a rare glimpse into Hnizdovsky’s mid-career, with a
sampling of infrequently and never-before-exhibited works. The pieces are
emblematic of a period that was most trying for the artist, both financially
and spiritually, but that was also among his most creative ones.

In Crucifixion (oil, 1955), traces of vivid red contrasting with the dark
backdrop convey a sense of anguish and foreboding. Bondage (oil, 1961)
echoes the somber mood, while the shadow in Darkness (oil, 1961) is
juxtaposed against a ray of light, perhaps the portent of a brighter future.

The colors and style in these early canvases reflect the influence of
artists such as Albrecht Durer, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, and El Greco and
hint at the artist’s roots in his native Borshchiv region of Ukraine, where
traditional embroidery is characterized by deep, rich reds and burgundies
framed in a lush, velvety black

Supplementing the collection of paintings and prints is a charming display
of original Hnizdovsky ex libris designs, terra-cotta works, and books
illustrated by the artist that include, among others, the poetry of John
Keats and Stanley Kunitz.

A slideshow of photographs provided by the artist’s family traces his life
from boyhood in Ukraine, to displacement in Western Europe, and ultimate
settlement in the United States.

Jacques Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White celebrates the life and
work of this remarkable artist who found fame in the United States but
remained deeply attached to the land of his birth. It also marks his recent
symbolic “homecoming,” which not coincidentally took place on the 90th
anniversary of the artist’s birth and 20th anniversary of his death.

In 2005, Hnizdovsky’s remains were transferred to a cemetery in Lviv,
Ukraine, where many prominent figures in Ukrainian cultural and political
history have been laid to rest. The significance of this event was captured
in the words of the [previous] U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, John E. Herbst:

“Jacques Hnizdovsky returns to his homeland leaving behind him in the United
States a rich cultural legacy… . Now citizens of his beloved Ukraine will
have an opportunity to appreciate his direct and sometimes amusing images,
which often draw upon the life of his native land.

Hnizdovsky follows in the tradition of so many immigrants to America who
have fused the artistic traditions of their homelands with the energy of the
New World to weave a tapestry that enriches all our lives and brings our
countries together.”

A number of recent shows in New York City drew attention to the evolvement
of mature artists’ work through numerous stages in their careers. This
exhibition takes a similar perspective by surveying Hnizdovsky’s evolution
into an artist in his prime. -30-
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http://www.artdaily.com/section/news/index.asp?int_sec=2&int_new=16699
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23. POLEMICS: MYKOLA RIABCHUK REPLY TO MS TARANEC

LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Riabchuk
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 23
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006
RE: LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Natalie Taranec, Australia
Subject: Comment regarding M Ryabchuk response
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #728, Article 24
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 10, 206

RE: COLD WAR & BLIND ANTI-AMERICANISM
Joseph Stalin would have greatly appreciated your piece on Cold War II
LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Ryabchuk
Addressed to Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar, Norway
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #724, Article 20
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, July 5, 2006

Dear Ms Taranec,

I should have probably to answer you earlier but, alas, I haven’t had
access to AURs for a few weeks, while being on holidays. You are
right, my letter in the AUR #724 looks rather odd (even for me). I
feel, there are two reasons for this.
First, my emotional letter to Dr Bakhtiar was not intended for
publication – I just cc-ed it to Mr Williams for his records (it was
certainly my fault because I did not indicate that the letter was not
for publication);
and second, there were two very important attachments to my letter
which were not mentioned in the AUR. I attached highly relevant
articles by Timothy Garton Ash and Ann Applebaum – as a substitute
for my own arguments in discussion with Dr Bakhtiar. Hence my
phrase “I have little to add.”
Besides these technicalities yet, I feel no regret for defining Dr
Bakhtiar’s activity with notorious Stalin’s words. If freedom of
speech means a right to write quasi-academic stupidities, it means
also a right to call idiots idiots. Even though, if I wrote it for
publication, I would have certainly used more politically correct term
like “intellectual irresponsibility” or something of the sort.
Earlier this year, Dr Lucan Way quipped that the term “stupidity” is
acceptable in intellectual disputes since it merely designates a wide
gap between the opportunity and its actual realization (“orange”
politics is a good example).
By the same token, I would say that the term “idiotism is acceptable
since it merely designates the gap between the intention and the result.
In these terms, I feel idiotic myself since my spontaneous letter brought
rather unexpected results. Sorry for this.
With best wishes,
Mykola Riabchuk (ryabchuk@iatp.kiev.ua)

PS – In this case I would ask Mr Williams to publicize my humble
response to Ms Taranec in the AUR.
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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24. WORLD FORUM OF UKRAINIANS TO FOCUS ON UNITED NATIONS
RECOGNITION OF 1932-1933 FAMINE IN UKRAINE AS GENOCIDE
AGAINST UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

UNIAN, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

KYIV – The 6th World Forum of Ukrainians among other matters will focus
on UN recognition of the 1932 – 1933 famine in Ukraine as a genocide act
against the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s press service
told Ukrinform.

International condemnation of the crime against Ukrainians must become a
part of restoration of historical justice towards the Ukrainian nation, who
suffered cruel discrimination and repression, political scientists believe.

The 1932 – 1933 famine in Ukraine was a tragedy of humanity of the 20th
century. The great famine in Ukraine, which 75th anniversary will be marked
in 2007 and 2008, was killing 17 people every minute.

Considering the issue of recognition of the famine as a genocide against the
Ukrainians was blocked at a session of CIS Council of Foreign Ministers in
April. Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia voted for including the matter into
agenda, while Armenia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan abstained and Russia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan voted against.

The 6th World Forum of Ukrainians, which is to become one of main events
timed to the 15th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, will be underway in
Kyiv between August 18 and 20. It will be attended by 500 delegates and
1,230 guests, including almost 40 researchers of the famine from 14
countries, particularly, from the USA, Canada, Switzerland, France, Japan,
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Georgia, Poland and Lithuania. -30-
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25. UKRAINE 3000 CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LAUNCHES WEBSITE

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 25
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 31, 2006

KYIV – The Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation has launched

a renewed official website: http://www.ukraine3000.org.ua/eng.html .

Information on the website is available in Ukrainian, Russian and English. .

The website contains information about the Foundation and its programs,
projects and activities, as well as articles, documents, concept papers,
news and photo archives.

The purpose of the website is to inform the public about the activities of
the Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation.

The Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation
Statement by Kateryna Yushchenko

The Ukraine 3000 International Foundation is a non-governmental charitable
organization founded in 2001.

Creating this Foundation, we sought to make it as useful for Ukraine as
possible. We tried to figure out our society’s most urgent needs in the
vortex of modern life. Our conclusion was that people indispensably need

to believe in certain prospects for the country, for their families, and for
themselves, no matter how they picture these prospects.

One needs to be certain that the period of instability and problems will
come to an end, if one believes in the future with all one’s heart and puts
much effort into building it up.

This is precisely our goal: help Ukraine to build up her own future, become
herself, and fulfill her global mission. The Foundation’s mission has been
formulated based on this goal: promote the search for the best trajectory of
development for the Ukrainian society and explain it to the Ukrainians.

Personal participation by everyone, joint actions, work for the common good
are the principles laying the basis for the Foundation’s activity. Our major
aspiration is to disseminate these ideas, make them dominate in the society,
and unite as many adherents of these ideas as possible.

Every representative of the Ukrainian people has to understand that s/he is
in the highlight, s/he is the main character, and much depends on her/his
contribution.

Our views are shared by tens of thousands of people and hundreds of
organizations. They have succeeded themselves and are prepared to help

their country.

We are deeply grateful to all working with us and supporting us. Our joint
action is very important, because due to it Ukraine is getting better every
day.

We invite everyone sharing our goals and principles to support our
Foundation. Together we can do more!

God bless Ukraine!

Kateryna Yushchenko, Head of the Supervisory Board
———————————————————————————————–
Contact: Maryna Antonova, presa@kateryna.org.ua.
———————————————————————————————–
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AUR#741 Jul 31 Declaration Of National Unity, Four Areas Unresolved; St Dept’s David Kramer In Kyiv: Interior Minister’s Death Not Suicide;

=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

DRAFT TEXT OF
DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 741

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., MONDAY, JULY 31, 2006

Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up.
Some news services do not publish in August, not the AUR.

——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. DRAFT TEXT OF DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

2. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT SAYS WORKING GROUP
REACHES AGREEMENT ON MOST PROVISIONS IN DECLARATION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

3. UKRAINE: IVAN VASYUNYK OF PRESIDENT’S STAFF NAMES
FOUR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO SIGNING UNITY DECLARATION
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1437 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

4. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S CHIEF OF STAFF OLEH RYBACHUK
PLAYS DOWN LACK OF PROGRESS IN CRISIS TALKS
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1710 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

5. REGIONS PARTY DOES NOT ACCEPT ‘OUR UKRAINE’ BLOCS
POSITIONS IN NATIONAL UNITY COALITION TALKS
Ukrainian News Agency, Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

6. UKRAINE’S PRO-RUSSIAN PARTY OF REGIONS REJECTS
“BLACKMAIL, THREATS” DURING CRISIS TALKS
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 29, 2006

7. PARTY OF REGIONS OFFICIAL TARAS CHORNOVIL SAYS PARTY
IS READY TO UNITE WITH THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNISTS
IN CASE OF A NEW EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

8. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER YURI YEKHANUROV SAID ROUND-
TABLE TALKS ‘COMPLICATED’ NO COMPROMISE ON FOUR ISSUES
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0834 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

9. LEADER OF PARTY OF REGIONS YANUKOVYCH MEETS WITH A
TOP U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER
Kramer also meets with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1219 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

10. ALL-UKRAINIAN ‘ROUND-TABLE’ A POTEMKIN VILLAGE
CREATED BY PRES YUSHCHENKO FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR
Regnum, Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 28, 2006

11. UKRAINIAN INTERIOR MINISTER LUTSENKO WILL NOT WORK
IN A CABINET CHAIRED BY VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
I am against candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite Ukrainian society.
INTERVIEW: With Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
By Ivan Leonov, Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 28 Jul 06, p 4, 5
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

12. THE MANY CHOICES OF YUSHCHENKO
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: by Tammy Lynch, Boston
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

13. YUSHCHENKO PREFERS AKHMETOV TO YANUKOVYCH
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 26, 2006

14. “YURIY KRAVCHENKO – SUICIDE RULED OUT”
Suicide verdict in death of former Ukrainian Interior Minister questioned
“We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them. This

situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present one, too.”
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY:
By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 29 Jul 06, p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

15. CARTE BLANCHE FOR VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website in Ukrainian, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Jul 24, 2006

16. RUSSIANS REFUSE TO RAISE UKRAINIAN FLAGS ON SHIPS

DURING RUSSIAN NAVY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN CRIMEA
Ukrainian TV critical of Russian Navy Day festivities in Crimea
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

17. MILITARY SERVICE FOR GRADUATES OF HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE NOT REQUIRED AFTER 2010
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1439 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

18. POLISH PRESIDENT APPOINTS POLISH-UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE
Sister committee to be appointed on the Ukrainian side
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2120 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, July 28, 2006

19. COUNCIL OF EUROPE OFFICIAL URGES MOLDOVA TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable
Infotag news agency, Chisinau, in Russian 0935 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

20. UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON ‘PAUSE’
INTERVIEW: With Prof. Robert Legvold
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 28, 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 21
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

22. JACQUES HNIZDOVSKY AT UKRAINIAN MUSEUM IN NYC
Acclaimed Ukrainian painter and printmaker (1915-1985)
ArtDaily.com, USA, Sunday, July 23, 2006

23. POLEMICS: MYKOLA RIABCHUK REPLY TO MS TARANEC
LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Riabchuk
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 23
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

24. WORLD FORUM OF UKRAINIANS TO FOCUS ON UNITED NATIONS
RECOGNITION OF 1932-1933 FAMINE IN UKRAINE AS GENOCIDE
AGAINST UKRAINIAN PEOPLE
UNIAN, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

25. UKRAINE 3000 CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LAUNCHES WEBSITE
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 25
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 31, 2006
========================================================
1
. DRAFT TEXT OF DECLARATION OF NATIONAL UNITY

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

The Ukrayinska Pravda web site has published the draft text of the
declaration of national unity that President Viktor Yushchenko presented to
participants in the round table that began on 27 July.

The talks, which are aimed at ending the political deadlock, are attended by
Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, parliament speaker Oleksandr Moroz, the
leaders of parliamentary factions, and a number of public figures.

The following is an excerpt from the report by Ukrainian Ukrayinska Pravda
website on 27 July; subheadings as published:

The text of the draft declaration of national unity that President
Yushchenko proposed to the round table participants. The final version,
which is to be signed by political leaders, is to be agreed by a working
group on Friday [28 July].

DECLARATION [UNIVERSAL] OF NATIONAL UNITY
Being conscious of [our] responsibility to the Ukrainian people and the
exceptional nature of the current political situation,

Respecting the will of the people expressed in an honest and democratic
manner in the election to the Supreme Council of Ukraine [parliament] on
26 March 2006,

Wishing to resolve the political problems that have arisen in the Supreme
Council of Ukraine in a considered and responsible manner,

Wishing to bring about a general national reconciliation, which we believe
to be the key to Ukraine’s future and an instrument for resolving our
society’s current problems,

Introducing the tradition of national political and social dialogue for
resolving the inherited and acquired problems in the life of the state,

Attesting that the core of the people’s consolidation is the unconditional
observance of the principles of democracy and respect for human rights
and freedoms, social justice and Ukraine’s European choice,

Confirming that Ukraine’s foreign policy course is unchanged and
irreversible, and with the purpose of enhancing its international authority,

And unswervingly guided in acts and deeds by Ukraine’s national interests,

We, representatives of the political forces in parliament, declare those
principles that manifest our common political will to join forces for the
good of Ukraine and its citizens.

In order to realize such priorities of national development as the high
quality of life of citizens, a competitive and knowledge-based economy,
effective and just authorities, a state that is respected in the world and
integrated into global processes, we agree to the priority execution of

A Plan of Action of National Unity:

1. To preserve Ukraine as a unitary and united state.

2. To continue and improve constitutional reforms, to create a balanced
system of “checks and balances” between the president of Ukraine, the
Supreme Council of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,
and to re-establish a functional Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

3. To bring the decisions of all bodies of state power and local
self-government into line with the Constitution of Ukraine.

4. To create the political and judicial conditions for the unimpeded
activity of the opposition in elective bodies of power at all levels.

5. To reform executive power structures and to render impossible the
politicization of state service through the priority adoption of the laws of
Ukraine “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” and “On State Service”
(new edition), prepared and submitted by the president of Ukraine.

6. To continue reform of the courts in accordance with the approved
conception for improvement of the judiciary for the consolidation of just
courts in Ukraine.

7. To reform the system of law enforcement bodies to European standards, to
bring criminal law and criminal justice into line with the standards and
recommendations of Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the
European Union, and the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.

8. To stimulate the development of local self-government by ensuring its
financial means and the reform of the administrative-territorial order. To
reject federalism in favour of decentralization.

9. To tame corruption at all levels of power, in particular, by supporting
the president’s legislative initiatives in this area.

10. To ensure the status of Ukrainian as the single state language and the
language of official communication of power bodies, while simultaneously
guaranteeing the rights of the languages of national minorities in line with
the European Charter.

11. To develop the culture and restore the spiritual life of the multiethnic
Ukrainian people, to ensure the integrity of the linguistic-cultural sphere.

12. To observe the freedom of religion. To support efforts to form a single
national Ukrainian Orthodox church.

13. To improve the welfare of Ukrainian citizens, to overcome poverty
through effective and targeted social security and just pension provision.

14. To form a middle class by increasing the accessibility of higher
education and transforming public incomes policy, to guarantee decent wages,
to develop entrepreneurship and stimulate job creation.

15. To campaign for a healthy lifestyle, to redirect the health care system
towards the patient, and found a National Centre for Fighting Tuberculosis
and HIV/AIDS, a National Heart Centre, a National Cancer Centre, a
Nationwide Centre for Mother and Child Health Care.

16. To achieve an annual rate of GDP growth of at least 5 per cent with
inflation no more than 10 per cent, to stimulate the creation of at least 1m
jobs a year.

17. To conduct tax reform, that includes, in particular, introduction of a
real estate tax and a single social deduction from payroll.

18. To increase the effectiveness of natural resource use, especially fuels,
to introduce energy saving technologies.

19. To make agriculture more efficient by putting land into economic
circulation.

20. To provide state guarantees of the inviolability of property rights.

21. To raise the effectiveness of utilities through the creation of
competition in the housing and utilities sector.

22. To urgently adopt the amendments to legislation required for Ukraine’s
WTO entry and to join this organization by the end of 2006.

23. To implement unswervingly the Ukraine-EU action plan, to urgently start
talks on creation of a free-trade zone between Ukraine and the EU, and to
join a NATO Membership Action Plan.

24. To establish effective economic partnership with all Ukraine’s
interested foreign partners, guided by interests of mutual advantage.

We, the undersigned, are convinced that the implementation of the priorities
described should become the decisive criteria for the formation and activity
of the coalition and the system of power as a whole, whose activity will be
founded on new mechanisms of public-political cooperation, in particular:

1. To develop and introduce regular procedures for public consultation on
important issues of social development and state building, with the
inclusion in the dialogue of, in particular, non-parliamentary political
forces, public associations and other participants in the social-political
process.

2. To form effective mechanisms for social control over the authorities’
activity, ensuring the transparency and accountability of state management
bodies and local self-government bodies.

3. To ensure that the activity of power bodies conforms to Ukraine’s
national interests, strategic development priorities, the interests of
particular communities and citizens, by means, in particular, of the
participation of political parties and public forces in improving the
effectiveness of the state’s personnel policy.

We are convinced that the implementation of the principles of this
declaration, which will provide the basis for the majority coalition
agreement, are possible only if a coalition of national unity is formed in
the Supreme Council of Ukraine of the 5th convocation [current parliament],
and we support such a step. [Passage omitted: the list of round table
participants]
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2. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT SAYS WORKING GROUP
REACHES AGREEMENT ON MOST PROVISIONS IN DECLARATION

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – The presidential secretariat says that the working group has reached
agreements on most provisions in the National Unity Declaration. Ukrainian
News has learned this from the president’s press service.

According to the message, during the talks, the sides agreed on most
priority questions concerning the state development.

Implementation of the state policy in regards to [1] languages, [2]
preservation, integrity and unity of Ukraine, as well as the [3] country’s
integration with Europe and the [4] Common Economic Area, are among
questions that need further discussions.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Verkhovna Rada Chairman Oleksandr
Moroz claimed that the working group on the wording of the National Unity
Declaration included a paragraph in the draft document that Ukraine may join
NATO only after a relevant national referendum.

The working group on the wording of the National Unity Declaration comprised
Regions Party MPs Mykola Azarov, Olena Lukash, Our Ukraine bloc MPs Petro
Poroshenko, Roman Zvarych, Socialist Party faction MPs Vasyl Tsushko,
Yaroslav Mendus, and Communist Party MP Leonid Hrach.

The presidential secretariat delegated Ivan Vasiunik, the first deputy head
of the presidential secretariat, Mykola Poludionnyi, the head of the chief
service for legal policy of the presidential secretariat, Ihor Koliushko,
the head of the chief service for institutional development of the
presidential secretariat, and Zhanna Doktorova, the head of the chief state
legal service. -30-
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3. UKRAINE: IVAN VASYUNYK OF PRESIDENT’S STAFF NAMES
FOUR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO SIGNING UNITY DECLARATION

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1437 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sat, Jul 29, 2006

KIEV – In the talks on signing the declaration of national unity, the
political formulation of tasks concerning [1] language, [2] the unity of
Ukraine, [3] European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as [4] future
activity within the Single Economic Space [with Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan] require additional discussion, the first deputy head of the
presidential secretariat, Ivan Vasyunyk, said on Saturday [29 July].

He said that during the talks, they kept to President Viktor Yushchenko’s
firm line on refusing to change the country’s domestic and foreign policy
course.

“The president confirms his consistent position on the need for a
consolidation of the country’s responsible political forces, the rejection
of far-fetched political aims that don’t have a future, and the achievement
of a consensus on the resolution of the issues that artificially divide
society, that involve guarantees of state security and ensuring the welfare
and security of citizens,” the president’s press service quotes Vasyunyk as
saying.

The press service also reported that the presidential secretariat would be
working on Saturday, 29 July, and Sunday, 30 July. -30-

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4. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S CHIEF OF STAFF OLEH RYBACHUK
PLAYS DOWN LACK OF PROGRESS IN CRISIS TALKS

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1710 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

Oleh Rybachuk, the head of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s
secretariat, has played down the lack of progress in crisis talks between
the president and parliamentary faction leaders.

In a live interview with private TV 5 Kanal on 30 July, Rybachuk praised
negotiators’ attitude to the talks and said they were set to continue on
Monday 31 July.

“Tomorrow morning, the president expects results of negotiations in
working groups and a continuation of the round table’s work, in particular
the approval of the declaration (of national unity),” Rybachuk said.
“Practically all parties have agreed with the spirit and letter of the
declaration.”

Rybachuk said he “would have been surprised if the Party of Regions had
signed the declaration so quickly”. He said the declaration does not
necessarily have to be signed by all five major parties involved in the
talks – the pro-Russian Party of Regions, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc,
propresidential Our Ukraine, the Socialists and the Communists.

He recalled that President Viktor Yushchenko still had the option of
dissolving parliament, but said the president “realizes that this would not
solve the problem”.

“I can’t imagine the situation whereby the declaration would not be signed.
This would force the president to call a fresh election,” he said. “This is
not blackmail. This is the way things are.”

Rybachuk said Yushchenko had until 2 August to decide whether to back
MPs’ nomination of his arch rival Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister.

Rybachuk rejected the assumption that Yushchenko called the round table to
show the politicians’ inability to reach any agreement and thus obtain more
grounds to dissolve parliament. -30-
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5. REGIONS PARTY DOES NOT ACCEPT ‘OUR UKRAINE’ BLOCS
POSITIONS IN NATIONAL UNITY COALITION TALKS

Ukrainian News Agency, Kiev, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – The Party of Regions says it doesn’t accept positions expressed by
the Our Ukraine Bloc during the talks on the National Unity Declaration
draft and creation of the coalition.

This follows from a statement by the presidium of the Regions Party’s
political council, a copy of which was made available to Ukrainian News.

As the statement reads, during the talks, the Our Ukraine Bloc is trying to
thrust its ideology on the possible wide coalition and govern the majority
by blackmailing and threatening to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada.

The Party of Regions says that it would not turn down its election program,
calling such propositions as disgraceful.

It is also calling on President Viktor Yuschenko to submit the candidature
of Regions Party leader Viktor Yanukovych to the post of premier, which was
proposed by the majority.

Member of the Regions Party faction Yevhen Kushnariov said that
representatives of the anti-crisis coalition cannot agree to three positions
in the declaration draft proposed by the president: [1] on NATO, [2] the
Russian language and [3] Common Economic Area.

“If our position is taken into account, we are ready to continue talks and
search for compromise solutions,” Kushnariov said.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, on July 29, the presidential secretariat
said that the working group had reached agreements on most provisions in the
National Unity Declaration.

The open meeting of the roundtable won’t take place before Monday, July 31.
July 29 through July 30, the Socialist Party and Party of Regions planned to
hold meting of their political councils and discuss the National Unity
Declaration drafted by the working group.

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========================================================
6. UKRAINE’S PRO-RUSSIAN PARTY OF REGIONS REJECTS
“BLACKMAIL, THREATS” DURING CRISIS TALKS

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 29, 2006

KIEV – A key figure in the pro-Russian Party of Regions has accused
propresidential Our Ukraine of not being flexible enough during crisis talks
between President Viktor Yushchenko and the leaders of major political
parties.

In a live TV interview, MP Yevhen Kushnaryov said Our Ukraine was trying to
impose its ideology on others and rejected what he described as blackmail
and threats during the talks.

He said Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych does not want to become
a prime minister at the price of sacrificing his party’s principles.

Kushnaryov also said that the main stumbling blocks during the talks were
relations with NATO and Russia, and the status of the Russian language. The
following is an excerpt from a report by Ukrainian One Plus One TV on 29
July, subheadings have been inserted editorially::

[Presenter] A strongly-worded statement by the Party of Regions’ political
council was posted on the party website an hour ago. It accuses Our Ukraine
of trying to impose its ideology on the Party of Regions by threatening it
with dissolving parliament.

It also says that [Party of Regions leader] Viktor Yanukovych would not agree
to become a prime minister at the price of compromises mentioned in the
declaration [of national unity, which is discussed at the crisis talks called by
President Yushchenko].

We can now ask our guest, deputy Party of Regions faction leader Yevhen
Kushnaryov, about the party’s position. Good evening, Mr Kushnaryov.

[Kushnaryov, in Russian throughout] Good evening.

[Presenter] The previous report in our programme said that the main reason
why the [unity] agreement has not been signed is the fact that there is no
guarantee that Viktor Yanukovych will become prime minister. Do you think
this is true?

[Kushnaryov] I am surprised by this kind of statement. To start with, I’d
like to see them as nothing but a simple misunderstanding. Our party’s
position has been described in no uncertain terms in the statement by the
political council presidium, which you have quoted.

“BLACKMAIL AND THREATS”
In a few words, indeed, we do not accept negotiations based on blackmail and
threats. In essence, what we have been offered is – although there are 240
MPs in the coalition [in the 450-seat parliament] – to agree to Our Ukraine
imposing its own ideology on us all and, in effect, running the majority if
a grand coalition is set up. We have been asked to give up the basic
stipulations of our election programme which was backed by over 8m of our
compatriots.

Therefore, we do not accept this tone and these conditions. I’d like to
briefly quote from what our leader Viktor Yanukovych said at the political
council meeting. They contain a full and clear answer to all these
insinuations. Quote –

[Presenter, interrupting] I’d like to ask you something, if I may – top
representatives of your party said that a compromise has been found on all
issues. This is what they said yesterday. If this is so, which compromises
contained in the agreement are you not happy with? What are they about?

[Kushnaryov] I’ll answer your question after the quote. So, Viktor
Yanukovych said: I do not want to become prime minister at the price of
shame and of betraying our voters. I find it humiliating to hear this let
alone to agree to this.

To me, the premiership is not the goal but rather a means to an end. My goal
is to unite Ukraine and to improve the life of every Ukrainian family and to
make the world respect us. This is the essence of the Party of Regions’ position.

Now to the compromises. We have shown our ability to reach compromises
during the two weeks of talks with Our Ukraine – talks which, by the way,
they have repeatedly denied [were taking place]. We found compromise
wordings of all the difficult issues.

But on coming to the round table we were handed a completely different
document. In it, the wording of these issues was tough and uncompromising,
which is what split Ukraine a year-and-a-half ago [i.e. after the 2004 presidential
election].

If we had signed this document, we would not know how to hide our eyes for
shame. Naturally, we did not agree to this version. We have proposed a version
of our own. We are ready to look for a compromise, but let me say this again:
we do not accept blackmail or threats, because there is not legal basis to
them.

[Presenter] Mr Kushnaryov, thanks. But can you specify to our viewers what
are these compromises about?

STUMBLING BLOCKS
[Kushnaryov] We are arguing over three things. [1] First, NATO – we are not
against cooperating with NATO, but it is only the Ukrainian people who can
resolve the accession issue, and it is through a referendum. But they are
trying to force us to sign a formula for a NATO accession accord.

[2] The Russian language. They are trying to impose a formula upon us whereby
Russian will drag out an increasingly miserable existence in our country. We
want the Ukrainian and Russian languages to have equal rights.

[3] And lastly, we are being offered to go to Europe and forget that Russian
exists at all. What we are proposing is that the document should mention a
clear position on good-neighbourly relations with Russia and on continued
talks about the Single Economic Space [alliance backed by Russia].

[Presenter] It appears as though no agreement has been reached after more
than two days of round-table talks.

[Kushnaryov] That’s right. But if our position is taken into account, we are
ready for more talks and to look for compromises. -30-
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7. PARTY OF REGIONS OFFICIAL TARAS CHORNOVIL SAYS PARTY
IS READY TO UNITE WITH THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNISTS
IN CASE OF A NEW EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION


Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, July 30, 2006

KIEV – Member of the Regions Party faction in the Verkhovna Rada Taras
Chornovil says the party is ready to set up an election bloc with the Socialist
and Communist parties in case the president disbands the parliament and
announces an early parliamentary election.

Chornovil was speaking in an interview with the Fifth Channel. “We’re ready
to unite with our present coalition partners in a single bloc, but we understand
that this may split the state even more. I would not like them to push us into
that,” he said.

He also said that representatives of the Regions Party are planning to
attend the roundtable meeting on July 31 if it is held. However, leaders of
the party have doubts as to the fruitfulness of the talks.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, on July 29, the Party of Regions said it
had not accepted positions expressed by the Our Ukraine Bloc during the
talks on the National Unity Declaration draft and creation of the coalition.
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8. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER YURI YEKHANUROV SAID ROUND-
TABLE TALKS ‘COMPLICATED’ NO COMPROMISE ON FOUR ISSUES

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0834 gmt 29 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

KIEV REGION – Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov has described
the situation around the signing of a declaration of national unity [as a result
of the round-table talks among the president and leaders of major political
parties] as “complicated”.

“As of this minute, the situation is complicated,” the prime minister told
journalists in the village of Velyka Oleksandrivka (Kiev Region) today.

Yekhanurov added that the participants in the round-table talks focused on
four issues regarding which they have not reached a compromise yet –

[1] the federalization and integrity of Ukraine,
[2] the language issue,
[3] Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration
[4] and cooperation with the Single Economic Space [an economic

alliance of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine].

The prime minister, however, remains optimistic about the possibility of
reaching a compromise on these issues.

[At 0859 gmt on 29 July, Interfax-Ukraine quoted the leader of the Socialist
Party’s parliamentary faction, Vasyl Tsushko, as saying that the signing of
a declaration of national unity has been delayed because President
Yushchenko could not guarantee that he would submit the candidacy of the
Party of Regions leader, Viktor Yanukovych, to parliament for approval as
prime minister.

“Yushchenko does not trust Yanukovych today and Yanukovych under-
standably does not trust Yushchenko,” he said. “This is the name of the game.”]
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9. LEADER OF PARTY OF REGIONS YANUKOVYCH MEETS WITH A
TOP U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER
Kramer also meets with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1219 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – The leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, has met the US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, David
Kramer, Yanukovych’s personal website has said.

Yanukovych and Kramer discussed the domestic political situation in Ukraine,
ways of solving it and ways of reaching stability in society. Moreover, they
discussed prospects for foreign investment in Ukraine, the development of
economic relations between Ukraine, Europe and Russia and ways of deepening
US-Ukraine relations.

[UNIAN news agency also said in another report on 28 July at 1221 gmt that
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, David Kramer, also met Ukrainian
Foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk.

Tarasyuk informed Kramer of the recent political developments in Ukraine, in
particular, about the round-table discussion between representatives of
major political forces and members of the public initiated by Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko. Tarasyuk also stressed that Ukraine’s foreign
policy aimed at European and Euro-Atlantic integration remains unchanged.]

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10. ALL-UKRAINIAN ‘ROUND-TABLE’ A POTEMKIN VILLAGE

CREATED BY PRES YUSHCHENKO FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR
Regnum, Moscow, Russia, Friday, July 28, 2006
“All-Ukrainian ’round table’ is a unique and highly senseless measure. The
sitting created an impression that main personages knew something, were
close to reaching an agreement, not-so-actively participated in the event,
and refrained from engaging in serious discussions.

The whole event looked like a camouflage of agreements unknown to
spectators,” Kiev Political and Conflict Research Center Director Mikhail
Pogrebinskiy stated to REGNUM correspondent, commenting on the national
’round table’ with participation of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko
and parliamentary factions’ leaders held July 27.

“Timoshenko who evidently lost the event, worked for the audience,’ the
analyst continued. ‘Her behavior was entirely inadequate; she tried to
frighten Yushchenko without actually saying anything new, referring to some
falsified polls.”

The president, according to Mikhail Pogrebinskiy, demonstrated a strong
determination to join NATO. The event was a good and impressive show for

the US ambassador to Ukraine: “President demonstrated that he had done the
utmost in order to persuade even communists that all should agree with the
plan concerning NATO membership.”

On the options of the situation development, the analyst commented: “The
first option is that Our Ukraine will succeed in persuading the Regions
Party to agree with the formulation concerning the plan on NATO membership.

Then, Ukrainian Communist Party will not sign. It will possibly mean the
faction’s leaving parliamentary majority. Our Ukraine will replace it.

The other option is a neutral wording of the issue will emerge, something
about ‘mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO and access to it based on
referendum results.’ Generally speaking, the second formulation does not in
any way impede implementing the alliance accessing plan.

In such a case, the CPU may stay in the coalition, part of Our Ukraine may
join it in some format, and Yushchenko will try to position himself as the
national unifier.” -30-

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LINK: www.regnum.ru/english/680608.html
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12. UKRAINIAN INTERIOR MINISTER LUTSENKO WILL NOT WORK
IN A CABINET CHAIRED BY VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
I am against candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite Ukrainian society.

INTERVIEW: With Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
By Ivan Leonov, Ukrayina Moloda, Kiev, in Ukrainian 28 Jul 06, p 4, 5
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Saturday, Jul 29, 2006

Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has said that he will not work in the
Cabinet chaired by Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych. Speaking in an
interview with a propresidential newspaper, Lutsenko said that Yanukovych
cannot unite the nation.

Lutsenko also said that he quit the Socialist Party of Ukraine in protest
against the party’s joining a coalition of the Party of Regions and the
Communist Party of Ukraine, an act which Lutsenko called betrayal of the
party’s history.

The following is an excerpt from the first part of Lutsenko’s two-part
interview with Ivan Leonov, published in the Ukrainian newspaper Ukrayina
Moloda on 28 July under the title Yuriy Lutsenko: I am ruling out a violent
scenario, subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Leonov] Mr Lutsenko, today’s meeting of the president with top
law-enforcement officials (the interview took place Wednesday [26 July]
evening – Author) has already been dubbed by some Party of Regions MPs as
Bankova’s [street where presidential office is located] preparations for a
violent scenario. What was the meeting really about?

[Lutsenko] The meeting with the president was of working nature, we
exchanged information about ensuring the rule of law and order in this
country, with an emphasis on the duty of the police to protect the right to
free and peaceful expression of opinions by citizens of all political views.

NO USE OF FORCE AGAINST PROTESTORS
[Leonov] There were no discussions of a violent scenario?

[Lutsenko] It is possible that the state will need to be protected from
unconstitutional actions of revenge-seekers. Certain members of parliament
have taken the liberty to propose a vote on the candidacy of the prime
minister without it being submitted by the president, which is a blatant
violation of the Criminal Code, in particular Article 109: Actions aimed at
forceful change or overthrowing the constitutional order or capture of state
power.

In addition, Part 3 of this article says the following: public calls for
such actions using mass media. This means that even an act of announcing
these intentions is a crime. Today the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine]
issued an appropriate statement, calling on politicians and citizens to
refrain from unconstitutional ways of forming government bodies.

If someone attempts to storm or tries to limit in some way the jurisdiction
of the president, we will enforce the law, but without unnecessary
demonstration of power – peaceful protesters will not be limited in their
rights. The police will stop those who break the law, while the
Prosecutor-General Office and the SBU will assess these actions from a legal
standpoint.

Even though the law-enforcement bodies are seriously, even theoretically,
evaluating the possible threat from extremists, I think it will not come to
that. Like in the song, which, in my opinion, is close to the majority in
parliament today – “Our armoured train is parked on the side track”.

[Leonov] What was the need for today’s meeting with law-enforcement
officials and governors?

[Lutsenko] This was not an emergency meeting but a working one. Even though
we, of course, discussed our cooperation in the event of worsening political
situation. But this worsening is happening not because of people’s wishes,
but through politicians’ attempts to gain revenge at any cost. This concerns
politicians from various camps.

Only two viewpoints exist for them – theirs and the wrong one. That is why
they use arguments like public confrontation, some of them are already
picturing tanks storming, bloodshed. In reality, none of this exists in
society. I am constantly travelling to different regions, and I assure you
that people are not jumping on the barricades for the interests of fat cats
in parliament.

The governors confirmed this. But this is a special period, when the
authorities must coordinate their actions to preserve the rule of law and
order in the country. Other topics discussed with the governors included
smuggling, illegal migration, judicial system and so on.

[Leonov] A possible dissolution of parliament by the president is being
actively discussed in political and legal circles. Assuming it happens, but
[parliamentary speaker Oleksandr] Moroz does not comply with this decision
and MPs fail to leave parliament. Your actions? Are you going to kick them
out, or on the contrary – not let them in?

[Lutsenko] I cannot even imagine who may give such orders. If they want to
assemble in some building, let them assemble. MPs have this right, because
the dissolution of parliament does not mean that MPs lose their powers. But
I suspect that most of them will immediately run back to their
constituencies to prepare for a new election.

[Passage omitted: Reiterates that police will not use force against peaceful
protesters]

[Leonov] What about [youth party] Pora, which has moved towards the Cabinet
of Ministers building in order to prevent Yanukovych from taking the prime
minister’s seat in the event that he is appointed illegally?

[Lutsenko] I am not trying to hide my sympathy for Pora, but I must say that
despite my sympathy, last week we confiscated the chains, which they
intended to use to chain themselves to the parliament building, and huge
logs, which they apparently wanted to use to lock the entrances for MPs. We
wanted to make sure that these tools are not used for some extremist
purposes.

I can recall how we were kicked out of the Independence Square during the
Ukraine without Kuchma events [protests against President Kuchma in 2001] –
we were told that the square was closed for repairs. These working methods
of the authorities are in the past, because the Cabinet of Ministers is
already been repaired (laughing).

In reality, this is not so funny, because Pora can possibly be intuitively
feeling the danger to the state and democracy, and acting, albeit somewhat
childishly, but they are feeling where they need to be. With its actions in
front of the cabinet building, Pora reacted to anti-state calls for possible
usurpation of power, and showed that some people in Ukraine are prepared to
defend the constitutional order without waiting for law-enforcement bodies
to react. That is why I responded very calmly to this picket.

[Leonov] You sympathize with Pora and deny rumours that you may head a new
party called European Left. Some people are saying that you could be a good
candidate to head the Our Ukraine [propresidential party], this would
refresh the party and draw attention away from certain controversial
individuals in its leadership, would boost its ratings.

A recent opinion poll indicated that a good number of Ukrainians see you as
a leader of some political force. How does Yuriy Lutsenko himself see his
political future in the event of dismissal?

[Lutsenko] As long as I am the minister, I am not preparing any back-up
landing strips. At some point I decided not to run for parliament, trust me,
this was a principled decision for me. I came here to clean up the police,
to make it more effective. I have no other goals right now.

On the other hand, I am an active politician, and I like the fact that the
people are interested in my plans and seeing the possibility of my energy
being used in some direction. But I must disappoint you – I am not making
any political plans. [Passage omitted: repetition]

WILL NOT WORK WITH YANUKOVYCH
[Lutsenko] The only thing I can say is that I will not be involved in any
political force, especially not the one that had discredited itself and is
now serving the interests of oligarchs’ money. The president has also asked
me about my vision of the political situation, and I have informed him about
my decision not to work in the cabinet if it is headed by Yanukovych.

I stress that in this case the problem is not simply citizen Yanukovych, who
has some managerial experience, but Yanukovych as the symbol of a political
camp with the opposite views. It is unacceptable for me to endorse such a
cabinet with my presence.

Of course, weaklings can find a host of reasons: not to give up the seat to
others or to prove that even in those conditions I can work. But I think
that politics is not a game of who can fool the voters the most and who can
scam their own partners for the sake of portfolios, but adhering to stable
principles both in power and in opposition.

It is disgusting to see politicians bargaining for comfy chairs and
attempting to monopolize power instead of dividing it evenly , finding a
balance and having a cabinet of national reconciliation.

[Leonov] Are you also in favour of a grand coalition?

[Lutsenko] I think Ukraine today needs a cabinet of national reconciliation.
Because the people of Ukraine voted evenly for different political forces.
To form a cabinet headed by a bright symbol of one of the sides will mean a
victory for one side over the other.

There will be no reconciliation, no constructivism. The cabinet of national
reconciliation cannot be headed by someone who is afraid of meeting students
in Ivano-Frankivsk or coal miners in Donetsk.

That is why I am against the candidacy of Yanukovych, who will never unite
Ukrainian society from the Carpathian Mountains to the Black Sea, and I do
not wish to work in this cabinet of revenge against the principles that I
live by.

[Leonov] Judging by your words, you see a possibility of heading the
Interior Ministry in a cabinet of reconciliation, or am I mistaken?

[Lutsenko] Speaking of cooperation between parliament and the president, it
is desirable to find a constructive candidate for the post of prime minister
other than Yanukovych. Including, possibly, from the Party of Regions. If I
receive an offer to work with another members of the Party of Regions as
prime minister, then yes, I will work. But only in a cabinet of national
compromise.

If this unifying figure for the whole society is a member of the Party of
Regions – good, if he is from Fatherland, Our Ukraine or the Socialist
Party – not bad too. Of course, better yet would be a candidacy of an
unaffiliated policeman, but this is…[ellipsis as published] (laughing
sincerely) not foreseeable in the near future.

[Leonov] Is this option being considered even by the Regionals? Have you
received some propositions?

[Lutsenko] I had a conversation with the most serious player in the Party of
Regions on this issue, who was not against me staying as minister, but some
officials in key regional police directorates will need to be changed. I
said that this is unacceptable to me, and if I remain a member of the
cabinet, I do not plan to subordinate the Interior Ministry’s personnel
policy to the interests of any faction in parliament.

Similar attempts have been made before, when I was first appointed to this
post, but everyone understood very quickly that appointments would be made
only based on professionalism and honesty. Because this ministry is special,
and it cannot be under any political or business influence.

I consider de-politicization and de-commercialization of police the main
goal of this part of my life, and I have spent much effort and health on
this. It is impossible to put a price tag on this seat that would make me
change my beliefs. This was my answer. So in reality all these
talks…[ellipsis as published]

I understand very clearly that it may be desirable to keep Lutsenko in this
job to cover up some actions, which may be incompatible with the ideals of
democracy and freedom that we fought for. But I will not cover up this
policy, this is my right.

[Leonov] Which player in the Party of Regions are you talking about?

[Lutsenko] It does not matter who voiced this position, especially because
earlier some MPs from the Party of Regions voiced it during talks with the
leaders of the presidential secretariat.

Mr Yushchenko also asked me about my attitude to this possibility, and I
told him that I had publicly announced my decision, and that it was a matter
of principle. A politician must be predictable. [Passage omitted: Reiterates

that police must stay out of politics]

[Leonov] What do you think about the new tape scandal in parliament? [MP
Oleh] Lyashko of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has said that he has recordings
of phone conversations where MP Andriy Klyuyev boasts that the Regionals had
bought your teacher Oleksandr Moroz and the Socialist MPs for 300m dollars.

Taking into account that the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has turned to not only
the Prosecutor-General’s Office but also all other law-enforcement bodies,
the president and the National Security and Defence Council, how will the
Interior Ministry react to this and will it investigate the reports of
bribery? I understand that this issue is painful to you…[ellipsis as
published]

[Lutsenko] It is painful because the Socialist Party has changed radically.
But thank God, the request was sent not to the Interior Ministry but to the
Prosecutor-General’s Office and the SBU, this is their jurisdiction, and I
am most of all interested in an objective investigation.

The only problem is that the information on bribery was reported by Lyashko,
and I consider him a journalist who does not mind spreading untruthful data.

On the other hand, rumours of outrageous amounts of bribes in parliament
today are becoming more and more persistent. Today we discussed with the
head of the SBU, Mr [Ihor] Drizhchanyy, possible directions of
investigations into not only this but many other reports.

I will not announce our intentions, but in this case we are talking about a
professional inquiry into possible financial rewards given to MPs for voting
a certain way or taking a certain position. I mean not only the scandal
surrounding the speaker, but other suspicions as well.

In general, if the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has some evidence, it should be
send to the SBU and the Prosecutor-General’s Office. Because I am afraid
that politicians may be again slinging mud at each other, and the people
will stop reacting to these serious allegations.

I am afraid that in an effort to sling more mud at the opponent, it will
come down to a point where no-one can be trusted. This is serious, because
then politicians will stop fearing public accountability.

If someone cries Wolf! five times, in the end they will eat the whole herd,
and no-one will react. One must cry only when the wolf has eaten and there
is evidence that it was the wolf, not mice.

QUIT PARTY IN PROTEST
[Leonov] Has your request to quit the Socialist Party been reviewed, or are
you still a member of the party? Moroz is saying that until a decision is
made concerning your request, Lutsenko remains a Socialist.

[Lutsenko] I am not a member of the Socialist Party, because I suspended my
membership in accordance with the law when I became minister. Now I cannot
keep the party ticket of the political force which betrayed its history.

I would prefer not to say any names, because it is difficult…[ellipsis as
published] to judge the actions of the Socialist Party leaders, the people
whom I stood with shoulder-to-shoulder for 15 years, when the threats and
temptations were much bigger, but we went through it all. [Passage omitted:
repetition]

[Leonov] Has it been long since you last spoke with Moroz? Are you aware of
his motivation for the union with Yanukovych and [Communist leader Petro]
Symonenko?

[Lutsenko] A long time ago. This is a very difficult period for me,
obviously, and that is why it is hard. We did not talk about his actions.
You see, the motto of uniting Ukraine is obviously good. But it cannot be
implemented by helping yesterdays take revenge.

Maybe, in order to achieve complete unity, we need to bring back [former
President Leonid] Kuchma and [former presidential administration chief
Viktor] Medvedchuk? But Heorhiy Gongadze [murdered journalist] cannot be
brought back, unfortunately…[ellipsis as published]

When this anti-crisis coalition appeared, I went to Rivne Region for my
brother’s birthday. To be honest, I drank a lot of vodka, because it was
very difficult psychologically. I do not want to compete at presenting
images, the main assessment will be given by voters. Our paths with Moroz
have split, but it does not mean that I will look for nasty labels for these
people.

In my request to quit the party, I listed the reasons, and on the bottom I
added that I remain thankful for the victorious 15-year history of
cooperation with the Socialist Party, all the way to the Orange Revolution.
———————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================

11. THE MANY CHOICES OF YUSHCHENKO

COMMENTARY
: by Tammy Lynch, Boston
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

Tuesday marks the first day when Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko can
legally dismiss the parliament for failing to produce a government. Such a
move would trigger new parliamentary elections in a country that has already
seen four rounds of elections (three presidential and one parliamentary) in
less than two years.

Since the creation of a majority coalition encompassing the Party of
Regions, the Socialists and the Communists, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
(BYUT) has been urging President Yushchenko to take just that step.

In contrast, the coalition members, and the majority of Yushchenko’s own Our
Ukraine Bloc, are calling on the president to avoid new elections, with Our
Ukraine either joining the government or forming an opposition.

The elections, they say, would produce disaster for Our Ukraine and the
President, since Our Ukraine’s popularity has decreased in recent months.
But is this absolutely certain? Or might they provide a way out?

What are the arguments? What are the possibilities?
President Viktor Yushchenko reportedly favors the idea that Our Ukraine
will officially join a majority coalition with the Party of Regions in order
to
maintain control of a number of ministries. Current Prime Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov and Anatoliy Kinakh also support this option.

It is not a simple option, however, which no doubt explains the President’s
hesitance. Yushchenko must be wondering just how much influence his
ministers would have in a Yanukovych government, with a parliament
dominated by the Party of Regions. Will they be ministers in name only?

Even more, will they continue to support the will of the president as the
center of power shifts in the country? Some individuals currently lobbying
Yushchenko for places in the Yanukovych government have not always
been loyal to the president’s ideals and goals.

For example, it is no secret that, during the acrimonious debates over WTO
reform in 2005, Anatoliy Kinakh worked against a number of the measures
introduced, suggesting they were harmful for Ukrainian business. On several
measures, his faction voted against the then-government of Yulia Tymoshenko,
as did a number of businessmen in Our Ukraine. What will they do now?
Yushchenko must also think of the response of voters to any partnership with
Yanukovych .

But whether Our Ukraine officially remains in opposition or joins the
coalition, the President must understand that both of these options will
likely lead to the same outcome – Our Ukraine splits, leaving roughly half
of the party in the opposition and half in the coalition. The “political
wing” of the party, or those who would be classified “democrats” in the
closest Western sense, is unlikely to agree to join the coalition.

Meanwhile, the “business wing,” which values close economic ties with both
the Party of Regions and Russia, is unlikely to agree to remain in
opposition. The inevitable result will be a split in the party, if not in
the immediate short-term, than within several months.

Therefore, no matter what choice he makes, Viktor Yushchenko will be faced
with a drastically changed bloc (and party) under a Yanukovych government.

The argument over the likely scenario of a new election reportedly is one of
Yushchenko’s greatest concerns. If polls are to be believed, Our Ukraine’s
support has disintegrated to under 10%, while BYUT’s has remained stable
or slightly increased and the Party of Regions has gained at least 5 points.
These results could mean that the Party of Regions alone would control a
majority of at least 226 deputies in parliament.

However, it should be noted that polls leading up to March’s 2006 election
were, in general, very wrong on specific numbers, although they did express
trends. The last polls before election-day suggested, for example, that Our
Ukraine would win over 20%, that BYUT would win under 15% and that
Yanukovych would win over 35%. One poll from a respected agency (KIIS),
listed BYUT’s support at 11%. The party received almost 23%.

Nevertheless, there is no ignoring the fact that support for the Party of
Regions has increased while support for Our Ukraine has decreased.

But let us play devils advocate for a moment. Is it possible that a new
election – even with decreased support for Our Ukraine – may not produce as
disastrous a result for the “orange” parties as it would seem on the
surface.

Most importantly, the Party of Regions stands today on the verge of
controlling a constitutional majority (301 deputies) in the parliament. Both
the leaders of BYUT and Our Ukraine fear that the official confirmation of a
Yanukovych government will produce massive defections from their ranks.

The leadership of both parties privately suggests that up to 40 deputies
from each faction could join the majority, thanks to various overlapping
interests and incentives. These votes, plus the 186 from Regions, 29 from
the Socialists and 21 from Communists, would put the new coalition well over
the number needed for a constitutional majority. It would, in fact, be able
to over-rule any presidential veto.

If Our Ukraine officially joins the coalition, the numbers would be similar,
also putting the decisions on presidential vetoes in the hands of the
parliament. What would these Our Ukraine deputies do as members of the
Party of Regions coalition, with the power centered in Yanukovych’s hands?
Could they withstand the various “incentives” provided? Are they as loyal
as Yushchenko would like? Will they support the president’s initiatives?
This must be a concern.

A new election is unlikely to provide Yanukovych with 300 deputies,
particularly if the Socialists and Communists do not return, as is possible.
In fact, while Regions likely would increase its plurality, the number of
BYUT deputies may also increase. A constitutional majority may be averted
in this way.

Let us suppose, for example, that Yanukovych gains a majority of 230
deputies (they now have 186), BYUT gains 135 (129 today) and Our Ukraine
gains 70 (down from 81) in a new election. It is likely that the number of
BYUT defectors – those who will most likely vote where the money is
located – will have been drastically reduced on a new list.

It is also likely that Our Ukraine, in a worse case scenario, would remain
split. Yanukovych could create a 270 deputy majority fairly easily. But, he
would not have 300 votes, and a unified, ideological opposition would have
been created. Ukraine would have achieved a real party structure in its
parliament.

The wildcards, of course, are the results of the Communist and Socialist
Parties, as well as the Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko. Our Ukraine could also do
far worse, and BYUT could do far better.

In the best case scenario, BYUT would increase its number of deputies to
150, by winning 30% of the vote, thereby assuring the lack of a
constitutional majority for Yanukovych. This is not probable, but also not
impossible.

It would take a real, organized political campaign, focusing on identifying
and activating voters. It is unknown whether Tymoshenko can produce such
a campaign, but such a result would clearly justify a new election.

Obviously, there are numerous “ifs,” and significant risks to a new
election. The two most difficult to estimate are the effect on an
increasingly tired and apathetic voting public, and the response of the
Party of Regions and its supporters to the announcement of a new election.

Will the Party of Regions understand that they could gain in parliament and
accept the election, or will they question the legality of the choice,
calling for court and street protests? Can a conflict be averted through
discussion before an announcement is made?

A new election, of course, also would increase the influence of Tymoshenko,
possibly at the President’s expense. The President no doubt understands
this well. Yushchenko, then, must decide who he believes is more dangerous
to him – Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. Who is more dangerous to his goals
and ideals? Who is more dangerous to his legacy? To his international
reputation?

Yushchenko also has said that he must consider the unity of the country.
But, while concerns about the risks of a new election are clear and valid,
the claim that a Yanukovych -Our Ukraine government would unite the country
is difficult to understand.

The government in question would be led by representatives from Eastern
Ukraine – many of whom were the subject of past criminal charges and many
of whom worked actively against the orange revolution.

It likely would include the least trusted and least charismatic members of
Our Ukraine (the businessmen), and may have to endure criticism from Our
Ukraine’s most committed democratic reformers.

Even more, it would leave out representatives from the Bloc of Yulia
Tymoshenko, which won 14 out of 27 regions in the country during the
election. These regions include the entire central area and a good portion
of the West. Our Ukraine’s only regional victories came in the country’s
three most Western oblasts.

In essence, geographically speaking, a Party of Regions-Our Ukraine
government would unite the 10 Eastern and Southern regions of the country
(won by the Party of Regions) with the three most Western regions, skipping
everything in central and central-Western Ukraine.

However, even this scenario is questionable, since all indications from the
three Western regions suggest that voters there do not support a Party of
Regions-Our Ukraine coalition. From Lviv, Our Ukraine’s government
ministers could be viewed as nothing more than tools of the Party of
Regions. Therefore, in the end, the only real supporters of this “unifying”
government may be voters in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Clearly, there is no choice that provides Yushchenko with victory. The safe
choice would be to unify part of Our Ukraine with Yanukovych and hope that
he is unable to produce a constitutional majority.

Or, if a constitutional majority is formed, to hope that its members from
Our Ukraine remain loyal to the President and committed to the goals of
European integration, free market, competitive economics and Western ideals.

The risky choice is to call elections, either supporting a unified
“democratic forces” list, or coordinating the efforts of BYUT and Our
Ukraine. The results likely won’t provide a majority for the democratic
forces. They also will probably increase the influence of the Party of
Regions in parliament.

But the results may forestall a constitutional majority for Yanukovych ,
decrease the influence of money, more accurately represent the will of
voters, and create an opposition that is unified and that truly can
influence parliament.

The choice, as always, belongs to the President. -30
——————————————————————————————–
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/25/5886.htm
——————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
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========================================================
13. YUSHCHENKO PREFERS AKHMETOV TO YANUKOVYCH

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Our Ukraine has repeatedly refuted information on the negotiations with
Party of Regions (PRU). Most probably, they will do it once again when
signing agreement that will allow Our Ukraine members to work in
Yanukovych’s government.

Political situation in Ukraine is still balancing between dissolution of the
parliament and singing an agreement with anti-crisis coalition.

The option of getting oppositional status for a pro-presidential party has
become unattractive.

Last week President Yushchenko made the right choice having chosen a new
negotiating partner. Now, instead of Viktor Yanukovych, Rynat Akhmetov will
reason with Yushchenko.

Akhmetov was there on Friday, he came to the president on Monday. They say,
he spent almost half a day with the president. Ukrainian billionaire spoiled
family vocation – his beloved ones have been waiting for him in Monte Carlo
for almost two months, but he has to breathe a hot capital smog instead of
enjoying Cote d’-Azur.

Akhmetov’s meetings with the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine show that he is
solving the problem of his private legitimacy in the West as well as his
position in Forbes.

This makes Akhmetov a more flexible negotiating partner than Yanukovych.

Something happens between Our Ukraine Block (NU) and PRU twice a day.
They seclude in the well-conditioned rooms. Since it is forbidden to call
such meetings ‘negotiations’ we can say they ‘share viewpoints’.

The meeting is attended by Petro Poroshenko (claims the First Vice-Minister
in Yanukovych’s government), Roman Zvarych (claims the Minister of Justice)
and Oleksandr Tretyakov (claims the Head of President’s Secretariat).

Acting National Security and Defense Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin
actively joined the negotiation process. Horbulin seems to go on working as
an acting NSDC Secretary forever, since his age will not allow him to be
fully and properly appointed.

The only subject of negotiations is participation of Our Ukraine in the
coalition with PRU.

[1] Yushchenko’s most desired option is to change Yanukovych’s nomination
for a more neutral personality. Besides, President’s Secretariat received
letters and appeals from central region communities to bring in the
nomination of Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

But Yanukovych does not accept any variants of retreat. It is the matter of
principle for him and Akhmetov: “We’ve got the first place at the elections,
the premier is ours.”

That’s their logic: “You had to agree when we offered you premier’s office
and half of the government in exchange for Yanukovych’s speakership. But
Our Ukraine chose orange coalition.”

Yanukovych’s stability in this matter seemed to make Yushchenko and Our
Ukraine give up.

[2] There is another condition for Our Ukraine to join the coalition – to
alter Coalition Agreement even with the Communists if they consent to basic
principles. Yushchenko’s only goal is to keep influence in the country.

It is all about spheres of influence for Yushchenko: security services,
coalition regulations and action plan.

According to some sources, Yanukovych even agreed to sign the government
letter to Brussels stating Ukraine’s readiness to join Membership Action
Plan.

Other sources claim Borys Tarasyuk accepts Yanukovych’s nomination if
“the vector of foreign remains unchanged.”

[3] The third condition set by Our Ukraine is the offices.

“What an appetite! We will go on a diet!” said PRU MP about negotiations
with Our Ukraine. There is a new word in political lexicon – ‘compensator’.

Our Ukraine wants to compensate the offices of premier and speaker (taken by
anti-crisis coalition) with three minister’s portfolios (the First
Vice-Premier, Interior Minister and Minister of Justice).

The rest of portfolios will be proportionally divided, as a result of which
Our Ukraine gets another 5-6 minister’s portfolios.

The thing is that some president’s ‘dear friends’ will not be pleased with
the Ministry of Culture or Ministry of Family, Youth and Sport. They want
an economic block which is logically to be controlled by Yanukovych.

Early election is unwanted scenario for all the players: expenses for
Akhmetov, all-national tour for Yanukovych and extremely high risk for
Yushchenko.

President’s analytics admit low ratings of their chief. Probably they hope
for unification of the ‘orange’ electorate and making up a ‘black-and-white
picture’: either Maidan (Yushchenko-Tymoshenko) or Anti-Maidan
(Yanukovych).

Under such conditions they forecast the same result as received at the
presidential elections 2004: 52% against 44% in favor for Yushchenko.

“Our slogan will be: “Save Ukrainian sovereignty!” revealed official from
Yushchenko’s staff. Yanukovych’s dependence from Moscow will become
the anti-thesis.

At the same time PRU has its own of Gallup Poll data: last week their rating
reached 42% which will get them 226 votes in the parliament in case of the
‘orange’ failure.

In such case Yushchenko is helpless – the parliament elected at early
election can not be dissolved for a period of a year.

Early election is not Yushchenko’s bluff, his staff claims. Moreover, his
recent meeting with Yanukovych, who proved to be absolutely uncomplying,
made dissolution of the parliament look even more real.

Recently Yushchenko got expert legal analysis from the Institute for State
and Law which also serves for the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

Lawyers backed Yushchenko’s logic which aroused Moroz’s indignation. The
Law Institute of the Verkhovna Rada came up with a completely different
decision. Obviously no other legal establishment dared to do the job within
such time limits.

Now Moroz is in a very difficult situation when he can’t have any influence
on his own future career. No one negotiates with him.

Moroz will not play on his own since a capitalist will never understand a
socialist. The only thing Moroz can do is to vote for Yanukovych without
Yushchenko’s submission.

Such variant is absolutely unacceptable for Akhmetov who needs to take care
of his foreign business partners and the country’s investment image. It is
easier for him to live through another election. Besides, American
consultants and spin doctors are sure to back him in this matter.

Yushchenko might be interested in early elections to get his speaker in the
parliament. Even if Yanukovych has an overall majority, it is the president
who brings in premier’s nomination for parliament’s approval. And Yushchenko
sets only one condition for that – he nominates HIS Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada.

Friday afternoon was determined the best time to dissolve the parliament. It
does not matter what Friday, this one or next. The thing is that there will
be a 3-day break in the work of the Verkhovna Rada. Two days off and
miserable vocations are the main demoralizing factors for a Ukrainian MP.
———————————————————————————————-
Translated by Eugene Ivantsov for UP

LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/27/5928.htm
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[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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14. “YURIY KRAVCHENKO – SUICIDE RULED OUT”
Suicide verdict in death of former Ukrainian Interior Minister questioned

“We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them. This

situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present one, too.”

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Oleksandra Prymachenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 29 Jul 06, p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

Despite official findings to the contrary, former Interior Minister Yuriy
Kravchenko was killed rather than committed suicide, an influential
Ukrainian weekly has said.

Kravchenko, who died of two gunshot wounds, lost consciousness after the
first shot and would not have been able to inflict the second would himself,
former Health Minister Mykola Polishchuk, who is also an expert in firearms
injuries, told the paper in an interview.

The weekly bitterly criticized the Ukrainian police and concluded that the
current administration was interested in covering up the murder. Kravchenko,
who had been accused of involvement in the murder of journalist Heorhiy
Gongadze, was found dead in March 2005.

The following is an excerpt from an article by Oleksandra Prymachenko,
entitled “Yuriy Kravchenko – suicide ruled out”, published in the Zerkalo
Nedeli newspaper on 29 July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Newspaper introduction] “The penetrating gunshot wounds suffered by Yuriy
Fedorovych Kravchenko were caused by his own hand,” wrote a specialist who
carried out the official examination of the body of Ukrainian Interior
Minister Yuriy Kravchenko.

Let us hope that this expert is still alive. Despite the doubts about
suicide which have always existed and have been expressed on a number of
occasions, including in Zerkalo Nedeli.

Despite the fact that Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko voiced his own doubts
on this score a long time ago. And even despite the fact that on the basis
of the very same material evidence a recognized authority in firearms
studies has reached a totally different conclusion. The official expert may
still remember who it was that made his hand tremble as it wrote the lines
quoted at the beginning.

We asked Mykola Polishchuk to help “decipher” for the uninitiated the
official conclusion of the expert who carried out the investigation to
establish the cause of Kravchenko’s death.

The first book to be published in the former USSR about this type of
injury – “Firearms injuries to the head” – was edited by V. Polishchuk [as
published] and V. Storch. Mykola Polishchuk is the author of the part which
refers to peacetime. A second paper written by Polishchuk was called
“Firearms injuries to the central nervous system”.

This, among other things, examines bullet and shrapnel wounds. Furthermore,
Mykola Polishchuk was for over 10 years a consultant at regional, municipal
and then republican forensic examinations into skull and brain injuries and
injuries to the central nervous system, including firearms injuries. This
gentleman is better known to the general public as health minister.

Acquainted with the documents provided by Zerkalo, including the expert’s
official findings, Mykola Polishchuk agreed to answer our questions and to
provide his own conclusion.

KRAVCHENKO PASSED OUT AFTER FIRST SHOT
[Prymachenko] Mr Polishchuk, let’s begin with the findings. You have studied
the results of the external and internal examination of the body, the
results of the laboratory examination and the expert’s conclusions. What is
your conclusion?

[Polishchuk] Going by the nature of the injuries described in the documents,
it is quite clear that this was a violent death and the injuries could not
have been inflicted by the person’s own hand. The possibility that this
could have been suicide has to be ruled out.

There were two firearms wounds on the body (the front surface of the neck
and the right temple). The first was lethal and could have led to death
through loss of blood without immediate medical attention. The first
firearms wound was at close range from a weapon pressed against the body.

The direction of the wound is uncharacteristic of a wound inflicted by the
person himself, because it travels from bottom to top and from inside to
outside. It is extremely difficult to believe that a person would be capable
of injuring himself in this way – it would be too awkward.

As a result of this firearms wound he sustained several fractures of the
lower jaw, seven teeth were broken (traumatic amputation), a fracture of the
upper jaw and nasal cartilages and damage to the tongue. Thus, he had to
lose consciousness as a result of such a trauma.

[Prymachenko] Do you admit there is a hypothetical possibility, albeit one
in a thousand, that with such an injury a person could not lose
consciousness?

[Polishchuk] I don’t think that is possible, however strong-willed he might
be. After such an injury he could only have grown weak and feeble and he
would have to have let a pistol fall from his hands. Nobody could have held
a weapon in his hands after such an injury.

He was sitting not in an armchair, in which he could have propped himself up
on his elbows, but on a high chair. With his height (over 190 cm) and
weight, it is also ruled out that after such a shot he would not have fallen
from the chair.

Unfortunately, the question of whether he could have lost consciousness was
not put to the experts.

The second injury – to the temple – was the fatal one. It was delivered at
close range, but it left no contact imprint. That would have been
characteristic of a suicide, and especially bearing in mind the previous
injury, if he had shot himself he would have had to press the barrel against
his temple.
FIRST SHOT SHORTLY FOLLOWED BY SECOND
[Prymachenko] In the official findings it says that the gap between the
first and the second shot could have been from several seconds to a dozen or
more minutes. What’s your opinion?

[Polishchuk] The period between the first and second injuries was very
short – we are talking about seconds. It could not have been a dozen or more
minutes, or even a few minutes. This is borne out by the lack of blood in
the lungs, the bronchial tubes and the stomach.

If a person had remained alive with such an injury, he would had to have
taken several breaths. That means blood would have passed into the lungs,
the gullet and the stomach.

A person in such a condition would undoubtedly have swallowed mucus with
blood, and perhaps fragments of tooth and bone. The internal examination
shows clearly that this did not happen.

[Prymachenko] The examination officially concludes that, after the first
firearms wound Kravchenko could have made certain movements of his own.
Do you agree with that?

[Polishchuk] Unfortunately, the question was not raised before the forensic
examination as to whether a person could have made not just independent, but
precise deliberate actions after the first injury and within a certain
period of time.

I maintain that after the first injury he would not have recovered
consciousness. I do not agree with the experts’ claims that the first injury
was a moderately severe one, because the number of extracted teeth alone
shows that this was a serious injury.

I maintain that a few seconds after the first injury this person was
incapable of carrying out any deliberate precise actions. That is
impossible.
WHO COVERED UP THE TRUTH?
[Prymachenko] According to Zerkalo’s information, which Mr Polishchuk
declined to comment on, the above information was brought to the attention
of the heads of the law-enforcement bodies immediately following
Kravchenko’s death and after the external examination by the appropriate
agencies. And subsequently we reminded the law-enforcement bodies about
this a number of times.

Which unseen hand concealed this crime at all stages of its investigation by
the law-enforcement agencies? Why did the Orange authorities not make sure
that it was properly investigated?

Why does it lead us to think that there is no proper authority in our
country or that it had something to fear in connection with Kravchenko’s
murder, although we have always been assured that the opposite was the case?

Why have Kravchenko’s family had to bear the cross of his “suicide” as well
as the loss of a loved one? Why have they been forced to think that he left
them of his own volition? They most probably have always believed that his
martyrdom redeemed a lot.

There are more questions now than there were on the day Kravchenko died.
And the “suicide note” – a charge in which only one specific name has been
mentioned – [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kuchma – has quite a
different ring about it.

It cannot be ruled out for certain that those who gave the order to the
murderers did not make any special effort to conceal the real reason for
Kravchenko’s death. What they did understand was that pinpointed
intervention is required, but our so-called law-enforcement system has its
own way of operating – automatically, by reflex action.

After all, everyone knew who Kravchenko was, and the last thing anyone
needed was a headache in the form of a “cold case”. Nobody needed the truth,
starting with external surveillance which was shadowing Kravchenko and at
best neglected its duties, and ending with the top people at the
Prosecutor-General’s Office.

And it is possible that in this whole disgraceful investigation the
organizers of the murder put the screws only on the expert. And later
everybody closed their eyes and, forgetting about professional honesty,
lied, lied and lied again.

The chronology of this lie is immense, like the list of those who turned
over the pages of this case who could and should have said: this was not
suicide. And yet this was obvious even to a non-professional examining the
dead body.

[Passage omitted: Only Yuriy Lutsenko doubted this was suicide]

We do not know who killed Kravchenko or [murdered journalist Heorhiy]
Gongadze, or what happened to Kyrpa [former transport minister who was
found dead in December 2004] and we have been unable to get answers to
these and many other questions.

We do not trust our law-enforcement agencies and we are afraid of them.
This situation suited the old administration and, clearly, suits the present
one, too.

And it is clear that each serious criminal case in the future will be
investigated exclusively from the point of view of political expedience. The
decision to close the Kravchenko case, which was investigated by the
Prosecutor-General’s Office, has now been revoked by it.

The reason is Yuriy Lutsenko’s statement that he has information that
rejects the suicide version.

Will not these “new circumstances” be the basis for a new investigation in
the shape of a proper experts’ examination? -30-
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15. CARTE BLANCHE FOR VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Viktor Chivokunya
Ukrayinska Pravda website in Ukrainian, Kyiv, Ukraine, Mon, Jul 24, 2006

Tonight at 0:01 Yushchenko will get the chance to dissolve the parliament.
Very few politicians will sleep well on this night. In fact, they may sleep
like babies. At the first point, they will look pretty miserable on TV with
livid rings under the eyes.

At the second point, anyway the decision is expected in the morning since at
this time our president is either watching Discovery Channel or dreaming of
something nice but not issuing decrees.

At the third point, Our Ukraine Block (NU) keeps negotiating with Party of
Regions (PRU) on formation of an orange government chaired by.Viktor
Yanukovych.

This Tuesday morning Viktor Yushchenko meets leaders of parliamentary
factions in his Secretariat. This meeting may be always called a
‘consultation’ which according to the Fundamental Law precedes calling early
election.

July 25 is the day half of Ukrainian politicians call the deadline or the
date of parliament dissolution. The logic is quite simple: since
Yekhanurov’s government resigned on May 25 today is the 60th day Ukraine
is living without new Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 90 of the Fundamental Law is a true present for Tymoshenko: “The
President is empowered to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada in case a new Cabinet
of Ministers is not formed after the 60 days from the resignation of the
previous government.”

However, humorist lawyers from Yanukovych’s staff do not consider July 25
Time-X. They believe Yekhanurov’s government did not resign but abdicated to
the newly elected Verkhovna Rada.

Ukraine has no Constitutional Court which can clear up the whole matter. PRU
deputies from the previous Verkhovna Rada and personally Oleksandr Moroz
dragged the procedure of adjuring judges of the Constitutional Court.

Now the parliament rests on juridical hexogen since the amended Fundamental
Law contains numerous holes for Yushchenko to squeeze in.

In particular, the Fundamental Law implies no obligation for the president
to bring in the nomination of the prime minister proposed by the coalition
for parliament’s approval. Moreover, he is granted 15 days to consider the
nomination, i.e. the president may hesitate. Otherwise he would be deprived
of such time-out.

Well, if only Medvedchuk knew what heritage he left for Yushchenko when
writing the Fundamental Law. Now Viktor Volodymyrovych can only sunbathe in
Monte Carlo and try to interpret the Constitution of Ukraine explaining what
exactly he meant by certain provisions and articles.

But now Medvedchuk’s viewpoint is absolutely insignificant. As known,
Medvedchuk is prosperous in business but not too successful in politics.

Now Yushchenko gets carte blanche to blackmail Yanukovych. If the latter
does not accept the president’s terms the former may dissolve the
parliament.

Here goes the scenario: Yushchenko waits till the end of a 15-day term
(August 2nd or 3rd), takes his sit in front of a camera on the background of
a library and the national flag. He records the following speech:

“Dear fellow citizens, dear friends. As a guarantor of the Fundamental Law I
will not risk to bring in the nomination of Viktor Yanukovych (whom I
respect) for parliament’s approval since half of Ukraine just curses at him.
Only Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to decide if I have the right
not to submit premier’s nomination. That’s why I appeal to the
Constitutional Court and call to form this body of legitimate power in the
country.”

Months will pass till the court is completely formed. The decision of the
Constitutional Court may be expected on the eve of Maidan anniversary. And
that’s the most optimistic forecast!

Obviously, appeal to the Constitutional Court is the way to win the time and
space to reform Our Ukraine, get Yuriy Lutsenko head the party list and face
future parliamentary elections.

Figuratively saying, the court will be a football player who is dragging a
game while Yushchenko chooses an appropriate time for the final whistle to
announce a new game.

While the time works for Yushchenko, Tymoshenko will lose her electorate
since Our Ukraine gets back its voters. That’s why Tymoshenko stands for
immediate dissolution of the parliament even if she has to run for the
parliament under one list with Our Ukraine.

Evidently, Oleksandr Moroz has nothing to lose. Early election is a
political death for him. If Socialist Party runs for the parliament by
itself they will never get into the Verkhovna Rada. If Socialists join PRU
Moroz is sure to play the second fiddle. He can forget about speaker’s
office since Akhmetov has lots of young and ambitious friends who will learn
Ukrainian language.

Moroz has no other choice but to make Yanukovych the prime minister now. He
is ready to vote for his nomination even without Yushchenko’s submission.
Yushchenko in his turn will not recognize Yanukovych a legitimate premier.
But who said there wouldn’t be 150 indefeasible MPs who would try to smash
down the doors of the Cabinet of Ministers building and get Yanukovych in
there?

Another important factor is that Yushchenko has no influence in the
Prosecutor General’s Office. But those guys from Donetsk do have it.

Yushchenko should be alarmed by Moroz’s live performance on the National TV
Channel: “Even if such decree were issued the Verkhovna Rada would never
yield to such legal mayhem,” Moroz started to use Khazbulatov’s lexicon.

So, historical spiral forms a ring now. There were three presidents in
Ukraine in 2004: Kuchma in Koncha Zaspa, Yushchenko who had given an oath
in a half-empty session hall and Yanukovych who had recorded his greeting
broadcast appeal and who had received greetings from Moscow, Minsk and
Tashkent.

Now we might have three premiers: Yekhanurov as an acting PM, Yanukovych who
was elected without Yushchenko’s consent and.Tymoshenko as people’s premier
supported by Kyiv Maidan.

However, this medal has its reverse. Yushchenko makes Party of Regions
consent to his terms. According to sources of Ukrayinska Pravda, Yushchenko
is ready to bring in Yanukovych’s nomination in case Our Ukraine gets at
least six offices:

the First Vice-Prime Minister, Interior Minister, Minister of Justice,
Minister of Industrial policy, Economics Minister, Finance Minister.

“Having heard that, our delegation stood up, shook hands and went away. It
is easier for us to get ready for early election and to bury ‘the orange’
forever!” said PRU representative. Another day of negotiations brought no
results.

However offering his ministers to Yanukovych, Yushchenko has to keep in
mind that any minister may be sacked by a simple voting in the parliament.

Our Ukraine desperately needs to have influence on Yanukovych without
forming a coalition since Yushchenko can blackmail PRU threatening them
with leaving the coalition which will result in its collapse. That’s why PRU
needs a cooperation agreement with Our Ukraine.

.Meanwhile 5 buses with a special police squad Berkut were noticed at
President’s Secretariat. Kyiv police has reassured it is not Yushchenko’s
guards but reserve subunits to prevent fights and disorder near the
Verkhovna Rada. -30-
—————————————————————————————————
Translated by Eugene Ivantsov for UP.
LINK: http://www.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/7/25/5890.htm
———————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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16. RUSSIANS REFUSE TO RAISE UKRAINIAN FLAGS ON SHIPS
DURING RUSSIAN NAVY DAY CELEBRATIONS IN CRIMEA
Ukrainian TV critical of Russian Navy Day festivities in Crimea

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 30 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 30, 2006

A private Ukrainian TV channel has broadcast a critical report about Russian
Navy Day celebrations in Crimea. The Russians rejected Kiev’s demands to
raise Ukrainian flags on ships taking part in the festivities, the TV said.

It added that this was the first time that Ukrainian sailors had not been
invited to attend the event. The TV also showed deputy Russian Duma speaker
Sergey Baburin saying that Russian troops should be “the masters” in Crimea.
The following is the text of a report by Ukrainian One Plus One TV on 30
July:

[Presenter] For the first time over the past eight years, the Russian Black
Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine’s Sevastopol has not invited Ukrainian
sailors to take part in the Navy Day celebrations. The holiday itself was
marred by the crash of a jet taking part in the [Russian] Baltic Fleet
parade. Two pilots were killed. However, some Russian guests did not like
restrictions on flights in Crimea.

[Correspondent] A traditional parade is the only event that remained
unchanged on Russian Navy Day. However, this was the first time it was
celebrated without Ukrainian sailors. They were not invited. The Russians
also rejected a demand to raise Ukrainian flags on their ships.

[Serhiy Kunitsyn, head of the Sevastopol city administration, in Russian]
The Bora ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet hoisted the Ukrainian flag. I
think this is normal. One should not see politics here and be indignant
about this. This shows respectful relations between the two countries.

[Correspondent] However, Russian Black Sea Fleet commanders agreed to the
Ukrainian authorities’ demand to cancel missile launches during a water
sports show. The aviation participation was limited for safety purposes as
well.

[Vladimir Masorin, Russian navy commander] Missiles and bombs were once
launched from this bay, but we do not do this any more. And probably this is
right. Because there are so many people here and the holiday should first of
all be safe and nice.

[Correspondent] Visiting politicians were more outspoken. They do not lose
hopes to be masters in some of Ukraine’s territory.

[Sergey Baburin, deputy speaker of the Russian Duma] I am upset with
restrictions that are taking an increasing toll on the parade. The ban on
missile launches, the limited use of aviation during the parade as well as
other demands by Ukraine certainly make me upset. My wish is modest: the
Russian troops should be the masters here.

[Correspondent] The same day, the head of the Sevastopol city administration
dismissed rumours that it was the last time that the Russian navy celebrates
its day in Sevastopol. The Russians will celebrate it until their term of
deployment in Crimea expires.

[Video shows people watching ships and a submarine on the parade, sailors
shooting an old canon placed onboard, amphibious personnel carriers leaving
the ships, parachuting tricks in the sky, sailors aligning on a ship’s
deck.] -30-
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17. MILITARY SERVICE FOR GRADUATES OF HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE NOT REQUIRED AFTER 2010

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1439 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – Graduates of higher education institutions in Ukraine will not have
to do their military service after 2010, Ukrainian Defence Minister Anatoliy
Hrytsenko has told a meeting with rectors of institutions of higher
education.

The meeting took place at the Ministry of Defence. The Ukrainian Minister of
Science and Education, Stanislav Nikolayenko, also took part in the meeting.

[Currently a number of state-owned civil institutions of higher education in
Ukraine provide military training to their male students, after which the
graduates obtain the rank of junior officers in reserve and do not have to
join the army. Those who do not undergo military training during their
course are obliged to join the army after graduation.]

The press service of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry has said that the state
programme for development of armed forces in Ukraine for 2006-2011 initially
included a provision for a significant reduction of the number of military
training departments in institutions of higher education, including those
which train officers in reserve. [Passage omitted: students in Ukraine were
very upset about this provision of the programme.]

The Ministry of Science and Education reached an agreement with the Ministry
of Defence about the gradual reduction of military training departments at
civil institutions of higher education. Another decision was taken by the
government to start this reduction in 2008, while earlier it was planned for
2006.

[Passage omitted: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a decree to reduce
the number of military training departments at civil institutions of higher
education on 25 July 2006.] -30-
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18. POLISH PRESIDENT APPOINTS POLISH-UKRAINIAN COMMITTEE
Sister committee to be appointed on the Ukrainian side

Source: PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2120 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, July 28, 2006

WARSAW – President Lech Kaczynski on Friday [28 July] appointed a
Polish-Ukrainian Presidential Committee. A sister committee is also to be
created on the Ukrainian side. “Such a committee has sense, because it can
counteract ‘storms’,” feels member of the main council of the Union of
Ukrainians in Poland [ZUwP], Miron Sycz.

As has been stated on the presidential website, the appointment of the new
body is “an expression of the weight that Lech Kaczynski attaches to the
development of Polish-Ukrainian political and economic relations”.

The head of L. Kaczynski’s staff, Elzbieta Jakubiak, has become the
committee’s chairwoman, while a deputy head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Pawel Kowal, has become its deputy head.

The composition of the newly-appointed body also includes: two deputy
ministers of internal affairs and administration, Wladyslaw Stasiak and Pawel
Soloch, an undersecretary of state at the Presidential Chancellery, Andrzej
Krawczyk, and the deputy ambassador of the Republic of Poland in
Washington, Boguslaw Winid.

As the presidential press services have written, in accordance with an
agreement at the Polish and Ukrainian presidential level a sister
Presidential Committee is also to be appointed on the Ukrainian side. Its
composition is also to include experts on Polish-Ukrainian relations and
ministry representatives.

In the view of member of the main council of the Union of Ukrainians in
Poland [ZUwP] Miron Sycz, Poland and Ukraine are mutually “strategic
countries”. “Let us put it bluntly: a ‘storm’ in one country or the other
means a serious destabilization in the whole of Europe. Such a committee has
sense, because it can counteract such ‘storms’,” Sycz stressed in an
interview for PAP.

In his view, although the appointed committee will serve both Poland and
Ukraine in equal degree, at the moment it is nonetheless “needed more by
Ukraine”. -30-

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19. COUNCIL OF EUROPE OFFICIAL URGES MOLDOVA TO
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable

Infotag news agency, Chisinau, in Russian 0935 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

CHISINAU – It is very important for Moldova to improve its relations with
the Russian Federation, without which it is impossible to solve many serious
problems in this region of Europe, the chairman of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Rene van der Linden, told a
news conference in Chisinau on Thursday [27 July] evening.

Rene van der Linden said that Moldova and Europe should work with Russia,
which is also part of Europe and a member of the Council of Europe and it
should meet its commitments.

“The reform process is taking place in Moldova much easier than in Russia
because of historic, political and geographical reasons. However, building
good relations with Russia is in Moldova’s and Europe’s interests,” the PACE
chairman said.

He described the situation in Ukraine as not the most favourable, but
mentioned Moldova’s good relations with this neighbour.

Rene van der Linden also said that the PACE has asked the parliamentary
committee for appointments and immunity to prepare a report on the case of
former Moldovan Defence Minister Valeriu Pasat who is now in prison. Valeriu
Pasat has been sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for selling MiG-29
fighters to the USA in 1997. -30-

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20. UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ON ‘PAUSE’

INTERVIEW: With Prof. Robert Legvold
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)

Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 28, 2006

PRAGUE – For four months, Ukraine has been in the grips of a political
deadlock. Robert Legvold, a professor of political science at New York’s
Columbia University, says that recent constitutional changes granting new
powers to the Verkhovna Rada have created a situation where lawmakers are
fighting over power, not policy.

RFE/RL: It’s been four months since parliamentary elections in Ukraine. How
would you describe the political climate there, given the protracted
struggle to form a government?

Robert Legvold: I think Ukraine has now moved into a very difficult period,
because in many ways the underlying trends that had been there for some
time — notwithstanding the November-December Orange Revolution in 2004 —
have now really settled in and created a kind of paralysis or political
stasis within the system that I think is likely to be there for some time. I
don’t see an easy way out.

RFE/RL: To what degree are the current difficulties a result of the new
constitutional shift in power away from the presidency toward the
parliament?

“This struggle to get a government already proves the difficulty that any
government that would be formed will have in actually conducting a national
political and economic agenda.”

Legvold: The new arrangements, by weakening the presidency and empowering
both the Rada and the prime minister’s slot, virtually guaranteed that with
an election as close as the March election, that there would be this
incredible struggle among the different political groups, particularly since
the results of the elections were not decisive and it created the grounds
for the struggle.

RFE/RL: Why have the various political factions been unable until now to
form a government? Is this a clash of personalities, or a battle over more
substantive policy issues?

Legvold: That struggle was more intense because the stakes in the political
contest are essentially only over power and influence within institutions
and they’re not fundamental conflicts over policy. And in any political
system that’s well-functioning, normally you want political differences and
political contests to be about political alternatives, policy alternatives,
and that’s not what’s happening in Ukraine.

RFE/RL: Ahead of the elections, many were anticipating the possibility of a
partnership between Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions. It seemed like a compromise that Yushchenko could accept — but
only as long as Yanukovych was not made prime minister. Four months later,
does Yushchenko still have the political clout he needs to say no to
Yanukovych?

Legvold: I think his ability to say no and stick by it is very considerably
weakened. It doesn’t mean he won’t attempt to do it. When I first thought
about what might happen coming out of the election, one of the possibilities
did seem to me to be an alliance between the Yushchenko group and the Party
of Regions.

But we got to it in a very cluttered fashion, not the least because of this
imponderable that emerged at a critical stage — that is, the Socialists’
and [party head Oleksandr] Moroz’s decision to defect from the other
coalition. And that’s what caused all of this to unravel, and pushed
Yushchenko into what was certainly something he didn’t want, which was

to take seriously a cooperation with the Party of Regions.

RFE/RL: So what now? Will Ukraine get a working government?

Legvold: I think the future is not terribly promising in terms of clear and
progressive, coherently pursued policy. This struggle to get a government
already proves the difficulty that any government that would be formed will
have in actually conducting a national political and economic agenda.

We have seen now for some years inefficiency in policymaking because of the
makeup of the Rada and the changing nature of the government even before
Yushchenko came to power in 2004. So I think that situation that we’ve
associated with Ukraine is likely to remain or even get worse in the near
term. But it need not produce a crisis.

RFE/RL: Will a new parliament dominated by the Party of Regions mean a
complete shift toward Russia, and away from the pro-Western policy that
Yushchenko has made the keystone of his presidency?

An anti-NATO, pro-Russia demonstration in Crimea last month (RFE/RL)Legvold:
I don’t think that Ukraine is going to engage in political donnybrook at the
top level over the question of, say, Ukraine’s entry into NATO, or
alternatively on the other side, enormous cleavages over the question of the
relationship to be built with the Russians, or even over domestic policy.

That, however, doesn’t add up to an efficient agenda — that adds up to an
agenda that I would describe as lowest common denominator.

RFE/RL: After the Orange Revolution, support for Yushchenko and Ukraine

wasvery high in the West. How much has this protracted crisis hurt Ukraine in
terms of Western goodwill?

Legvold: It has not lost international goodwill, but it leaves Brussels and
Washington in a quandary, because it appears that any straightforward
progress on Ukraine’s part that would qualify them for either the EU or the
next steps on NATO are under a cloud at the moment.

I think what it does is put a kind of pause in Ukraine’s relationship with
the West, raising question marks about Ukraine. But I don’t think it changes
their basic attitude, hopes for Ukraine — including hopes that it can make
movement toward integration with the West.

RFE/RL: What about Russia? Moscow is sure to welcome a Yanukovych-led
parliament. Does this mean a situation where Russia eases its pressure on
Ukraine?

Legvold: With the Russians, it may have actually eased the situation,
because I think the Russians have stopped worrying about the so-called
colored revolution. I think it’ll therefore ease the question of Ukraine as
an issue in Russia’s relations with the West.

And I think given this makeup — this stalemate in politics — it also means
that the lowest common denominator on the question of Russia and Ukraine
is going to favor a civil relationship with Russia, but not one where the
Ukrainians roll over, because even Yanukovych and his people are not
about to concede everything to Gazprom on a gas deal. -30-
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http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/fb14de87-5d75-4e4c-8d48-46ba42242e6a.html
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21. MUSEUM OF COMMUNISM IN PRAGUE

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 21
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006

PRAGUE – The Museum of Communism is the first museum in Prague
(since the Velvet Revolution) exclusively devoted to a system established
in the sphere of the former Soviet Union. The Museum of Communism
will allow for the display and interpretation of objects and historic
documents.

It stands as an authoritative historical narrative relating to this 20th
century phenomenon and is in no way intended by the organisers as a
filter for contemporary political issues in the Czech Republic.

The original items and meticulous installations containing authentic
artefacts will be displayed in the three main rooms, while the adjacent
projection room will provide a space for regular film screenings,
educational activities, occasional lectures and temporary displays
pertaining to the subject of the permanent exhibition.

Highlights from the displays include rare items from the Museum’s own
comprehensive archive as well as material obtained by the organisers
from major collections, both public and private.

To read a series of news articles about the museum click on:
http://www.muzeumkomunismu.cz/eng_articles.html

Museum of Communism, Legacy s.r.o., Na prikope 10
110 00 Prague 1, The Czech Republictel.: +420 224 21 29 66
email: muzeum@muzeumkomunismu.cz
LINK: http://www.muzeumkomunismu.cz/
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22. JACQUES HNIZDOVSKY AT UKRAINIAN MUSEUM NYC
Acclaimed Ukrainian painter and printmaker (1915-1985)

ArtDaily.com, USA, Sunday, July 23, 2006

NEW YORK CITY.- The Ukrainian Museum presents the exhibit ‘Jacques
Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White’ through September 27. The
works of critically acclaimed painter and printmaker Jacques Hnizdovsky
(1915-1985) will be on view at The Ukrainian Museum in New York City
from June 11 to August 27, 2006.

Titled ‘Jacques Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White,’ the exhibition
showcases a body of work by the artist spanning a nearly fifty-year career
that had its origins in Ukraine and culminated in the United States.

The canvases and prints in the exhibition range from the early works
produced prior to Hnizdovsky’s arrival in the U.S., such as Displaced
Persons (oil, 1948), to multiple examples of the superb woodcuts – the
genre in which he was the most prolific. Included among the latter are the
cherished rams, sheep, and depictions of still-life objects that often show
traces of Hnizdovsky’s subtle sense of humor.

This show provides a rare glimpse into Hnizdovsky’s mid-career, with a
sampling of infrequently and never-before-exhibited works. The pieces are
emblematic of a period that was most trying for the artist, both financially
and spiritually, but that was also among his most creative ones.

In Crucifixion (oil, 1955), traces of vivid red contrasting with the dark
backdrop convey a sense of anguish and foreboding. Bondage (oil, 1961)
echoes the somber mood, while the shadow in Darkness (oil, 1961) is
juxtaposed against a ray of light, perhaps the portent of a brighter future.

The colors and style in these early canvases reflect the influence of
artists such as Albrecht Durer, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, and El Greco and
hint at the artist’s roots in his native Borshchiv region of Ukraine, where
traditional embroidery is characterized by deep, rich reds and burgundies
framed in a lush, velvety black

Supplementing the collection of paintings and prints is a charming display
of original Hnizdovsky ex libris designs, terra-cotta works, and books
illustrated by the artist that include, among others, the poetry of John
Keats and Stanley Kunitz.

A slideshow of photographs provided by the artist’s family traces his life
from boyhood in Ukraine, to displacement in Western Europe, and ultimate
settlement in the United States.

Jacques Hnizdovsky…In Color and in Black & White celebrates the life and
work of this remarkable artist who found fame in the United States but
remained deeply attached to the land of his birth. It also marks his recent
symbolic “homecoming,” which not coincidentally took place on the 90th
anniversary of the artist’s birth and 20th anniversary of his death.

In 2005, Hnizdovsky’s remains were transferred to a cemetery in Lviv,
Ukraine, where many prominent figures in Ukrainian cultural and political
history have been laid to rest. The significance of this event was captured
in the words of the [previous] U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, John E. Herbst:

“Jacques Hnizdovsky returns to his homeland leaving behind him in the United
States a rich cultural legacy… . Now citizens of his beloved Ukraine will
have an opportunity to appreciate his direct and sometimes amusing images,
which often draw upon the life of his native land.

Hnizdovsky follows in the tradition of so many immigrants to America who
have fused the artistic traditions of their homelands with the energy of the
New World to weave a tapestry that enriches all our lives and brings our
countries together.”

A number of recent shows in New York City drew attention to the evolvement
of mature artists’ work through numerous stages in their careers. This
exhibition takes a similar perspective by surveying Hnizdovsky’s evolution
into an artist in his prime. -30-
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http://www.artdaily.com/section/news/index.asp?int_sec=2&int_new=16699
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23. POLEMICS: MYKOLA RIABCHUK REPLY TO MS TARANEC

LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Riabchuk
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 23
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 31, 2006
RE: LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Natalie Taranec, Australia
Subject: Comment regarding M Ryabchuk response
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #728, Article 24
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 10, 206

RE: COLD WAR & BLIND ANTI-AMERICANISM
Joseph Stalin would have greatly appreciated your piece on Cold War II
LETTER-TO-THE-EDITOR: By Mykola Ryabchuk
Addressed to Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar, Norway
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #724, Article 20
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, July 5, 2006

Dear Ms Taranec,

I should have probably to answer you earlier but, alas, I haven’t had
access to AURs for a few weeks, while being on holidays. You are
right, my letter in the AUR #724 looks rather odd (even for me). I
feel, there are two reasons for this.
First, my emotional letter to Dr Bakhtiar was not intended for
publication – I just cc-ed it to Mr Williams for his records (it was
certainly my fault because I did not indicate that the letter was not
for publication);
and second, there were two very important attachments to my letter
which were not mentioned in the AUR. I attached highly relevant
articles by Timothy Garton Ash and Ann Applebaum – as a substitute
for my own arguments in discussion with Dr Bakhtiar. Hence my
phrase “I have little to add.”
Besides these technicalities yet, I feel no regret for defining Dr
Bakhtiar’s activity with notorious Stalin’s words. If freedom of
speech means a right to write quasi-academic stupidities, it means
also a right to call idiots idiots. Even though, if I wrote it for
publication, I would have certainly used more politically correct term
like “intellectual irresponsibility” or something of the sort.
Earlier this year, Dr Lucan Way quipped that the term “stupidity” is
acceptable in intellectual disputes since it merely designates a wide
gap between the opportunity and its actual realization (“orange”
politics is a good example).
By the same token, I would say that the term “idiotism is acceptable
since it merely designates the gap between the intention and the result.
In these terms, I feel idiotic myself since my spontaneous letter brought
rather unexpected results. Sorry for this.
With best wishes,
Mykola Riabchuk (ryabchuk@iatp.kiev.ua)

PS – In this case I would ask Mr Williams to publicize my humble
response to Ms Taranec in the AUR.
————————————————————————————————-

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24. WORLD FORUM OF UKRAINIANS TO FOCUS ON UNITED NATIONS
RECOGNITION OF 1932-1933 FAMINE IN UKRAINE AS GENOCIDE
AGAINST UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

UNIAN, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

KYIV – The 6th World Forum of Ukrainians among other matters will focus
on UN recognition of the 1932 – 1933 famine in Ukraine as a genocide act
against the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s press service
told Ukrinform.

International condemnation of the crime against Ukrainians must become a
part of restoration of historical justice towards the Ukrainian nation, who
suffered cruel discrimination and repression, political scientists believe.

The 1932 – 1933 famine in Ukraine was a tragedy of humanity of the 20th
century. The great famine in Ukraine, which 75th anniversary will be marked
in 2007 and 2008, was killing 17 people every minute.

Considering the issue of recognition of the famine as a genocide against the
Ukrainians was blocked at a session of CIS Council of Foreign Ministers in
April. Moldova, Azerbaijan and Georgia voted for including the matter into
agenda, while Armenia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan abstained and Russia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan voted against.

The 6th World Forum of Ukrainians, which is to become one of main events
timed to the 15th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, will be underway in
Kyiv between August 18 and 20. It will be attended by 500 delegates and
1,230 guests, including almost 40 researchers of the famine from 14
countries, particularly, from the USA, Canada, Switzerland, France, Japan,
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Georgia, Poland and Lithuania. -30-
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25. UKRAINE 3000 CHARITABLE FOUNDATION LAUNCHES WEBSITE

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #741, Article 25
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 31, 2006

KYIV – The Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation has launched

a renewed official website: http://www.ukraine3000.org.ua/eng.html .

Information on the website is available in Ukrainian, Russian and English. .

The website contains information about the Foundation and its programs,
projects and activities, as well as articles, documents, concept papers,
news and photo archives.

The purpose of the website is to inform the public about the activities of
the Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation.

The Ukraine 3000 International Charitable Foundation
Statement by Kateryna Yushchenko

The Ukraine 3000 International Foundation is a non-governmental charitable
organization founded in 2001.

Creating this Foundation, we sought to make it as useful for Ukraine as
possible. We tried to figure out our society’s most urgent needs in the
vortex of modern life. Our conclusion was that people indispensably need

to believe in certain prospects for the country, for their families, and for
themselves, no matter how they picture these prospects.

One needs to be certain that the period of instability and problems will
come to an end, if one believes in the future with all one’s heart and puts
much effort into building it up.

This is precisely our goal: help Ukraine to build up her own future, become
herself, and fulfill her global mission. The Foundation’s mission has been
formulated based on this goal: promote the search for the best trajectory of
development for the Ukrainian society and explain it to the Ukrainians.

Personal participation by everyone, joint actions, work for the common good
are the principles laying the basis for the Foundation’s activity. Our major
aspiration is to disseminate these ideas, make them dominate in the society,
and unite as many adherents of these ideas as possible.

Every representative of the Ukrainian people has to understand that s/he is
in the highlight, s/he is the main character, and much depends on her/his
contribution.

Our views are shared by tens of thousands of people and hundreds of
organizations. They have succeeded themselves and are prepared to help

their country.

We are deeply grateful to all working with us and supporting us. Our joint
action is very important, because due to it Ukraine is getting better every
day.

We invite everyone sharing our goals and principles to support our
Foundation. Together we can do more!

God bless Ukraine!

Kateryna Yushchenko, Head of the Supervisory Board
———————————————————————————————–
Contact: Maryna Antonova, presa@kateryna.org.ua.
———————————————————————————————–
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AUR#740 Jul 28 Moment Of Truth Approaching Ukraine’s Political Life; New Poll Shows Party Support Changing; New Prime Minister Expected Soon

=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 740

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FRIDAY, JULY 28, 2006

Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up

——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT OPENS ROUND TABLE, SAYS MOMENT
OF TRUTH IS APPROACHING UKRAINE’S POLITICAL LIFE
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1310 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

2. UKRAINIAN DRAFT DECLARATION SETS 24 PROVISIONS
FOR COALITION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1802 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

3 . UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT HOLDS POLITICAL STALEMATE TALKS
Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

4. UKRAINE’S ROUND-TABLE TALKS STUMBLE OVER NATO
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1830 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

5. UKRAINIAN PARTY LEADERS EXCHANGE OPINIONS
AT ROUND-TABLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO
UT1, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

6. UKRAINIAN POLL SHOWS CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT
IF ANOTHER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CALLED
Regions 38.7%, Tymoshenko Bloc 35.1%, Social Party not clear 3% hurdle
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1035 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

7. UKRAINE’S HAZY CONSTITUTION ADDS TO TROUBLES
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, 27 July, 2006

8. MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE
What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova
Basapress news agency, Chisinau, in Moldovan 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

9. POLISH PRIME MINISTER SAYS WE WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS
WITH ANY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1234 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

10. POLISH PRESIDENT COUNTING ON UKRAINE NOT CHANGING
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2011 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, Published: Jul 27, 2006

11 . UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER MOROZ AND A TOP US
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER MEET IN KYIV
Discuss signing of declaration of national unity, foreign policy issues.
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0821 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

12. UKRAINE’S FUTURE LOOKS LESS ORANGE
Orange Revolution has gone sour
By Stephen Mulvey, BBC News, United Kingdom, Wed, July 26, 2006

13. UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS AS ORANGE
PARTIES JOSTLE FOR POWER
COMMENTARY: By Niall Green
World Socialist Web Site, UK, Thu, 27 July 2006

14. “VICTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL BECOME A BANDIT HIMSELF”
Russian emigre tycoon says Ukrainian president should disband parliament
INTERVIEW:
With Boris Berezovskiy
By Oleksandr Chalenko, Segodnya, Kiev, in Russian 21 Jul 06; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

15. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER TO BE APPOINTED VERY SOON
Yanukovych will be nominated, Regions Party expected to make concessions
Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, in Russian 28 Jul 06; p 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

16. “CENTRIFUGE TOWARDS THE CENTRE”
Ukrainian president likely to approve premier from rival camp
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Yuliya Mostova
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 22 Jul 06; pp 1, 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

17. ORANGE REVOLUTION IS “OVER BUT NOT A FAILURE”
INTERVIEW: With Taras Kuzio
By Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations
New York, Washington, D.C., Monday, July 24, 2006

18. UKRAINE REMEMBERS VICTIMS OF HOLOCAUST
Monument dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region
The Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS (FJC)
Moscow, New York, Monday, July 24 2006

19. UKRAINIAN CARTOONIST’S WORKS ON EXHIBIT IN TEHRAN
Mehr News Agency (MNA), Tehran, Iran, Sunday, July 23, 2006

20. MAPPING UKRAINIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MODERNISM
By Kevin Nance, Art Critic, Chicago Sun Times
Chicago, Illinois, Thursday, July 27, 2006

========================================================
1
. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT OPENS ROUND TABLE, SAYS MOMENT
OF TRUTH IS APPROACHING UKRAINE’S POLITICAL LIFE

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1310 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko has told a round-table meeting with
leading politicians and public figures of the need to unite around the
principle of Ukraine’s unity and sovereignty.

In his opening remarks to the meeting in the presidential secretariat, which
was relayed live by state-run UT1, private ICTV and TV 5 Kanal, Yushchenko
said Ukraine is facing a “moment of truth”, and described the current
situation in parliament as a “trap and a dead-end”.

Yushchenko convened the meeting in an effort to find a way out of the
ongoing government crisis through the signing of a declaration of national
unity. The following is an excerpt from Yushchenko’s opening remarks
broadcast by Ukrainian television TV 5 Kanal on 27 July:

[Live broadcast starts in mid-sentence] forces that may have different
views, that may often have opposing views on one issue of Ukraine’s
development or another. But I am confident this is not a reason to split
Ukraine and the nation. It seems to me that the nation would never split the
country. It is split by politicians.

It has so happened that today we are facing big challenges to which we need
to respond. Some of these challenges were inherited. They have their own
history. Others developed within the framework of the recent battles.
Neither the former, nor the latter give us an understanding of tolerance,
the strengthening of the principle of co-existence.

They do not give us mutual understanding either. Therefore, I hope that
today’s round table will be the point from which we start counting a new era
in the political and social life of Ukraine.

The form of our dialogue is based on international experience. I am happy
today that a Ukrainian [round] table can be held today in Ukraine, in Kiev,
and we do not need to go to Warsaw, and we do not need to invite political
leaders from neighbouring countries or the West.

The time has come when we can initiate a nationwide polemic that is open and
fair. Its agenda is defined by the nature of the Ukrainian people, whose
philosophy and temper make them look for sophisticated and wise decisions
even in the hardest situations.

I am thankful to the participants of the round table for their readiness to
have this talk, to my political colleagues sitting to my right [parliament
faction leaders]. I know that for some of them this road was not easy, but I
highly appreciate your understanding of how important it is now to be at one
round table.

I would like to say special words of gratitude and wisdom to the
representatives of society who found time, when it was necessary, to come
here because I know many of them were outside Kiev and Kiev Region. I am
very thankful to you for this.

Your presence confirms that you are above [several words indistinct] all the
political discussions that can be held in this hall, because the scale of
actions now relate to such significant notions as independence, integrity,
Ukrainian democracy and Ukrainian freedom and fairness.

I am citing this series of concepts in order to stress the exceptional
importance of the subject and the prospects of our discussion.

UKRAINE FACES MOMENT OF TRUTH
I am confident a moment of truth is approaching in Ukraine’s political life.
We need to make a decision.

We are faced with a conflict, and not one of names, I am sure, but of
events. I would put these events together by saying that, first of all, they
are: the course of statehood and the course of state fragmentation; the
principles of democracy and the principle of manipulating the nation; the
basics of a new European political culture and the recurrence of the past,
revenge, moral contamination and the leukaemia of dignity.

During the fifteenth year of independence, the ideology of equal distance to
the west and east, north and south is still being imposed on people. We have
already been there. This is a dead-end.

You cannot hide from these problems regardless of what party you are in,
what flag you have above you. The Supreme Council [parliament] is at the
centre of these challenges. The situation that we can still see in
parliament can be described in one way only: this is a trap and a dead-end.

It seems to me there are two ways we can get out of this. By the way, we are
standing close to both of them now. And we have an inevitable choice, to
speak frankly. Either we follow the path of confrontation and delay solving
the vitally important problems of the nation and the state, or – maybe for
the first time in our history – we can pave a road to the real unity of the
nation.

The second step is much more difficult than the first one. Very often it
will be difficult for certain political forces to explain it to their
voters, but it is still possible.

It so happened that the election to Ukraine’s parliament ended with a score
of one all, with 8m votes for one bloc of political parties, and over 8m
votes for another bloc. Today it is up to politicians to make a true choice
of national strategy.

Either they are brave, stand upon principles of consolidation and take hold
of the national prospects, or they live by the principles of intolerance and
political warfare to the last man, not even accepting the principle of
coexistence. This scares me as president. It should not be this way in
politics.

The question is not about the relations between certain individuals. The
question is whether the political elite is capable of forming the national
course and following it strictly.

It hurts me that electoral rhetoric has not been forgotten, and instead it
was brought into the parliament hall. It concerns the issues that can never
split a European nation, whether it be discussion of the language policy or
our European choice, the integration issue or the WTO, church consolidation
or our history.

I am confident that a responsible politician will never speculate with an
issue that produces tension in society. The election is over.

NEED TO UNITE AROUND PRINCIPLE OF UKRAINE’S INTEGRITY
This is indeed an exceptionally difficult moment, and I ask all the
political forces to start uniting around the principles of the country’s
integrity regardless of the locations and political forces that you
represent.

We should unite to guarantee national sovereignty, the integrity of the
border and territories, implementation of economic transformations that are
market-based, open, competitive and clear. We should guarantee all the
democratic rights and freedoms that have been won. We should not allow a
step back for any democratic position or freedom.

Today we are strong not for our mottoes, but for resolute, wise and
consolidating actions. These are never too many for a good thing.

Anyone who wants to see Ukraine united, not ruins on both sides of the
Dnipro River, must understand this.

For all the fairness and strictness of the national truth, we should finally
conceive the real Ukraine and start its new day with the common will of the
authorities and the opposition.

Certainly, the unity of Ukraine is an unconditional category. But I believe
it may not be artificial, sly or semi-true. We will be able to achieve such
unity only when it is ultimately clearly defined and explained thanks to our
joint efforts.

What is unity? How do we understand this? How can we get consolidated
around this issue as the key national priority?

It seems its principles are the following:

[1] the integrity of Ukrainian territories, we should not speak or be sly
about the rest; the inviolability of its borders and territories; [2] a
close dialogue between the regions;
[3] the unconditional guarantee of the state status for the Ukrainian
language;
[4] a civilized approach to languages and cultures of national minorities;
[5] guarantees of the freedom of speech and all fundamental human rights
and freedoms;
[6] the creation of liberal conditions for Ukraine’s economic development;
[7] the implementation of the nation’s European prospects.

In my opinion, these are the basis of our unity. I think these are the
principles and categories that can unite us for the sake of the future.
[Passage omitted: Yushchenko compares the parliamentary election in Ukraine
to those in the neighbouring countries.]

We need to abandon a fluctuating course. We need to take a resolute stand on
the future prospects that are so important for Ukraine.

SHOULD CONFIRM IRREVERSIBILITY OF DOMESTIC,
FOREIGN POLICY COURSES
Finally. I would like to add a few thoughts to these fundamental aspects of
unity. It seems to me that the unity means respect for the spirit of public
tolerance. Understanding the uniqueness of the current political situation,
I consider it to be a true historical chance to achieve the political,
economic and spiritual unity of our country.

It seems to me it is a good occasion to talk about the integral Ukraine and
its unity, to forget the atmosphere of elections and to be wise.

We are obliged and need to be balanced and brave in dealing with the
challenge of current political problems, first of all those in the Ukrainian
parliament, and use the true national consolidation as an unbeatable ground
for the unity of Ukrainian society.

I am confident that while sitting at this round table we need to drop for a
long time the politics of revenge and confrontation. We need to confirm that
Ukraine’s domestic and foreign courses are irreversible. By the way, this is
the course that received support at the presidential election in 2004.

In our actions we need to drop the slightest personal ambition and be ruled
by the fundamental national interests of Ukraine. This is the most
important, in my opinion. By taking this road, we will be able to open new
prospects for Ukraine and for our people. By neglecting the voice of wisdom
and balance and by taking a different path, we will all lose.

Dear colleagues, I would like to welcome you to a dialogue once more. I am
confident that we will able to make the decisions that are the best in this
situation.

I am confident these decisions will become the basis for our common document
today, which is called the declaration [Ukr: Universal] of national unity.
[Passage omitted: Yushchenko describes the schedule of the meeting.]
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2. UKRAINIAN DRAFT DECLARATION SETS 24 PROVISIONS
FOR COALITION OF NATIONAL UNITY

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1802 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is proposing that Supreme
Council [parliament] chairman Oleksandr Moroz, Prime Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov and the leaders of the factions in parliament form a coalition of
national unity.

This is stated in the declaration of national unity offered for signing as
the result of the round table taking place in Kiev today attended by the
president, the leaders of political parties and public figures.

“We are convinced that the implementation of this declaration’s provisions,
which will form the basis of a majority coalition agreement, is only
possible if a coalition of national unity is formed in the Ukrainian Supreme
Council of the fifth convocation, and we support this step,” the draft
declaration says.

Interfax-Ukraine’s correspondent says that the draft sets out a plan of
actions for national unity coalition participants and it has 24 provisions.

The document defines points that must be carried out: Ukraine must remain a
single and unitary state, the creation of a balanced system; refraining from
confrontation between the president, the Supreme Council and the cabinet;
and reviving the work of the Constitutional Court.

The document proposes bringing decisions by all bodies of state authority
and of local self-government into line with the constitution. It is also
proposed to create political and legal conditions to ensure the opposition
can work without obstruction in election bodies at all levels.

The plan of action envisages reforming the executive authorities and
preventing the politicization of state service by making it a priority to
pass new versions of the laws on the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and
state service prepared for presentation by Yushchenko.

The plan also includes the following provisions: the continuation of
judicial reform, reform of the law-enforcement bodies in line with European
standards, the bringing of criminal law and criminal justice into line with
the standards and recommendations of the Council of Europe’s committee of
ministers, the European Union and the rules of the European Court of Human
Rights.

The declaration says it’s necessary to introduce amendments to some
legislative acts to accelerate Ukraine’s entry to the World Trade
Organization by the end of 2006.

Other points are achieving annual GDP growth of no less than 5 per cent and
inflation of no more than 10 per cent, as well as the creation of at least
1m jobs a year.

Further, the plan proposes conducting tax reform to introduce property tax
and collect a single national insurance payment from wages. Also, it’s
planned to raise the quality of utility services by creating competitive
conditions in the housing and utilities sector.
Also, the document defines the need to raise Ukrainian citizens’ standard of
living and defeat poverty by implementing effective targeted social welfare,
as well as the need to provide worthy pensions.

The action plan talks of the need to stimulate the system of local
self-government by ensuring it is sufficiently financed and by reforming
administrative borders, and talks of a rejection of federalism in favour of
decentralisation.

The plan says it is necessary to pay special attention to the fight against
corruption at all levels of power by supporting the legislative initiatives
of the president in this area. It is also necessary to ensure Ukrainian has
the status of the only state language and the language of officials, whilst
at the same time guaranteeing the rights of languages of ethnic minorities,
in line with the European Charter.

On culture and the revival of spirituality, it is proposed to maintain
freedom of confession and support efforts to build a single national
Ukrainian orthodox church.

The plan says there must be the implementation of the Ukraine-EU plan of
action and immediate talks regarding the creation of a free trade zone
between Ukraine and the European Union, as well as the joining of a NATO
Membership Action Plan.

It envisages the establishment of effective economic partnerships with all
relevant foreign trade partners, guided by common interests and mutual
benefit.

These priorities must be the defining criteria of the formation and activity
of the coalition and the system of power as a whole, which will find as
their basis new mechanisms of social and political collaboration.

These mechanisms include: the drafting and introduction of regular procedures
for public consultations regarding important issues of social development and
state building, the formation of effective mechanisms of public monitoring
of the authorities’ actions, and ensuring openness and accountability of the
bodies of state and local self-government.

For this document to come into force, it must be signed by: Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko, Supreme Council chairman Oleksandr Moroz and
Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, as well parliament faction leaders Viktor
Yanukovych (Party of Regions), Yuliya Tymoshenko (Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc),
Roman Bezsmertnyy (Our Ukraine), Vasyl Tsyshko (Socialist Party) and Petro
Symonenko (Communist Party).

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3. UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT HOLDS POLITICAL STALEMATE TALKS

Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko held crisis talks Thursday to find a way
out of Ukraine’s political stalemate, but his appeal for compromise was
shattered when lawmaker Yulia Tymoshenko lashed out against what she
termed calls for artificial unity.

“In not a single democratic country in the world is it possible to unite all
political forces,” said Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the 2004 Orange
Revolution, in an angry speech during the round-table discussions. “As a
rule, there are those in power and the opposition.”

The ex-Soviet republic has been locked in turmoil since Viktor Yanukovych’s
pro-Russian Party of Regions won the most seats in a March parliamentary
election, besting the pro-Western reformers who backed Yushchenko, but
falling short of a majority.

Yushchenko’s allies teamed up with Tymoshenko’s bloc and the Socialist Party
to create a majority coalition in June, but the Socialists defected before
it had time to form a new government. The Socialists united with the Party
of Regions and the Communists in a new coalition that proposed Yanukovych
as prime minister.

Fraud allegations during Yanukovych’s run for the presidency against
Yushchenko in 2004 triggered the massive protests known as the Orange
Revolution; the Supreme Court declared the vote invalid, and Yushchenko
defeated Yanukovych in a rerun.

Yushchenko so far has not forwarded Yanukovych’s nomination as premier to
the parliament. But because the parliament convened more than 60 days ago
without forming a government, Yushchenko technically has the right to
dissolve the legislature and call new elections.

Faced with the equally unattractive prospects of calling new elections or
allowing his foe to become prime minister, Yushchenko has been casting
desperately for a solution as the Aug. 2 deadline to decide on Yanukovych’s
candidacy approaches.

“The moment of truth has come, we need to make a decision,” Yushchenko
said at the start of the round-table, which was televised live.

Yushchenko proposed that all the parties sign a memorandum of national unity
that which would safeguard freedom of speech, Ukraine’s territorial
integrity, liberal economic reforms, European integration efforts and
support for a single national language, Ukrainian.

But when the leaders began discussing the memorandum, discussion over
whether Ukraine should join NATO sparked heated debate. The Socialists and
Communists oppose NATO membership, while Yushchenko countered that
cooperation with the alliance was the only way to provide security to
Ukraine.

After Yushchenko and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko exchanged
barbs over NATO and the issue of creating a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church,
Tymoshenko said the sharp disagreements were an example of why a broad
coalition would not work.

“Why should we have two centers of power that rule the country with
different courses … it is only a matter of time before they clash,” she
said.

But Yanukovych, who is seeking Yushchenko’s support, appeared eager to find
a compromise. He said that “cooperation with NATO is natural.”

However, after six hours of talks, the party leaders failed to reach an
agreement on the text of the memorandum. Yushchenko ordered a working group
to hash out differences and prepare a final document by Friday morning.

The tension in the room was obvious, even without the main issue – of
Yanukovych’s premiership – being addressed. When Yanukovych went into a
long-winded speech, Yushchenko pointedly interrupted to tell him he had been
speaking too long.

Yushchenko ally Roman Bezsmertny said that the president’s bloc was willing
to work with Party of Regions, but only if a new coalition of national unity
was formed. “Today all of us must think first of all about unity,” he said.

Ukraine remains deeply divided between the Russian-speaking east, which
supports Yanukovych, and the Ukrainian-speaking west, which considers a
Yanukovych premiership a betrayal of the Orange Revolution.

Tymoshenko pressed the president to reject any union with Yanukovych, urging
him to dissolve parliament and call new elections.
Yushchenko has appeared reluctant to take such a drastic step.

The Party of Regions suggested earlier Thursday that it was ready for some
compromises, but would refuse to discuss dropping Yanukovych.

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4. UKRAINE’S ROUND-TABLE TALKS STUMBLE OVER NATO

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1830 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – A heated discussion over Ukraine’s NATO integration erupted at the
round-table talks among the country’s leading politicians and public figures
held in Kiev today.

While President Viktor Yushchenko wanted the talks’ final document, called a
declaration of national unity, to contain a clear provision that joining
NATO is Ukraine’s goal, Communist leader Petro Symonenko and parliamentary
speaker Oleksandr Moroz called for the exclusion of such a provision from
the proposed document.

Addressing the participants in the round-table talks broadcast live UT1
state TV and three private TV channel, President Viktor Yushchenko recalled
that Ukraine’s European aspirations mean “joining the NATO defence system”,
which, in his view, “is the cheapest and the most reliable concept from the
point of view of national spending”.

“Do not forget that we are living in a country without a single meter of
demarkated state border. Esteemed politicians, you are responsible for
this,” Yushchenko said. He urged the politicians “to produce an honest
answer because we are not talking about virtual things but your families,
our families and 48 million Ukrainians”.

The president’s reasons, however, remained unheard by the leaders of the
Communist and Socialist parties. Both Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz
insisted that the provision on Ukraine’s accession to NATO be excluded from
the draft declaration.

“We will join NATO when we need to. We will hold a referendum when the time
comes. But today let us not include in the declaration something that
irritates people,” Moroz said.

Communist leader Petro Symonenko said that his party has been a consistent
opponent of Ukraine’s joining NATO and he is not going to sign any documents
containing such provisions. He suggested that a nation-wide referendum on
NATO should be held in Ukraine as soon as in November this year.

In an attempt to reconcile views of all participants in the talks, the
leader of the propresidential Our Ukraine parliamentary faction, Roman
Bezsmertnyy, proposed to amend the disputed NATO clause to read that a
decision on joining NATO should be taken following a nation-wide referendum.
Such wording, however, was rejected by both Symonenko and Moroz.

In the end, the participants in the talks agreed to form a working group
which is work out a draft declaration of national unity acceptable for all
sides of the round table by 0730 gmt 28 July. -30-
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5. UKRAINIAN PARTY LEADERS EXCHANGE OPINIONS
AT ROUND-TABLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO

UT1, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

The leaders of major Ukrainian parties have presented their positions at a
round-table meeting with President Viktor Yushchenko. The meeting, which
it is hoped will solve the current political crisis, is being broadcast live by
the state TV channel and three commercial channels.

The parliament speaker and head of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Oleksandr
Moroz, urged those present to sign an agreement on forming a grand
coalition, and said that all differences could be settled through talks.

The leader of the parliamentary coalition and head of the pro-Russian Party
of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, said there were few policy differences
between the old Orange coalition and the new coalition of his Party of
Regions, the Socialists and the Communists. He echoed calls for the
formation of a broader coalition, and praised President Yushchenko for not
taking the side of any political party.

“We are sure that the president will never take the side of any political
party, that he will be on the side of the state and Ukraine’s national
interests,” Yanukovych said. He expressed hope that they “will manage to
find a common language for the sake of the state and Ukrainian people”.

The prime minister and head of the propresidential Our Ukraine People’s
Union party, Yuriy Yekhanurov, said that a grand coalition can be formed,
but without the Communist Party.

“Only the president is the source of stability in this country, so the
government believes that it is his proposals that should become the
foundation for reaching a balanced and responsible compromise,” Yekhanurov
said. This compromise will make it possible “to form in parliament the only
grand coalition possible in the current situation, without the Communist
Party, but allocating to them the posts they have won in a difficult
struggle,” Yekhanurov said.

The opposition bloc leader, Yuliya Tymoshenko, has said she will never join
any grand coalition with the Party of Regions and listed grounds for holding
a new parliamentary election. Tymoshenko called on the president to dissolve
parliament and hold a new parliamentary election.

“I have to say that our bloc has won in 14 regions of Ukraine. Under no
circumstances shall we join any grand coalitions because today we see that
the budget resolution which has been submitted revokes all the decisions
adopted by the cabinet in order to combat the black economy,” Tymoshenko
said.

She said that politics has become “the most profitable business” in Ukraine.
This is why her political force “reserves the right, first, to insist on
holding a repeat parliamentary election because the political grounds for
this do exist, since the [parliamentary] majority does not enjoy the backing
of the majority of Ukrainian people”. “Second, parliament has been
discredited. Third, whatever we sign, there will be no unity as we all
differ ideologically”, Tymoshenko said. -30-
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6. UKRAINIAN POLL SHOWS CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT
IF ANOTHER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CALLED

Regions 38.7%, Tymoshenko Bloc 35.1%, Social Party not clear 3% hurdle

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1035 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – If an early election was called, the Party of Regions would be
supported by 38.7 per cent of voters who definitely decided to take part and
expressed a preference. The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc would get 35.1 per cent
and the Socialist Party would not clear the three-per-cent hurdle, taking
only 2.8 per cent.

UNIAN’s correspondent reports that these are the results of a public opinion
survey unveiled today by the director of the Institute of Social and
Political Psychology of the Academy of Political Sciences, Mykola
Slyusarevskyy.

“Our Ukraine and the Communist Party would get less support [than in the
last election], although they would still cross the entry barrier: 6.9 per
cent and 4.4 per cent respectively.

As before, People’s Opposition Bloc of Nataliya Vitrenko is on the verge of
the entry barrier with 3.3 per cent. Pora-Party of Reforms and Order would
not get into parliament, with 2.5 per cent, and neither would the
Socialists, with 2.8 per cent,” Slyusarevskyy said.

At the same time, he stressed that if Our Ukraine and Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc formed a single list of candidates, they could count on 40.6 per cent of
votes from those who definitely decided to take part and expressed a
preference.

“On the same condition, Party of Regions could get around about the same
number of votes, 39.2 per cent, but the situation for other parties would
change. In particular, Pora-Reforms and Order would have a chance of getting
into parliament with 3.2 per cent, but things would be worse for Vitrenko’s
bloc (2.9 per cent) and the Socialists (2.6 per cent)”, he said.

The head of the institute’s laboratory, Pavlo Frolov, pointed out that
nearly half of respondents – 48.6 per cent – say they made a mistake in
their choice at the 2004 presidential election. “This opinion is especially
widespread among supporters of the Party of Regions (86.1 per cent) and the
Communists (81.9 per cent).

Only a quarter of those asked ( 26.5 per cent) still say they made the right
choice, and most of those are those who voted for Our Ukraine at the
parliamentary election (62.7 per cent) and Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (46.3 per
cent),” Frolov said.

The institute carried out the poll on 14-20 July. A total of 2,293
respondents were surveyed in 334 built-up areas, of which 146 urban and 188
rural. The poll was carried out among a representative sample of people aged
18 or over. The margin of error is 2.1 per cent. -30-
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7. UKRAINE’S HAZY CONSTITUTION ADDS TO TROUBLES

Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, 27 July, 2006

KIEV: Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko says that he will stick to the
constitution as he wrestles with a political crisis. But there is a problem:
neither he nor his opponents truly understand what the document says.

The constitution, hurriedly adopted during another crisis two years ago, is
unclear on crucial issues such as whether Yushchenko has the power to
dissolve parliament or reject its nominee for prime minister.

And the Constitutional Court, whose job it is to adjudicate on any disputes
over the document, is paralysed because parliament cannot agree on the
appointment of new judges.

Yushchenko is locked in a stand-off with the opposition majority in
parliament that wants him to appoint his rival, Viktor Yanukovich, as prime
minister. The Ukrainian president, citing the constitution, says that he has
the right to reject Yanukovich’s candidacy and dissolve parliament. His
opponents, also citing the constitution, say he has no such right.

“We have a collapse of constitutional law. It has just ceased to exist
here,” said Vadym Karasyov, director of the Institute for Global
Strategies, a Kiev think tank. “Every politician interprets the constitution
how he wants.”

Yushchenko’s aides say that the lack of clarity in the constitution has
helped bring about Ukraine’s political crisis. “Unfortunately, it contains
contradictions which have led to this situation and give rise to differing
interpretations,” presidential legal adviser Mykola Poludenny told
reporters.

Yushchenko and his opponents are working on a compromise deal that would
give Yanukovich the prime minister’s job. The real test for the
constitution, say analysts, will come if that deal collapses.

Article 90 (2) of the constitution states parliament must form a cabinet
within 60 days after the previous government is removed. If it does not the
president can dissolve the chamber and call new elections.

That deadline expired on Tuesday. But there is a loophole. Yushchenko’s
opponents say the last government was not removed but its authority expired.
Therefore, they argue, the 60-day countdown never actually started.

Article 106 (9) says parliament proposes its candidate for prime minister to
the president. He then has 15 days to present the nomination back to
parliament for approval. But it does not say if that means Yushchenko can
reject parliament’s choice.

The constitution took on its current form when parliament voted through
amendments to the document on December 8, 2004. That was at the height of
the “Orange Revolution”, a wave of street protests over a rigged
presidential election.

The amendments, watering down presidential powers, were part of a backroom
deal with outgoing president Leonid Kuchma that allowed Yushchenko to take
over.

The changes should have been followed up with enabling legislation spelling
out how to apply the principles in the constitution. Since then though, parliament
has been without a stable majority so the legislation has not been passed.
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========================================================
8. MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE
What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova

Basapress news agency, Chisinau, in Moldovan 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

CHISINAU – The chairman of the Moldovan parliament, Marian Lupu, told
a news conference today that the Moldovan-Romanian relations should be
more flexible and intelligent on the part of both Bucharest and Chisinau.

Lupu assessed the relations between Romania and Moldova as “latent” and said
that this issue will be discussed within the forthcoming visit by Romanian
Senate President Nicolae Vacaroiu to Chisinau.

Marian Lupu described a recent proposal by Romanian President Traian Basescu
to Moldova to enter the EU together as abstract and unachievable as it lacks
practical maturity.

“Language, history and national issues are under permanent discussion and I
do not believe we will find a common language in these issues. There is a
single chance for good neighbouring relations, which is to eliminate
disputed moments from the dialogue and replace them with practical issues:
transborder cooperation, trade, economic projects, investments, cooperation
in the humanitarian sector,” Lupu said.

Speaking about Moldovan-Russian relations, Lupu said they are rather tense
at all levels and urged for a dialogue with Russia in order to resolve this
situation.

“Without Moscow’s participation, no solution will be found to the Dniester
conflict. The dialogue could be held at the levels of governments and
parliaments. We are witnesses of a new concept of Russia’s foreign policy,
which seems to be very pragmatic and even aggressive. We are going through
an adaptation period and I hope that common sense will win and we will find
areas of common interests in our partnership,” Marian Lupu said.

Commenting on prospects for relations with Ukraine, Lupu said that
Chisinau’s foreign policy will not change regardless of the way the
political situation in Ukraine develops.

What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova, especially in
the context of the joint border monitoring at the Dniester sector of the
border and the Dniester conflict settlement. What concerns the evolution of
political climate in Ukraine, there is a certain risk and we are waiting for
the outcome of the situation,” Lupu said. -30-

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9. POLISH PRIME MINISTER SAYS WE WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS
WITH ANY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE

PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1234 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

WARSAW – Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski said on Wednesday [26 July]
that Poland monitors the development of the situation in Ukraine with concern
but assured reporters that it would maintain relations with any democratically
elected government of that country.

Those are Ukraine’s internal affairs and we respect Ukraine’s sovereignty in
all aspects though we regret political crisis in the Ukrainian parliament,
the prime minister said.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski underlined that Polish foreign policy vis-a-vis Ukraine
is pursued vis-a-vis the country and not a specific government. “We will
talk with every government,” the prime minister said.

He added that the situation in Ukraine has stabilized. “We do not want to
overreact,” he stressed. Democracy is a difficult process and a “hasty
declaration of failure” is “explicitly irresponsible”, the prime minister
concluded.

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10. POLISH PRES COUNTING ON UKRAINE NOT CHANGING

PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2011 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, Published: Jul 27, 2006

WARSAW – President Lech Kaczynski told [commercial] TVN24 television
on Wednesday [26 July] that his Tuesday conversation with Ex-president
Aleksander Kwasniewski had been necessary. The meeting was about the
political situation in Ukraine.

“We spoke almost exclusively about the issue of Ukraine, where President
Kwasniewski played a very serious role,” said President L. Kaczynski. He did
not reveal details of the conversation. He said only that they had spoken
about “different variants”. “I think that at this moment we will still try
and talk with the highest circles in Ukraine, but it is of course Ukraine
that will decide about its fate,” he stressed.

The president made whether Poland will be the “advocate of Ukraine in
Europe” dependent upon the policy of that country. “We are defending the
interests of Ukraine in our interests as well,” he said.

The president is counting on it that the line of Ukraine “will not change”.
He added that “from the point of view of Poland, it is not a matter of
indifference what coalition rules there.” He stressed that there were no
factors tending to “a cooling of relations with the authorities of Ukraine”.
[passage omitted]

Asked about his attitude towards Kwasniewski, President L.Kaczynski stressed
that he had “never felt a particular antipathy towards him”. “We are people
who first had contact in our youth, but we chose completely different roads.
In direct contacts, President Kwasniewski is a pleasant man,” he said.

For L. Kaczynski, that the present and former presidents, “people with
different life-stories and belonging to different groups, meet from time to
time is something obvious”.

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11.UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER MOROZ AND A TOP US
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER MEET IN KYIV
Discuss signing of declaration of national unity, foreign policy issues.

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0821 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – The chairman of the Supreme Council [parliament] of Ukraine,
Oleksandr Moroz, has met Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State David Kramer to discuss
the signing of the declaration of national unity, as well as foreign policy
issues.

Speaking after the meeting on Friday [28 July], Moroz told journalists that
they had discussed the prospects for signing the declaration of national
unity and also issues related to forming a new cabinet. Moroz said he hoped
that the document would be signed on Friday. “I hope that the final document
will be signed today, or at least that there will be at least three
signatures on it,” Moroz said.

At the same time, Moroz said that the signing of the declaration or a
failure to do so by parties involved in the talks will not mean that a
coalition is formed, expanded or reformatted. “This document is a message
to society,” he said. He said he doubted that the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc
faction or the Communist Party would sign the declaration.

[Passage omitted: Moroz says the talks are held to find a “model for
Ukraine’s development”.] -30-
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12. UKRAINE’S FUTURE LOOKS LESS ORANGE
Orange Revolution has gone sour

By Stephen Mulvey, BBC News, United Kingdom, Wed, July 26, 2006

Everything was meant to change in Ukraine as a result of the Orange
Revolution in the last three months of 2004.

Corruption and cronyism were supposed to give way to transparency and
democracy. “Bandits” were meant to be jailed, dubious privatisations were
meant to be reversed. EU and Nato membership appeared to be within reach.

It has not quite worked out like that – though some important goals were
achieved.

“The main achievement of the Orange Revolution was freedom of speech,”
says Taras Berezovets, chief editor of the Ukrainian political website,
Polittech.org.

“Another benefit has been freedom of business. Politicians stopped
interfering, and we now have an economic boom, which has continued
despite recent political crises.”

A parliamentary election in March, unlike many previous elections, was free
and fair – so much so, that the winner was the man who “lost” the Orange
Revolution, the pro-Russian former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych.

He has now been nominated again for the premiership, which, under
constitutional amendments brought in after the Orange Revolution, would
make him the most powerful man in the country.

IN-FIGHTING
But many of the Revolution’s promised changes did not occur. Corruption
allegations still dog some government ministers. Political parties resemble
business clans, bankrolled by tycoons who often double as members of
parliament. Reports of vote-buying are rife.

Things started to go wrong from the very start.

Any political goals the leaders of the Orange Revolution may have shared
were forgotten during the coalition government headed by Yulia Tymoshenko,
which took office in February 2005, and quickly descended into in-fighting.

Ms Tymoshenko accused Mr Yushchenko’s inner circle of corruption. He
sacked her, and accused her of abusing her position to repay debts.

Mr Yushchenko then outraged many of his own supporters by turning to his
rival, Mr Yanukovych, for help in a parliamentary vote to confirm his new
prime ministerial nominee.

During the Revolution it had been Yushchenko and Tymoshenko against
Yanukovych. Suddenly it was Yushchenko and Yanukovych against
Tymoshenko, who voted against Mr Yushchenko’s nominee.

CATCH 22
In the months since the March election – in which his party came a poor
third – Mr Yushchenko has been faced with a choice of which enemy to form a
coalition with: Ms Tymoshenko or Mr Yanukovych.

Ukrainian commentators say he negotiated with both simultaneously, dragging
the talks out for months in an attempt to extract maximum concessions.

Finally, he struck a deal with Ms Tymoshenko, with the Socialist Party as a
junior partner, just as in 2005. But within days the Socialists had second
thoughts and opted instead to join a coalition with Mr Yanukovych. Now Mr
Yanukovych has the upper hand, and is inviting Mr Yushchenko’s party to join
his coalition.

Mr Yushchenko now has to decide whether to agree, or whether it would be
better for his Our Ukraine party to go into opposition. A third option,
favoured by Ms Tymoshenko, would be for him to dissolve parliament and
call new elections.

“It is a Catch 22 situation,” says Taras Kuzio, a senior fellow of the US
body, the German Marshall Fund. “Yanukovych as prime minister would
overshadow Yushchenko. Yushchenko would be sidelined. And his supporters
would desert him in droves, going over to Tymoshenko. Politically, he would
be finished. “But if he calls fresh elections it could be even worse.”

‘ANTI-CRISIS’ COALITION
Taras Berezovets of polittech.org agrees that new elections held now would
simply reduce Our Ukraine’s share of the vote from 14% in March to 9% or
10%.

What a new Yanukovych government would mean for Ukraine and for the legacy
of the Orange Revolution is an open question.

For example, the “anti-crisis coalition” formed by his Party of Regions, the
Socialist Party and the Communist Party, pledges to continue moving towards
Mr Yushchenko’s goal of EU membership and to abide by any result of a
referendum on Nato membership.

“Yanukovych claims he is a new man, and is not going back to the bad old
ways,” says Taras Kuzio. “We simply do not know whether he will have to work
within the parameters of the post-Orange system or not.”

How long a Yanukovych government would last is also unclear.

The Party of Regions’ big business backers do not have much in common with
the Communists, and neither group has much in common with the more “Orange”
members of the Socialist Party, some of whom have already begun splitting
away.

So whatever happens next, Ukraine seems far from a return to political
stability. -30-
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LINK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5215210.stm
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13. UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS AS ORANGE
PARTIES JOSTLE FOR POWER

COMMENTARY: By Niall Green
World Socialist Web Site, UK, Thu, 27 July 2006

A coalition of the Party of the Regions, the Communists and the
Socialists-which together hold a majority of seats in the Ukrainian
parliament (Rada)-continues to be prevented from forming a government by the
leaders of the “Orange Revolution,” President Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko.

The Party of the Regions won the March elections to the Rada with 32 percent
of the vote. Tymoshenko’s eponymous political party came second with 22
percent, followed by Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine trailing a distant third.

According to the constitution, Yushchenko had until midnight July 24 to
approve or reject Party of the Region’s leader Viktor Yanukovich as the
country’s prime minister. The deadline passed with Yushchenko insisting he
has until August 2 to decide if he will endorse the new government or call
fresh elections to the Rada.

Presidential loyalist and former prime minister Yuri Yekhanurov has been
re-appointed head of an interim government.

Our Ukraine could join with the Party of the Regions in a “grand coalition.”
Roman Zvarych, a spokesman for Our Ukraine, indicated that if the
pro-Russian Party of the Regions was willing to adapt to Yushchenko’s more
pro-Western agenda, then the two parties could form a government. “We are
ready for cooperation on condition the country continues its domestic and
foreign policy line,” Zvarych said.

Ukraine should continue working to join the World Trade Organisation by the
end of 2006 and the European Union, as well as maintaining close ties with
NATO and eventually joining the alliance, he explained. This amounts to a
diktat that any deal between them would be predicated on the Party of the
Region’s adopting the policies of a party decisively rejected in the polls.

The formation of any government led by Yanukovich-the defeated presidential
candidate in 2004-has been strongly opposed by Tymoshenko, who has
demanded the post of prime minister for herself.

In a move intended to prevent the Yanukovich-led coalition from taking
office, Tymoshenko’s party resigned from the Rada on July 24. If they are
joined by 26 deputies from Our Ukraine’s faction, then the Rada will lack
the two-thirds quorum necessary to function, forcing fresh elections.

The move was also designed to place maximum pressure on Yushchenko in a
so-far unsuccessful bid to force him to use his presidential powers to
reject Yanukovich as premier.

For Tymoshenko, a multimillionaire oligarch whose fortune was made in the
privatised gas supply market in the 1990s, failure to gain power at the
expense of the Party of the Regions would be a political and personal
disaster. A Party of the Regions-led government would be likely to push for
her prosecution for numerous alleged criminal practices in business and
politics.

Caught between these factions, Yushchenko has faced a political “Catch 22”
since the results of March’s election left his party in a dismal third
place. Most Ukrainian commentators have predicted that if Yushchenko
responds to the demand of Tymoshenko and calls fresh elections, Our
Ukraine’s share of the vote will collapse, from 14 percent in March to as little as
9 or 10 percent, with many of its remaining supporters switching their vote to
either the Party of the Regions or the Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko.

Alternatively, if the president backs the formation of a government led by
Yanukovich, then he will be portrayed by Tymoshenko as having “betrayed” the
Orange Revolution.

Most crucially, should Yushchenko allow the pro-Russian Party of the Regions
to take office, he will lose the backing of his principal supporter, the
United States.

The Orange Revolution, hailed in the Western media as a victory for
Ukraine’s “democratic forces,” was little more than a political coup organised and
funded by the US and other Western powers to bring to power a section of the
country’s elite that were amenable to Washington’s aim of weakening the
influence of Russia in all the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Yushchenko’s acceptance of a Yanukovich government would be unacceptable to
Washington, which has now identified Tymoshenko as the key figure to press
ahead with its strategy for Ukraine.

There is as yet no direct evidence that her decision to quit parliament was
approved by the Bush administration. But Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, fierce
opponents since the president sacked her from the post of prime minister in
2005, only agreed to share power as a result of pressure from the US to form
a Tymoshenko-led government that would keep the Party of the Regions out of
power.

The debacle in Ukraine has proven to be a major embarrassment for US foreign
policy. In the struggle between Washington and Moscow, the Orange Revolution
was seen as a major blow to Russian influence in a region rich in oil and
gas deposits and energy transit routes. Less than two years later,
Washington’s plans for the Ukraine are in disarray.

US and European media outlets, so effusive in their praise for the Orange
Revolution in 2004, are almost silent on the crisis in Ukraine today.

Writing in the Financial Times, Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow at the
New America Foundation, commented that current events “have been barely
reported by most of the US media, let alone commented on. This silence marks
a response to ideological and geopolitical embarrassment of which the old
Soviet media might have been proud.”

Despite the silence, Washington is already preparing to disrupt any new
pro-Russian government in Kiev. The Stratfor web site, highly connected in
US foreign policy and security circles, wrote on July 24 that Tymoshenko’s
task will be to mobilise her supporters “against a hostile government,
whether one emerges immediately or after a new election.”

The article continues: “Though [Tymoshenko’s] supporters are highly
motivated and often young, they are concentrated in western Ukraine and
Kiev. She enjoys almost no support in the heavily pro-Russia east. Should
she find herself isolated entirely from government, however, she might have
no other option but to attempt the large-scale undermining of Ukraine’s
political system through public demonstrations, blockades, work stoppages
or extra-constitutional maneuvers.”

There could not be a more frank description of the fundamentally
undemocratic character of Tymoshenko and, by extension, of the Orange
Revolution sponsored and organised by the US.

Stratfor concludes that her actions would not be driven by “resetting
Ukraine on a course toward Europe, nor about gaining concessions on energy
or economic policy. It is a matter of personal ambition. Having lost the
office of prime minister, she will not rest (or allow her followers to rest)
until she is back at the top.”
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LINK: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jul2006/ukra-j27.shtml
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14. “VICTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL BECOME A BANDIT HIMSELF”
Russian emigre tycoon says Ukrainian president should disband parliament

INTERVIEW: With Boris Berezovskiy
By Oleksandr Chalenko, Segodnya, Kiev, in Russian 21 Jul 06; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

The Ukrainian president should disband parliament to keep “bandits” from
coming to power, Boris Berezovskiy has said in an interview with a major
daily. He called the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine
“bandits” and said Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko should disband
parliament in order to prevent them from coming to power.

He also said the Americans “do not understand anything about what is going
on in the post-Soviet space”. He criticized the USA for violating
international law in Iraq.

The following is the text of the article by Oleksandr Chalenko, entitled
“Viktor Yushchenko will become a bandit himself”, published in the Ukrainian
daily newspaper Segodnya, which is close to the Party of Regions, on 21
July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

PARLIAMENT MUST BE DISBANDED
[Chalenko] Boris Abramovich [Berezovskiy], what do you think of the current
political situation in Ukraine?
[Berezovskiy] I think President Viktor Yushchenko is the one who has pushed
it into a corner. And he has only one way out, if he really wants to solve
it. And that is to disband parliament.

I remember a conversation I had with him a year and a half ago, when he had
just become president. Viktor Andriyovych [Yushchenko] then told me that he
saw Ukraine as a normal, effective and democratic state. But in assessing
the current situation, he not only did not fulfil this task, but Ukraine
stands even farther from democracy than it did under [former Ukrainian
President Leonid] Kuchma.

If Yushchenko sends Viktor Yanukovych’s nomination [for prime minister] to
parliament, then that will be a betrayal of everyone who stood with him on
the Maydan [Independence Square in Kiev, the focal point of the Orange
revolution which brought Yushchenko to power in December 2004].

[Chalenko] And what should the president do after disbanding parliament?
[Berezovskiy] Go into the parliamentary election under a single list with
Yuliya Tymoshenko. Otherwise, [Yushchenko’s bloc] Our Ukraine will have no
victory, because Yushchenko himself discredited it.

Earlier I thought that Viktor Andriyovych represented the democratic
component of the orange movement in an ideological way, and not Yuliya
Tymoshenko. Now I have come to understand that I was wrong. It is Yuliya
Volodymyrivna [Tymoshenko] who personifies the democratic force.

[Chalenko] Perhaps you are not aware that the most recent polls show that
first, the people are against a new election and second, it is the Party of
Regions which would win a repeat election.
[Berezovskiy] I am sceptical of the data in polls. You see, Ukrainians have
a very mobile mode of thinking. Today they have certain sympathies and
tomorrow others. I think it is enough that 15 per cent of Ukrainians are in
favour of disbanding parliament. Because this is the progressive minority,
and it is this minority which moves the passive majority in social progress.

THE “BANDITS”
[Chalenko] Okay, but what if Yushchenko presents Yanukovych’s nomination
for prime minister in parliament after all? What will happen?
[Berezovskiy] The Party of Regions will physically take care of him.
Yanukovych is a bandit. Yes, yes. Once upon a time, Viktor Andriyovych
[Yushchenko] was not ashamed to call Yanukovych a bandit. So if he presents
him to be prime minister, then he will become a bandit himself.

Really, the leader of the Party of Regions is a figure from the 1970s, one
speaking in a mixture of criminal slang and the language of “homo
soveticus”. Tymoshenko is right in calling the last coalition in parliament
a union between the communists and criminals. Both of them are bandits. But
the communists have always been state bandits.

[Chalenko] And yet if there is a re-election, will you provide financial aid
to help Yuliya Tymoshenko set up an “institute of civil society”, like you
helped Yushchenko during the presidential election?
[Berezovskiy] I will not help Tymoshenko personally, because I am a foreign
citizen and do not have the right to do that under Ukrainian law. But I will
help a democratic and transparent election be held, like our Civil Freedom
Fund did in the last election.

Aleksandr Goldfarb, the chairman of our fund, is in Kiev now. He is holding
negotiations on help with the representatives of a few political
forces…[ellipsis as published]

[Chalenko] Which ones exactly?
[Berezovskiy] Ask him. We always finance projects which are directed at
supporting and developing civil society.

AMERICANS WITH NO CLUE
[Chalenko] The G8 summit was just held in St. Petersburg. They say that in
return for support in Iran and North Korea, the Yankees “gave up” democracy
in Russia and Ukraine. Is that true?
[Berezovskiy] You know, I wasn’t there, and so I don’t know anything. But I
can say one thing: the Americans do not understand anything about what is
going on in the post-Soviet space. One should not count on them in affairs
of democratization in Ukraine.

Remember when [Henry] Kissinger came to Ukraine before the presidential
election? He only met Kuchma and Yanukovych, and did not meet Yushchenko.
The Yankees are really hypocritical.

Instead of getting involved in democratization in Iraq (by the way, against
the law, as they are acting against the statute of the UN, having not got
its permission to invade), they would do better to be engaged in
democratization in Ukraine taking a strong position against Yanukovych.

They are doing nothing to counteract the Russian special services in
Ukraine. And it is they [the Russians] who have provoked the situation we
see today in parliament, including buying [speaker Oleksandr] Moroz.

[Chalenko] What happened to your court case against [Yushchenko’s allies
Davyd] Zhvaniya and [Oleksandr] Tretyakov?
[Berezovskiy] I know they have already been summoned. The case will be
heard in the fall. The English courts are slow, but they are fair.
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15. NEW UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER TO BE APPOINTED VERY SOON
Yanukovych will be nominated, Regions Party expected to make four concessions

Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, in Russian 28 Jul 06; p 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko’s party has dropped its demands to
replace Viktor Yanukovych as candidate for prime minister and exclude the
Communists from the parliamentary majority, Oleksandr Chalenko says in a
newspaper linked to Yanukovych’s Party of Regions.

According to the newspaper’s sources, Yanukovych will be nominated for
prime minister on 28 July. The following is the text of report by Ukrainian
newspaper Segodnya on 28 July:

This country will most probably have a prime minister today. Yesterday it
became more or less clear that the president will submit the candidacy of
Viktor Yanukovych for prime minister to parliament. The time of this
nomination is already known – 1600 [1300 gmt].

[Party of Regions MP] Taras Chornovil has told Segodnya that an agreement
on this was reached with the president by 0900 on Thursday [27 July], as
members of his party were saying. In any case, the Party of Regions has
urged 100-per-cent readiness from its members, which means that everybody
has to be in the session hall today.

In the morning, the deputies will fulfil one of the main conditions of the
president for Yanukovych’s nomination – they will elect Constitutional Court
judges.

Something like unofficial consultations and working meetings went off and on
between the Party of Regions and [Yushchenko’s party] Our Ukraine earlier,
but yesterday full-scale negotiations started. [Communist leader] Petro
Symonenko has said that the earlier consultations between the coalition and
the Yushchenko people at the level of working groups looked like “talks on
the employment of the president’s people”.

Now the latter delegated to the talks [Our Ukraine MPs] Petro Poroshenko,
Roman Zvarych, Roman Bezsmertnyy and Anatoliy Kinakh.

Both parties told Segodnya that the talks are about to be completed. “A week
ago I did not have a feeling that a coalition will be, but now I have it,”
said Yuriy Pavlenko, who works concurrently as Our Ukraine MP and acting
sports and youth minister.

Incidentally, it has emerged that Our Ukraine finally dropped its demands to
replace Viktor Yanukovych as the candidate for prime minister and to exclude
the Communists from the coalition.

The Regions are expected to make the following concessions in return.

FIRST – appoint Petro Poroshenko as first deputy prime minister (when this
newspaper was printed, this was not yet confirmed).

SECOND – appoint [Economics Minister] Arseniy Yatsenyuk (a man of the
president) finance minister and subordinate the customs office, the control
and revision department and the tax administration to him (the Regions are
inclined to accept this).

THIRD – the fuel and energy complex has to be supervised by somebody from
Our Ukraine, but state monopolies like Naftohaz Ukrayiny go to the Regions
(this has already been settled).

FORTH – somebody who suits Yushchenko has to be appointed interior minister.
The Party of Regions can agree with this, but only if it is not [current
Interior Minister] Yuriy Lutsenko. One wing in the party, however, says that
Lutsenko as the minister will be no tragedy – let him join Yanukovych’s
government, and this will kill him as a politician. -30-
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16. “CENTRIFUGE TOWARDS THE CENTRE”
Ukrainian president likely to approve premier from rival camp

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Yuliya Mostova
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 22 Jul 06; pp 1, 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is unlikely to disband parliament even
though it may be in his best interests to do so, an influential weekly has
opined.

The best option for his Our Ukraine bloc is to unite with opposition leader
Yuliya Tymoshenko and prevent the Party of Regions from forming a
constitutional majority in parliament, it said.

But Our Ukraine is apparently demoralized and is inclined to join the
coalition led by the Party of Regions. Yushchenko also likes the idea of an
alliance with the Party of Regions in exchange for an increased quota of
ministers in the new cabinet, but this is risky as new ministers will be
fully dependent on the prime minister and parliamentary speaker, who could
initiate their dismissal, it concluded.

The following is the text of the article by Yuliya Mostova, entitled
“Centrifuge towards the centre”, published in Zerkalo Nedeli on 22 July,
subheadings have been inserted editorially:

It is no secret to anyone that many parties and their leaders spend colossal
amounts of money on consultants experts and image makers. As a rule they are
not just feeding the horses.

No, these people whose calling is to make a politician’s image more
attractive, work – some better, some worse – for the money spent on them.
But the overwhelming majority of self-confident leaders in love with
themselves do not use the work of consultants scrupulously and
systematically.

FOLLOWING SOUND ADVICE – PARTY OF REGIONS
Only one political force showed an example of unwavering obedience to the
recommendations of highly-paid consultants – the Party of Regions. The funds
they paid were returned with more than just electoral dividends. And the
recommendations of American and Russian PR-men (by the way, ones not in the
Kremlin pool) are being followed after the election, too.

Both leaders and rank-and-file faction members alike are strictly following
the recommendations of the image-makers. And we are not just talking about a
dress code or topics for news conferences or about ways to present needed
information to the media or the need to send clear signals to influential
embassies. We are talking about the practically unwavering adherence to
rules worked out on public positioning.

Have you paid attention to the fact that representatives of the Party of
Regions have not allowed themselves to speak harshly about the president for
nearly four months? Or to the fact that the congress for Party of Regions
deputies of all levels was held in Ukrainian?

And of course you will recall that Donetsk, despite the efforts of
[Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Nataliya] Vitrenko, did not
declare itself a NATO-free territory.

And everyone has already made due note of how severely and uncompromisingly
the Party of Regions is capable of fixing image problems. The instance of
kicking MP [Oleh] Kalashnykov, who took part in an attack on a group of
journalists from the STB TV channel, out of the faction is an eloquent
example of such capabilities.

This lot of micro and macro recommendations is meant to show Ukraine and the
world (meaning its Western part) another face for the Party of Regions. All
of this is supposed to make us believe that [Party of Regions member Mykola]
Azarov will no more put pressure on opponents using the levers of the Tax
Administration.

Or that [former election chief Serhiy] Kivalov, in administering the fate of
judges, will be guided exclusively by their professionalism. Or that [a
former deputy prime minister Andriy] Klyuyev will not show any interest in
shadow schemes in the fuel and energy complex in general or in state
joint-stock companies in particular.

And that [Party of Regions MP Mykola] Dzhyha will become that person who
will fill in the existing blanks in the [journalist Heorhiy] Gongadze
[murder] case.

OPEN EYES
One of the goals of the new political make-up is to create comfortable
public conditions for President Yushchenko, whose partnership the Party of
Regions is still trying to achieve. In principle, Mr Yushchenko has got into
a situation, which is in short characterized by the words: “I’d be happy to
fool myself”.

Of course, the president has the right to make any decision for which he is
ready to bear responsibility. But it is important for him, at this possibly
last strategic crossing to make a decision with his eyes wide open, and not
eyes wide shut.

FIRST, because, the decision will be equivocal in any case, but no less
responsible because of that. And SECOND, because his decision is a decision
on the fate of the political force which supported him. After all the fate
of the president and Our Ukraine is linked by many things.

Like the president, Our Ukraine is banging its head over the question “what
to do?” Practically no-one has a sure answer to this question. As before,
the bloc has three options open before it, as we wrote last week: early
elections, joining the coalition or being in the opposition.

It is perfectly clear that the bloc, which is not only split along party
lines, but also divided into groups of influence which define their goals in
differing ways, is in no condition to make a decision without the president.

One thing that appears very strange is not only that the president has not
found it necessary to meet with the Our Ukraine faction in the four months
since the election, but that he has not done so even after the creation of
an ideologically unfriendly coalition.

In essence, [Our Ukraine formal leader] Roman Bezsmertnyy is the link
between the faction and the president; he is able to take the entire
spectrum of opinions within the faction to the head of state. But only if Mr
Yushchenko is in a good mood. If he is storming like thunder and lightning,
then it’s not easy at all.

Yushchenko’s striving to narrow the number of people he converses with as
much as possible and the long search for a clear residential position has
led to not only the Party of Regions holding consultations with the group
composed of Bezsmertnyy, [Oleksandr] Tretyakov and [Roman] Zvarych which
is officially authorized for such consultations, but with other, unauthorized,
groups as well.

In the bloc’s information field, there are interpretive versions of
conversations between the “dear friends” and [Party of Regions MP Mykola]
Azarov and [Party of Regions MP Yevhen] Kushnaryov, the president and
[Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc – YTB – leader Yuliya] Tymoshenko, the president
with [Party of Regions MP Rinat] Akhmetov and the president with [prime
minister designate Viktor] Yanukovych and [outgoing Prime Minister Yuriy]
Yekhanurov with everyone.

There is no single “database” in either the bloc itself, or in the
presidential secretariat. In place of one, there is a wealth of information
snippets, based on which the president will make his decision. What
decision? Today, no-one knows.

THE PRESIDENT’S POSITION
There is a very great possibility that Viktor Yushchenko will introduce
Yanukovych’s candidacy [for prime minister] to parliament.

The president’s position has wavered between two extremes: from “never
in my life” to “I’ll introduce it immediately and let’s be done with it”. The
faction, thirsting for something definite has come close to the level of
dispersion in which the slogan “Save yourself while you can!” has become
close to many.

At the same time, both the Our Ukraine HQ and the presidential secretariat
are continuing to weigh various actions while waiting for Yushchenko’s
verdict. Polls prove the intuitive suppositions of those in the president’s
court: the orange electorate is demoralized, disappointed and most
important, apathetic.

Moreover, blitz-polls have convinced officials in the secretariat that this
negative tendency has yet to reach its peak. This argument, like a number of
others, including Tymoshenko’s dominating role in the attempt at an orange
comeback via early elections, is forcing the president to think ever more
sceptically about such a turn of events.

However, according to data at Zerkalo Nedeli, the aggregate sum of
psychological missteps taken by representatives of the Party of Regions –
Azarov’s tone of voice in discussing the budget resolution; Yanukovych’s
personnel position; the backslapping by [Communist Party of Ukraine leader
Petro] Symonenko and [Socialist Party of Ukraine MP Mykola] Rudkovskyy’s
hints at impeachment have worried the president, forcing him to guess that
tucking someone comfortably into bed does not mean it will be easy to sleep
with him.

It’s clear that it was exactly this which served as the reason which
perplexed the anti-crisis group (not to be confused with the anti-crisis
coalition) to prepare a list of all the risks, pluses and minuses of
disbanding parliament. Zerkalo Nedeli learned that this task was placed
before them on Thursday [20 July].

The main apologists for such a way out of the situation among those speaking
with the president are Yuliya Tymoshenko and [presidential chief-of-staff]
Oleh Rybachuk.

INFLUENCING THE GRAND COALITION
Now about the grand coalition and other forms of cooperation between the
president and the coalition which has been set up. A number of experts and
adherents to the idea are trying to convince the head of state that without
his people in the executive branch, the president will de facto lose all his
power by the end of September when the Party of Regions intends to establish
a constitutional majority [of more than 300 deputies in parliament].

Of course, there is a grain of truth in this. In order to remain a serious
player, the president clearly needs more than the two cabinet members
allowed him by the constitution – the foreign minister and the defence
minister.

But the constitutional majority that the Party of Regions is talking about
in the hallways as just a question of time will relieve him of the right of
veto over laws passed by parliament.

And the president can forget about the Constitutional Court which is now
being formed under the legal and sensitive leadership of Mr Kivalov. And so
Mr Yushchenko needs effective contact with the Party of Regions, by securing
that his people take 10 posts in the executive branch.

(By the way, a working group is working on themes meant to explain Our
Ukraine’s cooperation with the Yanukovych to the public at large. Of course,
the base of the pyramid of explanations is unifying the country and the
corresponding need for consensus.)

In the course of consultations with the Party of Regions, one of the groups
of negotiators reached an agreement that the personnel sacrifices in favour
of Our Ukraine would include the first deputy prime minister with
authorities, the minister of interior affairs and the justice minister.
There was also agreement reached that the two ministers nominated by the
president and not by the prime minister would not figure in the quota of 10.

We do not know whether Thursday’s [20 July] meeting between the president
and Viktor Yanukovych confirmed these points. We only know that Mr
Yanukovych was not ready to talk about specific personnel issues. And also
that he was very sceptical about the idea of dividing up the cabinet by
sector.

As you will recall, posts in the orange coalition were divided using this
very principle, upon which responsibility for the state of an entire
sector – the fuel and energy sector, the economy, the humanitarian sector
[and so on] – was carried by one of the three political forces in the
coalition all the way up the vertical of power.

That is, if Tymoshenko got the minister of fuel and energy, then that meant
Naftohaz Ukrayiny [state oil and gas company], the National Energy
Regulating Commission and other entities in fuel and energy were for her
personnel and other responsibilities. The Party of Regions does not want
that. That is, they only want it for themselves, without entrusting any
serious sectors to Our Ukraine.

MINISTERS DEPEND ON PARLIAMENT
And there are other points. Under the old constitution, as we recall, the
president wandered far beyond the legal field when he determined the fates
of ministers. Formally, they could only be dismissed at the request of the
prime minister.

But using the fact that the old constitution gave the president the right to
sign any decree to dismiss the prime minister, the head of state had direct
influence on members of the cabinet.

Now the fate of any minister depends on the parliamentary speaker, who is
capable of including a report from any member of the cabinet, or from the
prime minister who (in our case) controls the parliamentary majority, on the
agenda at any time. And that majority, in any composition, including without
Our Ukraine votes, will be enough to dismiss any minister at any moment.

And how much time do you think is needed to “recruit” the lion’s share of
potential Our Ukraine ministers? Especially if people in these posts are
people who have been calling for cooperation with the Party of Regions
consistently and for a long time…[ellipsis as published]

SERIOUS DOUBTS
I have also heard that the 12 presidential-Our Ukraine ministers put into
the executive will be able to first, defend themselves, and second,
influence the situation in the country. Two things force one to doubt these
thoughts.

FIRST, the spirit of the snake box which reigns in the presidential bloc
gives no reason to think that ministers who get into the Yanukovych
government will act remembering the parable of the divining stick and the
broom.

SECOND, Viktor Yanukovych style of leadership is different from the
democratic cabinet talk sessions with Tymoshenko or Yekhanurov’s silent
ignoring of the government’s opinion or of certain “government factions” and
representatives. In Yanukovych’s government everything will be quite simple:
“Battalion, line up! And forward, march!” Far from every person is able to
withstand such pressure.

WAYS TO COOPERATE
Now a little about who Our Ukraine can use to keep its finger on the pulse
of the executive branch. We are not talking about names.

The president probably cannot fully be guided by the principle of “three Ps”
in this situation [allusion unclear]. Understanding the large arsenal the
Party of Regions has, Mr Yushchenko will strive foremost to appoint
trustworthy, or rather loyal, people. We are talking about forms of
cooperation. There are three.

[1] FIRST – is Our Ukraine entering the coalition before the vote on
Yanukovych for prime minister? That is a collective and final “Goodbye,
Maydan!” [i.e. the Orange Revolution].

[2] The SECOND form is Our Ukraine joining the coalition after the prime
minister is confirmed. The law does not in this case require a
reconfirmation of the head of government or a new vote on him.

The main part of Our Ukraine (it cannot be ruled out that after adopting the
first or second variant of a decision, several people will de facto split
off and join YTB) will simply sign the coalition agreement after which their
representatives will join the executive branch. Sort of a “virgin birth”
with the real prospect of the consequences described above.

[3] But someone was able to come up with a third variant: Our Ukraine
remains in the parliamentary opposition and the quota is given directly to
the president who fills it with professionals and technical people not
affiliated to any party or to people who give up their membership in the
parties which make up Our Ukraine.

I never did figure out whom in central and western Ukraine they are trying
to fool with this “just a little bit pregnant” format of working with
Yanukovych. Nonetheless, this variant is being discussed along with the
others.
LOSING VOTERS
Independent of the chosen manner of cooperation, a situation could certainly
form as a result, one in which having joined the executive branch, Our
Ukraine loses its electorate once and for all and shares responsibility for
the results of the government’s activity with the other members of the
coalition – results which for both subjective and objective reasons are far
from guaranteed to be positive. At the same time, the president loses his
electoral support and the rest of his real power.

Possibly Mr Yushchenko is counting on an open, or perhaps closed, protocol
in which the Party of Regions’ answers to Yushchenko’s conditions are
written. It is known to be true that such a list exists. It includes issues
concerning the political future of the current head of state and issues
which are of principle importance to the development of the country.

In some ways this list is similar to the “Protocol of Differences” which
existed among the members of the former orange coalition. But it is hard to
judge the level of consensus which has been reached today between the
president and the Party of Regions.

It is known that the first group of issues was discussed with [Party of
Regions MP Rinat] Akhmetov. As far as issues of the state are concerned,
they were discussed with a wider group of participants. And at a certain
stage they gave the president optimism.

Whether they are enforced by “the Donetsk word” or a Donetsk signature is
not of principle importance for results, but for the president it is
important.

To say that there is a critical mass of people in Our Ukraine who feel joy
from the prospect of cooperating with the current coalition is to fool one’s
self.

There is no-one there on Yanukovych’s side, but there are those who are
ready to cooperate with someone who is strong; there are very few who love
Tymoshenko, but many who think a decision for our Ukraine to go into the
opposition is the correct one.

There are not a lot of people there who will blush when a little Ukrainian
asks “How could you guys screw up like that?” But there are a lot who
understand that the electorate which is left needs to be saved.

In light of the lack of consensus, the party cannot allow itself to cross
the president’s decision. And it appears that the overwhelming majority will
accept any decision Viktor Yushchenko takes. Whatever it is.

KEEPING TOGETHER IN THE OPPOSITION
Our Ukraine cannot go into opposition without the president. Those who
believe in this step are convinced: if Yushchenko, for any of the above
reasons, decides to cooperate with the legally established coalition and its
lawfully nominated prime minister, and the faction stays in the opposition,
then in a very short time, a significant part of the Our Ukrainians will de
facto join the majority.

And a smaller, but radical part, will be drawn into Tymoshenko’s orbit and
leftovers of the Our Ukraine faction will not be of any use or attractive to
the electorate.

Undoubtedly, if for one second you believe that the slogans used by Our
Ukraine during the presidential and even parliamentary elections were
sincerely shared by Viktor Yushchenko’s adherents, then there cannot be any
talk of cooperation with the “anti-crisis” coalition. Our Ukraine’s place is
in the opposition. Together with the president.

Exactly that decision is dictated [1] first by the traditions of the
civilized world – you couldn’t keep hold of power, didn’t justify the
voters’ hopes, did not show the talent of a negotiator – go into the
opposition. And the next election will judge whether the winners were able
to handle their tasks.

[2] Second, there is a real prospect that Our Ukraine’s quota in the
government as the “women’s’ council for the division commander” is not a way
out for the president.

[3] Third, the rescued and potential electorate has to be given a clear
signal of at least some kind of consistent action. After all, gluing the
country together doesn’t mean trading one’s principles…[ellipsis as
published]

People in Our Ukraine understand well that opposition under an uncontrolled
Yanukovych a la [former President Leonid] Kuchma is not only dangerous for
capital and career growth…[ellipsis as published]

They don’t believe Tymoshenko there, or in her striving to coordinate
actions with Our Ukraine. The statements on joint lists are considered to be
the result of shock which has not yet passed.

There they believe that it is not possible to keep the 150 MPs which are
needed to keep the ruling coalition from overcoming a veto and changing the
constitution or to keep the Party of Regions within at least some semblance
of democratic bounds without allowing appetites to grow to monarchical size.

People there do not believe their comrades in the bloc, thinking that sooner
or later the Party of Regions will find enough arguments to create a
constitutional majority at their own expense and at that of YTB.

And the fact that Andriy Klyuyev – who is responsible for this ticklish
direction – is not forcing Our Ukraine and YTB MPs into the coalition camp
today does not comfort those who know the weaknesses of their party fellows.

People in Our Ukraine do not believe that Viktor Yushchenko will disband
parliament. And that is the most important thing. And so when talk is of the
opposition, people are looking foremost not for ways to act, but for reasons
which would explain why this is impossible.

In the big picture, no-one in Our Ukraine is flattered by getting
[chairmanship of parliament’s several standing] committees and no-one
considers posts held to be a means to influence parliamentary decisions.

[1] First, because the Party of Regions has created its own majorities in
those committees which the opposition has been given. And [2] second,
because decisions are made by the majority in the session hall anyway and a
committee’s position can be ignored.

ACTING RATHER THAN ASKING WHAT TO DO
In fact if what has transpired had served as a lesson for Our Ukraine and
YTB, then today they would not be asking “what to do?”

A sober assessment of the prospects of early elections; consolidation of
positions in communicating with the president and forming his point of view;
working out and publicly confirming joint plans; setting up an analytical
group for working on basic directions for developing the economy and
withstanding threats to national security; or drafting corresponding bills.

Or working to hold onto a critical number in factions which would make
possible a business opposition as well as a political opposition to exist in
the country.

Does anyone doubt that [wealthy businessmen Serhiy] Taruta, [Vitaliy]
Hayduk, [Ihor] Kolomoyskyy and an entire slew of other businessmen will
sleep soundly even one night after Yanukovych becomes prime minister?

With the move of the two orange factions into the opposition, voters will
get a clear signal and orientation. The country in general will get an
understandable system of political relations and an opposition capable of
fairly effectively defending rights and freedoms. And the civilized world
will understand what is happening.

Nevertheless, today the chance for such a variant is slight. It is much more
likely that the president will take Viktor Yanukovych’s candidacy for
confirmation by parliament for which the president will get his enlarged
quota in the executive branch. And that will happen not because the Party of
Regions does not have enough votes in the session hall or personnel to fill
vacant posts.

It will happen not because many in the Party of Regions think that a union
with the Communist Party of Ukraine does nothing to decorate a “market”
party and not because Rinat Akhmetov is beginning to understand that
Oleksandr Moroz in the political game is a figure as big as Akhmetov in
business. And that Akhmetov’s experience in politics is about the same as
Moroz’ experience in business…[ellipsis as published]

The Party of Regions and its person number one need the president and Our
Ukraine for “image”.

What did Mykola Azarov get for showing up on Independence Square in an
orange scarf [in 2004]? And how his fellow party members laugh at the
humiliating procedure of “voting for the speaker” [earlier this month, when
nobody voted for Azarov].

But Mr Yanukovych gets complete use of the country and the possibility to
enter civilized society as a “homo erectus”. But he doesn’t need to put on
an orange scarf to do this, just an orange mask.

———————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
17. ORANGE REVOLUTION IS “OVER BUT NOT A FAILURE”

INTERVIEW: With Taras Kuzio
By Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations
New York, Washington, D.C., Monday, July 24, 2006

Taras Kuzio ( http://www.gwu.edu/~elliott/faculty/kuzio.cfm), an expert on
post-Soviet affairs at George Washington University, discusses the current
political crisis in Ukraine and what it means for the country’s relations
with the United States, the European Union, and Russia. He says the Orange
Revolution, while over, should not be considered a failure.

[QUESTION] Why has it taken three months for a government to get off the
ground in Ukraine?

[TARAS KUZIO] With the new constitutional reform that was introduced this
year just ahead of the parliamentary elections. The Ukraine moved from a
presidential to, in effect, a parliamentary presidential system. Therefore,
one could lay some blame upon this being a completely new system for
Ukraine.

The move to a parliamentary presidential system is in many ways when looking
at the transitions imposed in Europe a very positive thing because countries
with parliamentary systems have tended to do far better in democratization
than those in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] which tend to
have presidential systems. That is one factor.

A second factor has been the ingoing division within the orange revolution
camp which became in September of last year when the Yulia Tymoshenko
government was dismissed by Viktor Yushchenko, and since then the orange
camp which consists of three political forces Ukraine allied to the
president, Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, and the socialist party. The three have
really never gotten back together again and they entered the parliamentary
elections in March as a separate component.

These inner divisions led to very long and protracted coalition
negotiations, and the government can not be proposed under the new
constitutional reforms until a parliamentary coalition is created because
previously under the old system it was the president who appointed the
government. Now the government is appointed and responsible to a
parliamentary coalition-so more of a west European model.

[QUESTION] Given the outcome of the March elections, it seems the
Ukrainian public has swung back toward the Party of the Regions, which is
led by Viktor Yanukovich, who famously lost the presidential elections in
2004 in what became known worldwide as the Orange Revolution. Why
has his popularity gone up since then?

[TARAS KUZIO] One has to compare the results of the parliamentary
elections in March to the presidential elections in November and December
2004. The results are pretty much the same, and nothing has really changed.

Although the Party of Regions this year came first in the five political
forces which crossed the 3 percent threshold into parliament, they received
32 percent, when one does a comparison of what the political forces who
supported Viktor Yanukovich in 2004 obtained and what they obtained this
year, and the orange forces who backed Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 and what
they obtained this year. There really is not that much of a difference.

So both sides obtained approximately the same percentage of support. It is
just that the Party of Regions came first with thirty two percent because
they were the only political force which crossed into parliament that
represented the old system whereas the orange forces were divided between
three political forces.

But the two together actually obtained more than the party of regions.
Therefore, they were able if they had wanted or had the political will to
create an orange coalition which would have given them more than 50 percent
of the seats.

[QUESTION] Does it seem that Yanukovich will become prime minister then?

[TARAS KUZIO] It is a question that is difficult to answer because of these
constitutional reforms. The president is supposed to just have a formality
of actually proposing his name now because the parliamentary coalition is
being created called the anti-crisis coalition consisting of the communists
the socialist and the party regions.

They have nominated Viktor Yanukovich for Prime minister; they nominated him
to the president, the president then puts his name to parliament to be voted
on. That is the formal procedure. It has never happened before. But this is
the actual procedure under the constitutional reform.

Mr. Viktor Yushchenko has said that he does not want to see Mr. Yanukovich
as prime minister for a whole host of reasons. One of which, he feels he
will be overshadowed by Mr. Yanukovich, because he is a strong willed
character, also because the position of Prime minister has become more
important and has more power under the constitutional reform, but also
because Mr. Yanukovich is loathed by a good proportion of Ukraine, primarily
in western and central Ukraine who voted for the orange revolution.

Viktor Yanukovich does represent in many people’s mind that election fraud
and violence that took place in 2004. He is a divisive figure not a uniting
figure. Whether the president has the right not to propose Mr. Yanukovich
for the position of Prime minister to parliament for its vote, is a separate
question because the only real alternative for Viktor Yushchenko is really
to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections.

So he is really caught between two very difficult questions, and I would
suspect that he will have to go forward and propose Mr. Yanukovich for the
position of Prime Minister because it is the lesser of two evils. Because if
he calls fresh elections the party of regions could well get more votes than
they got in March precisely because the Orange camp has failed to come back
together again.

[QUESTION] Does this mean that the Orange Revolution is effectively dead?

[TARAS KUZIO] I think regarding the Orange Revolution, the first nail in the
coffin was done in September of last year when the president, in my view,
wrongly disbanded the Yulia Tymoshenko government and created the divisions
in the Orange camp which led to the situation today.

Up until the divisions in September last year, the Party of Regions had an
average rating of about 20 percent. After the September crisis, the party of
regions shot up over 30 percent.

What has happened now with the defection of the socialist part to the party
of regions to create this so called anti crisis coalition has in effect put
second nail in the coffin of the orange revolution. We should be very
cautious here.

Although the potential for an orange coalition now is very unlikely because
the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine together does not have enough
deputies to create a parliamentary coalition. They only have 210 and they
are required 226 minimum.

At the same time, many of the positive aspects which have arisen out of the
election of Viktor Yushchenko and the orange revolution will continue. It
will be difficult to see how any coalition in power in Ukraine even the
Prime minister Yanukovich can turn back the gains of the orange revolution
in a more freer system.

Ukraine held its first free and fair elections in March of this year and a
free and independent media. There is a danger here with the creation of the
anti crisis coalition. After all it is the first coalition in Ukraine’s
history with a communist inside the coalition. But at the same time, it
would be wrong to assume that the Orange Revolution is a failure. It is
over, but I would not say it is a failure.

[QUESTION] Why is Yulia Tymoshenko such a divisive figure in your opinion?

[TARAS KUZIO] I think that she finds it difficult to work as a team player.
In many ways some regard her as a populist. I think this is a much abused
term because after all many political forces, parliaments, and governments
in Europe have parties in power which include such political forces.
Poland-a member of EU and NATO-have two so called populist parties in its
government.

So I think it is a mixture of misnomer, very wrong negative views about
Yulia Tymoshenko rising from her Prime Ministership in 2005. Particularly
from economists who regard her economic policies as wrong. At the same time,
she is also somebody who is one of the few political forces in parliament
who is willing to break from the old regime.

So she is somebody with a force for good as well in terms of pushing along
democratization and the battle against corruption. It is never a black and
white issue.

If you are an economist, you probably don’t like her because of her
attitudes towards laissez-faire economics and re-privatization. At the same
time in Europe, many of her social market economic policies are the norm,
which they are not in the U.S. So there are different views about her.

And of course she has a checkered past as someone who was involved in the
energy industry in the 1990s and became in effect one of Ukraine’s first
dissident oligarchs. So people have very mixed views about her. They find it
difficult to work with her in terms of working as a team.

Certainly she shares some of the responsibility for the implosion of the
orange camp. But I would lay the greatest blame here and responsibility on
the president because during those three months of coalition negotiations
from March to June, it really was a responsibility of the president to
ensure that they be completed very quickly. And the fact they dragged on
right to the deadline in late June is really the responsibility of Our
Ukraine politicians and President Yushchenko.

[QUESTION] What has been the effect on the Ukrainian people? I have read a
lot of articles that Ukrainian people have become very disillusioned with
politics.

[TARAS KUZIO] Yes, this is something that is probably the saddest aspects of
the entire crisis and the different crises rising since September of last
year. One of the main reasons why people went on the streets in the orange
revolution was precisely because they thought that Viktor Yushchenko
represented somebody who was different to the norm. He wasn’t the typical
politician.

Usually public opinion in post-communist Europe, particularly in the CIS,
tends to see politicians as all the same: They are all a bunch of rogues,
who only enter politics for corrupt personal interests and not for the
interests of their voters or the country’s interests at large. People go
into the streets, such as during the orange revolution, believing that this
is not quite the case with this particular person with Viktor Yushchenko.

That innocence is in some ways being totally eroded because we have now a
return to the view that “well, we were wrong, all politicians are actually
all same. Viktor Yushchenko has not really been that different from the
other politicians.” That is one of the most tragic aspects.

You see that in today in Kiev where the ability of youth groups such as
Pora, which means “its time,” which was very active during the Orange
Revolution, is now unable to get people on the streets to protest the
formation of this new coalition and the possible appointment of Viktor
Yanukovich as prime minister.

They are unable to do that today because people are disillusioned. People
are angry; they feel deceived that the politicians they believed would make
Ukraine different during the orange revolution have proven that they are
incapable of doing that. Here I think Viktor Yushchenko really has failed to
live up to many people’s expectations, both in the west and in Ukraine.

[QUESTION] Specifically, what are Yushchenko’s main mistakes? I am referring
to the past year, not just the past few months.

[TARAS KUZIO] His main mistakes have been an inability to understand
strategic questions facing the country. When the presidential administration
and the president have dealt with issues, these have tended to be in
reaction to events-for example, the gas crisis in January 2006. There has
been a total inability of the president to have a backup command structure.
His presidential secretariat has failed to provide him with that.

The first head of the presidential secretariat Oleksandr Zinchenko and the
current head of the presidential secretariat Oleg Rybachuk have both failed
to provide the president with the necessary backup, expertise, and research
for him to undertake presidential functions. The National Security Council
has also not really operated as it should do, given the previous president
Leonid Kravchuk.

There is a mixture of institutional problems, strategic inability to deal
with issues in Ukraine, and also a kind of detachment from what is going on
around them. The president’s party itself Our Ukraine proved to be
disastrous. This is a party after all where the honorary chairman is the
President Viktor Yushchenko.

A year ago, in the summer or spring of 2005, we would have expected that
this party, which is headed by the president, would have come in first in
the elections. In fact, he came in third, with 10 percent fewer votes than
in 2002 under Kuchma. These are precisely the fault of the president and Our
Ukraine leadership.

Another important area, which has certainly impacted relations with the West
has been an inability to understand the relationship between domestic and
foreign policy issues. The U.S. in particular, for example, and the Bush
administration was actively lobbying after the parliamentary elections in
March of this year for an orange coalition.

This orange coalition would have been a precursor to Ukraine being invited
to a membership action plan at NATO’s Riga summit in November of this year,
and potentially for an invitation to membership in the 2008 NATO enlargement
summit.

But this was conditional on the Orange camp reuniting and forming a
government very quickly. I don’t think the Bush administration really cared
who the prime minister would be, as long as there would be a reuniting of
pro-reform pro-democratic forces.

The fact that the president and his team were willing to drag on these
coalition negotiations for three months just because they did not want to
let in Yulia Tymoshenko’s prime minister and at the same time was
simultaneously negotiating with potentially the Party of Regions for a grand
coalition, is I think a complete failure of their understanding of how this
would impact not only inside Ukraine, which we have talked about, but also
understand this impact upon the west.

Now you have in the west a Ukraine fatigue in many ways. The supporters
of the orange revolution, supporters of Viktor Yushchenko, which
were numerous particularly in the U.S. and within NATO, which had an open
door policy have now become far less, and they have become disillusioned as
well with the inability of Viktor Yushchenko to really stamp his authority on the
country.

[QUESTION] Let’s talk about foreign policy. What does a Yanukovich
premiership mean for European and U.S-Ukrainian relations?

[TARAS KUZIO] Certainly because of the growing Ukraine fatigue, it is highly
unlikely that Ukraine would be potentially invited into a membership action
plan in the Riga NATO summit in November of this year.

It is difficult to imagine NATO inviting in a country with a parliamentary
coalition leading a government that includes two political forces-a
socialist and a communist-that are totally opposed to membership in NATO.

That is one of the factors, already with the anti-NATO and anti-American
demonstrations in the Crimea in June, which the president was unable to deal
with. Those demonstrations have already put a question mark on the whole
question of whether Ukraine would have been anyway invited into NATO in
2008.

I think the enlargement summit now is likely to be postponed from 2008 to
maybe a few years down the road. The NATO issue both outside Ukraine and
inside the new government is likely now to return more the Kuchma era
position on NATO, which was “yes we are interested in cooperation with NATO,
but we are not interested in membership.” That is one of the downsides.

The other area which deals with the European Union is more complicated
because the European Union never really welcomed the Orange Revolution
unlike NATO.

The EU never opened its doors to Ukraine following the Orange Revolution,
and its argument (particularly it’s West European members) was that “we are
so preoccupied with our own internal problems such as Turkey, failure of the
constitution to be passed by France and the Netherlands in their referendum,
and entire enlargement fatigue that the European Union is going through that
we really can’t deal with Ukraine at the moment.”

So Ukraine was in many ways sidelined and cold shouldered by the European
Union and therefore any kind of relationship is unlikely to change there.
The only possible change would be that what we have is in many ways a very
cynical view in Western Europe that the Orange Revolution was never here to
say or very successful.

[QUESTION] Russian-Ukrainian relations since the Orange Revolution have been
less than spectacular. Do you see a lot of the issues with Russia changing,
for example, the gas crisis earlier this year, the Black Sea fleet, issues
of democratization, etc.?

[TARAS KUZIO] Some issues will change, some issues will not. Russia and
Ukraine under even Kuchma and during Vladimir Putin’s first term were
already on very divergent political paths.

Let’s recall that Putin’s Russia is heading towards a more utilitarian
regime, and Ukraine is still heading towards and still has moved with its
constitutional reforms towards a more democratic system away in some ways
from the CIS. Politically internally they are still very different
countries.

At the same time, where it will change is that the Putin regime was always
hostile to the democratic revolutions that were taking place where it
regarded as its turf, the CIS. Therefore, regardless of what Mikhail
Saakashvili did in Georgia or Victor Yushchenko did in the Ukraine, the
Putin regime was always going to adopt the very negative view about those
leaderships.

The fact that now you will have a change where the prime minister could be
held by Viktor Yanukovich will certainly create a change in atmosphere and
relation with Russia.

At the same time, Russia has already stated that it is not planning to give
Ukraine under Prime Minister Yanukovich any preferences on gas. Russia is
playing hardball even with its allies inside the CIS. It has not really been
giving them any better privileges and preferences.

For example, pro-Russia Armenia still has to pay a higher price for its gas
being delivered from Russia than even Ukraine today under Yushchenko. So I
don’t think there is going to be many changes there.

Where there will be changes will be more on the level of diplomatic and
political relations. After all, party regions in Ukraine have already in
2005 signed a close agreement of cooperation with president Putin’s party of
Unified Russia.

So there is already some kind of close relations. Certainly, the Party of
Regions and Viktor Yanukovich’s Prime minister would maybe adopt less
hostile in Russia’s view positions on international relations.

For example, Ukraine in the last two years has been adopting the western
position on isolating the Yulia Tymoshenko regime in Belarus and among human
rights issues in general inside the CIS. That could be now less likely to be
the case.

Also, U.S. backed regional initiatives in the region such as the GUAM group
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and the community of democratic
choice, these are two regional groupings that the U.S. and the Bush
administration has been backing.

Anybody such as prime minister Yanukovich would be like to be colder to
these initiatives because they would be seen as provocative towards Russia.
Those would be the kind of main changes. What it would in effect be is maybe
a return to the Kuchma era, multi-vector foreign policy.

But it is so difficult to completely see ahead because of these
constitutional reforms because even under these constitutional reforms,
president Yushchenko still has control over the security forces and foreign
policy issues.

What we can in effect see is the prime minister conducting one foreign
policy and the president conducting another. In that respect, there could be
a clash between parliament and president over foreign policy issues.

[QUESTION] What does it mean for future elections in Ukraine about the
divisiveness in the country: East versus West, pro-Russia versus pro-Europe,
religious versus the secular parts, catholic parts in the west versus
eastern orthodox? There seems to be this in the United States with the red
versus blue. How significant and how damaging is this going to be to the
political process going forward?

[TARAS KUZIO]The regional divides is a very important factor in Ukrainian
politics in terms of elections and voting. It does not have an impact on an
interpersonal level and in terms of some kind of conflict. After all, these
individuals living in the east of Ukraine and in the west of Ukraine are all
Ukrainians in terms of citizenship.

The divisions between them are purely on a linguistic level primarily. From
a linguistic level, this leaves different political preferences. So we are
not talking about a potential ethnic divide or potential ethnic conflict as
we have seen in many other countries. Hence, what we should be careful of is
moving from an idea regionalism can therefore lead to separatism or to
interethnic conflict.

This regionalism is a factor that Ukraine has inherited from the Soviet era
and even from other periods in history. It does have political preferences.
It just means that of all the political forces in parliament none of them
really have ability to attract voters from throughout the country.

They are all in many ways regionally based including the Party of Regions
itself, which is not popular in western central Ukraine. But what we tend to
have a problem with in the west in particular in western media and newspaper
accounts are that this issue is over simplified.

It is not a question of Catholic nationalist west versus a pro-Russian
Orthodox East. There are more Orthodox believers living in west Ukraine than
Catholics. Catholics are only confined to three provinces of west Ukraine.
West Ukraine is far bigger than three provinces. It is linguistic. It is not
really religious, but that linguistic is a consequence of history and it
leads to political preferences and in some ways foreign policy issues.

What it does mean is that kind of anti-Russianism that you have in three
Baltic States understandably because of the occupation that they went
through under the Soviet Union is only really something that exists in
western Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine, which is largely Russian speaking, that
kind of anti-Russianism does not exist.

Therefore, no politician no president certainly can really adopt a stern
anti-Russian line. He has to carefully tread between dealing with Russia on
the one hand and dealing with the west on the other. What we should again be
cautious of understanding is that a pro-Russian position in eastern Ukraine
means really that all it wants is good relations with Russia.

It does not mean that the east Ukrainian region wants to somehow join Russia
or join this nebulous Belarus Russia union that has been creating over the
last ten years. What we in effect have is most Ukrainians are in favor of
integration with Europe to the European Union.

NATO is a different question. What they also want is that this integration
with Europe be not done at the expense of bad relations with Russia. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
Podcast: http://www.cfr.org/publication/11168/kuzio.html
———————————————————————————————–
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18. UKRAINE REMEMBERS VICTIMS OF HOLOCAUST
Monument dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region

The Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS (FJC)
Moscow, New York, Monday, July 24 2006

ZOLOCHEV, Ukraine – A monument commemorating victims of the
Holocaust has been dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region, Ukraine.

The ceremony included Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Azriel Chaikin, Chief Rabbi
of the Zhitomir region Shlomo Wilhelm, Chief Rabbi of the Ivano-Fankovsk
region Moshe Kolesnik, Chief Rabbi of Rovno Shneur Zalman Shneerson,
officials representing the regional and the city’s authority agencies and
Jews from across the world whose parents originate from this Ukrainian town.

A citizen of Belgium, Fanny Zilmend was one who with gathered these people
in the former Jewish cemetery to dedicate a monument to Jews killed by
Nazis. The monument was made by a famous sculptor of Lvov, Vasil
Kamenschik.

After a red ribbon was cut to symbolize the opening of the monument, the
floor was passed to Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Azriel Chiakin. Addressing his
speech to hundreds of people of different nationalities, the rabbi thanked
G-d for being free to speak the native language, to pray and to build
monuments in the free country of Ukraine.

“We have to learn from the errors of the past and do everything possible to
save the world from terrorism.” At the ceremony, the participants chanted
“El Mole Rachamim” and the Kaddish Prayer.

Head of the Zolochev Region Administration Boris Zolotnik stressed that
Ukraine treated with equal respect people of different nationalities buried
in its land. “It is a very important event for our city to dedicate a
monument to those killed by Nazis during World War Two. What had
happened in the middle of the past century must never occur again!”

NOBEL LAUREATE IN CHEMISTRY ROLAND HOFFMAN
One of representatives of Jews whose parents came from this city in Ukraine,
Nobel laureate in chemistry Roland Hoffman shared his emotions of the visit
to the native land of his parents: “It was very important for me. The house
I was born in is still standing here. I believe building monuments is very
important even though there are no Jews here anymore.

This is essential for the education of the young generation, so that the
youths know that Zolochev had once been home for many Jews – one third of
its total population – living side by side with Ukrainians and Polish. And
then there was the Holocaust. One part of my soul – the optimistic one –
says this will never happen again, but another part of my heart whispers it
can happen in any moment. This won’t happen only as long as we remember
the lessons of the past.” -30-
————————————————————————————————
LINK: http://www.fjc.ru/news/newsArticle.asp?AID=406616
———————————————————————————————–
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19. UKRAINIAN CARTOONIST’S WORKS ON EXHIBIT IN TEHRAN

Mehr News Agency (MNA), Tehran, Iran, Sunday, July 23, 2006

TEHRAN – Once again, the works of Ukrainian cartoonist Vladimir
Kazanevsky were put on display in Tehran at the Kupeh Gallery on
July 20, ISNA reported on Sunday.

The 22 cartoons had previously been exhibited for two weeks at Tehran’s
Nashr-e Salis Gallery in May at the invitation of Iranian cartoonist Kianush
Ramezani.

The cartoons are being sold for 130 euros each and prints of the artworks
are on sale at an affordable price. The exhibition runs until August 2 at
the gallery, which is located at 845 Enqelab Ave, opposite Khark St.,
between Hafez and Vali-e Asr avenues.

Kazanevsky’s cartoons have earned him many prestigious awards in
international events including the Yomiuri International Cartoon Contest in
Japan (1990) and the 4th Certamen International Competition in Spain (1996).
He won 22 prizes in 2001 alone.

Many countries, including Romania, Hungary, Belgium, Japan, and the United
States, have displayed his cartoons over the two past decades. Iran’s House
of Cartoon also hosted his 2002 Tehran exhibition.

Kazanevsky, 56, has published his works in the books “Heads” and “Revelation
of Elderly Cupid” in Belgium and Ukraine. His “The Art of Modern Cartoon”,
surveying the theory of cartoon art, was published in English in 2003. MMS/HG
—————————————————————————————————
LINK: http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=357088
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20. MAPPING UKRAINIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MODERNISM

By Kevin Nance, Art Critic, Chicago Sun Times
Chicago, Illinois, Thursday, July 27, 2006

CHICAGO- Mention Ukrainian art and your mind leaps first to Easter eggs.
You know the ones I mean: those fragile folk-art treasures called psanky,
with their delicate intertwining lines and geometric figures that smack of
classical decoration and Byzantine iconography.

What might not occur to many Americans — for reasons having to do with the
country’s reluctant mingling with Russia and, later, the Soviet Union — is
Ukraine’s contribution to the modern art movements that percolated
throughout Europe and the United States in the early 20th century.

“Crossroads: Modernism in Ukraine, 1910-1930,” a touring exhibit making a
welcome stop at the Chicago Cultural Center through Oct. 15, is out to
change that.

Culled from private collections as well as those of the National Art Museum
of Ukraine and other institutions there, this handsome, mostly unfamiliar
grouping of about 70 works by 21 artists firmly establishes Kiev (which
Ukrainians now spell Kyiv) as one of the most fertile hotbeds of European
modernism, along with St. Petersburg and Paris.

A casual walkthrough of the exhibit — the first of its kind in the United
States — can tend to leave you with the impression of a polyglot,
aggressively cosmopolitan art that lacked easily discernible national
characteristics. Those trendy Ukrainians!

They dipped their brushes into virtually every paint can of the avant garde,
from Cubism and Futurism to (belatedly) Art Nouveau and (early on)
Constructivism. (That last movement, widely considered a Russian phenomenon,
was actually pioneered in part by a cadre of native or adopted Ukrainians.)

A closer look, though, takes you back to those Easter eggs, or rather to
their connections with classical, Byzantine and ecclesiastical sources.

There’s a distinctly Ukrainian lushness that adheres to even the most severe
compositions here — such as Kazimir Malevich’s “suprematist” images, with
their subtle use of Christian symbols — and deepens into outright decadence
in the overheated canvases of Vsevolod Maksymovych.

A Constructivist journal cover from 1929 by Vasyl Yermilov is part of
“Modernism in Ukraine” at the Chicago Cultural Center.

For good or ill, Maksymovych, a nudist, body builder and dapper
provocateur-about-town who committed suicide at age 21 after a drug
overdose, unexpectedly dominates this exhibit.

His smorgasbord of large-scale decorative panels, heavily indebted to
Symbolism and Art Nouveau (especially as embodied by Aubrey Beardsley and
Gustav Klimt), may be too rich a diet for some; “The Nude” (1914), a trio of
lithe bodies fronted by a fey young man whose privates are covered by what
appears to be a heart-shaped valentine, borders on camp.

But two of his images from 1913, “Kiss” (a worthy homage to Klimt’s icon of
the previous decade) and “Masquerade” (his most macabre and Beardsleyesque
panel), are jaw-dropping stunners.

The show’s other standout is Viktor Palmov, who both employed and subverted
the social realism of the early Soviet era by tamping down its heroic
political agenda in favor of stylized treatments of the figure, endowing
them with some of the folk mysticism and high color saturation that we now
associate with Chagall.

The Soviets initially tolerated the Ukrainian avant-garde but eventually
reversed course, sending a generation of free-thinking modernists into exile
or the gulag. Here’s the trail they left behind. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
Contact: knance@suntimes.com
LINK: http://www.suntimes.com/output/entertainment/cst-ftr-art27.html
———————————————————————————————–
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AUR#740 Jul 28 Moment Of Truth Approaching Ukraine’s Political Life; New Poll Shows Party Support Changing; New Prime Minister Expected Soon

=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 740

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FRIDAY, JULY 28, 2006

Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up

——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT OPENS ROUND TABLE, SAYS MOMENT
OF TRUTH IS APPROACHING UKRAINE’S POLITICAL LIFE
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1310 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

2. UKRAINIAN DRAFT DECLARATION SETS 24 PROVISIONS
FOR COALITION OF NATIONAL UNITY
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1802 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

3 . UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT HOLDS POLITICAL STALEMATE TALKS
Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

4. UKRAINE’S ROUND-TABLE TALKS STUMBLE OVER NATO
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1830 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

5. UKRAINIAN PARTY LEADERS EXCHANGE OPINIONS
AT ROUND-TABLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO
UT1, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

6. UKRAINIAN POLL SHOWS CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT
IF ANOTHER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CALLED
Regions 38.7%, Tymoshenko Bloc 35.1%, Social Party not clear 3% hurdle
UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1035 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

7. UKRAINE’S HAZY CONSTITUTION ADDS TO TROUBLES
Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, 27 July, 2006

8. MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE
What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova
Basapress news agency, Chisinau, in Moldovan 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

9. POLISH PRIME MINISTER SAYS WE WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS
WITH ANY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1234 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

10. POLISH PRESIDENT COUNTING ON UKRAINE NOT CHANGING
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2011 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, Published: Jul 27, 2006

11 . UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER MOROZ AND A TOP US
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER MEET IN KYIV
Discuss signing of declaration of national unity, foreign policy issues.
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0821 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

12. UKRAINE’S FUTURE LOOKS LESS ORANGE
Orange Revolution has gone sour
By Stephen Mulvey, BBC News, United Kingdom, Wed, July 26, 2006

13. UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS AS ORANGE
PARTIES JOSTLE FOR POWER
COMMENTARY: By Niall Green
World Socialist Web Site, UK, Thu, 27 July 2006

14. “VICTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL BECOME A BANDIT HIMSELF”
Russian emigre tycoon says Ukrainian president should disband parliament
INTERVIEW:
With Boris Berezovskiy
By Oleksandr Chalenko, Segodnya, Kiev, in Russian 21 Jul 06; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

15. UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER TO BE APPOINTED VERY SOON
Yanukovych will be nominated, Regions Party expected to make concessions
Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, in Russian 28 Jul 06; p 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

16. “CENTRIFUGE TOWARDS THE CENTRE”
Ukrainian president likely to approve premier from rival camp
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Yuliya Mostova
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 22 Jul 06; pp 1, 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

17. ORANGE REVOLUTION IS “OVER BUT NOT A FAILURE”
INTERVIEW: With Taras Kuzio
By Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations
New York, Washington, D.C., Monday, July 24, 2006

18. UKRAINE REMEMBERS VICTIMS OF HOLOCAUST
Monument dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region
The Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS (FJC)
Moscow, New York, Monday, July 24 2006

19. UKRAINIAN CARTOONIST’S WORKS ON EXHIBIT IN TEHRAN
Mehr News Agency (MNA), Tehran, Iran, Sunday, July 23, 2006

20. MAPPING UKRAINIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MODERNISM
By Kevin Nance, Art Critic, Chicago Sun Times
Chicago, Illinois, Thursday, July 27, 2006

========================================================
1
. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT OPENS ROUND TABLE, SAYS MOMENT
OF TRUTH IS APPROACHING UKRAINE’S POLITICAL LIFE

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1310 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko has told a round-table meeting with
leading politicians and public figures of the need to unite around the
principle of Ukraine’s unity and sovereignty.

In his opening remarks to the meeting in the presidential secretariat, which
was relayed live by state-run UT1, private ICTV and TV 5 Kanal, Yushchenko
said Ukraine is facing a “moment of truth”, and described the current
situation in parliament as a “trap and a dead-end”.

Yushchenko convened the meeting in an effort to find a way out of the
ongoing government crisis through the signing of a declaration of national
unity. The following is an excerpt from Yushchenko’s opening remarks
broadcast by Ukrainian television TV 5 Kanal on 27 July:

[Live broadcast starts in mid-sentence] forces that may have different
views, that may often have opposing views on one issue of Ukraine’s
development or another. But I am confident this is not a reason to split
Ukraine and the nation. It seems to me that the nation would never split the
country. It is split by politicians.

It has so happened that today we are facing big challenges to which we need
to respond. Some of these challenges were inherited. They have their own
history. Others developed within the framework of the recent battles.
Neither the former, nor the latter give us an understanding of tolerance,
the strengthening of the principle of co-existence.

They do not give us mutual understanding either. Therefore, I hope that
today’s round table will be the point from which we start counting a new era
in the political and social life of Ukraine.

The form of our dialogue is based on international experience. I am happy
today that a Ukrainian [round] table can be held today in Ukraine, in Kiev,
and we do not need to go to Warsaw, and we do not need to invite political
leaders from neighbouring countries or the West.

The time has come when we can initiate a nationwide polemic that is open and
fair. Its agenda is defined by the nature of the Ukrainian people, whose
philosophy and temper make them look for sophisticated and wise decisions
even in the hardest situations.

I am thankful to the participants of the round table for their readiness to
have this talk, to my political colleagues sitting to my right [parliament
faction leaders]. I know that for some of them this road was not easy, but I
highly appreciate your understanding of how important it is now to be at one
round table.

I would like to say special words of gratitude and wisdom to the
representatives of society who found time, when it was necessary, to come
here because I know many of them were outside Kiev and Kiev Region. I am
very thankful to you for this.

Your presence confirms that you are above [several words indistinct] all the
political discussions that can be held in this hall, because the scale of
actions now relate to such significant notions as independence, integrity,
Ukrainian democracy and Ukrainian freedom and fairness.

I am citing this series of concepts in order to stress the exceptional
importance of the subject and the prospects of our discussion.

UKRAINE FACES MOMENT OF TRUTH
I am confident a moment of truth is approaching in Ukraine’s political life.
We need to make a decision.

We are faced with a conflict, and not one of names, I am sure, but of
events. I would put these events together by saying that, first of all, they
are: the course of statehood and the course of state fragmentation; the
principles of democracy and the principle of manipulating the nation; the
basics of a new European political culture and the recurrence of the past,
revenge, moral contamination and the leukaemia of dignity.

During the fifteenth year of independence, the ideology of equal distance to
the west and east, north and south is still being imposed on people. We have
already been there. This is a dead-end.

You cannot hide from these problems regardless of what party you are in,
what flag you have above you. The Supreme Council [parliament] is at the
centre of these challenges. The situation that we can still see in
parliament can be described in one way only: this is a trap and a dead-end.

It seems to me there are two ways we can get out of this. By the way, we are
standing close to both of them now. And we have an inevitable choice, to
speak frankly. Either we follow the path of confrontation and delay solving
the vitally important problems of the nation and the state, or – maybe for
the first time in our history – we can pave a road to the real unity of the
nation.

The second step is much more difficult than the first one. Very often it
will be difficult for certain political forces to explain it to their
voters, but it is still possible.

It so happened that the election to Ukraine’s parliament ended with a score
of one all, with 8m votes for one bloc of political parties, and over 8m
votes for another bloc. Today it is up to politicians to make a true choice
of national strategy.

Either they are brave, stand upon principles of consolidation and take hold
of the national prospects, or they live by the principles of intolerance and
political warfare to the last man, not even accepting the principle of
coexistence. This scares me as president. It should not be this way in
politics.

The question is not about the relations between certain individuals. The
question is whether the political elite is capable of forming the national
course and following it strictly.

It hurts me that electoral rhetoric has not been forgotten, and instead it
was brought into the parliament hall. It concerns the issues that can never
split a European nation, whether it be discussion of the language policy or
our European choice, the integration issue or the WTO, church consolidation
or our history.

I am confident that a responsible politician will never speculate with an
issue that produces tension in society. The election is over.

NEED TO UNITE AROUND PRINCIPLE OF UKRAINE’S INTEGRITY
This is indeed an exceptionally difficult moment, and I ask all the
political forces to start uniting around the principles of the country’s
integrity regardless of the locations and political forces that you
represent.

We should unite to guarantee national sovereignty, the integrity of the
border and territories, implementation of economic transformations that are
market-based, open, competitive and clear. We should guarantee all the
democratic rights and freedoms that have been won. We should not allow a
step back for any democratic position or freedom.

Today we are strong not for our mottoes, but for resolute, wise and
consolidating actions. These are never too many for a good thing.

Anyone who wants to see Ukraine united, not ruins on both sides of the
Dnipro River, must understand this.

For all the fairness and strictness of the national truth, we should finally
conceive the real Ukraine and start its new day with the common will of the
authorities and the opposition.

Certainly, the unity of Ukraine is an unconditional category. But I believe
it may not be artificial, sly or semi-true. We will be able to achieve such
unity only when it is ultimately clearly defined and explained thanks to our
joint efforts.

What is unity? How do we understand this? How can we get consolidated
around this issue as the key national priority?

It seems its principles are the following:

[1] the integrity of Ukrainian territories, we should not speak or be sly
about the rest; the inviolability of its borders and territories; [2] a
close dialogue between the regions;
[3] the unconditional guarantee of the state status for the Ukrainian
language;
[4] a civilized approach to languages and cultures of national minorities;
[5] guarantees of the freedom of speech and all fundamental human rights
and freedoms;
[6] the creation of liberal conditions for Ukraine’s economic development;
[7] the implementation of the nation’s European prospects.

In my opinion, these are the basis of our unity. I think these are the
principles and categories that can unite us for the sake of the future.
[Passage omitted: Yushchenko compares the parliamentary election in Ukraine
to those in the neighbouring countries.]

We need to abandon a fluctuating course. We need to take a resolute stand on
the future prospects that are so important for Ukraine.

SHOULD CONFIRM IRREVERSIBILITY OF DOMESTIC,
FOREIGN POLICY COURSES
Finally. I would like to add a few thoughts to these fundamental aspects of
unity. It seems to me that the unity means respect for the spirit of public
tolerance. Understanding the uniqueness of the current political situation,
I consider it to be a true historical chance to achieve the political,
economic and spiritual unity of our country.

It seems to me it is a good occasion to talk about the integral Ukraine and
its unity, to forget the atmosphere of elections and to be wise.

We are obliged and need to be balanced and brave in dealing with the
challenge of current political problems, first of all those in the Ukrainian
parliament, and use the true national consolidation as an unbeatable ground
for the unity of Ukrainian society.

I am confident that while sitting at this round table we need to drop for a
long time the politics of revenge and confrontation. We need to confirm that
Ukraine’s domestic and foreign courses are irreversible. By the way, this is
the course that received support at the presidential election in 2004.

In our actions we need to drop the slightest personal ambition and be ruled
by the fundamental national interests of Ukraine. This is the most
important, in my opinion. By taking this road, we will be able to open new
prospects for Ukraine and for our people. By neglecting the voice of wisdom
and balance and by taking a different path, we will all lose.

Dear colleagues, I would like to welcome you to a dialogue once more. I am
confident that we will able to make the decisions that are the best in this
situation.

I am confident these decisions will become the basis for our common document
today, which is called the declaration [Ukr: Universal] of national unity.
[Passage omitted: Yushchenko describes the schedule of the meeting.]
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2. UKRAINIAN DRAFT DECLARATION SETS 24 PROVISIONS
FOR COALITION OF NATIONAL UNITY

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1802 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is proposing that Supreme
Council [parliament] chairman Oleksandr Moroz, Prime Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov and the leaders of the factions in parliament form a coalition of
national unity.

This is stated in the declaration of national unity offered for signing as
the result of the round table taking place in Kiev today attended by the
president, the leaders of political parties and public figures.

“We are convinced that the implementation of this declaration’s provisions,
which will form the basis of a majority coalition agreement, is only
possible if a coalition of national unity is formed in the Ukrainian Supreme
Council of the fifth convocation, and we support this step,” the draft
declaration says.

Interfax-Ukraine’s correspondent says that the draft sets out a plan of
actions for national unity coalition participants and it has 24 provisions.

The document defines points that must be carried out: Ukraine must remain a
single and unitary state, the creation of a balanced system; refraining from
confrontation between the president, the Supreme Council and the cabinet;
and reviving the work of the Constitutional Court.

The document proposes bringing decisions by all bodies of state authority
and of local self-government into line with the constitution. It is also
proposed to create political and legal conditions to ensure the opposition
can work without obstruction in election bodies at all levels.

The plan of action envisages reforming the executive authorities and
preventing the politicization of state service by making it a priority to
pass new versions of the laws on the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and
state service prepared for presentation by Yushchenko.

The plan also includes the following provisions: the continuation of
judicial reform, reform of the law-enforcement bodies in line with European
standards, the bringing of criminal law and criminal justice into line with
the standards and recommendations of the Council of Europe’s committee of
ministers, the European Union and the rules of the European Court of Human
Rights.

The declaration says it’s necessary to introduce amendments to some
legislative acts to accelerate Ukraine’s entry to the World Trade
Organization by the end of 2006.

Other points are achieving annual GDP growth of no less than 5 per cent and
inflation of no more than 10 per cent, as well as the creation of at least
1m jobs a year.

Further, the plan proposes conducting tax reform to introduce property tax
and collect a single national insurance payment from wages. Also, it’s
planned to raise the quality of utility services by creating competitive
conditions in the housing and utilities sector.
Also, the document defines the need to raise Ukrainian citizens’ standard of
living and defeat poverty by implementing effective targeted social welfare,
as well as the need to provide worthy pensions.

The action plan talks of the need to stimulate the system of local
self-government by ensuring it is sufficiently financed and by reforming
administrative borders, and talks of a rejection of federalism in favour of
decentralisation.

The plan says it is necessary to pay special attention to the fight against
corruption at all levels of power by supporting the legislative initiatives
of the president in this area. It is also necessary to ensure Ukrainian has
the status of the only state language and the language of officials, whilst
at the same time guaranteeing the rights of languages of ethnic minorities,
in line with the European Charter.

On culture and the revival of spirituality, it is proposed to maintain
freedom of confession and support efforts to build a single national
Ukrainian orthodox church.

The plan says there must be the implementation of the Ukraine-EU plan of
action and immediate talks regarding the creation of a free trade zone
between Ukraine and the European Union, as well as the joining of a NATO
Membership Action Plan.

It envisages the establishment of effective economic partnerships with all
relevant foreign trade partners, guided by common interests and mutual
benefit.

These priorities must be the defining criteria of the formation and activity
of the coalition and the system of power as a whole, which will find as
their basis new mechanisms of social and political collaboration.

These mechanisms include: the drafting and introduction of regular procedures
for public consultations regarding important issues of social development and
state building, the formation of effective mechanisms of public monitoring
of the authorities’ actions, and ensuring openness and accountability of the
bodies of state and local self-government.

For this document to come into force, it must be signed by: Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko, Supreme Council chairman Oleksandr Moroz and
Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, as well parliament faction leaders Viktor
Yanukovych (Party of Regions), Yuliya Tymoshenko (Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc),
Roman Bezsmertnyy (Our Ukraine), Vasyl Tsyshko (Socialist Party) and Petro
Symonenko (Communist Party).

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3. UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT HOLDS POLITICAL STALEMATE TALKS

Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream, Kiev, Ukraine, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko held crisis talks Thursday to find a way
out of Ukraine’s political stalemate, but his appeal for compromise was
shattered when lawmaker Yulia Tymoshenko lashed out against what she
termed calls for artificial unity.

“In not a single democratic country in the world is it possible to unite all
political forces,” said Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the 2004 Orange
Revolution, in an angry speech during the round-table discussions. “As a
rule, there are those in power and the opposition.”

The ex-Soviet republic has been locked in turmoil since Viktor Yanukovych’s
pro-Russian Party of Regions won the most seats in a March parliamentary
election, besting the pro-Western reformers who backed Yushchenko, but
falling short of a majority.

Yushchenko’s allies teamed up with Tymoshenko’s bloc and the Socialist Party
to create a majority coalition in June, but the Socialists defected before
it had time to form a new government. The Socialists united with the Party
of Regions and the Communists in a new coalition that proposed Yanukovych
as prime minister.

Fraud allegations during Yanukovych’s run for the presidency against
Yushchenko in 2004 triggered the massive protests known as the Orange
Revolution; the Supreme Court declared the vote invalid, and Yushchenko
defeated Yanukovych in a rerun.

Yushchenko so far has not forwarded Yanukovych’s nomination as premier to
the parliament. But because the parliament convened more than 60 days ago
without forming a government, Yushchenko technically has the right to
dissolve the legislature and call new elections.

Faced with the equally unattractive prospects of calling new elections or
allowing his foe to become prime minister, Yushchenko has been casting
desperately for a solution as the Aug. 2 deadline to decide on Yanukovych’s
candidacy approaches.

“The moment of truth has come, we need to make a decision,” Yushchenko
said at the start of the round-table, which was televised live.

Yushchenko proposed that all the parties sign a memorandum of national unity
that which would safeguard freedom of speech, Ukraine’s territorial
integrity, liberal economic reforms, European integration efforts and
support for a single national language, Ukrainian.

But when the leaders began discussing the memorandum, discussion over
whether Ukraine should join NATO sparked heated debate. The Socialists and
Communists oppose NATO membership, while Yushchenko countered that
cooperation with the alliance was the only way to provide security to
Ukraine.

After Yushchenko and Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko exchanged
barbs over NATO and the issue of creating a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church,
Tymoshenko said the sharp disagreements were an example of why a broad
coalition would not work.

“Why should we have two centers of power that rule the country with
different courses … it is only a matter of time before they clash,” she
said.

But Yanukovych, who is seeking Yushchenko’s support, appeared eager to find
a compromise. He said that “cooperation with NATO is natural.”

However, after six hours of talks, the party leaders failed to reach an
agreement on the text of the memorandum. Yushchenko ordered a working group
to hash out differences and prepare a final document by Friday morning.

The tension in the room was obvious, even without the main issue – of
Yanukovych’s premiership – being addressed. When Yanukovych went into a
long-winded speech, Yushchenko pointedly interrupted to tell him he had been
speaking too long.

Yushchenko ally Roman Bezsmertny said that the president’s bloc was willing
to work with Party of Regions, but only if a new coalition of national unity
was formed. “Today all of us must think first of all about unity,” he said.

Ukraine remains deeply divided between the Russian-speaking east, which
supports Yanukovych, and the Ukrainian-speaking west, which considers a
Yanukovych premiership a betrayal of the Orange Revolution.

Tymoshenko pressed the president to reject any union with Yanukovych, urging
him to dissolve parliament and call new elections.
Yushchenko has appeared reluctant to take such a drastic step.

The Party of Regions suggested earlier Thursday that it was ready for some
compromises, but would refuse to discuss dropping Yanukovych.

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4. UKRAINE’S ROUND-TABLE TALKS STUMBLE OVER NATO

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1830 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – A heated discussion over Ukraine’s NATO integration erupted at the
round-table talks among the country’s leading politicians and public figures
held in Kiev today.

While President Viktor Yushchenko wanted the talks’ final document, called a
declaration of national unity, to contain a clear provision that joining
NATO is Ukraine’s goal, Communist leader Petro Symonenko and parliamentary
speaker Oleksandr Moroz called for the exclusion of such a provision from
the proposed document.

Addressing the participants in the round-table talks broadcast live UT1
state TV and three private TV channel, President Viktor Yushchenko recalled
that Ukraine’s European aspirations mean “joining the NATO defence system”,
which, in his view, “is the cheapest and the most reliable concept from the
point of view of national spending”.

“Do not forget that we are living in a country without a single meter of
demarkated state border. Esteemed politicians, you are responsible for
this,” Yushchenko said. He urged the politicians “to produce an honest
answer because we are not talking about virtual things but your families,
our families and 48 million Ukrainians”.

The president’s reasons, however, remained unheard by the leaders of the
Communist and Socialist parties. Both Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz
insisted that the provision on Ukraine’s accession to NATO be excluded from
the draft declaration.

“We will join NATO when we need to. We will hold a referendum when the time
comes. But today let us not include in the declaration something that
irritates people,” Moroz said.

Communist leader Petro Symonenko said that his party has been a consistent
opponent of Ukraine’s joining NATO and he is not going to sign any documents
containing such provisions. He suggested that a nation-wide referendum on
NATO should be held in Ukraine as soon as in November this year.

In an attempt to reconcile views of all participants in the talks, the
leader of the propresidential Our Ukraine parliamentary faction, Roman
Bezsmertnyy, proposed to amend the disputed NATO clause to read that a
decision on joining NATO should be taken following a nation-wide referendum.
Such wording, however, was rejected by both Symonenko and Moroz.

In the end, the participants in the talks agreed to form a working group
which is work out a draft declaration of national unity acceptable for all
sides of the round table by 0730 gmt 28 July. -30-
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5. UKRAINIAN PARTY LEADERS EXCHANGE OPINIONS
AT ROUND-TABLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO

UT1, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1400 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

The leaders of major Ukrainian parties have presented their positions at a
round-table meeting with President Viktor Yushchenko. The meeting, which
it is hoped will solve the current political crisis, is being broadcast live by
the state TV channel and three commercial channels.

The parliament speaker and head of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, Oleksandr
Moroz, urged those present to sign an agreement on forming a grand
coalition, and said that all differences could be settled through talks.

The leader of the parliamentary coalition and head of the pro-Russian Party
of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych, said there were few policy differences
between the old Orange coalition and the new coalition of his Party of
Regions, the Socialists and the Communists. He echoed calls for the
formation of a broader coalition, and praised President Yushchenko for not
taking the side of any political party.

“We are sure that the president will never take the side of any political
party, that he will be on the side of the state and Ukraine’s national
interests,” Yanukovych said. He expressed hope that they “will manage to
find a common language for the sake of the state and Ukrainian people”.

The prime minister and head of the propresidential Our Ukraine People’s
Union party, Yuriy Yekhanurov, said that a grand coalition can be formed,
but without the Communist Party.

“Only the president is the source of stability in this country, so the
government believes that it is his proposals that should become the
foundation for reaching a balanced and responsible compromise,” Yekhanurov
said. This compromise will make it possible “to form in parliament the only
grand coalition possible in the current situation, without the Communist
Party, but allocating to them the posts they have won in a difficult
struggle,” Yekhanurov said.

The opposition bloc leader, Yuliya Tymoshenko, has said she will never join
any grand coalition with the Party of Regions and listed grounds for holding
a new parliamentary election. Tymoshenko called on the president to dissolve
parliament and hold a new parliamentary election.

“I have to say that our bloc has won in 14 regions of Ukraine. Under no
circumstances shall we join any grand coalitions because today we see that
the budget resolution which has been submitted revokes all the decisions
adopted by the cabinet in order to combat the black economy,” Tymoshenko
said.

She said that politics has become “the most profitable business” in Ukraine.
This is why her political force “reserves the right, first, to insist on
holding a repeat parliamentary election because the political grounds for
this do exist, since the [parliamentary] majority does not enjoy the backing
of the majority of Ukrainian people”. “Second, parliament has been
discredited. Third, whatever we sign, there will be no unity as we all
differ ideologically”, Tymoshenko said. -30-
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6. UKRAINIAN POLL SHOWS CHANGES IN PARTY SUPPORT
IF ANOTHER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CALLED

Regions 38.7%, Tymoshenko Bloc 35.1%, Social Party not clear 3% hurdle

UNIAN news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1035 gmt 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

KIEV – If an early election was called, the Party of Regions would be
supported by 38.7 per cent of voters who definitely decided to take part and
expressed a preference. The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc would get 35.1 per cent
and the Socialist Party would not clear the three-per-cent hurdle, taking
only 2.8 per cent.

UNIAN’s correspondent reports that these are the results of a public opinion
survey unveiled today by the director of the Institute of Social and
Political Psychology of the Academy of Political Sciences, Mykola
Slyusarevskyy.

“Our Ukraine and the Communist Party would get less support [than in the
last election], although they would still cross the entry barrier: 6.9 per
cent and 4.4 per cent respectively.

As before, People’s Opposition Bloc of Nataliya Vitrenko is on the verge of
the entry barrier with 3.3 per cent. Pora-Party of Reforms and Order would
not get into parliament, with 2.5 per cent, and neither would the
Socialists, with 2.8 per cent,” Slyusarevskyy said.

At the same time, he stressed that if Our Ukraine and Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc formed a single list of candidates, they could count on 40.6 per cent of
votes from those who definitely decided to take part and expressed a
preference.

“On the same condition, Party of Regions could get around about the same
number of votes, 39.2 per cent, but the situation for other parties would
change. In particular, Pora-Reforms and Order would have a chance of getting
into parliament with 3.2 per cent, but things would be worse for Vitrenko’s
bloc (2.9 per cent) and the Socialists (2.6 per cent)”, he said.

The head of the institute’s laboratory, Pavlo Frolov, pointed out that
nearly half of respondents – 48.6 per cent – say they made a mistake in
their choice at the 2004 presidential election. “This opinion is especially
widespread among supporters of the Party of Regions (86.1 per cent) and the
Communists (81.9 per cent).

Only a quarter of those asked ( 26.5 per cent) still say they made the right
choice, and most of those are those who voted for Our Ukraine at the
parliamentary election (62.7 per cent) and Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (46.3 per
cent),” Frolov said.

The institute carried out the poll on 14-20 July. A total of 2,293
respondents were surveyed in 334 built-up areas, of which 146 urban and 188
rural. The poll was carried out among a representative sample of people aged
18 or over. The margin of error is 2.1 per cent. -30-
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7. UKRAINE’S HAZY CONSTITUTION ADDS TO TROUBLES

Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Thursday, 27 July, 2006

KIEV: Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko says that he will stick to the
constitution as he wrestles with a political crisis. But there is a problem:
neither he nor his opponents truly understand what the document says.

The constitution, hurriedly adopted during another crisis two years ago, is
unclear on crucial issues such as whether Yushchenko has the power to
dissolve parliament or reject its nominee for prime minister.

And the Constitutional Court, whose job it is to adjudicate on any disputes
over the document, is paralysed because parliament cannot agree on the
appointment of new judges.

Yushchenko is locked in a stand-off with the opposition majority in
parliament that wants him to appoint his rival, Viktor Yanukovich, as prime
minister. The Ukrainian president, citing the constitution, says that he has
the right to reject Yanukovich’s candidacy and dissolve parliament. His
opponents, also citing the constitution, say he has no such right.

“We have a collapse of constitutional law. It has just ceased to exist
here,” said Vadym Karasyov, director of the Institute for Global
Strategies, a Kiev think tank. “Every politician interprets the constitution
how he wants.”

Yushchenko’s aides say that the lack of clarity in the constitution has
helped bring about Ukraine’s political crisis. “Unfortunately, it contains
contradictions which have led to this situation and give rise to differing
interpretations,” presidential legal adviser Mykola Poludenny told
reporters.

Yushchenko and his opponents are working on a compromise deal that would
give Yanukovich the prime minister’s job. The real test for the
constitution, say analysts, will come if that deal collapses.

Article 90 (2) of the constitution states parliament must form a cabinet
within 60 days after the previous government is removed. If it does not the
president can dissolve the chamber and call new elections.

That deadline expired on Tuesday. But there is a loophole. Yushchenko’s
opponents say the last government was not removed but its authority expired.
Therefore, they argue, the 60-day countdown never actually started.

Article 106 (9) says parliament proposes its candidate for prime minister to
the president. He then has 15 days to present the nomination back to
parliament for approval. But it does not say if that means Yushchenko can
reject parliament’s choice.

The constitution took on its current form when parliament voted through
amendments to the document on December 8, 2004. That was at the height of
the “Orange Revolution”, a wave of street protests over a rigged
presidential election.

The amendments, watering down presidential powers, were part of a backroom
deal with outgoing president Leonid Kuchma that allowed Yushchenko to take
over.

The changes should have been followed up with enabling legislation spelling
out how to apply the principles in the constitution. Since then though, parliament
has been without a stable majority so the legislation has not been passed.
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========================================================
8. MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, UKRAINE
What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova

Basapress news agency, Chisinau, in Moldovan 27 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thu, Jul 27, 2006

CHISINAU – The chairman of the Moldovan parliament, Marian Lupu, told
a news conference today that the Moldovan-Romanian relations should be
more flexible and intelligent on the part of both Bucharest and Chisinau.

Lupu assessed the relations between Romania and Moldova as “latent” and said
that this issue will be discussed within the forthcoming visit by Romanian
Senate President Nicolae Vacaroiu to Chisinau.

Marian Lupu described a recent proposal by Romanian President Traian Basescu
to Moldova to enter the EU together as abstract and unachievable as it lacks
practical maturity.

“Language, history and national issues are under permanent discussion and I
do not believe we will find a common language in these issues. There is a
single chance for good neighbouring relations, which is to eliminate
disputed moments from the dialogue and replace them with practical issues:
transborder cooperation, trade, economic projects, investments, cooperation
in the humanitarian sector,” Lupu said.

Speaking about Moldovan-Russian relations, Lupu said they are rather tense
at all levels and urged for a dialogue with Russia in order to resolve this
situation.

“Without Moscow’s participation, no solution will be found to the Dniester
conflict. The dialogue could be held at the levels of governments and
parliaments. We are witnesses of a new concept of Russia’s foreign policy,
which seems to be very pragmatic and even aggressive. We are going through
an adaptation period and I hope that common sense will win and we will find
areas of common interests in our partnership,” Marian Lupu said.

Commenting on prospects for relations with Ukraine, Lupu said that
Chisinau’s foreign policy will not change regardless of the way the
political situation in Ukraine develops.

What is happening now in Ukraine is very important to Moldova, especially in
the context of the joint border monitoring at the Dniester sector of the
border and the Dniester conflict settlement. What concerns the evolution of
political climate in Ukraine, there is a certain risk and we are waiting for
the outcome of the situation,” Lupu said. -30-

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9. POLISH PRIME MINISTER SAYS WE WILL MAINTAIN RELATIONS
WITH ANY DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN UKRAINE

PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1234 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

WARSAW – Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski said on Wednesday [26 July]
that Poland monitors the development of the situation in Ukraine with concern
but assured reporters that it would maintain relations with any democratically
elected government of that country.

Those are Ukraine’s internal affairs and we respect Ukraine’s sovereignty in
all aspects though we regret political crisis in the Ukrainian parliament,
the prime minister said.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski underlined that Polish foreign policy vis-a-vis Ukraine
is pursued vis-a-vis the country and not a specific government. “We will
talk with every government,” the prime minister said.

He added that the situation in Ukraine has stabilized. “We do not want to
overreact,” he stressed. Democracy is a difficult process and a “hasty
declaration of failure” is “explicitly irresponsible”, the prime minister
concluded.

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10. POLISH PRES COUNTING ON UKRAINE NOT CHANGING

PAP news agency, Warsaw, in Polish 2011 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service – United Kingdom, Published: Jul 27, 2006

WARSAW – President Lech Kaczynski told [commercial] TVN24 television
on Wednesday [26 July] that his Tuesday conversation with Ex-president
Aleksander Kwasniewski had been necessary. The meeting was about the
political situation in Ukraine.

“We spoke almost exclusively about the issue of Ukraine, where President
Kwasniewski played a very serious role,” said President L. Kaczynski. He did
not reveal details of the conversation. He said only that they had spoken
about “different variants”. “I think that at this moment we will still try
and talk with the highest circles in Ukraine, but it is of course Ukraine
that will decide about its fate,” he stressed.

The president made whether Poland will be the “advocate of Ukraine in
Europe” dependent upon the policy of that country. “We are defending the
interests of Ukraine in our interests as well,” he said.

The president is counting on it that the line of Ukraine “will not change”.
He added that “from the point of view of Poland, it is not a matter of
indifference what coalition rules there.” He stressed that there were no
factors tending to “a cooling of relations with the authorities of Ukraine”.
[passage omitted]

Asked about his attitude towards Kwasniewski, President L.Kaczynski stressed
that he had “never felt a particular antipathy towards him”. “We are people
who first had contact in our youth, but we chose completely different roads.
In direct contacts, President Kwasniewski is a pleasant man,” he said.

For L. Kaczynski, that the present and former presidents, “people with
different life-stories and belonging to different groups, meet from time to
time is something obvious”.

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11.UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT SPEAKER MOROZ AND A TOP US
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL DAVID KRAMER MEET IN KYIV
Discuss signing of declaration of national unity, foreign policy issues.

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 0821 gmt 28 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – The chairman of the Supreme Council [parliament] of Ukraine,
Oleksandr Moroz, has met Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs at the US Department of State David Kramer to discuss
the signing of the declaration of national unity, as well as foreign policy
issues.

Speaking after the meeting on Friday [28 July], Moroz told journalists that
they had discussed the prospects for signing the declaration of national
unity and also issues related to forming a new cabinet. Moroz said he hoped
that the document would be signed on Friday. “I hope that the final document
will be signed today, or at least that there will be at least three
signatures on it,” Moroz said.

At the same time, Moroz said that the signing of the declaration or a
failure to do so by parties involved in the talks will not mean that a
coalition is formed, expanded or reformatted. “This document is a message
to society,” he said. He said he doubted that the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc
faction or the Communist Party would sign the declaration.

[Passage omitted: Moroz says the talks are held to find a “model for
Ukraine’s development”.] -30-
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12. UKRAINE’S FUTURE LOOKS LESS ORANGE
Orange Revolution has gone sour

By Stephen Mulvey, BBC News, United Kingdom, Wed, July 26, 2006

Everything was meant to change in Ukraine as a result of the Orange
Revolution in the last three months of 2004.

Corruption and cronyism were supposed to give way to transparency and
democracy. “Bandits” were meant to be jailed, dubious privatisations were
meant to be reversed. EU and Nato membership appeared to be within reach.

It has not quite worked out like that – though some important goals were
achieved.

“The main achievement of the Orange Revolution was freedom of speech,”
says Taras Berezovets, chief editor of the Ukrainian political website,
Polittech.org.

“Another benefit has been freedom of business. Politicians stopped
interfering, and we now have an economic boom, which has continued
despite recent political crises.”

A parliamentary election in March, unlike many previous elections, was free
and fair – so much so, that the winner was the man who “lost” the Orange
Revolution, the pro-Russian former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych.

He has now been nominated again for the premiership, which, under
constitutional amendments brought in after the Orange Revolution, would
make him the most powerful man in the country.

IN-FIGHTING
But many of the Revolution’s promised changes did not occur. Corruption
allegations still dog some government ministers. Political parties resemble
business clans, bankrolled by tycoons who often double as members of
parliament. Reports of vote-buying are rife.

Things started to go wrong from the very start.

Any political goals the leaders of the Orange Revolution may have shared
were forgotten during the coalition government headed by Yulia Tymoshenko,
which took office in February 2005, and quickly descended into in-fighting.

Ms Tymoshenko accused Mr Yushchenko’s inner circle of corruption. He
sacked her, and accused her of abusing her position to repay debts.

Mr Yushchenko then outraged many of his own supporters by turning to his
rival, Mr Yanukovych, for help in a parliamentary vote to confirm his new
prime ministerial nominee.

During the Revolution it had been Yushchenko and Tymoshenko against
Yanukovych. Suddenly it was Yushchenko and Yanukovych against
Tymoshenko, who voted against Mr Yushchenko’s nominee.

CATCH 22
In the months since the March election – in which his party came a poor
third – Mr Yushchenko has been faced with a choice of which enemy to form a
coalition with: Ms Tymoshenko or Mr Yanukovych.

Ukrainian commentators say he negotiated with both simultaneously, dragging
the talks out for months in an attempt to extract maximum concessions.

Finally, he struck a deal with Ms Tymoshenko, with the Socialist Party as a
junior partner, just as in 2005. But within days the Socialists had second
thoughts and opted instead to join a coalition with Mr Yanukovych. Now Mr
Yanukovych has the upper hand, and is inviting Mr Yushchenko’s party to join
his coalition.

Mr Yushchenko now has to decide whether to agree, or whether it would be
better for his Our Ukraine party to go into opposition. A third option,
favoured by Ms Tymoshenko, would be for him to dissolve parliament and
call new elections.

“It is a Catch 22 situation,” says Taras Kuzio, a senior fellow of the US
body, the German Marshall Fund. “Yanukovych as prime minister would
overshadow Yushchenko. Yushchenko would be sidelined. And his supporters
would desert him in droves, going over to Tymoshenko. Politically, he would
be finished. “But if he calls fresh elections it could be even worse.”

‘ANTI-CRISIS’ COALITION
Taras Berezovets of polittech.org agrees that new elections held now would
simply reduce Our Ukraine’s share of the vote from 14% in March to 9% or
10%.

What a new Yanukovych government would mean for Ukraine and for the legacy
of the Orange Revolution is an open question.

For example, the “anti-crisis coalition” formed by his Party of Regions, the
Socialist Party and the Communist Party, pledges to continue moving towards
Mr Yushchenko’s goal of EU membership and to abide by any result of a
referendum on Nato membership.

“Yanukovych claims he is a new man, and is not going back to the bad old
ways,” says Taras Kuzio. “We simply do not know whether he will have to work
within the parameters of the post-Orange system or not.”

How long a Yanukovych government would last is also unclear.

The Party of Regions’ big business backers do not have much in common with
the Communists, and neither group has much in common with the more “Orange”
members of the Socialist Party, some of whom have already begun splitting
away.

So whatever happens next, Ukraine seems far from a return to political
stability. -30-
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LINK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5215210.stm
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13. UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS DEEPENS AS ORANGE
PARTIES JOSTLE FOR POWER

COMMENTARY: By Niall Green
World Socialist Web Site, UK, Thu, 27 July 2006

A coalition of the Party of the Regions, the Communists and the
Socialists-which together hold a majority of seats in the Ukrainian
parliament (Rada)-continues to be prevented from forming a government by the
leaders of the “Orange Revolution,” President Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko.

The Party of the Regions won the March elections to the Rada with 32 percent
of the vote. Tymoshenko’s eponymous political party came second with 22
percent, followed by Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine trailing a distant third.

According to the constitution, Yushchenko had until midnight July 24 to
approve or reject Party of the Region’s leader Viktor Yanukovich as the
country’s prime minister. The deadline passed with Yushchenko insisting he
has until August 2 to decide if he will endorse the new government or call
fresh elections to the Rada.

Presidential loyalist and former prime minister Yuri Yekhanurov has been
re-appointed head of an interim government.

Our Ukraine could join with the Party of the Regions in a “grand coalition.”
Roman Zvarych, a spokesman for Our Ukraine, indicated that if the
pro-Russian Party of the Regions was willing to adapt to Yushchenko’s more
pro-Western agenda, then the two parties could form a government. “We are
ready for cooperation on condition the country continues its domestic and
foreign policy line,” Zvarych said.

Ukraine should continue working to join the World Trade Organisation by the
end of 2006 and the European Union, as well as maintaining close ties with
NATO and eventually joining the alliance, he explained. This amounts to a
diktat that any deal between them would be predicated on the Party of the
Region’s adopting the policies of a party decisively rejected in the polls.

The formation of any government led by Yanukovich-the defeated presidential
candidate in 2004-has been strongly opposed by Tymoshenko, who has
demanded the post of prime minister for herself.

In a move intended to prevent the Yanukovich-led coalition from taking
office, Tymoshenko’s party resigned from the Rada on July 24. If they are
joined by 26 deputies from Our Ukraine’s faction, then the Rada will lack
the two-thirds quorum necessary to function, forcing fresh elections.

The move was also designed to place maximum pressure on Yushchenko in a
so-far unsuccessful bid to force him to use his presidential powers to
reject Yanukovich as premier.

For Tymoshenko, a multimillionaire oligarch whose fortune was made in the
privatised gas supply market in the 1990s, failure to gain power at the
expense of the Party of the Regions would be a political and personal
disaster. A Party of the Regions-led government would be likely to push for
her prosecution for numerous alleged criminal practices in business and
politics.

Caught between these factions, Yushchenko has faced a political “Catch 22”
since the results of March’s election left his party in a dismal third
place. Most Ukrainian commentators have predicted that if Yushchenko
responds to the demand of Tymoshenko and calls fresh elections, Our
Ukraine’s share of the vote will collapse, from 14 percent in March to as little as
9 or 10 percent, with many of its remaining supporters switching their vote to
either the Party of the Regions or the Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko.

Alternatively, if the president backs the formation of a government led by
Yanukovich, then he will be portrayed by Tymoshenko as having “betrayed” the
Orange Revolution.

Most crucially, should Yushchenko allow the pro-Russian Party of the Regions
to take office, he will lose the backing of his principal supporter, the
United States.

The Orange Revolution, hailed in the Western media as a victory for
Ukraine’s “democratic forces,” was little more than a political coup organised and
funded by the US and other Western powers to bring to power a section of the
country’s elite that were amenable to Washington’s aim of weakening the
influence of Russia in all the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Yushchenko’s acceptance of a Yanukovich government would be unacceptable to
Washington, which has now identified Tymoshenko as the key figure to press
ahead with its strategy for Ukraine.

There is as yet no direct evidence that her decision to quit parliament was
approved by the Bush administration. But Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, fierce
opponents since the president sacked her from the post of prime minister in
2005, only agreed to share power as a result of pressure from the US to form
a Tymoshenko-led government that would keep the Party of the Regions out of
power.

The debacle in Ukraine has proven to be a major embarrassment for US foreign
policy. In the struggle between Washington and Moscow, the Orange Revolution
was seen as a major blow to Russian influence in a region rich in oil and
gas deposits and energy transit routes. Less than two years later,
Washington’s plans for the Ukraine are in disarray.

US and European media outlets, so effusive in their praise for the Orange
Revolution in 2004, are almost silent on the crisis in Ukraine today.

Writing in the Financial Times, Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow at the
New America Foundation, commented that current events “have been barely
reported by most of the US media, let alone commented on. This silence marks
a response to ideological and geopolitical embarrassment of which the old
Soviet media might have been proud.”

Despite the silence, Washington is already preparing to disrupt any new
pro-Russian government in Kiev. The Stratfor web site, highly connected in
US foreign policy and security circles, wrote on July 24 that Tymoshenko’s
task will be to mobilise her supporters “against a hostile government,
whether one emerges immediately or after a new election.”

The article continues: “Though [Tymoshenko’s] supporters are highly
motivated and often young, they are concentrated in western Ukraine and
Kiev. She enjoys almost no support in the heavily pro-Russia east. Should
she find herself isolated entirely from government, however, she might have
no other option but to attempt the large-scale undermining of Ukraine’s
political system through public demonstrations, blockades, work stoppages
or extra-constitutional maneuvers.”

There could not be a more frank description of the fundamentally
undemocratic character of Tymoshenko and, by extension, of the Orange
Revolution sponsored and organised by the US.

Stratfor concludes that her actions would not be driven by “resetting
Ukraine on a course toward Europe, nor about gaining concessions on energy
or economic policy. It is a matter of personal ambition. Having lost the
office of prime minister, she will not rest (or allow her followers to rest)
until she is back at the top.”
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LINK: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jul2006/ukra-j27.shtml
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14. “VICTOR YUSHCHENKO WILL BECOME A BANDIT HIMSELF”
Russian emigre tycoon says Ukrainian president should disband parliament

INTERVIEW: With Boris Berezovskiy
By Oleksandr Chalenko, Segodnya, Kiev, in Russian 21 Jul 06; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

The Ukrainian president should disband parliament to keep “bandits” from
coming to power, Boris Berezovskiy has said in an interview with a major
daily. He called the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine
“bandits” and said Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko should disband
parliament in order to prevent them from coming to power.

He also said the Americans “do not understand anything about what is going
on in the post-Soviet space”. He criticized the USA for violating
international law in Iraq.

The following is the text of the article by Oleksandr Chalenko, entitled
“Viktor Yushchenko will become a bandit himself”, published in the Ukrainian
daily newspaper Segodnya, which is close to the Party of Regions, on 21
July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

PARLIAMENT MUST BE DISBANDED
[Chalenko] Boris Abramovich [Berezovskiy], what do you think of the current
political situation in Ukraine?
[Berezovskiy] I think President Viktor Yushchenko is the one who has pushed
it into a corner. And he has only one way out, if he really wants to solve
it. And that is to disband parliament.

I remember a conversation I had with him a year and a half ago, when he had
just become president. Viktor Andriyovych [Yushchenko] then told me that he
saw Ukraine as a normal, effective and democratic state. But in assessing
the current situation, he not only did not fulfil this task, but Ukraine
stands even farther from democracy than it did under [former Ukrainian
President Leonid] Kuchma.

If Yushchenko sends Viktor Yanukovych’s nomination [for prime minister] to
parliament, then that will be a betrayal of everyone who stood with him on
the Maydan [Independence Square in Kiev, the focal point of the Orange
revolution which brought Yushchenko to power in December 2004].

[Chalenko] And what should the president do after disbanding parliament?
[Berezovskiy] Go into the parliamentary election under a single list with
Yuliya Tymoshenko. Otherwise, [Yushchenko’s bloc] Our Ukraine will have no
victory, because Yushchenko himself discredited it.

Earlier I thought that Viktor Andriyovych represented the democratic
component of the orange movement in an ideological way, and not Yuliya
Tymoshenko. Now I have come to understand that I was wrong. It is Yuliya
Volodymyrivna [Tymoshenko] who personifies the democratic force.

[Chalenko] Perhaps you are not aware that the most recent polls show that
first, the people are against a new election and second, it is the Party of
Regions which would win a repeat election.
[Berezovskiy] I am sceptical of the data in polls. You see, Ukrainians have
a very mobile mode of thinking. Today they have certain sympathies and
tomorrow others. I think it is enough that 15 per cent of Ukrainians are in
favour of disbanding parliament. Because this is the progressive minority,
and it is this minority which moves the passive majority in social progress.

THE “BANDITS”
[Chalenko] Okay, but what if Yushchenko presents Yanukovych’s nomination
for prime minister in parliament after all? What will happen?
[Berezovskiy] The Party of Regions will physically take care of him.
Yanukovych is a bandit. Yes, yes. Once upon a time, Viktor Andriyovych
[Yushchenko] was not ashamed to call Yanukovych a bandit. So if he presents
him to be prime minister, then he will become a bandit himself.

Really, the leader of the Party of Regions is a figure from the 1970s, one
speaking in a mixture of criminal slang and the language of “homo
soveticus”. Tymoshenko is right in calling the last coalition in parliament
a union between the communists and criminals. Both of them are bandits. But
the communists have always been state bandits.

[Chalenko] And yet if there is a re-election, will you provide financial aid
to help Yuliya Tymoshenko set up an “institute of civil society”, like you
helped Yushchenko during the presidential election?
[Berezovskiy] I will not help Tymoshenko personally, because I am a foreign
citizen and do not have the right to do that under Ukrainian law. But I will
help a democratic and transparent election be held, like our Civil Freedom
Fund did in the last election.

Aleksandr Goldfarb, the chairman of our fund, is in Kiev now. He is holding
negotiations on help with the representatives of a few political
forces…[ellipsis as published]

[Chalenko] Which ones exactly?
[Berezovskiy] Ask him. We always finance projects which are directed at
supporting and developing civil society.

AMERICANS WITH NO CLUE
[Chalenko] The G8 summit was just held in St. Petersburg. They say that in
return for support in Iran and North Korea, the Yankees “gave up” democracy
in Russia and Ukraine. Is that true?
[Berezovskiy] You know, I wasn’t there, and so I don’t know anything. But I
can say one thing: the Americans do not understand anything about what is
going on in the post-Soviet space. One should not count on them in affairs
of democratization in Ukraine.

Remember when [Henry] Kissinger came to Ukraine before the presidential
election? He only met Kuchma and Yanukovych, and did not meet Yushchenko.
The Yankees are really hypocritical.

Instead of getting involved in democratization in Iraq (by the way, against
the law, as they are acting against the statute of the UN, having not got
its permission to invade), they would do better to be engaged in
democratization in Ukraine taking a strong position against Yanukovych.

They are doing nothing to counteract the Russian special services in
Ukraine. And it is they [the Russians] who have provoked the situation we
see today in parliament, including buying [speaker Oleksandr] Moroz.

[Chalenko] What happened to your court case against [Yushchenko’s allies
Davyd] Zhvaniya and [Oleksandr] Tretyakov?
[Berezovskiy] I know they have already been summoned. The case will be
heard in the fall. The English courts are slow, but they are fair.
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[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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15. NEW UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER TO BE APPOINTED VERY SOON
Yanukovych will be nominated, Regions Party expected to make four concessions

Segodnya newspaper, Kiev, in Russian 28 Jul 06; p 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 28, 2006

KIEV – President Viktor Yushchenko’s party has dropped its demands to
replace Viktor Yanukovych as candidate for prime minister and exclude the
Communists from the parliamentary majority, Oleksandr Chalenko says in a
newspaper linked to Yanukovych’s Party of Regions.

According to the newspaper’s sources, Yanukovych will be nominated for
prime minister on 28 July. The following is the text of report by Ukrainian
newspaper Segodnya on 28 July:

This country will most probably have a prime minister today. Yesterday it
became more or less clear that the president will submit the candidacy of
Viktor Yanukovych for prime minister to parliament. The time of this
nomination is already known – 1600 [1300 gmt].

[Party of Regions MP] Taras Chornovil has told Segodnya that an agreement
on this was reached with the president by 0900 on Thursday [27 July], as
members of his party were saying. In any case, the Party of Regions has
urged 100-per-cent readiness from its members, which means that everybody
has to be in the session hall today.

In the morning, the deputies will fulfil one of the main conditions of the
president for Yanukovych’s nomination – they will elect Constitutional Court
judges.

Something like unofficial consultations and working meetings went off and on
between the Party of Regions and [Yushchenko’s party] Our Ukraine earlier,
but yesterday full-scale negotiations started. [Communist leader] Petro
Symonenko has said that the earlier consultations between the coalition and
the Yushchenko people at the level of working groups looked like “talks on
the employment of the president’s people”.

Now the latter delegated to the talks [Our Ukraine MPs] Petro Poroshenko,
Roman Zvarych, Roman Bezsmertnyy and Anatoliy Kinakh.

Both parties told Segodnya that the talks are about to be completed. “A week
ago I did not have a feeling that a coalition will be, but now I have it,”
said Yuriy Pavlenko, who works concurrently as Our Ukraine MP and acting
sports and youth minister.

Incidentally, it has emerged that Our Ukraine finally dropped its demands to
replace Viktor Yanukovych as the candidate for prime minister and to exclude
the Communists from the coalition.

The Regions are expected to make the following concessions in return.

FIRST – appoint Petro Poroshenko as first deputy prime minister (when this
newspaper was printed, this was not yet confirmed).

SECOND – appoint [Economics Minister] Arseniy Yatsenyuk (a man of the
president) finance minister and subordinate the customs office, the control
and revision department and the tax administration to him (the Regions are
inclined to accept this).

THIRD – the fuel and energy complex has to be supervised by somebody from
Our Ukraine, but state monopolies like Naftohaz Ukrayiny go to the Regions
(this has already been settled).

FORTH – somebody who suits Yushchenko has to be appointed interior minister.
The Party of Regions can agree with this, but only if it is not [current
Interior Minister] Yuriy Lutsenko. One wing in the party, however, says that
Lutsenko as the minister will be no tragedy – let him join Yanukovych’s
government, and this will kill him as a politician. -30-
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[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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16. “CENTRIFUGE TOWARDS THE CENTRE”
Ukrainian president likely to approve premier from rival camp

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Yuliya Mostova
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 22 Jul 06; pp 1, 3
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is unlikely to disband parliament even
though it may be in his best interests to do so, an influential weekly has
opined.

The best option for his Our Ukraine bloc is to unite with opposition leader
Yuliya Tymoshenko and prevent the Party of Regions from forming a
constitutional majority in parliament, it said.

But Our Ukraine is apparently demoralized and is inclined to join the
coalition led by the Party of Regions. Yushchenko also likes the idea of an
alliance with the Party of Regions in exchange for an increased quota of
ministers in the new cabinet, but this is risky as new ministers will be
fully dependent on the prime minister and parliamentary speaker, who could
initiate their dismissal, it concluded.

The following is the text of the article by Yuliya Mostova, entitled
“Centrifuge towards the centre”, published in Zerkalo Nedeli on 22 July,
subheadings have been inserted editorially:

It is no secret to anyone that many parties and their leaders spend colossal
amounts of money on consultants experts and image makers. As a rule they are
not just feeding the horses.

No, these people whose calling is to make a politician’s image more
attractive, work – some better, some worse – for the money spent on them.
But the overwhelming majority of self-confident leaders in love with
themselves do not use the work of consultants scrupulously and
systematically.

FOLLOWING SOUND ADVICE – PARTY OF REGIONS
Only one political force showed an example of unwavering obedience to the
recommendations of highly-paid consultants – the Party of Regions. The funds
they paid were returned with more than just electoral dividends. And the
recommendations of American and Russian PR-men (by the way, ones not in the
Kremlin pool) are being followed after the election, too.

Both leaders and rank-and-file faction members alike are strictly following
the recommendations of the image-makers. And we are not just talking about a
dress code or topics for news conferences or about ways to present needed
information to the media or the need to send clear signals to influential
embassies. We are talking about the practically unwavering adherence to
rules worked out on public positioning.

Have you paid attention to the fact that representatives of the Party of
Regions have not allowed themselves to speak harshly about the president for
nearly four months? Or to the fact that the congress for Party of Regions
deputies of all levels was held in Ukrainian?

And of course you will recall that Donetsk, despite the efforts of
[Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine leader Nataliya] Vitrenko, did not
declare itself a NATO-free territory.

And everyone has already made due note of how severely and uncompromisingly
the Party of Regions is capable of fixing image problems. The instance of
kicking MP [Oleh] Kalashnykov, who took part in an attack on a group of
journalists from the STB TV channel, out of the faction is an eloquent
example of such capabilities.

This lot of micro and macro recommendations is meant to show Ukraine and the
world (meaning its Western part) another face for the Party of Regions. All
of this is supposed to make us believe that [Party of Regions member Mykola]
Azarov will no more put pressure on opponents using the levers of the Tax
Administration.

Or that [former election chief Serhiy] Kivalov, in administering the fate of
judges, will be guided exclusively by their professionalism. Or that [a
former deputy prime minister Andriy] Klyuyev will not show any interest in
shadow schemes in the fuel and energy complex in general or in state
joint-stock companies in particular.

And that [Party of Regions MP Mykola] Dzhyha will become that person who
will fill in the existing blanks in the [journalist Heorhiy] Gongadze
[murder] case.

OPEN EYES
One of the goals of the new political make-up is to create comfortable
public conditions for President Yushchenko, whose partnership the Party of
Regions is still trying to achieve. In principle, Mr Yushchenko has got into
a situation, which is in short characterized by the words: “I’d be happy to
fool myself”.

Of course, the president has the right to make any decision for which he is
ready to bear responsibility. But it is important for him, at this possibly
last strategic crossing to make a decision with his eyes wide open, and not
eyes wide shut.

FIRST, because, the decision will be equivocal in any case, but no less
responsible because of that. And SECOND, because his decision is a decision
on the fate of the political force which supported him. After all the fate
of the president and Our Ukraine is linked by many things.

Like the president, Our Ukraine is banging its head over the question “what
to do?” Practically no-one has a sure answer to this question. As before,
the bloc has three options open before it, as we wrote last week: early
elections, joining the coalition or being in the opposition.

It is perfectly clear that the bloc, which is not only split along party
lines, but also divided into groups of influence which define their goals in
differing ways, is in no condition to make a decision without the president.

One thing that appears very strange is not only that the president has not
found it necessary to meet with the Our Ukraine faction in the four months
since the election, but that he has not done so even after the creation of
an ideologically unfriendly coalition.

In essence, [Our Ukraine formal leader] Roman Bezsmertnyy is the link
between the faction and the president; he is able to take the entire
spectrum of opinions within the faction to the head of state. But only if Mr
Yushchenko is in a good mood. If he is storming like thunder and lightning,
then it’s not easy at all.

Yushchenko’s striving to narrow the number of people he converses with as
much as possible and the long search for a clear residential position has
led to not only the Party of Regions holding consultations with the group
composed of Bezsmertnyy, [Oleksandr] Tretyakov and [Roman] Zvarych which
is officially authorized for such consultations, but with other, unauthorized,
groups as well.

In the bloc’s information field, there are interpretive versions of
conversations between the “dear friends” and [Party of Regions MP Mykola]
Azarov and [Party of Regions MP Yevhen] Kushnaryov, the president and
[Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc – YTB – leader Yuliya] Tymoshenko, the president
with [Party of Regions MP Rinat] Akhmetov and the president with [prime
minister designate Viktor] Yanukovych and [outgoing Prime Minister Yuriy]
Yekhanurov with everyone.

There is no single “database” in either the bloc itself, or in the
presidential secretariat. In place of one, there is a wealth of information
snippets, based on which the president will make his decision. What
decision? Today, no-one knows.

THE PRESIDENT’S POSITION
There is a very great possibility that Viktor Yushchenko will introduce
Yanukovych’s candidacy [for prime minister] to parliament.

The president’s position has wavered between two extremes: from “never
in my life” to “I’ll introduce it immediately and let’s be done with it”. The
faction, thirsting for something definite has come close to the level of
dispersion in which the slogan “Save yourself while you can!” has become
close to many.

At the same time, both the Our Ukraine HQ and the presidential secretariat
are continuing to weigh various actions while waiting for Yushchenko’s
verdict. Polls prove the intuitive suppositions of those in the president’s
court: the orange electorate is demoralized, disappointed and most
important, apathetic.

Moreover, blitz-polls have convinced officials in the secretariat that this
negative tendency has yet to reach its peak. This argument, like a number of
others, including Tymoshenko’s dominating role in the attempt at an orange
comeback via early elections, is forcing the president to think ever more
sceptically about such a turn of events.

However, according to data at Zerkalo Nedeli, the aggregate sum of
psychological missteps taken by representatives of the Party of Regions –
Azarov’s tone of voice in discussing the budget resolution; Yanukovych’s
personnel position; the backslapping by [Communist Party of Ukraine leader
Petro] Symonenko and [Socialist Party of Ukraine MP Mykola] Rudkovskyy’s
hints at impeachment have worried the president, forcing him to guess that
tucking someone comfortably into bed does not mean it will be easy to sleep
with him.

It’s clear that it was exactly this which served as the reason which
perplexed the anti-crisis group (not to be confused with the anti-crisis
coalition) to prepare a list of all the risks, pluses and minuses of
disbanding parliament. Zerkalo Nedeli learned that this task was placed
before them on Thursday [20 July].

The main apologists for such a way out of the situation among those speaking
with the president are Yuliya Tymoshenko and [presidential chief-of-staff]
Oleh Rybachuk.

INFLUENCING THE GRAND COALITION
Now about the grand coalition and other forms of cooperation between the
president and the coalition which has been set up. A number of experts and
adherents to the idea are trying to convince the head of state that without
his people in the executive branch, the president will de facto lose all his
power by the end of September when the Party of Regions intends to establish
a constitutional majority [of more than 300 deputies in parliament].

Of course, there is a grain of truth in this. In order to remain a serious
player, the president clearly needs more than the two cabinet members
allowed him by the constitution – the foreign minister and the defence
minister.

But the constitutional majority that the Party of Regions is talking about
in the hallways as just a question of time will relieve him of the right of
veto over laws passed by parliament.

And the president can forget about the Constitutional Court which is now
being formed under the legal and sensitive leadership of Mr Kivalov. And so
Mr Yushchenko needs effective contact with the Party of Regions, by securing
that his people take 10 posts in the executive branch.

(By the way, a working group is working on themes meant to explain Our
Ukraine’s cooperation with the Yanukovych to the public at large. Of course,
the base of the pyramid of explanations is unifying the country and the
corresponding need for consensus.)

In the course of consultations with the Party of Regions, one of the groups
of negotiators reached an agreement that the personnel sacrifices in favour
of Our Ukraine would include the first deputy prime minister with
authorities, the minister of interior affairs and the justice minister.
There was also agreement reached that the two ministers nominated by the
president and not by the prime minister would not figure in the quota of 10.

We do not know whether Thursday’s [20 July] meeting between the president
and Viktor Yanukovych confirmed these points. We only know that Mr
Yanukovych was not ready to talk about specific personnel issues. And also
that he was very sceptical about the idea of dividing up the cabinet by
sector.

As you will recall, posts in the orange coalition were divided using this
very principle, upon which responsibility for the state of an entire
sector – the fuel and energy sector, the economy, the humanitarian sector
[and so on] – was carried by one of the three political forces in the
coalition all the way up the vertical of power.

That is, if Tymoshenko got the minister of fuel and energy, then that meant
Naftohaz Ukrayiny [state oil and gas company], the National Energy
Regulating Commission and other entities in fuel and energy were for her
personnel and other responsibilities. The Party of Regions does not want
that. That is, they only want it for themselves, without entrusting any
serious sectors to Our Ukraine.

MINISTERS DEPEND ON PARLIAMENT
And there are other points. Under the old constitution, as we recall, the
president wandered far beyond the legal field when he determined the fates
of ministers. Formally, they could only be dismissed at the request of the
prime minister.

But using the fact that the old constitution gave the president the right to
sign any decree to dismiss the prime minister, the head of state had direct
influence on members of the cabinet.

Now the fate of any minister depends on the parliamentary speaker, who is
capable of including a report from any member of the cabinet, or from the
prime minister who (in our case) controls the parliamentary majority, on the
agenda at any time. And that majority, in any composition, including without
Our Ukraine votes, will be enough to dismiss any minister at any moment.

And how much time do you think is needed to “recruit” the lion’s share of
potential Our Ukraine ministers? Especially if people in these posts are
people who have been calling for cooperation with the Party of Regions
consistently and for a long time…[ellipsis as published]

SERIOUS DOUBTS
I have also heard that the 12 presidential-Our Ukraine ministers put into
the executive will be able to first, defend themselves, and second,
influence the situation in the country. Two things force one to doubt these
thoughts.

FIRST, the spirit of the snake box which reigns in the presidential bloc
gives no reason to think that ministers who get into the Yanukovych
government will act remembering the parable of the divining stick and the
broom.

SECOND, Viktor Yanukovych style of leadership is different from the
democratic cabinet talk sessions with Tymoshenko or Yekhanurov’s silent
ignoring of the government’s opinion or of certain “government factions” and
representatives. In Yanukovych’s government everything will be quite simple:
“Battalion, line up! And forward, march!” Far from every person is able to
withstand such pressure.

WAYS TO COOPERATE
Now a little about who Our Ukraine can use to keep its finger on the pulse
of the executive branch. We are not talking about names.

The president probably cannot fully be guided by the principle of “three Ps”
in this situation [allusion unclear]. Understanding the large arsenal the
Party of Regions has, Mr Yushchenko will strive foremost to appoint
trustworthy, or rather loyal, people. We are talking about forms of
cooperation. There are three.

[1] FIRST – is Our Ukraine entering the coalition before the vote on
Yanukovych for prime minister? That is a collective and final “Goodbye,
Maydan!” [i.e. the Orange Revolution].

[2] The SECOND form is Our Ukraine joining the coalition after the prime
minister is confirmed. The law does not in this case require a
reconfirmation of the head of government or a new vote on him.

The main part of Our Ukraine (it cannot be ruled out that after adopting the
first or second variant of a decision, several people will de facto split
off and join YTB) will simply sign the coalition agreement after which their
representatives will join the executive branch. Sort of a “virgin birth”
with the real prospect of the consequences described above.

[3] But someone was able to come up with a third variant: Our Ukraine
remains in the parliamentary opposition and the quota is given directly to
the president who fills it with professionals and technical people not
affiliated to any party or to people who give up their membership in the
parties which make up Our Ukraine.

I never did figure out whom in central and western Ukraine they are trying
to fool with this “just a little bit pregnant” format of working with
Yanukovych. Nonetheless, this variant is being discussed along with the
others.
LOSING VOTERS
Independent of the chosen manner of cooperation, a situation could certainly
form as a result, one in which having joined the executive branch, Our
Ukraine loses its electorate once and for all and shares responsibility for
the results of the government’s activity with the other members of the
coalition – results which for both subjective and objective reasons are far
from guaranteed to be positive. At the same time, the president loses his
electoral support and the rest of his real power.

Possibly Mr Yushchenko is counting on an open, or perhaps closed, protocol
in which the Party of Regions’ answers to Yushchenko’s conditions are
written. It is known to be true that such a list exists. It includes issues
concerning the political future of the current head of state and issues
which are of principle importance to the development of the country.

In some ways this list is similar to the “Protocol of Differences” which
existed among the members of the former orange coalition. But it is hard to
judge the level of consensus which has been reached today between the
president and the Party of Regions.

It is known that the first group of issues was discussed with [Party of
Regions MP Rinat] Akhmetov. As far as issues of the state are concerned,
they were discussed with a wider group of participants. And at a certain
stage they gave the president optimism.

Whether they are enforced by “the Donetsk word” or a Donetsk signature is
not of principle importance for results, but for the president it is
important.

To say that there is a critical mass of people in Our Ukraine who feel joy
from the prospect of cooperating with the current coalition is to fool one’s
self.

There is no-one there on Yanukovych’s side, but there are those who are
ready to cooperate with someone who is strong; there are very few who love
Tymoshenko, but many who think a decision for our Ukraine to go into the
opposition is the correct one.

There are not a lot of people there who will blush when a little Ukrainian
asks “How could you guys screw up like that?” But there are a lot who
understand that the electorate which is left needs to be saved.

In light of the lack of consensus, the party cannot allow itself to cross
the president’s decision. And it appears that the overwhelming majority will
accept any decision Viktor Yushchenko takes. Whatever it is.

KEEPING TOGETHER IN THE OPPOSITION
Our Ukraine cannot go into opposition without the president. Those who
believe in this step are convinced: if Yushchenko, for any of the above
reasons, decides to cooperate with the legally established coalition and its
lawfully nominated prime minister, and the faction stays in the opposition,
then in a very short time, a significant part of the Our Ukrainians will de
facto join the majority.

And a smaller, but radical part, will be drawn into Tymoshenko’s orbit and
leftovers of the Our Ukraine faction will not be of any use or attractive to
the electorate.

Undoubtedly, if for one second you believe that the slogans used by Our
Ukraine during the presidential and even parliamentary elections were
sincerely shared by Viktor Yushchenko’s adherents, then there cannot be any
talk of cooperation with the “anti-crisis” coalition. Our Ukraine’s place is
in the opposition. Together with the president.

Exactly that decision is dictated [1] first by the traditions of the
civilized world – you couldn’t keep hold of power, didn’t justify the
voters’ hopes, did not show the talent of a negotiator – go into the
opposition. And the next election will judge whether the winners were able
to handle their tasks.

[2] Second, there is a real prospect that Our Ukraine’s quota in the
government as the “women’s’ council for the division commander” is not a way
out for the president.

[3] Third, the rescued and potential electorate has to be given a clear
signal of at least some kind of consistent action. After all, gluing the
country together doesn’t mean trading one’s principles…[ellipsis as
published]

People in Our Ukraine understand well that opposition under an uncontrolled
Yanukovych a la [former President Leonid] Kuchma is not only dangerous for
capital and career growth…[ellipsis as published]

They don’t believe Tymoshenko there, or in her striving to coordinate
actions with Our Ukraine. The statements on joint lists are considered to be
the result of shock which has not yet passed.

There they believe that it is not possible to keep the 150 MPs which are
needed to keep the ruling coalition from overcoming a veto and changing the
constitution or to keep the Party of Regions within at least some semblance
of democratic bounds without allowing appetites to grow to monarchical size.

People there do not believe their comrades in the bloc, thinking that sooner
or later the Party of Regions will find enough arguments to create a
constitutional majority at their own expense and at that of YTB.

And the fact that Andriy Klyuyev – who is responsible for this ticklish
direction – is not forcing Our Ukraine and YTB MPs into the coalition camp
today does not comfort those who know the weaknesses of their party fellows.

People in Our Ukraine do not believe that Viktor Yushchenko will disband
parliament. And that is the most important thing. And so when talk is of the
opposition, people are looking foremost not for ways to act, but for reasons
which would explain why this is impossible.

In the big picture, no-one in Our Ukraine is flattered by getting
[chairmanship of parliament’s several standing] committees and no-one
considers posts held to be a means to influence parliamentary decisions.

[1] First, because the Party of Regions has created its own majorities in
those committees which the opposition has been given. And [2] second,
because decisions are made by the majority in the session hall anyway and a
committee’s position can be ignored.

ACTING RATHER THAN ASKING WHAT TO DO
In fact if what has transpired had served as a lesson for Our Ukraine and
YTB, then today they would not be asking “what to do?”

A sober assessment of the prospects of early elections; consolidation of
positions in communicating with the president and forming his point of view;
working out and publicly confirming joint plans; setting up an analytical
group for working on basic directions for developing the economy and
withstanding threats to national security; or drafting corresponding bills.

Or working to hold onto a critical number in factions which would make
possible a business opposition as well as a political opposition to exist in
the country.

Does anyone doubt that [wealthy businessmen Serhiy] Taruta, [Vitaliy]
Hayduk, [Ihor] Kolomoyskyy and an entire slew of other businessmen will
sleep soundly even one night after Yanukovych becomes prime minister?

With the move of the two orange factions into the opposition, voters will
get a clear signal and orientation. The country in general will get an
understandable system of political relations and an opposition capable of
fairly effectively defending rights and freedoms. And the civilized world
will understand what is happening.

Nevertheless, today the chance for such a variant is slight. It is much more
likely that the president will take Viktor Yanukovych’s candidacy for
confirmation by parliament for which the president will get his enlarged
quota in the executive branch. And that will happen not because the Party of
Regions does not have enough votes in the session hall or personnel to fill
vacant posts.

It will happen not because many in the Party of Regions think that a union
with the Communist Party of Ukraine does nothing to decorate a “market”
party and not because Rinat Akhmetov is beginning to understand that
Oleksandr Moroz in the political game is a figure as big as Akhmetov in
business. And that Akhmetov’s experience in politics is about the same as
Moroz’ experience in business…[ellipsis as published]

The Party of Regions and its person number one need the president and Our
Ukraine for “image”.

What did Mykola Azarov get for showing up on Independence Square in an
orange scarf [in 2004]? And how his fellow party members laugh at the
humiliating procedure of “voting for the speaker” [earlier this month, when
nobody voted for Azarov].

But Mr Yanukovych gets complete use of the country and the possibility to
enter civilized society as a “homo erectus”. But he doesn’t need to put on
an orange scarf to do this, just an orange mask.

———————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
17. ORANGE REVOLUTION IS “OVER BUT NOT A FAILURE”

INTERVIEW: With Taras Kuzio
By Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations
New York, Washington, D.C., Monday, July 24, 2006

Taras Kuzio ( http://www.gwu.edu/~elliott/faculty/kuzio.cfm), an expert on
post-Soviet affairs at George Washington University, discusses the current
political crisis in Ukraine and what it means for the country’s relations
with the United States, the European Union, and Russia. He says the Orange
Revolution, while over, should not be considered a failure.

[QUESTION] Why has it taken three months for a government to get off the
ground in Ukraine?

[TARAS KUZIO] With the new constitutional reform that was introduced this
year just ahead of the parliamentary elections. The Ukraine moved from a
presidential to, in effect, a parliamentary presidential system. Therefore,
one could lay some blame upon this being a completely new system for
Ukraine.

The move to a parliamentary presidential system is in many ways when looking
at the transitions imposed in Europe a very positive thing because countries
with parliamentary systems have tended to do far better in democratization
than those in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] which tend to
have presidential systems. That is one factor.

A second factor has been the ingoing division within the orange revolution
camp which became in September of last year when the Yulia Tymoshenko
government was dismissed by Viktor Yushchenko, and since then the orange
camp which consists of three political forces Ukraine allied to the
president, Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, and the socialist party. The three have
really never gotten back together again and they entered the parliamentary
elections in March as a separate component.

These inner divisions led to very long and protracted coalition
negotiations, and the government can not be proposed under the new
constitutional reforms until a parliamentary coalition is created because
previously under the old system it was the president who appointed the
government. Now the government is appointed and responsible to a
parliamentary coalition-so more of a west European model.

[QUESTION] Given the outcome of the March elections, it seems the
Ukrainian public has swung back toward the Party of the Regions, which is
led by Viktor Yanukovich, who famously lost the presidential elections in
2004 in what became known worldwide as the Orange Revolution. Why
has his popularity gone up since then?

[TARAS KUZIO] One has to compare the results of the parliamentary
elections in March to the presidential elections in November and December
2004. The results are pretty much the same, and nothing has really changed.

Although the Party of Regions this year came first in the five political
forces which crossed the 3 percent threshold into parliament, they received
32 percent, when one does a comparison of what the political forces who
supported Viktor Yanukovich in 2004 obtained and what they obtained this
year, and the orange forces who backed Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 and what
they obtained this year. There really is not that much of a difference.

So both sides obtained approximately the same percentage of support. It is
just that the Party of Regions came first with thirty two percent because
they were the only political force which crossed into parliament that
represented the old system whereas the orange forces were divided between
three political forces.

But the two together actually obtained more than the party of regions.
Therefore, they were able if they had wanted or had the political will to
create an orange coalition which would have given them more than 50 percent
of the seats.

[QUESTION] Does it seem that Yanukovich will become prime minister then?

[TARAS KUZIO] It is a question that is difficult to answer because of these
constitutional reforms. The president is supposed to just have a formality
of actually proposing his name now because the parliamentary coalition is
being created called the anti-crisis coalition consisting of the communists
the socialist and the party regions.

They have nominated Viktor Yanukovich for Prime minister; they nominated him
to the president, the president then puts his name to parliament to be voted
on. That is the formal procedure. It has never happened before. But this is
the actual procedure under the constitutional reform.

Mr. Viktor Yushchenko has said that he does not want to see Mr. Yanukovich
as prime minister for a whole host of reasons. One of which, he feels he
will be overshadowed by Mr. Yanukovich, because he is a strong willed
character, also because the position of Prime minister has become more
important and has more power under the constitutional reform, but also
because Mr. Yanukovich is loathed by a good proportion of Ukraine, primarily
in western and central Ukraine who voted for the orange revolution.

Viktor Yanukovich does represent in many people’s mind that election fraud
and violence that took place in 2004. He is a divisive figure not a uniting
figure. Whether the president has the right not to propose Mr. Yanukovich
for the position of Prime minister to parliament for its vote, is a separate
question because the only real alternative for Viktor Yushchenko is really
to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections.

So he is really caught between two very difficult questions, and I would
suspect that he will have to go forward and propose Mr. Yanukovich for the
position of Prime Minister because it is the lesser of two evils. Because if
he calls fresh elections the party of regions could well get more votes than
they got in March precisely because the Orange camp has failed to come back
together again.

[QUESTION] Does this mean that the Orange Revolution is effectively dead?

[TARAS KUZIO] I think regarding the Orange Revolution, the first nail in the
coffin was done in September of last year when the president, in my view,
wrongly disbanded the Yulia Tymoshenko government and created the divisions
in the Orange camp which led to the situation today.

Up until the divisions in September last year, the Party of Regions had an
average rating of about 20 percent. After the September crisis, the party of
regions shot up over 30 percent.

What has happened now with the defection of the socialist part to the party
of regions to create this so called anti crisis coalition has in effect put
second nail in the coffin of the orange revolution. We should be very
cautious here.

Although the potential for an orange coalition now is very unlikely because
the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine together does not have enough
deputies to create a parliamentary coalition. They only have 210 and they
are required 226 minimum.

At the same time, many of the positive aspects which have arisen out of the
election of Viktor Yushchenko and the orange revolution will continue. It
will be difficult to see how any coalition in power in Ukraine even the
Prime minister Yanukovich can turn back the gains of the orange revolution
in a more freer system.

Ukraine held its first free and fair elections in March of this year and a
free and independent media. There is a danger here with the creation of the
anti crisis coalition. After all it is the first coalition in Ukraine’s
history with a communist inside the coalition. But at the same time, it
would be wrong to assume that the Orange Revolution is a failure. It is
over, but I would not say it is a failure.

[QUESTION] Why is Yulia Tymoshenko such a divisive figure in your opinion?

[TARAS KUZIO] I think that she finds it difficult to work as a team player.
In many ways some regard her as a populist. I think this is a much abused
term because after all many political forces, parliaments, and governments
in Europe have parties in power which include such political forces.
Poland-a member of EU and NATO-have two so called populist parties in its
government.

So I think it is a mixture of misnomer, very wrong negative views about
Yulia Tymoshenko rising from her Prime Ministership in 2005. Particularly
from economists who regard her economic policies as wrong. At the same time,
she is also somebody who is one of the few political forces in parliament
who is willing to break from the old regime.

So she is somebody with a force for good as well in terms of pushing along
democratization and the battle against corruption. It is never a black and
white issue.

If you are an economist, you probably don’t like her because of her
attitudes towards laissez-faire economics and re-privatization. At the same
time in Europe, many of her social market economic policies are the norm,
which they are not in the U.S. So there are different views about her.

And of course she has a checkered past as someone who was involved in the
energy industry in the 1990s and became in effect one of Ukraine’s first
dissident oligarchs. So people have very mixed views about her. They find it
difficult to work with her in terms of working as a team.

Certainly she shares some of the responsibility for the implosion of the
orange camp. But I would lay the greatest blame here and responsibility on
the president because during those three months of coalition negotiations
from March to June, it really was a responsibility of the president to
ensure that they be completed very quickly. And the fact they dragged on
right to the deadline in late June is really the responsibility of Our
Ukraine politicians and President Yushchenko.

[QUESTION] What has been the effect on the Ukrainian people? I have read a
lot of articles that Ukrainian people have become very disillusioned with
politics.

[TARAS KUZIO] Yes, this is something that is probably the saddest aspects of
the entire crisis and the different crises rising since September of last
year. One of the main reasons why people went on the streets in the orange
revolution was precisely because they thought that Viktor Yushchenko
represented somebody who was different to the norm. He wasn’t the typical
politician.

Usually public opinion in post-communist Europe, particularly in the CIS,
tends to see politicians as all the same: They are all a bunch of rogues,
who only enter politics for corrupt personal interests and not for the
interests of their voters or the country’s interests at large. People go
into the streets, such as during the orange revolution, believing that this
is not quite the case with this particular person with Viktor Yushchenko.

That innocence is in some ways being totally eroded because we have now a
return to the view that “well, we were wrong, all politicians are actually
all same. Viktor Yushchenko has not really been that different from the
other politicians.” That is one of the most tragic aspects.

You see that in today in Kiev where the ability of youth groups such as
Pora, which means “its time,” which was very active during the Orange
Revolution, is now unable to get people on the streets to protest the
formation of this new coalition and the possible appointment of Viktor
Yanukovich as prime minister.

They are unable to do that today because people are disillusioned. People
are angry; they feel deceived that the politicians they believed would make
Ukraine different during the orange revolution have proven that they are
incapable of doing that. Here I think Viktor Yushchenko really has failed to
live up to many people’s expectations, both in the west and in Ukraine.

[QUESTION] Specifically, what are Yushchenko’s main mistakes? I am referring
to the past year, not just the past few months.

[TARAS KUZIO] His main mistakes have been an inability to understand
strategic questions facing the country. When the presidential administration
and the president have dealt with issues, these have tended to be in
reaction to events-for example, the gas crisis in January 2006. There has
been a total inability of the president to have a backup command structure.
His presidential secretariat has failed to provide him with that.

The first head of the presidential secretariat Oleksandr Zinchenko and the
current head of the presidential secretariat Oleg Rybachuk have both failed
to provide the president with the necessary backup, expertise, and research
for him to undertake presidential functions. The National Security Council
has also not really operated as it should do, given the previous president
Leonid Kravchuk.

There is a mixture of institutional problems, strategic inability to deal
with issues in Ukraine, and also a kind of detachment from what is going on
around them. The president’s party itself Our Ukraine proved to be
disastrous. This is a party after all where the honorary chairman is the
President Viktor Yushchenko.

A year ago, in the summer or spring of 2005, we would have expected that
this party, which is headed by the president, would have come in first in
the elections. In fact, he came in third, with 10 percent fewer votes than
in 2002 under Kuchma. These are precisely the fault of the president and Our
Ukraine leadership.

Another important area, which has certainly impacted relations with the West
has been an inability to understand the relationship between domestic and
foreign policy issues. The U.S. in particular, for example, and the Bush
administration was actively lobbying after the parliamentary elections in
March of this year for an orange coalition.

This orange coalition would have been a precursor to Ukraine being invited
to a membership action plan at NATO’s Riga summit in November of this year,
and potentially for an invitation to membership in the 2008 NATO enlargement
summit.

But this was conditional on the Orange camp reuniting and forming a
government very quickly. I don’t think the Bush administration really cared
who the prime minister would be, as long as there would be a reuniting of
pro-reform pro-democratic forces.

The fact that the president and his team were willing to drag on these
coalition negotiations for three months just because they did not want to
let in Yulia Tymoshenko’s prime minister and at the same time was
simultaneously negotiating with potentially the Party of Regions for a grand
coalition, is I think a complete failure of their understanding of how this
would impact not only inside Ukraine, which we have talked about, but also
understand this impact upon the west.

Now you have in the west a Ukraine fatigue in many ways. The supporters
of the orange revolution, supporters of Viktor Yushchenko, which
were numerous particularly in the U.S. and within NATO, which had an open
door policy have now become far less, and they have become disillusioned as
well with the inability of Viktor Yushchenko to really stamp his authority on the
country.

[QUESTION] Let’s talk about foreign policy. What does a Yanukovich
premiership mean for European and U.S-Ukrainian relations?

[TARAS KUZIO] Certainly because of the growing Ukraine fatigue, it is highly
unlikely that Ukraine would be potentially invited into a membership action
plan in the Riga NATO summit in November of this year.

It is difficult to imagine NATO inviting in a country with a parliamentary
coalition leading a government that includes two political forces-a
socialist and a communist-that are totally opposed to membership in NATO.

That is one of the factors, already with the anti-NATO and anti-American
demonstrations in the Crimea in June, which the president was unable to deal
with. Those demonstrations have already put a question mark on the whole
question of whether Ukraine would have been anyway invited into NATO in
2008.

I think the enlargement summit now is likely to be postponed from 2008 to
maybe a few years down the road. The NATO issue both outside Ukraine and
inside the new government is likely now to return more the Kuchma era
position on NATO, which was “yes we are interested in cooperation with NATO,
but we are not interested in membership.” That is one of the downsides.

The other area which deals with the European Union is more complicated
because the European Union never really welcomed the Orange Revolution
unlike NATO.

The EU never opened its doors to Ukraine following the Orange Revolution,
and its argument (particularly it’s West European members) was that “we are
so preoccupied with our own internal problems such as Turkey, failure of the
constitution to be passed by France and the Netherlands in their referendum,
and entire enlargement fatigue that the European Union is going through that
we really can’t deal with Ukraine at the moment.”

So Ukraine was in many ways sidelined and cold shouldered by the European
Union and therefore any kind of relationship is unlikely to change there.
The only possible change would be that what we have is in many ways a very
cynical view in Western Europe that the Orange Revolution was never here to
say or very successful.

[QUESTION] Russian-Ukrainian relations since the Orange Revolution have been
less than spectacular. Do you see a lot of the issues with Russia changing,
for example, the gas crisis earlier this year, the Black Sea fleet, issues
of democratization, etc.?

[TARAS KUZIO] Some issues will change, some issues will not. Russia and
Ukraine under even Kuchma and during Vladimir Putin’s first term were
already on very divergent political paths.

Let’s recall that Putin’s Russia is heading towards a more utilitarian
regime, and Ukraine is still heading towards and still has moved with its
constitutional reforms towards a more democratic system away in some ways
from the CIS. Politically internally they are still very different
countries.

At the same time, where it will change is that the Putin regime was always
hostile to the democratic revolutions that were taking place where it
regarded as its turf, the CIS. Therefore, regardless of what Mikhail
Saakashvili did in Georgia or Victor Yushchenko did in the Ukraine, the
Putin regime was always going to adopt the very negative view about those
leaderships.

The fact that now you will have a change where the prime minister could be
held by Viktor Yanukovich will certainly create a change in atmosphere and
relation with Russia.

At the same time, Russia has already stated that it is not planning to give
Ukraine under Prime Minister Yanukovich any preferences on gas. Russia is
playing hardball even with its allies inside the CIS. It has not really been
giving them any better privileges and preferences.

For example, pro-Russia Armenia still has to pay a higher price for its gas
being delivered from Russia than even Ukraine today under Yushchenko. So I
don’t think there is going to be many changes there.

Where there will be changes will be more on the level of diplomatic and
political relations. After all, party regions in Ukraine have already in
2005 signed a close agreement of cooperation with president Putin’s party of
Unified Russia.

So there is already some kind of close relations. Certainly, the Party of
Regions and Viktor Yanukovich’s Prime minister would maybe adopt less
hostile in Russia’s view positions on international relations.

For example, Ukraine in the last two years has been adopting the western
position on isolating the Yulia Tymoshenko regime in Belarus and among human
rights issues in general inside the CIS. That could be now less likely to be
the case.

Also, U.S. backed regional initiatives in the region such as the GUAM group
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and the community of democratic
choice, these are two regional groupings that the U.S. and the Bush
administration has been backing.

Anybody such as prime minister Yanukovich would be like to be colder to
these initiatives because they would be seen as provocative towards Russia.
Those would be the kind of main changes. What it would in effect be is maybe
a return to the Kuchma era, multi-vector foreign policy.

But it is so difficult to completely see ahead because of these
constitutional reforms because even under these constitutional reforms,
president Yushchenko still has control over the security forces and foreign
policy issues.

What we can in effect see is the prime minister conducting one foreign
policy and the president conducting another. In that respect, there could be
a clash between parliament and president over foreign policy issues.

[QUESTION] What does it mean for future elections in Ukraine about the
divisiveness in the country: East versus West, pro-Russia versus pro-Europe,
religious versus the secular parts, catholic parts in the west versus
eastern orthodox? There seems to be this in the United States with the red
versus blue. How significant and how damaging is this going to be to the
political process going forward?

[TARAS KUZIO]The regional divides is a very important factor in Ukrainian
politics in terms of elections and voting. It does not have an impact on an
interpersonal level and in terms of some kind of conflict. After all, these
individuals living in the east of Ukraine and in the west of Ukraine are all
Ukrainians in terms of citizenship.

The divisions between them are purely on a linguistic level primarily. From
a linguistic level, this leaves different political preferences. So we are
not talking about a potential ethnic divide or potential ethnic conflict as
we have seen in many other countries. Hence, what we should be careful of is
moving from an idea regionalism can therefore lead to separatism or to
interethnic conflict.

This regionalism is a factor that Ukraine has inherited from the Soviet era
and even from other periods in history. It does have political preferences.
It just means that of all the political forces in parliament none of them
really have ability to attract voters from throughout the country.

They are all in many ways regionally based including the Party of Regions
itself, which is not popular in western central Ukraine. But what we tend to
have a problem with in the west in particular in western media and newspaper
accounts are that this issue is over simplified.

It is not a question of Catholic nationalist west versus a pro-Russian
Orthodox East. There are more Orthodox believers living in west Ukraine than
Catholics. Catholics are only confined to three provinces of west Ukraine.
West Ukraine is far bigger than three provinces. It is linguistic. It is not
really religious, but that linguistic is a consequence of history and it
leads to political preferences and in some ways foreign policy issues.

What it does mean is that kind of anti-Russianism that you have in three
Baltic States understandably because of the occupation that they went
through under the Soviet Union is only really something that exists in
western Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine, which is largely Russian speaking, that
kind of anti-Russianism does not exist.

Therefore, no politician no president certainly can really adopt a stern
anti-Russian line. He has to carefully tread between dealing with Russia on
the one hand and dealing with the west on the other. What we should again be
cautious of understanding is that a pro-Russian position in eastern Ukraine
means really that all it wants is good relations with Russia.

It does not mean that the east Ukrainian region wants to somehow join Russia
or join this nebulous Belarus Russia union that has been creating over the
last ten years. What we in effect have is most Ukrainians are in favor of
integration with Europe to the European Union.

NATO is a different question. What they also want is that this integration
with Europe be not done at the expense of bad relations with Russia. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
Podcast: http://www.cfr.org/publication/11168/kuzio.html
———————————————————————————————–
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18. UKRAINE REMEMBERS VICTIMS OF HOLOCAUST
Monument dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region

The Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS (FJC)
Moscow, New York, Monday, July 24 2006

ZOLOCHEV, Ukraine – A monument commemorating victims of the
Holocaust has been dedicated in Zolochev, Lvov region, Ukraine.

The ceremony included Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Azriel Chaikin, Chief Rabbi
of the Zhitomir region Shlomo Wilhelm, Chief Rabbi of the Ivano-Fankovsk
region Moshe Kolesnik, Chief Rabbi of Rovno Shneur Zalman Shneerson,
officials representing the regional and the city’s authority agencies and
Jews from across the world whose parents originate from this Ukrainian town.

A citizen of Belgium, Fanny Zilmend was one who with gathered these people
in the former Jewish cemetery to dedicate a monument to Jews killed by
Nazis. The monument was made by a famous sculptor of Lvov, Vasil
Kamenschik.

After a red ribbon was cut to symbolize the opening of the monument, the
floor was passed to Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Azriel Chiakin. Addressing his
speech to hundreds of people of different nationalities, the rabbi thanked
G-d for being free to speak the native language, to pray and to build
monuments in the free country of Ukraine.

“We have to learn from the errors of the past and do everything possible to
save the world from terrorism.” At the ceremony, the participants chanted
“El Mole Rachamim” and the Kaddish Prayer.

Head of the Zolochev Region Administration Boris Zolotnik stressed that
Ukraine treated with equal respect people of different nationalities buried
in its land. “It is a very important event for our city to dedicate a
monument to those killed by Nazis during World War Two. What had
happened in the middle of the past century must never occur again!”

NOBEL LAUREATE IN CHEMISTRY ROLAND HOFFMAN
One of representatives of Jews whose parents came from this city in Ukraine,
Nobel laureate in chemistry Roland Hoffman shared his emotions of the visit
to the native land of his parents: “It was very important for me. The house
I was born in is still standing here. I believe building monuments is very
important even though there are no Jews here anymore.

This is essential for the education of the young generation, so that the
youths know that Zolochev had once been home for many Jews – one third of
its total population – living side by side with Ukrainians and Polish. And
then there was the Holocaust. One part of my soul – the optimistic one –
says this will never happen again, but another part of my heart whispers it
can happen in any moment. This won’t happen only as long as we remember
the lessons of the past.” -30-
————————————————————————————————
LINK: http://www.fjc.ru/news/newsArticle.asp?AID=406616
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19. UKRAINIAN CARTOONIST’S WORKS ON EXHIBIT IN TEHRAN

Mehr News Agency (MNA), Tehran, Iran, Sunday, July 23, 2006

TEHRAN – Once again, the works of Ukrainian cartoonist Vladimir
Kazanevsky were put on display in Tehran at the Kupeh Gallery on
July 20, ISNA reported on Sunday.

The 22 cartoons had previously been exhibited for two weeks at Tehran’s
Nashr-e Salis Gallery in May at the invitation of Iranian cartoonist Kianush
Ramezani.

The cartoons are being sold for 130 euros each and prints of the artworks
are on sale at an affordable price. The exhibition runs until August 2 at
the gallery, which is located at 845 Enqelab Ave, opposite Khark St.,
between Hafez and Vali-e Asr avenues.

Kazanevsky’s cartoons have earned him many prestigious awards in
international events including the Yomiuri International Cartoon Contest in
Japan (1990) and the 4th Certamen International Competition in Spain (1996).
He won 22 prizes in 2001 alone.

Many countries, including Romania, Hungary, Belgium, Japan, and the United
States, have displayed his cartoons over the two past decades. Iran’s House
of Cartoon also hosted his 2002 Tehran exhibition.

Kazanevsky, 56, has published his works in the books “Heads” and “Revelation
of Elderly Cupid” in Belgium and Ukraine. His “The Art of Modern Cartoon”,
surveying the theory of cartoon art, was published in English in 2003. MMS/HG
—————————————————————————————————
LINK: http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=357088
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20. MAPPING UKRAINIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MODERNISM

By Kevin Nance, Art Critic, Chicago Sun Times
Chicago, Illinois, Thursday, July 27, 2006

CHICAGO- Mention Ukrainian art and your mind leaps first to Easter eggs.
You know the ones I mean: those fragile folk-art treasures called psanky,
with their delicate intertwining lines and geometric figures that smack of
classical decoration and Byzantine iconography.

What might not occur to many Americans — for reasons having to do with the
country’s reluctant mingling with Russia and, later, the Soviet Union — is
Ukraine’s contribution to the modern art movements that percolated
throughout Europe and the United States in the early 20th century.

“Crossroads: Modernism in Ukraine, 1910-1930,” a touring exhibit making a
welcome stop at the Chicago Cultural Center through Oct. 15, is out to
change that.

Culled from private collections as well as those of the National Art Museum
of Ukraine and other institutions there, this handsome, mostly unfamiliar
grouping of about 70 works by 21 artists firmly establishes Kiev (which
Ukrainians now spell Kyiv) as one of the most fertile hotbeds of European
modernism, along with St. Petersburg and Paris.

A casual walkthrough of the exhibit — the first of its kind in the United
States — can tend to leave you with the impression of a polyglot,
aggressively cosmopolitan art that lacked easily discernible national
characteristics. Those trendy Ukrainians!

They dipped their brushes into virtually every paint can of the avant garde,
from Cubism and Futurism to (belatedly) Art Nouveau and (early on)
Constructivism. (That last movement, widely considered a Russian phenomenon,
was actually pioneered in part by a cadre of native or adopted Ukrainians.)

A closer look, though, takes you back to those Easter eggs, or rather to
their connections with classical, Byzantine and ecclesiastical sources.

There’s a distinctly Ukrainian lushness that adheres to even the most severe
compositions here — such as Kazimir Malevich’s “suprematist” images, with
their subtle use of Christian symbols — and deepens into outright decadence
in the overheated canvases of Vsevolod Maksymovych.

A Constructivist journal cover from 1929 by Vasyl Yermilov is part of
“Modernism in Ukraine” at the Chicago Cultural Center.

For good or ill, Maksymovych, a nudist, body builder and dapper
provocateur-about-town who committed suicide at age 21 after a drug
overdose, unexpectedly dominates this exhibit.

His smorgasbord of large-scale decorative panels, heavily indebted to
Symbolism and Art Nouveau (especially as embodied by Aubrey Beardsley and
Gustav Klimt), may be too rich a diet for some; “The Nude” (1914), a trio of
lithe bodies fronted by a fey young man whose privates are covered by what
appears to be a heart-shaped valentine, borders on camp.

But two of his images from 1913, “Kiss” (a worthy homage to Klimt’s icon of
the previous decade) and “Masquerade” (his most macabre and Beardsleyesque
panel), are jaw-dropping stunners.

The show’s other standout is Viktor Palmov, who both employed and subverted
the social realism of the early Soviet era by tamping down its heroic
political agenda in favor of stylized treatments of the figure, endowing
them with some of the folk mysticism and high color saturation that we now
associate with Chagall.

The Soviets initially tolerated the Ukrainian avant-garde but eventually
reversed course, sending a generation of free-thinking modernists into exile
or the gulag. Here’s the trail they left behind. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
Contact: knance@suntimes.com
LINK: http://www.suntimes.com/output/entertainment/cst-ftr-art27.html
———————————————————————————————–
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AUR#739 Jul 27 Pres Wants Any Coalition To Implement His Domestic & Foreign Policy; WTO; Poland; Romania; Finland; In The Public Interest;

=========================================================
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 739

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2006

Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up

——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. PRES YUSHCHENKO SAYS CONDITION FOR ANY COALITION
GOVERNMENT IS TO IMPLEMENT HIS ELECTION MANIFESTO OF
2004 AND PURSUE HIS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY
ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1618 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

2. “TIMELESS APPROACH TO WTO”
Ukraine parliament dragging feet on WTO-related legislation
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Olena Snezhko
Invest-Gazeta, Kiev, in Russian 25 Jul 06; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service. United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

3. THE ECONOMY UNDER A BROAD COALITION
OP-ED: By Valentin Zelenyuk
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 27 2006

4 . POLAND SAID WORKING ON NEW POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE
Gazeta Wyborcza website, Warsaw, in Polish 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

5. PRESENT AND PAST POLISH PRESIDENT LIKELY TO
JOIN EFFORTS ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1106 gmt 24 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Monday, July 24, 2006

6. FOURTH LARGEST UKRAINIAN SUGAR PRODUCER TO DEBUT
ON WARSAW STOCK EXCHANGE (WSE) IN THREE WEEKS
Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

7. ROMANIAN PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS NATO ISSUES, STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP DURING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
Romania is interested in what was happening in Ukraine because it
wants a democratic state at its borders. Romanian economy undergoes
unfair competition by Ukraine’s chemical industry selling cheap fertilizer
because it gets methane at a below market cost.
Rompres news agency, Bucharest, in English 1308 gmt 25 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

8 . FINLAND’S KEMIRA’S TIKKURILA COMPANY TAKES FULL
OWNERSHIP OF UKRAINE’S KOLORIT PAINTS
AFX Europe (Focus), Helsinki, Finland, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

9. EBRD TURNS FOCUS ON EASTERN BLOC
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is switching its
attention away from central Europe to Russia and central Asia, generating
massive infrastructure projects and opportunities in its wake. Peter O’Neill
assesses the risks and prizes in the, Lloyds List

Peter O’Neill, Lloyds List, London, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 21, 2006

10. GERMAN CO TO BUILD THIRD PLANT IN WESTERN UKRAINE
Building material manufacturer KNAUF builds in Borshev
Business Digest, Sofia, Bulgaria, Monday, July 24, 2006

11. FALL-OUT FROM UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE
By John Dizard, Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, July 26 2006

12. FAILURE OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION IS

A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY
COMMENTARY: By Anatol Lieven in the Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, July 25 2006

13. ORANGE REVOLUTION COMES FULL CIRCLE
By Natalia A. Feduschak in Kyiv, The Washington Times
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

14. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
OP-ED: By Walter Parchomenko
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 27 2006

15. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S AIDE IVAN VASYUNYK SAYS
PARLIAMENT RESORTING TO “BLACKMAIL”
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1559 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

16 . UKRAINIAN PRES HAS TILL 2 AUGUST TO DECIDE ON PM
TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1600 gmt 25 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tue, Jul 25, 2006

17. MINISTER LUTSENKO REGARDS AS POLITICAL MOVE BY
DONETSK PROSECUTORS TO CLOSE CASE OF FALSIFICATION
OF DOCUMENTS ERASING CRIMINAL RECORD OF YANUKOVYCH
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

18. “VOLODYMYR FESENKO: TYMOSHENKO WAS NOT FLEXIBLE
ENOUGH IN THE TALKS, AND SHE TRUSTED MOROZ TOO MUCH”
Dissolving Ukrainian parliament will only make things worse
INTERVIEW
: With analyst Volodymyr Fesenko
BY: Journalist Tetyana Pontik. Ukrayinska Pravda website,
Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 20 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 23, 2006

19. COMMENT ON JAMES SHERR COMMENTARY

Possibility the new Regions led coalition may reach a constitutional majority
Letter-To-The-Editor: by Tammy Lynch
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #739, Article 19
Washington, D.C., Thursday, July 27, 2006

20. A DAY AT THE MAIDAN AND AN EVENING AT THE RADA
COMMENTARY: By Stephen Velychenko

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #739, Article 20
Washington, D.C., Thursday, July 27, 2006


21. INTO THE VALLEY OF VINES…..CRIMEA
By Mark Smith, Guardian Saturday travel section
The Guardian, London, United Kingdom, Saturday July 22, 2006


22. THE SCIENCE-FICTION NOVEL THE SOVIETS FEARED
Passage that provides an eerie foreshadowing of Stalin’s politically
induced famine in Ukraine — millions died in 1932-33
By John J. Miller, The Wall Street Journal, New York, NY, Wed, July 26, 2006
========================================================
1
. PRES YUSHCHENKO SAYS CONDITION FOR ANY COALITION
GOVERNMENT IS TO IMPLEMENT HIS ELECTION MANIFESTO OF
2004 AND PURSUE HIS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

ICTV television, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1618 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

KIEV – Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has not ruled out that he will
dissolve parliament in his interview to major TV channels today. He insisted
that he won’t play a technical role and demanded that all security and
law-enforcement ministries and agencies be appointed by him rather than the
parliamentary coalition led by the pro-Russian Party of Regions.

The main condition for the coalition government and the prime minister is to
implement the president’s election manifesto of 2004 and pursue his domestic
and foreign policy, Yushchenko said. Yushchenko also demanded that
parliament nominate its quote of constitutional court judges and swear in
judges appointed by the president and the assembly of judges.

The following is an excerpt from Yushchenko’s news conference broadcast
by Ukrainian ICTV television on 26 July; subheadings have been inserted
editorially:

[Presenter] And now the main news of the day, the interview of Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko on his assessment of the current political
situation and plans of further actions. [Passage omitted: Yushchenko’s
introductory remarks]
TAKES TIME TO CONSIDER PREMIER’S CANDIDACY
[Yushchenko] I would like to make one general remark. It is very important
that we demonstrate patience and self-control in the process of forming a
government, security and law-enforcement ministries and agencies, that we do
not use pressure and – which is especially unpleasant – any ultimatums. Let
us respect the rights of the parties.

The president treated the processes happening in parliament for the last two
months with great patience. Moreover, I took part in some acts aimed at
normalizing the work of the Ukrainian parliament as soon as possible. I am
convinced that the 60 days that have passed have strengthened the philosophy
of Ukrainian parliamentarianism.

This is not only a minus, though of course the nation and the president have
been waiting for the answer and wanted that answer to be made much earlier
and in a more peaceful and compromise manner then it was reached. But I want
to emphasize that I respect parliament’s right to have special status and to
use its powers.

At the same time, I would like to stress that the president also has 15 days
envisaged by the constitution, during which he makes his decision. I would
like to emphasize once again that the president is not a mailbox that
automatically sends the answer on the same day to the same address. It is
evident that the authors of the constitution did not mean this by giving the
president the right to consider the candidate for prime minister for 15
days.

Obviously, the issue was about what course should be continued, what
relations between the president, the government and parliament should be,
what the procedure of appointing security and law-enforcement agencies is,
how a capable Constitutional Court is formed and many other things. It would
be very strange to give no answers to these obvious questions, although
there are legal issues that should be considered by lawyers at a certain
level, and there are many other things.

So, I proceed from the idea that the nation and parliament will get the
answer within the envisaged period. But I would ask the Ukrainian
parliament, especially certain political forces, not to create an illusion
of the possibility of pressure on the president regarding this decision.
NO USE OF FORCE
[Yushchenko] I would like to single out the topic which, in my view, should
not be raised either in parliament or outside it. These are various
scenarios involving use of force. I believe that one should not appeal to
the public and the mob now. One should not resort to disorder or find
comfort in the idea that they can do anything after the election. You can do
only one thing – observe the law.

When we talk about order or solving the current conflict, perhaps quite
naturally, we should emphasize and remember one thing – those who sow the
wind will yield a storm. I would not advise anyone to take the path of use
of force. I understand that this is a polemic, that this is an artificial
polemic, but I want to warn very seriously – it is not worth even discussing
this.

We should respect ourselves as politicians and look for answers that exist
rather than attempt to threaten that they won’t observe the constitution
again and please some sick minds.

[Olha Skotnykova, UT1 correspondent] First channel news, Olha Skotnykova.
Mr President, what is your assessment of the logic of events in parliament, in
particular statement by the speaker that parliament might not observe the
president’s decree on dissolution? What is your prediction as to what can
happen after that?

For instance if you issue the decree and parliament does not observe it and
continues sitting or appoints the prime minister on its own. What if this
scenario of legal nihilism come true? Thank you.
WARNS PARLIAMENT
[Yushchenko] Believe me, I would not like to pay too much attention to this
topic, but I stress that the decree will be fulfilled in accordance with the
constitution. And my decrees will be valid, legal and in line with the
letter and spirit of the Ukrainian constitution.

I have been and I am saying again that I will not allow anyone – starting
from myself – to break the Ukrainian constitution. It hurts that people who
were linked to writing the Ukrainian constitution today so easily begin to
comment on it in a dishonest way. To do this they should have formed the
Constitutional Court, which could assess the actions by the president and
parliament. This has not been done for smart reasons.

So, today we should look for understanding by sitting at the negotiation
table. It is better to come to an agreement than issue ultimatums. I will
not react to them. I am not interested in this because I, as the president,
have one goal – to ensure that the country’s political course, both domestic
and foreign, does not change.

Second, to protect the rights and freedoms with which not all of those who
now demand these actions from the president can be associated.

These are not empty words. I am convinced that today the Ukrainian nation
faces a test as never before. I understand that democracy does not take root
in a day. But I understand what price has been paid for freedom and
democracy in Ukraine to give it away so easily. I understand all the
difficulties of the Ukrainian parliament. I understand that it is split.

It is split naturally, when 8.3m people voted for one political force or
bloc and 8.6m people voted for another political force. I understand that 37
per cent of people support the coalition of the Party of Region, the
Communists and Socialists and 36.5 per cent do not support this coalition. I
understand even when 36 per cent support Our Ukraine’s integration into a
grand coalition and 36.5 per cent don’t.

So, one can feel that the nation has a stance. It is a complicated one.
Politicians cannot give a mathematical answer. Believe me, it is very
primitive to be guided by percentages. I am convinced that the challenge, a
test for Ukrainian politicians today, is how to show the nation the form of
understanding and consolidation which unfortunately did not happen during
the election. Those who will lead to a stand-off will lose.

Endless ultimatums are a weak response. Believe me, there is always a
counteraction to any action. The last thing I want is to appeal to voters or
Kiev residents, asking them to protect Ukraine’s democracy. I would not like
anyone in parliament to set the task of replacing the feeling of freedom,
independence and sovereignty with any other feelings. They won’t manage to
do this.

Ukraine is different. We have become more Ukrainian than two years ago. One
should not play with this. So, I would like very much that politicians don’t
redirect their responsibility to sit at the negotiation table and find a
compromise that would not have come to their minds two months ago. This is
the task for politicians.

I emphasize that to appeal to the public, to lead to a civil conflict and
look for an answer there, I think, is the ground for weak politicians.

CONDITIONS FOR PRIME MINISTER & COALITION GOVERNMENT
[Viktor Soroka, ICTV correspondent] Viktor Soroka, Fakty programme, ICTV.
Following this topic, both outside and inside parliament one people are
categorically calling on the president, as the head of state, to immediately
submit [to parliament] as candidate for prime minister Party of Regions
leader Viktor Yanukovych.

Others no less categorically, both in parliament and outside it, are calling
on you not to do this and immediately dissolve parliament. I understand that
there is possibly no definite answer, but what will the president’s position
be? And if he has to submit Yanukovych’s candidacy in accordance with the
constitution then on what condition, apart from guarantees of European
choice and adherence to human rights and freedoms? Thank you.

[Passage omitted: Yushchenko repeats he wants to take time to consider the
candidate for prime minister]

[Yushchenko] Point number two, which is no less fundamental for me, is what
policy the prime minister will carry out. I will not allow a situation when
a prime minister implements a policy of civil strife, a policy which leads
the Ukrainian nation in the direction opposite to sovereignty, a policy that
splits Ukraine’s lands and its territory, a policy that does not work for
consolidation.

Two years ago I ran for president and honestly won with a programme of
consolidation and democratic development of this country.

This is what my voters believed in. They are the same Ukrainians. By the
way, there were about 14m of them. so, when a discussion is going on now
whether to ignore or not this or that part of the Ukrainian policy, either
domestic or foreign, I think this discussion has no future. I will not play
a technical role in this country.

I will implement the policy with which I came to big politics as the
president. This is my declaration and my programme that was approved
by the majority of Ukrainian society.

Point three is that there are three scenarios now. [1] The first option – 60
days are over, but Ukraine has neither prime minister nor cabinet. And the
day when the president can dissolve parliament has come.

I would like to stress that all political contradictions in society can be
resolved in parliament in two ways – through an accord, or in other words,
through a coalition, or through dissolution and a search for a new
composition of parliament, trying to find an answer through a [new]
coalition of consent. I am not rejecting this scenario.

I just want to say that it could add unnecessary confrontation to society
and political forces. But this option can be considered as a response to
those who failed to resolve the burning issues during consultations.

[2] The second way is to form a coalition which could deal with any
challenges that have to do with the basics of Ukraine’s political course,
democracy and freedoms. I will not go into details whether it should be a
grand or not-so-grand coalition. The talks are under way. I am not a
participant in the talks. I am not a member of either team that is defending
its position.

I am the president. I am aware of the talks. I know that there is some
progress. But not enough progress for us to say today that a possible
coalition will be built based on these principles, a cabinet will be formed
based on these principles and this is what we think about the constitutional
court crisis and so on. These are the questions to which I am demanding
clear answers. Without them, neither coalition will make any progress.

I would like to note that the composition of a coalition, be it the existing
one or a grand coalition, depends on whether this or that political force is
granted access to government. Making declarations about democratic values,
irreversibility of domestic and foreign policy, basic freedoms is one thing.

But having mechanisms to implement and defend them is a different thing.
Being a part of the government is the guarantee of sticking to this course.
Passage omitted: repetition]

Under any coalition, I will demand that the law-enforcement block is not a
subject for discussion. The interior minister, the country’s defence
minister, the foreign minister, the prosecutor-general and the head of the
Security Service of Ukraine [SBU] should be appointed only by the president.
[Passage omitted: repetition]

[Yushchenko] I want to say that for me the formation of the Constitutional
Court is an extremely important condition. This is something the president
is never going to drop.

I perfectly understand that there are too many conditions and that it seems
easier to say no than to admit that for eight months they have being
misleading the nation, lying that the Constitutional Court cannot be formed,
and to say that the time of honest politicians has come. There should be a
Constitutional Court in this country if we are talking about the rule of
law, rights and freedoms. [Passage omitted: repetition]

Parliament is going to come up with its five [constitutional] judges which
is going to be a good test of democracy for them.

[Passage omitted: Yushchenko says coalition MPs want to nominate their
candidates only.]

It is understood that they have chosen the way of usurping the
Constitutional Court as they are ignoring the idea of equal representation
of parliament’s political forces [in the Constitutional Court]. Only one
political force will have a chance to nominate the candidates and approve
them. This is not honest politics.

This kind of politics is hard to understand as it is one-sided. And this is
exactly why it is going to be a good test of democracy which will show us
whether it makes sense to continue the coalition talks or to stop them.
[Passage omitted: repetition]
WANTS NEW CONSTITUTION
[Yushchenko] I think that the last [constitutional] reform added many
illogical things to the constitution of Ukraine. What we are witnessing now
is that new powers have been redivided among parliament, the president and
the cabinet. But there are no new laws which explain their format and their
use in practice. Whole sections of laws which regulate the general state of
affairs are missing. [Passage omitted: repetition]

We keep referring to the constitution, knowing full well that the
constitution cannot produce any answer. No answer. And politicians have to
find the will to find answers within the constitution.

I think that many misunderstandings stemmed from the recent changes [to the
constitution]. They have thrown this country into chaos when one branch of
power feels that certain constitutional powers have been lost, while the
other branch has not got all the necessary rules and regulations. Many
issues are still waiting to be resolved by constitutional means.

I believe that a consolidated stance of Ukraine’s democratic forces is the
way to resolve this kind of contradiction. These two or three forces should
sit down at the negotiating table and say that, in line with the
constitution, they are prepared to hold a public discussion of changes and
amendments to the constitution or to create a new text. The nation should
know that it is involved in the process. [Passage omitted: repetition]

I believe that only this kind of mutual understanding will bring harmony to
the relations among the branches of power. [Passage omitted: repetition]
————————————————————————————————-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
2. “TIMELESS APPROACH TO WTO”
Ukraine parliament dragging feet on WTO-related legislation

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Olena Snezhko
Invest-Gazeta, Kiev, in Russian 25 Jul 06; p 5
BBC Monitoring Service. United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

The Ukrainian parliament is dragging its feet on bringing legislation into
line with WTO requirements, Economics Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk has
said. It is therefore pointless to speculate on when Ukraine will be admitted
to the organization.

It is irrelevant whether Russia joins the WTO before or after Ukraine, a
Ukrainian newspaper has said. Much will depend on the majority in the new
parliament and the cabinet that will be formed on its basis.

The following is the text of the article by Olena Snezhko entitled “Timeless
approach to WTO” published in the Ukrainian weekly business newspaper
Invest-Gazeta on 25 July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

Ukraine and Russia are completely unable to complete entry to the World
Trade Organization. Whereas in the case of Russia the main obstacle is
negotiations with the USA, Ukraine’s chances may worsen over problems with
the passing of the necessary bills in parliament and the new composition of
the government that will include opponents of Ukrainian membership of that
organization.

For Ukraine the only remaining obstacle is Kyrgyzstan, which has raised a
demand to reduce import duties on agricultural goods. This caused
bewilderment in the Ukrainian government: Kyrgyzstan supplies its own
domestic market for these goods to only 40 per cent, and so liberalization
of conditions for exports to Ukraine is simply superfluous. All the more so,
in the framework of the free trade zone treaty there already exists a zero
rate for exports of goods from Kyrgyzstan.

In the words of Economics Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, if Ukraine makes
concessions and agrees to establish zero rates in the process of
negotiations on joining the WTO, it will have to take identical measures
with regard to other WTO members. This carries the threat of a review of
protocols already signed, including with the USA and the EU.

On the other hand, there has been progress in Kyrgyzstan’s consent to remove
from the negotiation framework the question of paying the Ukrainian debt of
27m dollars, whose existence is disputed by the Ukrainian side. However,
even despite the removal of this contentious issue, the situation regarding
negotiations between the two countries seems deadlocked.

In connection with this, the possibility has already been voiced of
insisting on the right of the majority in the working group for considering
Ukraine’s application.

“We are not rejecting the negotiating process with Kyrgyzstan,” Arseniy
Yatsenyuk says in a recent interview, “but it has to be exclusively
constructive. If it fails to have clear-cut signs of a constructive nature,
Ukraine will make use of its right to ask the majority in the WTO working
group to vote on the admission to the WTO without Kyrgyzstan.”

In that case, Ukraine can be accepted into the organization without signing
protocols with all the member countries.
NEED FOR COMPLIANT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Such an entry option requires the completion of bringing national
legislation into compliance with WTO standards. The prospects here are also
rather uncertain. The closer Ukraine gets to completing the negotiation part
of the integration process, the more obvious becomes the delaying by the
Supreme Council [parliament] of harmonization of legislation in accordance
with conditions of WTO agreements.

Although at the end of February this year, according to [outgoing Prime
Minister] Yuriy Yekhanurov, there were three or four laws remaining to be
passed for WTO entry, some of the bills are still “in the balance”. It is
precisely these bills that will be decisive for the time frame of
Ukraine’s accession to the WTO, if no way is found out of the existing
situation with Kyrgyzstan.

However, there is no question yet of time-frames for admission. This was
also said by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who stressed that it was bad practice to
promise WTO entry from year to year. Everything depends on how quickly
the package of laws sent to the deputies back at the beginning of the year is
passed. And once again the uncertainty factor surfaces, at the basis of
which is the functioning of parliament.

The sooner a stable majority forms, in whose composition and with which all
the deputies of the current convocation agree to work, the quicker the
relevant bills will be considered. Then it will be the quality of the
parliamentary coalition that will influence the date of Ukraine’s accession
to the organization.

But it is not only the composition of the majority that will play a decisive
role. “I am concerned by two elements,” said Ihor Burakovskyy, the director
of the Economic Research and Political Consultations Institute. [1] “First,
the WTO is not mentioned in the new coalition agreement, either because the
priority of entry is self-evident, or for other reasons.

[2] Second, according to my estimates, parliament has been renewed by about
60 per cent. This shows that many things, including the WTO, will have to be
explained to many people virtually from scratch, which is very arduous
purely from the technical point of view.

On the other hand, the question arises as to how pro-WTO the new government
will be. However, Mykola Azarov, when he was Ukrainian deputy prime
minister, was directly involved in the question of Ukraine joining the WTO,
and it cannot be said that he put a brake on the process.

There were other problems at that time, connected not with Azarov’s
personality, but with the general organization of the system of power. Of
course, regardless of the priority nature of membership, there is a risk of
traditional foot-dragging.”
NO COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA FOR FIRST ENTRY
When it is no longer a matter of the pluses and minuses of membership, and
its economic advantages have become obvious, Ukraine cannot afford further
delays to joining the WTO. But the reason for this is not at all the noisy
competition with Russia over who is to be first to join.

Yatsenyuk said that the Ukrainian government will only welcome the entry of
Russia into the WTO, since it will regulate the norms and rules by which
commercial relations are conducted between the countries.

Russia today is on the same path to the WTO as Ukraine. The signing of the
protocol between Russia and the USA that was expected during the G8 summit
in St Petersburg was postponed for an indefinite period because of a dispute
over the audit of the quality of meat products being supplied by the
Americans to the Russian market.

The head of the American delegation, Susan Schwab, named September as a
likely date, the minister of economic development and trade of the Russian
Federation, German Gref, named October, while the leader of the Russian
delegation, Maksim Medvedkov, declined to forecast a date at all. The
position was exacerbated by Georgia, which on that night announced that it
was recalling its signature to the protocol.

This position of Georgia may have extremely unpleasant consequences for
Russia, since dissatisfaction has already also been expressed by the EU, for
which the recall of Georgia’s signature may be a good precedent. In such
conditions, Russian membership of the WTO is expected in 2007-08.

From the viewpoint of people who consider that the Ukrainian economy will be
a big loser from overtaking Russia in the negotiation process, it can be
said that Ukraine has been a winner from the problems of Russian integration
into the WTO.

But in actual fact, as Ihor Burakovskyy said, “this question is exclusively
political and imposed by politicians. It has no basis. It is virtually
impossible to coordinate the process of integration of Russia and Ukraine
into the WTO, because every country works out individual conditions for
joining the WTO. We can coordinate general approaches and discuss some
things, as was done in simple forms.

But since every country has its specific features, principles and different
levels of interest (there is one level of interest regarding Ukraine and
another, for understandable reasons, regarding Russia), we need to speak
less about politics and more about strategy, techniques, negotiation tactics
and the need to adopt a list of agreed draft laws. Without this, whether
Russia joins or not, Ukraine will not be accepted into the WTO.”
————————————————————————————————
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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3. THE ECONOMY UNDER A BROAD COALITION

OP-ED: By Valentin Zelenyuk
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 27 2006

A lot of people are now wondering what will happen to Ukraine if the new
coalition comes to power. Despite being a strong supporter of the Orange
Revolution, I would strongly argue for the benefit of a broad coalition
involving the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine. As an economist, I will
focus on economic issues, but first a bit about politics.

I think any panic about a return to an authoritarian regime, as in Russia or
Belarus, and away from the EU is not justified at all, especially under a
broad coalition. In fact, I think the current composition of political
forces in Ukraine is in some sense ideal.

[1] First of all, Ukraine will still continue further democratization and
movement toward the EU and NATO because this policy is the prerogative
of the President and he is expected to be in power till at least 2009.
Helping to form this coalition, rather than going into opposition, would only
increase the President’s real power.

On the other hand, Ukraine needs a good economic relationship with Russia,
and the Prime Minister from the broad coalition is more likely to do this.

[2] Second, the economy should grow even faster because it would be in the
interest of both the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine.

[3] Third, if Our Ukraine forms a broad coalition with the Party of Regions,
the communists and those radical socialists close to the socialists would
have very little power to prevent further market reforms so desperately
needed by Ukraine.

[4] Finally, and this is important, Ukraine will have a great opposition
leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, who will raise the alarm in the event of
wrongdoing. I believe that such a composition is the best product that
Ukrainian democracy has had to date. And now, the economy.

Without doubt, the Orange Revolution helped Ukraine progress on the path of
democracy. However, one should be honest and acknowledge that the Orange
coalition failed not only to agree on politics, but on how to run the
economy. This is the biggest disappointment many people in Ukraine have,
regardless of their political sympathies. Let’s look at the facts.

Despite the great expectations of many, the rapid growth of 12.1 percent in
2004 was replaced by modest growth of 2.6 percent in 2005. The main reason
for this underperformance was the ‘shakeout of property rights’: not even
re-privatization per se, but the real threat of having re-privatization on a
mass scale, fueled by disagreements within the Orange coalition.

Only when the property rights shakeout was finally pacified, in September
2005, was private investment revived dramatically and Ukraine became much
more attractive for foreign investors. However, a lot of time and
opportunities were lost.

The great thing about a broad coalition is that it would not allow another
property rights shakeout, as neither the Party of Regions nor Our Ukraine
wants it. Some re-privatization, limited to a few strategic assets where any
violations of legislation proved unambiguous in court, would be desirable
(as Kryvorizhstal clearly illustrated).

Yet, time has been lost and the main forces in the new coalition are
unlikely to allow it. At least there would be no threat of another massive
revision of property rights, and this is the main reason for good economic
performance under the broad coalition.

Another advantage rooted in the fact that the interests of the Party of
Regions coincide with the interests of the majority of businesses, which is
very good at this stage in the economy’s revival. (GDP is currently just 65
percent of the 1990 level!).

Like it or not, the Party of Regions unites most business assets in Ukraine
now. Unlike a few years ago, some of their assets are now traded or will
soon be traded on local and international stock markets, and so their
leaders would want Ukraine to get better ratings, which would help their
stocks get higher valuations.

Better ratings are closely associated with economic and political
conditions. (In this respect, Ukraine is still doing poorly in terms of
business environment. In a recent World Bank survey called Doing
Business-2006, it was ranked 124 out of 155 countries. This is much worse
than most transitional and even developing countries, like Afghanistan,
which were higher in the rating!)

Therefore, the leaders of Party of Regions together with Our Ukraine,
behaving as rational economic agents, should be strongly inclined to carry
out the reforms necessary to improve economic and political conditions.

Could these reforms be made without a broad coalition? Ukrainians should
recall a lesson from the past – a package of pro-growth market reforms
failed to be adopted by parliament in 1996 and economic stagnation continued
till 1999!

Speaking realistically, the necessary economic reforms (land reform, tax and
pension reform, etc.) are practically feasible only under a broad
coalition – not when a few votes can sabotage a parliamentary decision on
critical issues.

Such sabotaging of the continuation of pro-market reforms would be very
likely under any narrow coalition, as the communists and the radical
socialists are likely to oppose such reforms, as past experience shows.

Finally, the improvement of economic conditions in Ukraine should determine
another benefit from a broad coalition – it will make Ukraine even more
attractive for foreign direct investments (FDI).

Before 2005 Ukraine had one of the lowest inflows of FDI per capita of all
transitional economies. Moreover, a major portion of all FDI inflows were
not from the West, but from the offshore zones (often with Ukrainian
origin). They were mostly from Cyprus and Russia, and so did not have the
same spillover effects as would have been the case with Western FDI brought
to successful transitional economies.

To sum up, with the broad coalition of Our Ukraine and Party of Regions,
Ukraine should be performing much better economically and politically than
under any shaky Orange or anti-crisis coalition. The hope is that the leader
of Our Ukraine will step over ambitions and emotions and form a broad
coalition with Party of Regions for the sake of prosperity for the whole of
Ukraine. -30-
—————————————————————————————————-
Valentin Zelenyuk is a Visiting Research Scholar at Kennan Institute at
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC,
USA, Senior Economist at Kyiv Economics Institute, visiting professor
of EERC at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Director of Ukrainian Productivity
and Efficiency Group (UPEG).
————————————————————————————————
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
4. POLAND SAID WORKING ON NEW POLICY TOWARDS UKRAINE

Gazeta Wyborcza website, Warsaw, in Polish 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

WARSAW – Will Poland change its strategy regarding Ukraine in the face of
the collapse of the orange camp? “We are prepared to help and act as an
intermediary, but we are not planning any new initiative within the next few
days,” Andrzej Krawczyk, President Lech Kaczynski’s foreign policy advisor,
tells Gazeta Wyborcza reporters.

No one knows whether President Viktor Yushchenko will dissolve parliament as
Yuliya Tymoshenko would like him to, or whether he will share power with the
pro-Russian blue camp that won the elections last March. “We are waiting for
the situation to stabilize,” Krawczyk adds.

What the presidential aide calls caution is deemed as helplessness and a
waste of time by the opposition. Politicians of the Civic Platform [PO] and
the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] say that Poland fell silent on Ukraine at
a time everyone expected us to be active. People who shaped Polish foreign
policy until recently tell us that Washington wanted to see Warsaw involved
in saving the orange camp.

“The Americans expected someone from Poland would intervene and call Kiev.
No call was made because the current president does not have the kind of
contacts that his predecessor had in Ukraine,” says an associate of former
prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz.

President Kaczynski’s people explain that under the new circumstances it was
impossible to apply the scenario of [former president] Kwasniewski’s
mediations and the Ukrainian round table. “Stronger involvement on Poland’s
part could be seen as meddling with internal affairs. After all, the last
elections were not rigged,” says MEP Konrad Szymanski of Law and Justice
[PiS].

Observers of the Ukrainian political scene also do not see how Warsaw could
have got more involved in the conflict after Yushchenko dismissed Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko last September. The situation in Ukraine continues
to fluctuate. Old alliances fall apart and new ones are forged.

It is even difficult to say who is a greater enemy for Yushchenko:
Tymoshenko, the princess of the orange revolution, or his main revolutionary
rival Viktor Yanukovych. One thing is certain: for nearly one year now no
one – not even Warsaw – could have succeeded in bringing members of the
warring orange camp to sit at one table.

Sources close to the president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate
that Poland will shortly change its strategy in the face of the political
changes taking place in Kiev. There will be few contacts at the government
level. Efforts will focus on the development of a civic society and
democratic institutions.

Contacts between NGOs and youth organizations will intensify. “We will start
with sending prominent advisors,” a source close to the president tells us.
What kind of advice does Poland have to offer? “On the introduction of
public procurement procedures, and the establishment of a civil service and
other modern state structures,” we hear.

Not all experts associated with the current administration agree with such a
strategy. One source who had huge influence on Polish foreign policy until
recently tells Gazeta Wyborcza reporters that “we should do everything we
can to persuade the blue camp to follow the path of the orange camp.” This
cannot be achieved by maintaining limited contacts, says our interlocutor.

It has to be said, however, that Poland will not be seen as a welcome
partner in Ukraine at present. Leonid Kozhara, former diplomat and deputy of
the Party of Regions who will now have a huge influence on Ukrainian foreign
policy, tells Gazeta Wyborcza reporters that the consent to have Poland act
as an intermediary in Kiev’s contacts with Washington and Brussels was a
mistake that the Ukrainians must not repeat.

Experts in Kiev claim that attempts at persuading the blue camp to change
colour are unrealistic. For Yanukovych’s people the very word “orange” is
synonymous with danger and hostile plotting. This does not mean we do not
have any chances, however.

When Yanukovych was prime minister under former president Leonid Kuchma,
he showed a very high interest in Poland. He sought to develop economic ties
with us. Warsaw will remain an interesting partner for Yanukovych if it
presents Kiev with attractive economic projects. A specific and financially
backed plan for taking joint advantage of the Odessa-Brody pipeline could be
one of them. -30-
————————————————————————————————
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========================================================
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5. PRESENT AND PAST POLISH PRESIDENT LIKELY TO

JOIN EFFORTS ON RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE
PAP news agency, Warsaw, in English 1106 gmt 24 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Monday, July 24, 2006
WARSAW – President Lech Kaczynski and former President Aleksander
Kwasniewski are to jointly deal with Poland’s foreign policy, Dziennik
disclosed on Monday [24 July]. This unexpected cooperation will cover
Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The former president has just been appointed chairman of the International
Centre for Prospective Studies in Kiev, while the incumbent president has
clearly suggested he would be willing to use Kwasniewski’s experience.

Andrzej Krawczyk, minister at the Presidential Chancellery assured Dziennik
that if President Kwasniewski addresses President Kaczynski with a
cooperation proposal on Polish-Ukrainian matters it will be considered “very
seriously and with good-will”. Also politicians of the Left were positive on

the initiative.

The cooperation proposal will probably be forwarded soon because

Kwasniewski is very keen on Poland playing an important mediation role in
Kiev in relations with the EU. He also wants to make the Kiev-based centre
a world renowned scientific institute, Dziennik wrote. -30-
————————————————————————————————

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
6. FOURTH LARGEST UKRAINIAN SUGAR PRODUCER TO DEBUT
ON WARSAW STOCK EXCHANCE (WSE) IN THREE WEEKS

Polish News Bulletin, Warsaw, Poland, Thursday, Jul 27, 2006

WARSAW – The fourth-biggest Ukrainian sugar producer, Astarta is preparing
to strengthen its position on the domestic market. In order to gather the
necessary financial means, it will conduct a share issue on the WSE. The IPO
will be carried out by ING Securities.

The company is to go public on 11 August and investors can already subscribe
for its shares. According to ING Securities director Andrzej Olszewsk, the
maximum number of new shares issued may reach 6.7m, with up to 7.6m shares
offered in total. The share price will range from ZL19 to ZL27, which means
that Astarta could earn from ZL127m to ZL180m on the operation.

“Our aim is to consolidate the fragmented Ukrainian sugar market. At
present, five leading sugar producers control only 30 percent of the
market,” says the Ukrainian enterprise’s CEO Wiktor Iwanczyk. By 2010,
Astarta plans to increase its market share from 3.2 percent to 10 percent.
————————————————————————————————
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
7. ROMANIAN PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS NATO ISSUES, STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP DURING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

Romania is interested in what was happening in Ukraine because it
wants a democratic state at its borders. Romanian economy undergoes
unfair competition by Ukraine’s chemical industry selling cheap fertilizer
because it gets methane at a below market cost

Rompres news agency, Bucharest, in English 1308 gmt 25 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

BUCHAREST – Romania’s President Traian Basescu said that his visit due
to the United States soon “becomes an annual visit and it will be repeated
within the Romanian-US partnership and it is not a spectacular one”.

Romania’s president said in an interview with daily Evenimentul Zilei, on
Tuesday 25 July, that his official visit to Washington would implicitly have
a working nature through the key-topics on its agenda including the
cooperation within NATO, issues related to the modernization and increase
in the technical and intervention capacity of the Romanian troops in the
operations theatres and the development of the strategic partnership.

Likewise, on this occasion they will hold talks on the economic cooperation
and trade exchanges, the US investments in Romania being given pride of
place.

“We would like to see US investments also in industries such as automotive
industry and aeronautics no matter if in IAR Ghimbav [central Romania], in
Romaero or the airplanes works in Craiova [southern Romania],” President
Basescu stressed.

President Basescu pointed out in context that his visit to Washington was
the second he had paid there since he had been in office and he would visit
Berlin in autumn for the second time. The recent visit to Paris as well was
the second this year, Basescu added.

Referring to his meeting with President Bush, President Basescu emphasized
the fact that the Black Sea issue had been integrated into the discussions
on Europe’s energy security. “It looks like Romania’s interests overlap
those of the US, which is not true. Romania’s interests only limitedly
coincide with those of the US,” President Basescu explained.

He also showed that Romania was interested in what was happening in Ukraine
because it wanted a democratic state at its borders or in what was going on
in Georgia, Moldova or the Caspian area. “We’d like the Caspian crude to be
able to get out of the area by different ways from those on the existing
routes supervised by one single state,” Romania’s president said.

In his opinion, the Romanian economy undergoes an unfair competition by
Ukraine’s chemical industry that, benefiting from much cheaper methane,
sells fertilizers on the international markets much cheaper than Romania,
which buys methane at the market price.

President Basescu will pay an official visit to the United States, on 26-28
July, at the invitation of his US counterpart George W Bush. The visit is
part of the political dialogue between Romania and the United States.

The visit’s agenda schedules the meeting with President George W Bush
followed by a news conference in the Oval Office and the dinner the US
President offers in honour of President Basescu, the members of the
Romanian official delegation attending.

The visit’s agenda also schedules an appointment with Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and several appointments with the US House
of Representative’s Speaker Dennis Hastert and US Congressmen at the
Capitolium and a meeting with the heads of parliament friendship groups with
Romania and a working dinner with the US Senate’s leaders, and some
officials of several NGOs interested in the regional strategy.

The visit’s targets also include the discussion of aspects of the
consolidation of the bilateral strategic relation between the US and Romania
as NATO allies in the struggle against terrorism as well as in the common
interest in the promotion of international and regional security and
stability. -30-

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8. FINLAND’S KEMIRA’S TIKKURILA COMPANY TAKES FULL
OWNERSHIP OF UKRAINE’S KOLORIT PAINTS

AFX Europe (Focus), Helsinki, Finland, Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

HELSINKI (AFX) – Kemira OY said its paints and coatings unit Tikkurila has
increased its stake in Ukrainian-based company Kolorit Paints to 100 pct.

The Finnish paints company acquired the remaining 49 pct that it did not own
from Ukraine’s LGU for an undisclosed sum.

Tikkurila bought a 51 pct stake in the company in Aug 2004. Kolorit’s name
will be changed to TOB Tikkurila. -30-
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fiplan1.afxnews.com ~ azer.sawiris@afxnews.com afs/wj
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9. EBRD TURNS FOCUS ON EASTERN BLOC
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is switching its
attention away from central Europe to Russia and central Asia, generating
massive infrastructure projects and opportunities in its wake. Peter O’Neill
aasesses the risks and prizes in the, Lloyds List


Peter O’Neill, Lloyds List, London, United Kingdom, Friday, Jul 21, 2006

THE European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is currently known
as the Bank which likes to say DA particularly when it comes to infrastructure.

Contracts for new projects are free-flowing across the old Eastern bloc and
the EBRD plans to be the catalyst for even more. Old and new ports and
airports, rail and pipeline networks, hydro and nuclear power stations and
their transmission links, city district heating, gold mines and minerals,
raw materials and consumer goods’ transport by new roads, sea, rail and
air… the list is extensive and costly, which is where the bank comes in.

Uneasy political and commercial truces are in place across much of the
region, but these can untangle very fast, particularly where a country is
run with overdependence on one man at the top. This is not just about
insurance and export credit risk, but potentially major financial disasters
which could hammer a foreign operator’s global budget strategy.

The presence of the EBRD is effectively a stabilising force amid a turbulent
political and financial climate. Ports and regional and hub airports in
particular are set to directly benefit from the five-year strategy, approved
at the recent EBRD annual general meeting in London.

There will be around 4bn of EBRD money per annum for all sectors in these
regions. EBRD leverage normally produces another 60% of further money from
government and private sector finance. Over five years, that should produce
a total of around 64bn.

The bank also says better own profits mean it will ‘accept higher country or
financial risk as well as taking on more participating in equity’.

The European Investment Bank, other multilateral lending bodies and
parastatal money from the likes of the Kuwait Investment Office, could all
add to the pile.

EBRD president Jean Lemierre told Lloyd’s List that its operational
countries who are now in the EU were ready to ‘graduate’ and most would be
out of EBRD lending by 2010.

Up to 40% of EBRD investment is envisaged for Russia, where there is stiff
local competition for emerging projects. The Russians are using their recent
oil and gas profits to strike up deals with old comrades in central Asia and
Ukraine on steel, power and oil and gas. The central Asians are talking to
China, Japan and Turkey, not simply multinationals in the EU and US.

Many have questioned why the Russians need help, with so much Kremlin
petrogas money around. Had bankers forgotten how much western money
and effort went down a big black hole as the Russians went into financial
freefall?

Mr Lemierre’s answer is that Russia’s regions still need major assistance.
The EBRD encourages countries to pursue public private partnerships (PPP),
adding ‘we are having a good discussion on this with Russia. There is
potential to finance ports, airports and bridges’.

He says Russia needs ‘to tap the market [so it] can use the money and the
skills of the private sector. This is absolutely crucial, otherwise there
will be bottlenecks in Russian growth and that would cause a serious
problem.’

Russia, however, is not the only controversy on the banks agenda. At the
recent AGM, Romanian interests made it clear that they were unhappy about
the high cost of PPP for governments compared with high profits made by
investors. They are aware that similar projects in the UK are under
criticism. Mr Lemierre freely admits that the region had a lot to learn
about managing PPP.

Foreign investors and big, foreign, operational companies complain of long
legal delays over disputed tenders, disinterested and blocking bureaucrats,
delays in clearances and corruption pressures. Accusations about state
agencies backtracking on agreed rates of return which were changed after
operators and investors had been hooked, have also been levelled at the
bank.

But for all these complaints the bank’s presence in the region does appear
to have had a positive impact. On offer is the promise of infrastructure on
a massive scale.

In Bulgaria, the airport privatisation process is well under way for the
Black Sea coastal airports of Varna and Burgas. The port strategy links show
that nodes developed with foreign partners are definitely in.

Burgas, with one of the Balkans’ biggest air cargo centres, is a major
transit hub for sea, rail and road (route E87). They boast there is cheaper
fuel from the Balkan’s largest refinery nearby (10km). The concession winner
for both airports will have to put up a total of 130m and the EBRD will put
in around 50m. Other Bulgarian airports in the government’s concession
strategy are Plovdiv, Rousse, Gorna Oryahovitsa and Targovishte.

In Georgia, progress at Batumi port has been impressive, but in addition,
tenders are to be called to effectively privatise K’ut’aisi airport in
north-central Georgia. ‘Ultra-modern’ upgrades of the airports of Batumi
airport and the capital Tbilisi should be finished by the year end. There
are negotiations with the US and other countries for Tbilisi to be used as a
transit point.

Azerbaijan has a major national transport development plan in place courtesy
of the EBRD and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which may now be another
source for collaborative funding. Last year the ADB said the state-owned
Caspian Shipping ‘monopolises sea transport and operates independently’.

The government is planning a major expansion of the port’s operations,
including the addition of large oil tankers. The Baku International Port is
an autonomous entity responsible for the operation, maintenance, and
development of four major terminals.The ministry of transport, the ADB
added, says that ‘the port needs communications, navigational, and
search-and-rescue facilities’.

In Kyrgyzstan, where they are working closely with China to modernise the
railway system, the EBRD is also working hard. Gold mining deposits and all
mineral mining is being ‘developed on basis of open tenders’. The bank is
hoping mining will be the engine that pulls the republic forward in reforms.

In turn, EBRD officials said the bank was ready to support gas pipeline or
energy projects under a concession structure. Kyrgyzstan has five million
people.

Everyone, including the Kyrgyzi, are still looking over their shoulders at
Russia. Speaking at the AGM, the Kyrgyzi representatives said: ‘We have
discussed our debts with Russia in the energy sector and we hope by autumn
the government will have implemented measures to make our energy sector more
attractive to investors and we are talking with companies about finance and
concessions.

‘We would also like to attract big investors from our neighbours,’ they
added, in a clear signal to the Chinese representatives.

In Tajikistan, meanwhile, the government is also keen to play the transit
role and delegates told Lloyd’s List there would there be more air passenger
and cargo traffic for Dushanbe before the end of the year. They hope
Dushanbe airport, with its Ganci military base, will become a transit point
between Asia and Europe.

India is two hours away, China one hour and London four hours. By next year
they plan to reduce air cargo rates, which are about four times road rates,
they said. The 13,800ft runway can handle the world’s heaviest freighters.

In Turkmenistan, the government plan for 2005-2020 envisages investing up to
$63bn in all sectors, of which $25bn will be foreign direct investment.

Better logistics are needed to cope with strong production and planned
increases in cotton, ready-made textiles and grain exports.
This country of only five million will also need to tap into all modes of
international shipping to cope with production from a range of new
fertilizer and chemical plants (150,000 tonnes per annum increase).

They are developing a new industry to produce 45,000 tonnes of paper per
annum. All this will be helped by new road and rail, such as the
Ashgabat-Karakums highway (650km) and the 550km Ashgabat-Turkmenbasy
port highway. There will be 1100km of new railway, including to Kazakhstan
along the shore of the Caspian. All this is aimed at uniting the oil and gas
fields into a single network.

While the clearly impressive array of projects under way point towards a
successful strategy on the part of the bank and its government partners, the
$64bn question is whether in the long term such investments will prove to be
a stabilising force.

Addressing the bank’s AGM, Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz, offered
some cautionary thoughts on the matter.

He said most of the privatisations had been more or less inflicted on the
transition countries in a botched experiment. They had done little good for
the general population except let them watch asset-stripping unfold,
acquired, he added, in quasi-legal or clearly criminal ways.

‘If you got $1bn-$2bn in assets through illegal privatisation, you’d fear
the next government in power would take it back so the best thing to do is
not to reinvest in the country but to take it out as fast as you can.’

By moving assets to western countries, he said, oligarchs enjoyed the best
of two worlds: ‘They had property rights protected abroad and weak rule of
law at home.’ -30-
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10. GERMAN CO TO BUILD THIRD PLANT IN WESTERN UKRAINE
Building material manufacturer KNAUF builds in Borshev

Business Digest, Sofia, Bulgaria, Monday, July 24, 2006

Delo German building materials manufacturer KNAUF will set up its third
Ukrainian plant in Borshev, western Ternopil region, the company CEO for
Ukraine, Oleksandr Gavrish, said. The availability of raw materials in the
town of Borshev was the main reason to choose it as the location for the new
plant, Gavrish added.

He said that the practice of importing gypsum from Moldova is no longer
feasible and the company would pursue a policy of setting up plants where
raw materials are available. KNAUF poured a total of 70 mln euro ($88.4 mln)
in ore mining in western Ukraine this year, the CEO said. The company’s two
other plants in Ukraine are located in the capital Kyiv and in the town of
Soledar, eastern Donetsk region.

According to Pyotr Aizman, the president of a local construction materials
association, KNAUF followed the current trend among construction materials
manufacturers to relocate their units from the capital to other regions, and
especially, to those in western Ukraine. The German manufacturer also owns
a sand quarry in Borshev.

Setting up such a plant costs 2.5 mln euro ($3.2 mln) to 3.0 mln euro ($3.8
mln), while return on the investment is registered in about five years,
local analytical company Pro-consulting, says. Yet, the capacity of the new
plant will increase KNAUF’s market share to 30 pct from 20 pct, forecasts
Valentin Simonov, director of a recently established construction materials
company.

KNAUF ( www.knauf.com) specialises in the production of preformed parts,
do-it-yourself (DIY) materials, facades, insulated and other building
materials. The company also has divisions for mechanical engineering,
logistics and interior construction. (Alternative name: Kiev, Ternopol)
http://www.delo.ua . -30-
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11. FALL-OUT FROM UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE

By John Dizard, Financial Times, London, UK, Wed, July 26 2006

The political crisis in Ukraine that broke up the pro-European and American
Orange Coalition is having profound knock-on effects in energy and,
ultimately, the securities markets.

The most immediate effect is that Europe now has few attractive alternatives
to ensure secure access to natural gas. On the present course, this is
leading to an undeclared bidding war between European importers and their
US rivals for relatively scarce supplies of liquefied natural gas.

Already, the lead times for LNG liquefaction plants in supplier countries
have lengthened from 36 months to more than four years. The impact on gas
prices of the scramble for supplies could be felt this winter, the season of
heavy demand in the northern hemisphere.

Among the prospective casualties are the US firms that are building LNG
import facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts, as well as gas-fired
utilities and industries that are counting on their supplies.

The US facilities are in a weaker position than competing facilities in
Europe and Asia. Customers, of US facilities, electric and gas utilities,
must pass price increases to end users through frequently recalcitrant state
regulatory agencies, whereas the Europeans and Asians do not.

That means that European LNG project financings will find it easier to
attract capital. It also means that the gas pipeline business is becoming
less attractive than the LNG industry. These days, ease in switching
suppliers is worth a premium.

However, Europe will become more dependent on gas from less stable regions,
such as the Gulf or Nigeria. That will lead to more price volatility – good
news for growing LNG trading operations, but not for industrial users or
households.

Under the Western model for building and operating gas pipelines, you are
paid a good, but not excessive, regulated return for acting as a common
carrier. Russia explicitly rejects that model; it sees pipelines as an
instrument of its political power.

Russia and its allies in Ukraine resolved January’s crisis over the cutbacks
of gas at the Ukraine border by in effect giving the state-controlled
Gazprom control over the Ukrainian pipelines and a huge storage system near
the border with Europe.

The Russian company’s control over Ukrainian pipelines also cuts off one of
the alternative routes for new pipelines between the giant Central Asian gas
reserves and Europe. January’s dispute was less over the price of Russian
gas imports, since these are largely paid for by transit fees, than over
Ukraine’s access to Russian pipelines to import Turkmen gas.

Under the European model, this access could not have been denied. Ukraine
has signed the European protocol on energy transit, and the Orange prime
ministerial candidate, Yulia Timoshenko, had said her government would
follow its requirements. Ukraine’s willingness to implement the transit
protocol under a non-Orange government is questionable.

Furthermore, by leaving control over Ukraine’s internal oil and gas
production with the local oligarchic structure, the country’s ability to
reduce its dependence on Russian, and Russia-transited, gas imports, is
negligible. That increases the risk to European supplies.

Western oil and gas people who have operated in Ukraine believe the
dependence could be reduced under a different legal regime. As one says:
“Ukraine has very significant reserves of gas. Timoshenko told us two months
ago she would open up production sharing agreements and joint venture access
to these fields. That would have brought in the western oil companies.”

Central European countries that might have joined European ventures to build
pipelines on southern, non-Russian routes are now doing deals directly with
Russia. “If they won’t defend their own interests, we certainly can’t count
on them to defend ours,” says one senior official.

An LNG project director of a European energy company says: “There is now
significant activity to secure new supplies of LNG. Europeans did not think
that this was an imminent issue, but now they realise that it is.”

The US authorities have been busy licensing new LNG import facilities. Few
of those facilities have tied up long-term supplies. Furthermore, the
long-term contracts that are in place have penalty prices for non-delivery
that can easily be outbid by European and Asian importers, particularly in
high-demand seasons.

With European national companies on the way to over-procuring their own LNG
requirements as a hedge, the rush for LNG could create a new division among
the allies.

Among the companies whose prospects could be most directly affected is
Cheniere Energy (LNG) whose primary business is the construction of three
offshore LNG terminals on the Gulf Coast. But given the growing dependence
of the US on LNG imports, the nation’s energy companies, utilities, and
industrial consumers of natural gas are at greater risk due to the events in
Ukraine. -30-
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12. FAILURE OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION IS

A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY

COMMENTARY: By Anatol Lieven in the Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, July 25 2006

When, in 2004, the Orange “revolution” in Ukraine against a rigged
presidential election seemed to put that country on the path to join the
west, it was top news in the US media and the stuff of countless emotional
commentaries. Many of them focused on the iniquity of Russia, which had
backed the existing Ukrainian regime.

Since then, the events of 2004 have proved to be no revolution at all, in
the sense of a fundamental change in the Ukrainian state. The Orange
coalition split, economic growth declined drastically, reform stagnated and,
in free and fair parliamentary elections in March this year, the pro-Russian
grouping led by the ousted candidate of 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, emerged
as the largest party.

After months of political chaos, including hooliganism by both sides in the
Ukrainian parliament, Mr Yanukovych will now probably lead a coalition
government under the presidency of his rival, Viktor Yushchenko.

These developments, however, have been barely reported by most of the US
media, let alone commented on. This silence marks a response to ideological
and geopolitical embarrassment of which the old Soviet media might have been
proud. It also misses an opportunity to conduct a searching public debate on
US and western strategy in the former Soviet Union.

For developments in and concerning Ukraine have contradicted an important
assumption on which US and, to a lesser extent, European strategies have
been based. They have demonstrated that the processes which the west has
encouraged in central Europe and the Baltic states cannot be extended
seamlessly to the former Soviet Union.

Societies, economies and national identities and affinities are very
different; links to Russia are closer; and both the US and the EU are weaker
than appeared to be the case a few years ago.

The failure of the Orange “revolution” is, in many ways, a great pity for
Ukraine. Irrespective of whether Ukraine can join western institutions,
westernising reform is a good thing in itself and should be pursued. But the
latest developments have also saved Ukraine, Europe and, indeed, the US
from a great danger.

That danger was the prospect of early Nato enlargement to Ukraine, which
until a few weeks ago was being pushed by powerful forces in Washington.
This strategy is dead for the foreseeable future and we urgently need to
develop an alternative one.

The danger from Nato expansion was threefold: the certainty of Russian
retaliation; the opposition of a large majority of Ukrainians, especially in
the Russian-speaking east and south; and the fact that Nato membership was
not going to be backed up by membership of the European Union, thereby
anchoring that country in the west.

At a conference on Ukraine in Rome in June, the majority of EU officials and
west European diplomats declared EU membership for Ukraine to be an
impossibility. Several expressed profound scepticism that even enhanced
partnership would amount to anything serious.

The reason was Ukraine’s lack of development, but equally important was
the revolt of west European electorates against further EU enlargement and
its costs to the west European taxpayer.

This in turn reflects the faltering west European economic growth of recent
years. The engine of EU enlargement, which did most of the heavy lifting
when it came to bringing the former communist states into the west, is close
to the limits of its strength.

We may regret these new circumstances, but we should also treat them as an
opportunity for new thought. We have tended to treat as truly legitimate and
democratic only those Ukrainian politicians who lead their country away from
Russia – whether their electorate wants it or not.

The divided affinities of Ukrainians are not a problem for us to solve, but
a deeply rooted historical and democratic reality. The west and Russia
should agree to avoid inflaming one or other Ukrainian grouping so far that
it will risk violent clashes and regional destabilisation.

For Russia, this means not intervening in Ukraine’s democratic process. For
the west, it means not trying to draw Ukraine into an anti-Russian alliance.
Neither side should try to claim exclusive economic influence.

If we are sensible, the result will be a Ukraine that is free, independent,
neutral, open to international investment and economically tied to both
Russia and the west. By all the standards of Ukrainian history, that would
be a wonderful fate. -30-
————————————————————————————————
The writer is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation. His
next book, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World,
co-authored with John Hulsman, is to be published by Pantheon in September
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/6c5fa0a8-1b7a-11db-b164-0000779e2340.html
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13. ORANGE REVOLUTION COMES FULL CIRCLE

By Natalia A. Feduschak in Kyiv, The Washington Times
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

KIEV — In a stunning turn of events, the political forces that were ousted
from power in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution are poised to make a vengeful
comeback. And at their helm will be Viktor Yanukovych, a man who suffered a
humiliating defeat, and who may be days away from returning to his former
job as prime minister.

“The situation is so complex that you won’t make sense without a half liter”
of vodka, former Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski said during a recent
conference in Yalta in summing up the situation in Ukraine today.

Just three weeks ago, the country appeared to be headed toward a period of
political stability, following hotly contested parliamentary elections in
March.

The three parties that backed the Orange Revolution and collectively won the
most seats in parliament finally signed a coalition agreement after months
of negotiations. The new government was expected to give President Viktor
Yushchenko a chance to move forward with reforms, particularly in
integrating Ukraine into the European Union and NATO.

More importantly, the public was expected to have a three-year respite from
a string of national and local elections, which had overly politicized the
country.

Then, in a shocking development, just days after signing the agreement,
Oleksandr Moroz, the Socialist Party leader, defected from the coalition on
July 6. Instead, he formed a new coalition with Mr. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian
Regions Party and the Communists.

The new grouping voted in Mr. Moroz as parliament speaker, a powerful post
following recent constitutional changes. They also chose Mr. Yanukovych as
their candidate for prime minister.

Mr. Moroz’s defection has not only changed parliament’s balance of power,
but has put Ukraine’s Western orientation in doubt and pushed the country
into its worst political crisis since 2004.

“The people are tired,” Mr. Yushchenko said in his regular radio address
last week, commenting on developments. “Society is unhappy with such a
development in parliament. Responsible for the social apathy today are all
national deputies and in particular, political leaders.”

Under new constitutional changes, Mr. Yushchenko is now left with two
unsavory choices: dissolve parliament and call new elections, or forward the
nomination of Mr. Yanukovych to the legislature and allow the man who is his
political opponent to form a government.

The president has until Tuesday to decide. On Friday, he canceled a trip to
Moscow for a meeting of ex-Soviet states, citing “political situation” back
home.

If he decides not to disband parliament, under the complex new
constitutional changes, Mr. Yushchenko has until Aug. 5 to decide whether to
forward Mr. Yanukovych’s nomination to lawmakers.

As Mr. Yushchenko mulls over his choices, observers point out that leaders
of the Orange coalition and the president himself are not without blame in
the current situation.

For nearly three months, the Orange coalition haggled over government
posts, critics say. Many of the arguments centered on whether Yulia
Tymoshenko, the firebrand politician who has had a turbulent relationship
with the president, would again become prime minister.

Mr. Yushchenko had fired her from the job last year because of infighting
with his own political allies, who were also jockeying for high-powered
positions. What job would go to Mr. Moroz, who previously had been
parliament speaker, did not appear to be a priority.

During this period, parliament’s work ground to a standstill. That prompted
negative reaction from the public, which had high hopes for the new
legislature. Instead of promised reforms, the public saw rising costs for
energy and consumer goods.

Mr. Yushchenko’s initial hands-off approach during the political
negotiations also cost him public support. In hoping to appear above the
fray, Mr. Yushchenko increasingly looked like a weak leader.

“At the macro level, he has been a visionary rather than a strategist,”
James Sherr of the Conflict Studies Research Center of Britain’s Defense
Academy wrote recently. “At the micro level, he has been an arbitrator
rather than an arbiter and a conciliator rather than a tactician. Since his
inauguration in January 2005, he has frequently lost sight of the enemy and
the country.”

Mr. Yanukovych and his party, on the other hand, have orchestrated an
impressive comeback. An American public relations firm has been hired to
boost their images. Until recently, Mr. Yanukovych has remained in the
background, letting other party members do the talking.

The party has also tapped into the public’s discontent and blamed
parliament’s standstill on the leaders of the Orange Revolution. They have
aggressively questioned Ukraine’s readiness to join the EU and NATO — both
priorities for Mr. Yushchenko.

Mr. Yanukovych’s party also has played the Russia card. Party leaders argue
that relations between the two countries need to be strengthened and Russian
must become an official language along with Ukrainian, because of the
country’s large ethnic Russian minority.

The strategy seems to be paying off. A recent opinion poll conducted by
Kiev’s prestigious Razumkov Center showed that if presidential elections
were held today, Mr. Yanukovych would win 31.3 percent of the vote, while
Mrs. Tymoshenko would earn 19.6 percent. Only 8.4 percent of those polled
said they would vote for Mr. Yushchenko.

Mr. Yushchenko, a former central bank chief, served as prime minister under
pro-Russian President Leonid Kuchma until he led protests against the
authoritarian president in 2001. He contested the 2004 presidential election
as the opposition candidate against Mr. Yanukovych, who was backed by Mr.
Kuchma and Russia. In the vote seen by observers as riddled with fraud, Mr.
Yanukovych was declared winner. The resulting Orange Revolution protests led
to a runoff win by Mr. Yushchenko.

The political capital earned in the revolution was soon lost in political
wrangling between Mr. Yushchenko and Mrs. Tymoshenko and corruption charges.
The two leaders parted ways last year until they were forced to come back
together to stop the ascent of the pro-Russian party.

In the March elections, Mr. Yanukovych’s Regions Party became the largest
bloc in the 450-seat parliament, winning 186 seats, or 32 percent, but not
enough to establish a stable government. The party was followed by the
Tymoshenko bloc in the second place with 129 seats (22 percent) and Mr.
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party in the third with 81 seats (14 percent). The
Socialists and Communists came in the fourth and fifth places with 33 and 21
seats, respectively.

Initially Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc formed a coalition with
support from the Socialists and with Mrs. Tymoshenko as the prime minister.
That plan was upset by Mr. Moroz’s defection.

In a sign of the times, Our Ukraine last week announced it was going into
the opposition, following similar statements by Mrs. Tymoshenko. Mrs.
Tymoshenko, however, is demanding the president dissolve the legislature and
call new elections to keep the pro-Russian majority from gaining power.

Mrs. Tymoshenko vowed Thursday that she and her deputies would stay away
from parliament until Tuesday in an effort to pressure the president to
dissolve parliament.

Mr. Yanukovych, for his part, met with Mr. Yushchenko Thursday, ostensibly
to discuss the political situation and to promote his candidacy. He said
there was no talk of dissolution and that he and the president shared many
similar positions.

The Ukrainians, meanwhile, apparently are in no mood for another cycle of
elections and political horse trading. A July 10-14 poll by the
International Institute of Sociology and the Center for Political Research
in Kiev found 54 percent of Ukrainians are opposed to a dissolution of
parliament, Agence France-Presse reported. -30-
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14. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

OP-ED: By Walter Parchomenko
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 27 2006

They say miracles can happen. They also say old habits dies hard.

Today in Ukraine, it seems like it will take no less than a miracle for the
splintered democratic forces ever to unite and form another Orange
coalition in the parliament, following the coalition’s collapse on July 6,
after existing just two days.

The personal ambitions of Orange leaders, and their disillusionment over
compromises made and opportunities lost, continue to pull them apart, and
with them the hopes and dreams of millions of Ukrainians who stood bravely
behind them during the perilous days of the Orange Revolution.

Have these democratic forces reached a dead end with no chance whatsoever of
reuniting and realizing the democratic ideals of the Orange Revolution? Not
necessarily so.

Today, Viktor Yushchenko still has a very rare, third opportunity to revive
the Orange Revolution. The first opportunity was on the Maidan (Independence
Square), when countless citizens rose up to protest blatant falsification of
the presidential election and call for an end to the corrupt and repressive
practices of former President Leonid Kuchma.

The second chance was the recent formation of an Orange coalition in
parliament, which was considered a sure thing, but quickly collapsed due to
strong opposition within the democratic coalition to the president’s nominee
for parliamentary speaker, the very confrontational Petro Poroshenko.

The essential scenario for a rare, third opportunity to unite Ukraine’s
democratic forces and possibly form a majority in the parliament is not one
that the president’s advisors are likely to bring to his attention, given
their decided lack of any strategic orientation in domestic politics. It
includes a critical assumption and several key steps.

The scenario presumes that Yushchenko acts boldly and decides to disband
parliament on or after July 25, in accord with the Constitution and calls
for a new election as prescribed by law. The president’s Our Ukraine bloc,
together with Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc provide compelling reasons to justify
the decision.

Moreover, in disbanding parliament, the president rejects the argument,
prevailing among Ukraine’s political pundits, that his political bloc and
the democratic forces, in general, can only lose public support in a rerun
of the parliamentary election as specious.

The scenario then develops in the following manner:

Step 1: Yushchenko breaks away from the dead-end group thinking of his

very ambitious tiny circle of “best and brightest advisors” who have little to
show in domestic politics during the past 18 months other than the awkward
defeat of the president’s Our Ukraine bloc in last March’s parliamentary
election and the steadily eroding public support for the president and his
bloc ever since then.

The president also demonstrates uncommon boldness, decisiveness, and
initiative and takes the first step toward a genuine, heartfelt
reconciliation with Yulia Tymoshenko, her bloc and other democratic forces.
Of course, Tymoshenko is ready, willing and able to reconcile and support
the president’s initiative.

Both leaders are drawn together by the disturbing defeat of the new
democratic coalition in parliament and the resulting great political
uncertainty facing the country.

Step 2: In a lengthy, emotional televised conference, Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko join forces on the eve of the election campaign. In separate
statements, each opens their heart to the nation and in a repenting,
confessional manner admits past mistakes, sharp personal differences, and
vows to work shoulder to shoulder for the public good and victory of the
democratic forces in the election, in particular.

The televised conference is a historic moment and a shot of adrenalin for a
nation with frayed nerves and suffering from political exhaustion. The
international community, disappointed by the recent collapse of the Orange
coalition, watches the event mesmerized and approvingly. Knowledge of this
fact arouses Ukrainian pride in this historic event to an even greater
extent.

Step 3: Yushchenko and Tymoshenko do not drop the ball. They continue to
show the public they are a genuine, democratic team that will continue to
work in tandem well beyond the election.

They take full advantage of the media to get their message across to the
nation: the fate of democracy in Ukraine is in great peril today and there
is a very real danger that Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions will
encourage widespread corruption in politics and business as they did under
President Kuchma, now that they are back in power.

Yushchenko takes the lead in informing, cultivating and harnessing public
opinion in support of this message. During the past 18 months, he failed to
do this in any systematic fashion. This grave error contributed, in no small
measure, to the public’s eroding faith in his presidency and the democratic
coalition, in general.

A dramatic, genuine reunion of the president and Tymoshenko could
dramatically change the calculus of Ukrainian politics. It is conceivable
that it could even give the democratic forces enough votes to topple
political kingpin Viktor Yanukovych and his party.

Yushchenko has nothing to lose and everything to gain in implementing this
scenario. Public confidence in the president has been eroding steadily for
months and is at an all-time low, according to recent Ukrainian polls.

If the proposed reunion with Tymoshenko is genuine and not lukewarm or
theatrical in any sense, he can reverse this very negative trend line, while
advancing the cause of democratic forces in the country.

After all, Ukrainians are a very forgiving, tolerant and sentimental people
who find little comfort in the death of the Orange Revolution, a seminal
event in their country’s rich history and a source of great pride.

Is the above scenario, given Ukraine’s current political realities,
unrealistic? Indeed, but it is not impossible. Nor would it take a miracle
to accomplish. However, it would take something nearly as rare; namely,
political courage.

But is political courage even possible in politics? In 1955, a then junior
Senator from the state of Massachusetts named John F. Kennedy wrote

about it in his Pulitzer Prize-winning classic “Profiles in Courage.”

In it, the freshman Senator illustrated how eight of his historical
Senatorial colleagues, men such as John Quincy Adams, instead of focusing
on their careers, stood alone against tremendous political and social
pressure and demonstrated astounding integrity – a quality that the great
American novelist, Ernest Hemingway, called “grace under fire.”

The crucial question is: can Yushchenko find the political courage to form a
genuine union with Yulia Tymoshenko, his former Orange ally and current
political rival, who has made his blood boil on so many occasions? To do so,
some old habits will have to die.

He will have to become a president with a firm hand, one who does not sit
passively on the political sidelines debating incessantly whether or not to
intervene in a crisis while Rome is burning. One who accepts responsibility
for policy failures instead of playing blame-game politics.

One who does not speak in platitudes or hide behind smooth-talking, arrogant
advisors but, rather, is able to look the people in the eye and address them
on television during a national crisis. One who in the heat of a crisis can
set aside personal political ambitions and partisan politics and do what is
best for the public interest.

But if President Yushchenko can find the political courage, then one thing
is certain. Ukraine will have a very rare, third chance to salvage the
October Revolution, to unite democratic forces and possibly return them to
parliament as a majority; and Ukrainians will for generations to come, no
doubt, thank him for putting the country, once again, on sure footing in its
march toward democracy and Europe. -30-
————————————————————————————————-
Walter Parchomenko, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council of
the United States currently based in Ukraine. The views expressed in this
article are purely his own.
————————————————————————————————-
LINK: http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/24860/
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15. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT’S AIDE IVAN VASYUNYK SAYS
PARLIAMENT RESORTING TO “BLACKMAIL”

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1559 gmt 26 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 26, 2006

KIEV – The presidential secretariat views the position of the parliamentary
coalition regarding the president nominating a candidate for prime minister
as blackmail, first deputy head of the secretariat Ivan Vasyunyk has said.

He told a news conference today that in countries with a developed
democracy, before presenting a candidate for premier to the president for
confirmation, the coalition would “hold preliminary consultations with the
president on the acceptability of and room for compromise in the cabinet’s
programme and so on”.

“Unfortunately, the newly formed anti-crisis coalition has decided to talk
to the president using faits acomplis, and this is the same as blackmail.
[They say] we’ve taken a decision, let the institution of the president
decide. This is a deadend, it’s a road to nowhere,” Vasyunyk said.

He also said that the president was worried that the situation in parliament
“is creating a threat to Ukraine’s young democracy, as well as to
parliamentarianism”. “Unfortunately, in this situation of a parliamentary
crisis, the president can’t be guaranteed and, consequently, can’t give
these guarantees to the Ukrainian people, that the coalition will carry out
and implement the state’s domestic and foreign policy course,” Vasyunyk
said.

“When a parliamentary crisis arises in civilized countries, it’s the
president’s duty to dissolve parliament. But our opponents claim that
they’ll refuse, that the president doesn’t have the right,” he said.

Vasyunyk said that the secretariat calls on parliament to be balanced and
calm. “There’s no need to get agitated and there’s no need to resort to
blackmail. The president is sure that all procedural issues and all
political issues will find their resolution as a result of dialogue,” he
said. -30-

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16. UKRAINIAN PRES HAS TILL 2 AUGUST TO DECIDE ON PM

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1600 gmt 25 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Tue, Jul 25, 2006

KIEV – The president [Viktor Yushchenko] has still not decided whether to
dissolve parliament and is hoping for a compromise with MPs, Yushchenko’s
legal adviser, Mykola Poludyonny, has said. He said that if Viktor
Yushchenko decides to hold an early election, he will hold consultations
with representatives of factions in parliament.

As for the candidate for prime minister, the president’s lawyers say he
still has until 2 August to consider it. The advisers describe the possible
appointment of the head of government by parliament without the president’s
nomination as illegitimate, and say it may even fall under an article of the
Criminal Code.

[Ihor Koliushko, captioned as presidential legal adviser] If the president
adopts a decision in line with Article 90 [of the constitution] on the early
dissolution of the Supreme Council [parliament], it will immediately lose
its authority to make any decision.

[Poludyonnyy] He hopes that the tense situation will move towards a
constructive one. If this does not happen, it is probably worth expecting
that the president will make use of the right we are talking about [to
dissolve parliament].

[The 60-day deadline from the opening of parliament for forming a new
government, after which Article 90 appears to give the president the right
to dissolve parliament, elapsed at midnight on 24 July. First deputy
parliament speaker Adam Martynyuk said that parliament will appoint the
prime minister on its own unless the president resubmits the majority’s
nominee, Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych – see Interfax-Ukraine
news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1131 gmt 24 Jul 06.] -30-
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17. MINISTER LUTSENKO REGARDS AS POLITICAL MOVE BY
DONETSK PROSECUTORS TO CLOSE CASE OF FALSIFICATION
OF DOCUMENTS ERASING CRIMINAL RECORD OF YANUKOVYCH

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 24, 2006

KIEV – Acting Interior Minister Yurii Lutsenko describes as a political move
by Donetsk prosecutors the closure of a case on falsification of court
verdicts erasing the criminal record of Party of Regions leader Viktor
Yanukovych. Yurii Lutsenko presented his estimation of the closure of the
case live on the Fifth TV channel.

“I regard it as a wrong decision…This was an obvious political
demonstration of loyalty to the man who wants to become the prime minister,”
Lutsenko said. He said there existed at least five facts indicating that the
case on erasing the criminal record of Yanukovych was falsified
.
In particular, he referred to findings of criminal experts that confirmed
that the case was falsified. “[This is] obvious work so that he (Yanukovych)
could submit to Yuschenko his biography without several years of his hard
early years,” Lutsenko said.

Lutsenko admitted however that he could not change anything as an official
in the development of the events, as the prosecution is the last instance.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the Donetsk regional prosecutor’s office
has closed a case on the falsification of documents on erasing the criminal
record of Yanukovych.

In February, the Donetsk regional prosecutor’s office resumed a case on
possible falsifications in erasing the criminal record of Party of Regions
leader Viktor Yanukovych. -30-
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18. “VOLODYMYR FESENKO: TYMOSHENKO WAS NOT FLEXIBLE
ENOUGH IN THE TALKS, AND SHE TRUSTED MOROZ TOO MUCH”
Dissolving Ukrainian parliament will only make things worse

INTERVIEW: With analyst Volodymyr Fesenko
BY: Journalist Tetyana Pontik. Ukrayinska Pravda website,
Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 20 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Sunday, Jul 23, 2006

Dissolving the Ukrainian parliament will not benefit either President Viktor
Yushchenko or the country as a whole, analyst Volodymyr Fesenko has said.
In an interview with a web site, he said this will only worsen the ongoing
political crisis and take Ukraine to the brink of disintegration.

As a possible way out of the situation, Fesenko proposed nominating a prime
minister who is not affiliated with the new majority in parliament (led by
the Party of Regions) or the failed Orange coalition.

Although the Party of Regions is widely seen as a pro-Russian force, many of
its key members are interested in developing trade with the West and in a
review of earlier gas accords with Russia, Fesenko said.

The following is an excerpt from Fesenko’s interview with journalist Tetyana
Montik entitled “Volodymyr Fesenko: ‘Tymoshenko was not flexible enough in
the talks, and she trusted Moroz too much'”, published on the Ukrayinska
Pravda website on 20 July; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

[Montik] Recently they have been calling Socialist Party leader Oleksandr
Moroz more and more often the Ukrainian Judas. Do you think there is a grain
of truth in this comparison?

[Fesenko] I would use a milder term in this case – “the ghost of the Kaniv
Four [an alliance in the 1990s, which involved Moroz, but whose decisions he
refused to honour] come back to life”. The idea of an alliance between the
Socialist Party and the Party of Regions [led by defeated 2004 presidential
election candidate Viktor Yanukovych] arose long before 6 July.

At first a section of the Socialist Party faction was in favour of a
coalition with the Regions, immediately after the elections, although at the
time Moroz and especially [then first secretary of the Socialist Party’s
political council Yosyp] Vinskyy were categorically opposed to such an
alliance.

Moroz’s denial of any claims to the speaker’s job within the framework of a
democratic coalition [consisting of key parties behind the Orange
Revolution: the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, propresidential Our Ukraine and the
Socialists] created the preconditions for the Socialist Party’s enticement
towards the Party of Regions.

The Socialists’ public opposition to electing [key Our Ukraine figure Petro]
Poroshenko as speaker was basically an ideological screen and a pretext for
a split with the “Orange team” and for aligning with the Party of Regions.

[Montik] What led Moroz to enter into an alliance with the “anti-crisis
coalition” [consisting of the Party of Regions, the Socialists and the
Communists]?
[Fesenko] The main reason for what happened was, in my view, very simple:
Moroz was very keen on becoming parliament speaker as this was his last
chance to make a real name for himself. This was his political swan song and
everything else took second place. [Passage omitted: Moroz described as a
master of political intrigue, accused of provoking current crisis]
PARLIAMENT’S DISSOLUTION WILL NOT END CRISIS
[Montik] What is the danger behind parliament’s dissolution and new
elections to the Supreme Council [parliament]? And to what extent is it
really to the “Orange team’s” benefit?

[Fesenko] First of all, these elections will not solve the main problem
today and parliament will remain split. The two antagonists – the Party of
Regions and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc – will still dominate. I have even
made out my own gloomy little formula: “The Party of Regions plus the Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc equals war.” What is more, this will be a war in society and
a war in parliament. Second, moderate politicians may be removed from
parliament, only to be replaced by radicals.

For example, instead of Moroz, with all his moral and ethical problems, we
could have [radical Progressive Socialist Party leader Nataliya] Vitrenko,
which would make the situation in parliament even more tense.

The political split will deepen, both during and after the elections. And
arguably the most serious problem is that any attempt to dissolve parliament
and declare early elections could lead to a political crisis, because the
leaders of parliament and the new coalition may not accept such a decision.

On the other hand, the election campaign itself and the results of the
elections may again aggravate a political split. And this may no longer be
just a question of a lack of trust in a potential prime minister, but in the
incumbent president, too.

Statements are being heard in the corridors of the Regional camp that if
[President Viktor] Yushchenko does not nominate [Viktor] Yanukovych for
prime minister and provokes the dissolution of the Supreme Council, then the
president may face a vote of no confidence in local councils, and there
would be a real danger of a split in the country.

If the Supreme Council is dissolved, the Party of Regions is threatening to
demand a snap presidential election simultaneously with early parliamentary
elections. There are no legal grounds for this, but there are historical
precedents. In 1993-94 [former Ukrainian President Leonid] Kravchuk, under
pressure from the Supreme Council, was forced to hold early presidential
elections. In other words, a parliamentary crisis in the event of the
dissolution of the Supreme Council threatens to develop into a general
political crisis.

[Montik] How likely is the Supreme Council to be dissolved?
[Fesenko] It is possible, in both theory and practice. However, when we
speak about a coalition process, we should take into account the
differences, a solution to which is not prescribed in the constitution or in
parliament’s regulations.

For example, there is no precedent for a situation where a coalition has
already been created, but has not been able to form a government, and there
it ceased to exist, but a second coalition starts to form its own government
after its predecessor has exhausted the one-month limit.

What do you do about time limits? Recalculate another month to form a new
coalition? Officially, yes, but then what about the 60 days set aside to
form a government?

Here you get a conflict of legalities, and the coalition is playing on them.
And it is quite possible that the president, in making his decision, will
refer to these. Only each side will allude to those norms of the
constitution and standing orders which suit it.

The legal grounds for dissolving the Supreme Council will come into play
after 24 July, when the 60 days allocated for the forming of a government
will have expired. And then the problem will be not so much a legal one as a
political one: will the president decide to hold early elections or not?
EARLY ELECTIONS WON’T HELP YUSHCHENKO
[Montik] What do you think Yushchenko will do?
[Fesenko] Bearing in mind the arguments we have already mentioned,
dissolving parliament will not be to the president’s advantage. Yushchenko
is aware of the risks of such a decision and so he will try to find a way
out of the crisis without having to call early elections. Basically, he has
a choice of several evils.

But there is only one solution, and that is a compromise with the Party of
Regions. It is just a question of the price and the conditions of such a
compromise. Of course, Yushchenko may use his old habit of dragging out a
solution to the problem, taking advantage of the fact that the constitution
allows the president up to 15 days to present a prime minister-designate to
parliament.

It is possible that the head of state will try to appeal to the
Constitutional Court regarding the many legal conflicts connected with the
coalition process and thus prod the Supreme Council into unblocking the work
of the Constitutional Court.

However, the tactic of prolonging a decision will lead to an even bigger
strategic defeat for the president. Sooner or later he will either have to
come to an agreement with the Regions or provoke extraordinary parliamentary
elections. But the later this is done, the weaker the president’s positions
will be.

[Montik] During all the long coalition talks, has Yushchenko shown himself
to be a weak politician?
[Fesenko] Let’s say he has demonstrated a lack of a firm and consistent
position. He hasn’t revealed an awareness of his own interests: what does he
actually want? [Passage omitted: repetition]

[Montik] Does Yushchenko have good advisers?
[Fesenko] Yushchenko’s problem is not that he doesn’t have enough advisers.
The problem is he has plenty, but no mechanism for working out a single
position. He is inclined to delegate powers, which is what he did when he
was prime minister. Then most cabinet decisions were taken in government
committees headed by the deputy prime ministers.

As a comparison, Tymoshenko [who was also a prime minister] abolished the
institution of government committees and categorically refused to
re-establish it because she is inclined towards a centralized model of
administration. Yushchenko, on the other hand, is drawn towards
decentralization and is not looking to take immediate control over the work
of his apparatus. That was how he operated during the election campaign.

It looks like that is the model of management he is sticking to now. But
during a crisis the political process is so complex that the president must
keep it permanently under control and he must have his own point of view.
Yushchenko’s nature is such that he often waits for a problem to sort itself
out, and if it doesn’t then he makes radical decisions at the last moment.

However, the situation now is so acute that he shouldn’t delay and he should
be making quick decisions. We can see from the current parliamentary crisis
that there are various legal interpretations and various positions in Our
Ukraine and, by all accounts, in the presidential secretariat.

And Yushchenko frequently wavers between different positions without
choosing a clear platform for himself. That is precisely why he is losing
tactically.
UKRAINE NEEDS A STRONGER LEADER
[Montik] Why has confidence in Yushchenko taken a tumble? Why is he
considered a weak president?
[Fesenko] That is a fairly widely held point of view, although in actual
fact Yushchenko is a rather mellow president, a president of compromise. But
society demands a strong leader, and therefore there is a demand for a
strong and a tough authoritarian-type prime minister – a Yuliya Tymoshenko
or a Yanukovych.

However, the problem is that neither one nor the other is acceptable to the
whole country. In Yushchenko’s words, neither will bring the country
together. And this serious problem – the candidate for prime minister – is
not helping to get us out of the parliamentary crisis in a constructive way.

In my view, the best way out of this situation would be to put forward a
nonaligned candidate for the post of prime minister. This may not conform to
the logic of constitutional reform and party elections, but it may help to
find a way out of the crisis without pain. But this option, by all accounts,
does not suit the Party of Regions.

[Montik] If you compare the two potential coalitions, which of them do you
think is the stronger – the anti-crisis coalition or the Orange one?
[Fesenko] Either type of coalition would be unstable and potentially risky.
Mainly because they have no experience of coalition and there is a very high
level of mistrust of one another. They are all afraid of the same thing: who
will be first to double-cross the other?

There have been differences in both coalitions, and they were most vividly
expressed between Our Ukraine and the Socialists – over NATO, language,
economic policy, land reform and privatization, for example.
NEW PARLIAMENT COALITION STABLE, FLEXIBLE
There are also potential differences among the anti-crisis coalition. [Key
Party of Regions figure Yevhen] Kushnaryov, for example, said back in April
that for the Party of Regions the least acceptable coalition option was an
alliance with the left, because it would be difficult to conduct an
effective economic policy with them.

A coalition with the Communists and the Socialists is good for the Party of
Regions as a way of coming to power. But to implement this power they need
Our Ukraine, because they have no serious differences with them over the
economy. It will be easier to reach agreement with them because both have
business representatives and people experienced in running the state.

The anti-crisis coalition looks more stable because it has a clearly
dominant leader which has cemented this alliance, and that is the Party of
Regions. This coalition also has a solid material base and a, figuratively
speaking, strong Donetsk management, i.e. with a democratic wrapping – a
tough, authoritarian style of management and a strong centralized base in
the Party of Regions which strengthens this coalition.

The Socialists and the Communists are the younger allies of the Regions, and
they are well aware of this. And what is very important – the Regions behave
in a very flexible and effective way. Whereas in the democratic coalition
people argued over every trifle, among the anti-crisis team there is not
even a hint of that: you want Moroz as speaker, fine, we’ll give the
Communists the post of first deputy speaker.

Although the Party of Regions is the strongest faction, it is prepared to
share posts even in government. But the key positions in the cabinet are
still, of course, with the Party of Regions. They are behaving very flexibly
and strictly in line with the letter of the constitution and [parliamentary]
procedure, which cannot, unfortunately, be said of the representatives of
the Orange coalition. We remember the discussion about the rights of a
parliamentary opposition.

[Passage omitted: Party of Regions had more effective coalition policy]

[Montik] Who is currently dictating the conditions in talks between the
Party of Regions and Our Ukraine?
[Fesenko] The position of the Party of Regions is stronger. When there were
talks between the Regions and Our Ukraine in June, the Regions even agreed
to [Our Ukraine’s Yuriy] Yekhanurov being prime minister.

They got the majority of the chief posts in the economy, above all control
over the fuel and energy sector, but they were prepared to give the
premiership to Yekhanurov.

Now the situation is different. They are insisting on Yanukovych for prime
minister and are prepared to share some posts with Our Ukraine, but this is
more like compensation to ease the bitter taste of Our Ukraine’s defeat.
Party of Regions’ strategy

[Montik] Why is the Party of Regions aiming for an alliance with Our
Ukraine?
[Fesenko] The point is, it is very important for them to come to an
agreement with the president and with Our Ukraine.

[1] First, because of its relations with Europe, the Party of Regions needs
Our Ukraine to “whiten” its image before Europe. And the Party of Regions
wants to get into Europe and to appear to be more “civilized”.

[2] Second, Yushchenko is still head of state who controls the
power-wielding structures, and the Regions are well aware of this. Then they
need Our Ukraine as a counterweight in relations with the left. Therefore the
Party of Regions is being quite flexible.

But for the president and Our Ukraine, the situation is complex. By coming
to an agreement with the Party of Regions they want to avoid a political
crisis, to prevent this country from splitting, to maintain the foreign
policy course and, finally, ensure certain strategic compromises in the
economy.

But even a tactical compromise with the Party of Regions is fraught with
serious risks for the president and Our Ukraine, particularly for their
political reputation. Most of the “Orange electorate” will not understand or
accept such a compromise.
GAS CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA
[Montik] If you take the gas question, is Yanukovych as Ukraine’s prime
minister really a panacea against a gas conflict with Russia?
[Fesenko] In this case you should look at two things. First, the Party of
Regions and Yanukovych himself have both criticized the gas agreements of 4
January.

And later, when Russia voiced its surprise at Tymoshenko’s requests to
review these agreements, Yanukovych said that we would not review them, in
other words he did a U-turn. But, on the other hand, preliminary agreements
with Gazprom were in place by now that the price of gas would not be
increased for the second half-year.

And the Party of Regions is clearly hoping that it will be able to keep the
prices at the current level or avoid a sharp gas price increase. But I think
they realize that an increase in the gas price cannot be avoided in the long
term.

The Party of Regions has its own economic interest in the gas problem,
because big business in the Regions is linked with the steel and chemical
industries, and these are industries which are suffering most of all from
the increase in the gas price. Therefore for them this question is crucial
and vital, and they will be giving it prime importance.

The problem is how they will resolve it – by making geopolitical concessions
to Russia or concessions over the control over the gas transport system.

[Montik] So, if the Party of Regions comes to power, the idea of a
gas-transport consortium between Russia and Ukraine may be revived?
[Fesenko] That’s quite possible. In the soft option, running the pipeline
could be a joint venture – preserving Ukraine’s rights of ownership, and in
the tougher option -privatizing the gas transport system and selling half
the shares to [Russia’s] Gazprom.
MOSCOW’S ROLE IN UKRAINIAN CRISIS
[Montik] Quite a lot has been said recently about Moscow having played by
no means the last part in this parliamentary crisis. Is there a grain of truth
in this, do you think?
[Fesenko] Undoubtedly. First, Russia could have played its part in the
collapse of the Orange coalition. The Socialist Party has long had good
contacts with Moscow, including with the Kremlin, through a number of
faction members. They say that Moroz himself has had meetings with [Russian
President Vladimir] Putin.

Rumours are going around the political corridors about a call to Moroz from
the Kremlin the day before these well-known events. Therefore, Moscow’s
influence could have been one of the reasons why the Socialists suddenly
reviewed their coalition sympathies.

Second, there are influential Russian politicians who have been cooperating
with the Party of Regions for ages. They could have lobbied through the
leadership of the Regions this centre-left coalition format.

It is no secret that Russia has been saying for a long time that a coalition
between the Regions and the leftist parties is the most acceptable option
from the point of view of Russia’s interests. They even thought of a name
for it in Moscow – “the coalition of the colours of the Russian flag
[white-blue-red]”.

[Montik] What was the main mistake of the “Orange team” in the coalition
talks? Was it the position of Tymoshenko who firmly insisted on her prime
minister’s portfolio?
[Fesenko] They all made mistakes. All the participants in the coalition
process in the Orange format made mistakes – the president, Tymoshenko,
Moroz and Our Ukraine. The absence of a clear position hampered Our Ukraine
and the president. They spent a long time deciding with whom it would be
better to come to an arrangement with, the Party of Regions or the Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc. And it was the idiosyncratic attitude towards Tymoshenko
which hampered them.

But Tymoshenko had another problem. She didn’t just want to be prime
minister, she wanted to weaken the position of the president and Our Ukraine
as much as possible, sometimes even to the extent of public humiliation.

[Passage omitted: Poroshenko wanted to restore his political reputation by
allying with Tymoshenko, Our Ukraine erred in dragging out coalition
process]
TENSION MAY LEAD TO DISINTEGRATION
[Montik] Tymoshenko is threatening a second revolution. Does Ukraine have
the stomach for another revolution?
[Fesenko] There is no revolution situation at the moment and so one can only
speak about a new Maydan [Independence Square in Kiev, the focal point of
the Orange Revolution] in terms of political theory.

In 2004 we saw the Maydan as a massive civilian protest, but now all we see
are multicoloured “party mini-Maydans”. People can be assembled, but better
to pay them.

Some people will come as a call of the heart, but in the main the people who
come to rally and “demonstrate in the tents” will be party activists who
will be brought in from the regions, and often for some kind of material
reward. And both Yuliya [Tymoshenko] and the Party of Regions will use this
technique. But it is hardly likely to work.

The social atmosphere has changed. The “revolution of raised expectations”
has turned into “counter-revolutionary disillusionment”.
Instead of a revolution, there may be the heightening of a confrontation and
an escalation of political and emotional tension with fatal consequences for
the country. Unlike 2004, a split in the country will no longer be a risk,
but a real threat.

[Montik] Russia has long been saying that one should prepare for such a
split.
[Fesenko] Yes, yes. And, unfortunately, in the Regions there are supporters
of such radical approaches. They do not dominate in the party and their
business wing is against the implementation of such a scenario, but there
are radicals there, and they are being sustained by certain political
circles in Russia.

Therefore, such a scenario could become a reality. Besides, sad though it
may seem, Yuliya Tymoshenko may help this scenario to come true by her
own radical actions. For her the main thing is victory, at any price.
But there can be no absolute victory in the present conditions, that is also
a fact.

Therefore the realization of an all-out confrontation scenario may again
split Ukraine and revive the kind of split that happened in 2004, but
already in new conditions where the opposing forces will have an
organizational-political base in the form of the local self-administration
bodies they control, which could become the institutional basis of this
split.
YANUKOVYCH AND NATO, EU ACCESSION
[Montik] If Yanukovych becomes prime minister, do you think Ukraine will
need to forget about its plans to join NATO and the EU?
[Fesenko] I would not dramatize the Yanukovych factor. Moreover, if the
situation had been calmer, and not so tense as it is now, then one could
have predicted that if he was appointed premier, Yanukovych would make a
number of pro-Western moves and statements just for show.

By the way, this was precisely the strategy that had been planned in the
event of Yanukovych’s victory at the presidential elections. Something
similar could happen this time. Besides, the business wing of the Party of
Regions is in favour of European integration, because they need it
economically and they will support this process.

For Yanukovych and his party the NATO issue is not the main one or the basic
one. Economic questions are the priority ones. That is why the main risks
may be connected with the revival of the Single Economic Space project [an
economic union of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, which is strongly
favoured by Moscow].

In terms of European integration, this is a more sensitive subject, since it
is scarcely possible to combine participation in the Single Economic Space
customs union with European integration.

As far as NATO is concerned, a soft option of “neutralizing the problem” is
likely: a public rejection of the rapid-entry strategy whilst maintaining
contacts and cooperation with the alliance.

The course towards Euro-Atlantic integration is being maintained, but in
restricted and moderate forms. The question of joining NATO is being
postponed and will be examined only through a nationwide referendum and at
some indeterminate future date, i.e. it is not a problem of today or
tomorrow.

This is what could happen in relation to NATO and the EU if Yanukovych gets
in. Nor should one forget that the management of foreign policy is within
the president’s remit. Whoever becomes foreign minister could be of crucial
importance for Ukraine’s foreign policy.

[Montik] Why then is Yanukovych now a stumbling block? What is his problem
right now?
[Fesenko] The appointment of Yanukovych as prime minister is symbolic
revenge. That is precisely how Yushchenko’s supporters, especially in
western Ukraine, interpret it. And for them a Yanukovych premiership is a
political and a moral insult.

Yushchenko realizes this very well. In western Ukraine they are already
calling for people not to recognize Yanukovych as prime minister. Yushchenko
also fears a possible political conflict on this and negative consequences
for his own political reputation. That is why he is trying all he can to
persuade the Party of Regions to withdraw the nomination of Yanukovych for
prime minister. -30-

———————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
19. COMMENT ON JAMES SHERR COMMENTARY

Possibility the new Regions led coalition may reach a constitutional majority
Letter-To-The-Editor: by Tammy Lynch
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #739, Article 19
Washington, D.C., Thursday, July 27, 2006

RE: James Sherr commentary, “The School of Defeat”

Action Ukraine Report (AUR), #738, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

Thank you, once again, to James Sherr for his impressive analysis on the
struggle for Ukraine’s government. As usual, it made me consider a few
things I hadn’t earlier.

One thing did occur to me while reading, however. I seems to me that the
debate over whether to have a new election must include the possibility
that, if things remain as they are, the Party of Regions-led coalition may
reach a constitutional majority.

If, as the leaders of Our Ukraine and BYUT fear, large numbers of their
members defect — you could see Regions 186 + Socialists 29 + OU 40 +

BYUT 40 = 295. Then, you have 21 Communists to spare, for a possible
(if not definite) constitutional majority. How will these Our Ukraine coalition
members vote? This well could remove President Yushchenko’s control by
eliminating the possibility of veto on key laws.

If Our Ukraine officially joins the coalition, a split in the party becomes
likely, making the “defectors” those who remain in opposition. In this
case, the coalition still may hold a constitutional majority, thanks to BYUT
defectors.

The question is what effect Our Ukraine’s ministers and deputies would have
on key votes that could eliminate a veto possibility. Given the shifting power
center in the country, will they continue to tow Yushchenko’s line?

Of course, any coalition with Regions, OU and the Communists would have
significant cleavages, making it unstable, but as we’ve seen, power and
money are incredible motivators.

A new election may increase the plurality of Regions (although we should
never discount Tymoshenko’s campaigning ability). But, if Our Ukraine
chooses to remain in opposition, the strength of the coalition may actually
be less after the Our Ukraine and BYUT “defectors” are removed in an
election, thus preventing them from artificially swelling the coalition’s
ranks. If Our Ukraine joins a coalition, again, an election could be used
to try to remove those with questionable loyalties.

This doesn’t take into account the questions about whether an election is
legitimate under these circumstances, of course, and how the Regions

members would react to, and during, a new election. I merely wonder if
the potential composition of a “new” Rada may be more advantageous to
the current opposition than it seems at first glance.

Tammy Lynch, Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy
Boston University, USA, ( tammylynch@hotmail.com)
———————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
20. A DAY AT THE MAIDAN AND AN EVENING AT THE RADA

COMMENTARY: By Stephen Velychenko

Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #739, Article 20
Washington, D.C., Thursday, July 27, 2006

Regular readers of MAIDAN will know that for the last months it has reported
how Party of Regions activists have engaged in the same kind of “rent a
crowd” practices as they practiced in 2004 and again during the
parliamentary elections. They might also wonder why this side of Region’s
activities does not get publicized and analyzed in the world media.

Their tactics include offering fifty hryvnia daily to whoever they find on
the streets in the poorer sections of Kyiv and busing- in young men from
Donbass. This short article will not offer an English summary of these
reports.

It rather records two personal observations made on July 23 and July 24 on
the Maidan and then in front of the Verkhovna rada which seem to confirm
the veracity of the MAIDAN.ORG reports.

[1] First, is the striking difference in the kind of supporters that turn
out from each side. On the Tymoshenko/PORA side there is a cross-section of
society. Young and old, both genders all walks of life. They seem terribly
unorganized in their formal public expressions of support. Their literature
does find its way into trash-bins, but I saw no discarded piles behind
buildings and in dark corners.

While Party of Regions also have some people from all walks of life, among
them one notices a predominance of adolescent males who seem to be more
concerned with waiving flags and making noises in unison than discussing
among themselves and with passers-by – as do Tymoshenko/Pora people.

Regions activists that I talked to and who tried to explain to me why the
Americans are evil and the Russians are “our brothers,” terminated the
exchange of ideas and told their associates to do likewise when I asked them
to tell me how many million Ukrainians did the American government murder.

When I asked a flag-waiver whether he was paid to come. He, of course, said
no. However his companions looked at him and at me in a rather unfriendly
manner – at which point I decided to leave. Looking into corners and
sidestreets, meanwhile, one can find piles of discarded Regions newspapers
and leaflets.

[2] The second noticeable difference between the two groups is the presence
of a visceral gut anger among Tymoshenko/PORA supporters, who in front of
cameras will break down in tears as they plead with Iushchenko not to
“surrender Ukraine to criminals and communists.”

Others, in quarrels with opponents or discussions among themselves,
literally shake with anger and contempt when they try express their
abomination and disgust with Regions and Communist politicians.

I witnessed them spitting in the face of a communist delegate (identifiable
by a lapel-pin) as he was running the gauntlet from the Rada to the council
of ministers across the street. An old lady with an egg was waiting for
Ianukovych by the exit from the Rada car-park — but I cannot say how that
ended.

When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 few people cared and life went on
normally for the next few weeks. Similarly, today in Ukraine, the Party of
Regions successfully staged a restorationist coup-d’etat this July, and life
has gone on normally.

However, there is still the chance that Tymoshenko will not repeat the
mistakes of Hrushevsky and the non-Bolshevik left in 1917 and put Ukraine
back on the democratic-European path. -30-
————————————————————————————————
Stephen Velychenko, is Resident Fellow,CERES, Research Fellow,Chair

of Ukrainian Studies, Munk Center University of Toronto, Devonshire
Place, Toronto M53 3K7, velychen@chass.utoronto.ca.
———————————————————————————————-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
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21. INTO THE VALLEY OF VINES…..CRIMEA

By Mark Smith, Guardian Saturday travel section
The Guardian, London, United Kingdom, Saturday July 22, 2006

Inspired by Tennyson’s stirring words, I set out by Eurostar one drizzly
pre-heatwave day to fulfil a childhood ambition and find the valley of the
charge of the Light Brigade.

The Crimea turned out to be a gem. Ukraine’s Soviet-era visa requirements
have been abolished, the budget airline crowds have yet to move in, and it’s
easily reached by train.

Twice a week, the “Kashtan” from Berlin to Kiev has a direct sleeping car
which carries on to Simferopol. Painted in the blue and yellow of the
Ukrainian flag, the sleeping car is elderly but comfortable, a home away
from home for an epic two-night journey across Europe, with patterned
carpet, frilly curtains and a corridor thoughtfully decorated with plastic
plants.

Simferopol is Crimea’s transport hub. The world’s longest trolleybus ride
takes a scenic but backside-numbing 2½ hours over the mountains to Yalta,
where a statue of Lenin glowers across the road at McDonald’s. Yalta’s
Livadia Palace was the Tsar’s summer residence and inspired location for the
1945 Yalta Conference, where Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were famously
photographed side-by-side.

I took a local train to Bakhchysaray to see the palace of the Tartar khans
who ruled the Crimea until 1783, and on to Sebastopol, the naval base
besieged by the British and French in 1854. Seven miles away, the little
port of Balaclava was the British supply base for the siege, where I climbed
the hill to the ruined fortress overlooking the harbour and the Black Sea.

The battlefield is utterly unsigned. I trudged inland for miles through the
drizzle, trying to find it with the 1854 map in my history book.
Disheartened, I eventually came to a roundabout, petrol station and the
Ukrainian equivalent of a Little Chef.

I asked for directions. Ignorant of the Ukrainian for “battle”, I
improvised, but my one-man impersonation of the battle of Balaclava proved
too much for the girl on the checkout.

She summoned the Heavy Brigade, a buxom woman from the kitchen who
gesticulated wildly and repeated “Yalta”. I took the Yalta road, and as if
by magic the landscape assumed the features of the 1854 map. The shallow
valley, the raised road with the hillocks used as redoubts, a row of poplar
trees marking the line of Russian guns. I’d found it.

Today, charging on horseback would be difficult, as Tennyson’s valley of
Death has become a valley of vines for Ukraine’s wineries. I can’t think of
a better use for it.

· London-Berlin starts at £79 one-way with couchette, Berlin-Simferopol £96
one-way with sleeper. See www.seat61.com/Ukraine.htm or call 0870 2435363.
————————————————————————————————–
http://travel.guardian.co.uk/countries/story/0,,1826033,00.html?gusrc=rss
————————————————————————————————
[ return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
22. THE SCIENCE-FICTION NOVEL THE SOVIETS FEARED
If nothing else, the One State is exceptionally good at killing people. In a
passage that provides an eerie foreshadowing of Stalin’s politically induced
famine in Ukraine — millions died in 1932-33 — Zamyatin describes how a
new method of food production solved the problem of hunger, mostly by
eliminating the number of mouths

By John J. Miller, The Wall Street Journal, New York, NY, Wed, July 26, 2006

Authors sometimes gripe about the long wait between the completion of a book
and its publication. Perhaps the sad case of the Russian writer Yevgeny
Zamyatin will help them put things in perspective: He finished his novel
“We” in 1921, but it didn’t appear in print in his native land until 1988.

The problem wasn’t that Zamyatin and his manuscript were obscure or unknown.
Rather, it was that they offended communist censors, who correctly
understood “We” to be a savage critique of the totalitarianism that was
starting to take shape in the years following the Russian Revolution.

They managed to suppress “We” inside the Soviet Union, but they weren’t able
to keep it from making a deep impression elsewhere: Two of the most iconic
novels in the English language — “Brave New World” by Aldous Huxley and
“1984” by George Orwell — owe an enormous debt to Zamyatin.

That’s because “We” is the ur-text of science-fiction dystopias: It
described an Orwellian society almost three decades before Orwell invented
his own version. Although the book has never been especially hard to find in
the U.S. — editions have been in print since 1924 — it will now become
even more readily available, thanks to Natasha Randall’s new translation,
published this month by the Modern Library.

Orwell actually had a tough time tracking down the novel for himself.
“Several years after hearing of its existence, I have at last got my hands
on a copy,” he wrote in a 1946 review of “We.” He immediately noticed its
similarity to Huxley’s work: “Brave New World,” he wrote, “must be partly
derived from it.” Despite this, Orwell regarded “We” as “not a book of the
first order.”

In certain respects, that’s true: The plot isn’t exactly gripping, and the
narrator has an annoying habit of letting his thoughts trail off into
ellipses…

Yet “We” is also the product of a powerful imagination. It describes a
futuristic world dominated by the One State, which is devoted to
“mathematically infallible happiness.” Because freedom is supposedly the
enemy of happiness, the One State strives to eradicate all marks of
individuality. “To be original means to somehow stand out from others,” says
one character. “Consequently, being original is to violate equality.”

The characters in “We” have numbers instead of names — the book’s
protagonist is D-503. In Randall’s translation, they are called “ciphers”
(in other versions, they are “numbers”). They wear matching uniforms and
shave their heads. “The Table of Hours” dictates their lives: It tells them
when to wake, when to work and when to sleep. “One sees oneself as part of
an enormous, powerful unit,” says D-503. “Such precise beauty: not one
extraneous gesture, twist or turn.”

Here, Zamyatin takes aim at obsessions with industrial efficiency. He refers
several times to Frederick Winslow Taylor, an American advocate of
scientific management whose ideas were popular in the young Soviet Union. If
Zamyatin had merely satirized Taylor, his censors might have let him get
away with it — Zamyatin was, after all, a Bolshevik who had supported the
Communist Revolution.

But Zamyatin went further, painting an ominous portrait of the Soviet
Union’s coming tyranny. In “We,” Taylor-style regimentation isn’t maintained
by factory-floor managers who are worried about the bottom line, but rather
by a corps of NKVD-like political police known as the Guardians. They
enforce order by terror, and nobody is supposed to talk about it. Following
the arrest of three ciphers, for instance, D-503 comments that
“Conversations, for the most part, concerned the rapid fall of the barometer
and the change of weather.”

The Guardians uphold the rule of the Benefactor, who is the product of a
sham election, conducted annually on the Day of the One Vote: “The history
of the One State does not know a single instance in which, on this day of
rejoicing, even one voice dared to disturb the magnificent unison.” The
influence on Orwell’s “1984” is apparent: Big Brother is more like a kid
brother.

The most memorable phrase in “1984” is probably “Big Brother is watching
you.” In “We,” the Guardians do the watching — a task made easier by the
fact that everyone lives in glass houses, literally. Curtains may be lowered
only at scheduled times for sex, which, because there’s no marriage, is
rationed through a system of pink slips. Promiscuity is more or less
encouraged because it prevents ciphers from creating personal bonds that
would conflict with their duties to the One State.

Zamyatin was trained as a naval engineer; he spent time in England
overseeing the construction of Russian icebreakers. Likewise, D-503 is the
designer of a spacecraft. His sexual seduction by I-330 leads him into an
underworld of rebels who plot against the Benefactor. (The male ciphers are
all odd-numbered, prefixed by consonants; the females are even-numbered,
with vowels.) This resistance movement refers to itself as MEPHI, as in
“Mephistopheles,” the devil who revolted against heaven.

Because D-503 is an otherwise loyal servant of the One State, he is haunted
by his attraction to I-330. When she gets him to play hooky from his job, he
feels both guilt and fear: “I had stolen my work from the One State, I am a
thief, I would soon be under the Machine of the Benefactor.” The Machine is
an execution device that vaporizes dissidents in public rituals.

If nothing else, the One State is exceptionally good at killing people. In a
passage that provides an eerie foreshadowing of Stalin’s politically induced
famine in Ukraine — millions died in 1932-33 — Zamyatin describes how a
new method of food production solved the problem of hunger, mostly by
eliminating the number of mouths: “True, only 0.2 percent of the population
of the earthly sphere survived. But in exchange for all that — the
cleansing of thousand-year-old filth — how glistening the face of the earth
has become! In exchange for all that, this zero-point-two percent has tasted

bliss in the ramparts of the One State.”

A key event in “We” involves the One State’s method for solving another
problem: Imagination. “It is the last barricade on the path to happiness,”
claims an announcement, which orders ciphers to undergo a kind of brain
surgery known as “the Great Operation.”

In the 1920s, copies of “We” were smuggled into the Soviet Union from
abroad — most of the communist literati knew what Zamyatin had written, and
they berated him for it. The harassment eventually became too much.

In 1931, Zamyatin penned a desperate letter to Stalin, begging for
permission to leave the country: “The critics have made me the devil of
Soviet literature,” he wrote, likening his inability to publish as a “death
sentence.” (Later this year, Yale University Press will print the full text
of this letter, as well as many other political and literary documents, in
“Soviet Power and Culture.”)

Amazingly, Stalin agreed to let Zamyatin go, perhaps because Maxim Gorky,
an impresario of Soviet literature, encouraged it. Zamyatin moved to Paris,
where he died in 1937. More than half a century later, “We” finally was
published inside the Soviet Union.

Its appearance provided a clear indication that glasnost was real — and
that the One State of our own world was heading toward collapse. -30-
————————————————————————————————
Mr. Miller writes for National Review and is the author of “A Gift of
Freedom.”
————————————————————————————————
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AUR#738 Jul 23 The School Of Defeat; Ukraine’s Orange Bust; What About The Maidan? Yalta European Strategy; What Is Russian Civilization?

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR

An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT
By James Sherr, Zerkalo Nedeli, Article One
WHAT IS RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION?
By Edvard Radzinsky, The Wall Street Journal Online, Article 12
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 738
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2006
Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up.
——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published in Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, No 28 (607)
In Ukrainian, Russian and (on the web) in English
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 22-28 July 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article One in English
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

2. UKRAINE’S ORANGE BUST
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Ethan Wallison
RealQuickPolitics (RQP), America’s political web site
for intelligent opinion, news, polls and analysis.
Chicago, Illinois, Friday, July 21, 2006

3. UKRAINE: WHAT ABOUT THE MAIDAN?
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Tammy Lynch,

THE ISCIP ANALYST, Volume XII, Number 7
Boston University, Boston, MA, Thursday, July 20, 2006

4. UKRAINE: FIRMLY PLANTED IN EAST AND WEST
COMMENTARY:
By Victor Pinchuk
This article was partially published in the

International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, July 11, 2006
Full article was published in the Dela newspaper, Kyiv, Ukraine
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article 4
Yalta European Strategy (YES), Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006
6. FORMER PRESIDENT OF POLAND KWASNIEWSKI APPOINTED
TO BOARD OF YALTA EUROPEAN STRATEGY (YES)
Yalta European Strategy (YES), Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

7. KNOCKING ON A CLOSED DOOR
Ukraine is keen to join the EU, but existing members are less
than excited at the prospect writes Nicholas Watt
By Nicholas Watt, Guardian Unlimited
London, United Kingdom, Friday, July 21, 2006

8. UKRAINE: POLAND DISAPPOINTED, BUT WON’T GIVE UP

ON ITS NEIGHBOR
Some actors who should be very active, including President Viktor
Yushchenko, are not doing their job properly.
INTERVIEW:
With Eugeniusz Smolar, President
Center for International Relations in Warsaw
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 21, 2006

9. YUSHCHENKO FACES GRIM CHOICE TO SOLVE UKRAINE CRISIS
By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev, Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 22 2006

10 . HERITAGE SURVIVES COMPLICATED PAST IN LVIV, UKRAINE
Joseph Sywenkyj for The New York Times
New York, New York, Sunday, July 23, 2006

11. SOCCER: UKRAINE IN THE EXPRESS LANE
FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking, FIFA.com, Thu, 20 Jul 2006

12. WHAT IS RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION?
COMMENTARY: By Edvard Radzinsky, The Wall Street Journal Online
New York, New York, Monday, July 10, 2006; Page A10

13. EUROPE & AMERICA ARE LOST ON THE ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE
Places where things are getting worse such as the weakening of the
democratic, pro-western camp in Ukraine
COMMENT & ANALYSIS:
By Gideon Rachman, Columnist
Financial Times, London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, July 18 2006
========================================================
1
. THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY:
By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published in Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, No 28 (607)
In Ukrainian, Russian and (on the web) in English
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 22-28 July 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article One in English
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

The period between 22 January 2005 and 7 July 2006 has been an object
lesson in the perils of victory. In a democracy, even an unrefined one,
victory is never supremacy, and it is always temporary.

The victor’s challenge is to alter the terms of the contest, so that when
the opponent comes back to power, he has to accept new rules, a new
discourse and a new reality. In other words, the opponent must come
back transformed.

That is what Margaret Thatcher achieved when she defeated the Labour
Party three times, and that is what Tony Blair accepted when he transformed
Labour into New Labour, embracing key elements of her consensus, which
he then artfully made his own.

That is what the Orange leaders failed to achieve. Their success would have
been far more significant than Margaret Thatcher’s. Their failure is likely
to prove far more damaging than hers would have been.

In mature democracies, governments can fail, they can even be spectacularly
incompetent, but the costs to the defeated are often trivial and are almost
always bearable.

The liberal democratic state is a limited state. Residual powers are vested
in civil society rather than ‘shadow structures of power’. The law is a
restraint on power, rather than its weapon.

There is no revolution to reverse; there is no counter-revolution poised to
reverse it. The old regime is a history lesson, not a political force.

In Ukraine, none of this is the case. In the Orange revolution, as in the
European revolutions of 1848, the old order was defeated, whilst its sources
and structures of power remained intact. The ‘revolutionary’ leaders made
their careers inside these structures.

They never fully grasped their self-serving, parasitical, rent-seeking and
(at worst) malevolent nature. They changed policies, but did little to
change the institutions that implemented them. They had a democratic,
European spirit, but no spirit of urgency and very little premonition of
danger.

In fairness, those who lacked these deficiencies-the post-Communist leaders
of Central Europe-never had to contend with Ukraine’s divisions, let alone
its harsh Bolshevik legacies and its unfavourable geopolitical realities.

Moreover, by the time these leaders came to power, their opponents had
already lost the comparative advantages that Ukraine’s Party of Regions has
nurtured and maintained: a strong vertical of authority, a cunning and
brutal approach to power and the remorseless employment of financial
resources to penetrate key institutions and buy up those who can be bought.

In 1992 a young Polish politician said, ‘irreversibility means that the
pre-revolutionary forces can come back to power, and it doesn’t matter’. In
Ukraine it matters. There is no Ukrainian Kwasniewski. There is only the
same Yanukovych. And whilst there has been very little revolution under
Yushchenko, the risk of counter-revolution is now strong.

The issue preoccupying (and, as ever, dividing) Orange forces today is how
to minimise this risk: by new elections or, failing that, radical
opposition? by normal, ‘constructive’ opposition in the present parliament?
by merger and amalgamation? Not all of these options recognise what must
be recognised: the reality of defeat.

BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR
Connoisseurs of President Yushchenko’s shortcomings might naturally
conclude that his reluctance to call new elections is mistaken. Is it?

Certainly in terms of his party’s interests, it is not mistaken, because
unless there is an epidemic of collective amnesia in the country, Nasha
Ukraina is destined to be slaughtered. But is Yushchenko mistaken in terms
of the interests of the country? Very possibly, he is not.

[1] Oleksandr Moroz’s defection might have been treacherous, but was
it illegal?

Sergey Rakhmanin has argued that it was not (ZN no 27 (606), 15-21
July). Moroz and Yanukovych certainly will be able to argue that it was
not, and they seem to believe this as well. Would the elections therefore
be conducted with an aura of legitimacy or illegitimacy?

[2] Would Regions play by the rules in these elections, as they did
(more or less) in March 2006, and if not, who would expose them? The
international community?

With a fresh war in the Middle East and a host of post-G8
anxieties to wrestle with, is it realistic to suppose that the major Western
players in the OSCE would mobilise the resources for election monitoring
that they were prepared to deploy in March? It’s far from certain.

What is certain is that Regions would go into elections feeling
not only strong, but after the aborted coalition agreement of 22 June,
aggrieved and cheated. Is that an omen for good behaviour?

[3] Is the electorate angry or disgusted? And with whom might they be
more angry or disgusted: the people who let them down on the Maidan
or the people who defeated them?

The latest depressing polls show that, despite its strength,
Regions is still disliked by the majority of the country. Yet they also
show that Tymoshenko remains less popular than Yanukovych.

When has a political process succeeded in mobilising people
against something in the absence of something they can be mobilised for?
The Weimar Republic in Germany and the Third Republic in France offer
discouraging precedents. Is Ukraine’s political order healthier than those?

[4] And if Regions returns to the Rada with a stronger plurality than
it has now, what then? The question answers itself.

There should be an elementary axiom in politics, as in war: never
attack when you are disorientated. Otherwise you are likely to experience
the fruits of the ancient Greek wisdom: ‘he whom the gods would destroy
they first make mad’.

Defeat is a time to observe, wait and think. And the first
sensible thought should be that, barring an act of gross stupidity by
Regions or their allies, there will be no new Maidan-at least not for now.

The second sensible thought should be that, whatever we have to say about
it, the remaining two options-parliamentary opposition and amalgamation-will
emerge de facto.

Those inside Nasha Ukraina who were arguing for a grand coalition months
before 7 July should see the difference between a coalition based upon a
well crafted compromise-the coalition available after 26 March-and a
coalition based upon a well negotiated surrender-the coalition on offer now.

But a fair proportion of that contingent will refuse to see it and for a
very tangible reason: the business interests which, now as in the past,
will be put ahead of their party and the country. For the same tangible
reason, the large contingent of free-lancers who joined BYuT à la Oleksandr
Volkov will also be bought.

But this does not necessarily mean that these contingents will not constrain
the options of the victors. Neither does it mean that the stragglers from
the field will be unable to form an opposition which, in time, becomes
cohesive and effective, or even, after a longer period of time, the
government of Ukraine.

If necessity is the mother of invention, then defeat should be the mother of
strategic wisdom. In the back channels of power and the cross channels
between opposition and grand coalition, strategic wisdom should be focused
on an immediate goal, a mid-term goal and a long-term goal.

The immediate goal should be the preservation of the conditions that make
long term battles worth fighting. In essence, this means the preservation
of democracy in Ukraine: the basic freedoms of speech and association that
preserve the stake of all parties in the system and the legitimacy of
Regions’ victory.

The challenge will be to sharpen Regions’ grasp of the contradiction between
the ‘administrative resource’, their natural temptation, and legitimacy,
their vital interest.

In an ideal world, someone would also persuade Regions to abandon the
financial resource as a means of governance. But we are not in an ideal
world, and no one has the slightest chance of doing that. It will be
difficult enough to appeal to the interests that Regions has. It will be
impossible to appeal to the ideals that they don’t possess.

The mid-term goal should be the mutation and reconstitution of the political
blocs that exist today. Today, these blocs are indigestible. Even at their
strongest and most noble, the Orange parties had only one aim in common:
the democratisation of state and society.

In terms of economic and geopolitical philosophy, they were divided. The
‘anti-crisis’ coalition mirrors these cleavages and, whilst repressed today,
many of them exist within Regions itself.

Ukraine also contains important constituencies-e.g. the business interests
grouped around the Industrial Consortium of Donbas-who do not fit
comfortably into any bloc. Defeat should be a solvent that melts today’s
blocs into more emollient units, diminishing the relevance of today’s
dividing lines and enabling groups to work together on the basis of common
and increasingly transparent interests.

The long-term goal should be to forge an opposition determined to change
the relationship between business and power in Ukraine and capable of
changing it.

A relationship between business and power exists in any democracy, but
in liberal democracies, it exists openly. It is the shadow element and,
inseparable from it, the criminal element which makes this a poisonous
relationship in Ukraine.

The commitment to embrace this principle of liberal democracy should, on an
equally self-interested basis, stimulate a commitment to join the community
of liberal democracies-in economic and political terms certainly, and once
the taboos and phobias are removed, in security terms as well.

A renewed bout of ‘civilised relations with Russia’ and its emerging Single
Economic Space might also rekindle an appreciation of Aleksandr
Griboedov’s nineteenth century wisdom: ‘we Russians so easily win spaces
and so worthlessly use them’.

WESTERN REALISM AND REALISM ABOUT THE WEST
Ukrainians should face the worst. Until the dust settles, the West is
unlikely to be of much help. This is only in part because of the war in the
Middle East, the worsening conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ever
present threat of war with North Korea.

It is also because, where Ukraine is concerned, Western governments are
entitled to be as disorientated as Ukrainians are. They also face a
dilemma. How can they possibly criticise the formation of a coalition
which Yushchenko’s inner circle has spent months negotiating?

The fact that this coalition has taken a different form from that which
Yushchenko sought is not the West’s business. But if its emergence
threatens democracy or provokes civil conflict, then whatever its rightful
business, it will certainly engage the West’s interests and provoke some
very sharp reactions.

A country’s foreign policy is never entirely its own business. Here,
Western governments must be prepared to face the worst:

[1] A resurrection of Russian dominance and a setback to security in
the Black Sea region. It is no secret that Yanukovych and Moroz firmly
oppose Ukraine’s membership of NATO.

Whilst rhetorically positive about the EU, Yanukovych is committed
to the Single Economic Space, which without Ukraine cannot become the
‘counterweight’ to the EU that President Putin seeks.

It also takes little effort to see that, whilst Yushchenko retains
formal primacy in foreign and security policy, his own weakness and the
budgetary powers of the Rada would, sooner or later, render these
prerogatives moot. In these circumstances, Georgia could lose its strongest
regional ally.

The newly revived GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)
and the larger Community of Democratic Choice could lose their rationale and
Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU in Transniestria, which is grossly
disagreeable to Russia, could end.

[2] They might multiply risks to energy security and diversity, which
to a significant extent depend upon Ukraine retaining ownership of its
pipeline network. The signal given on 13 July by the Chairman of Naftohaz
Ukrainiy, in contradiction to all previous assurances, that ownership would
be ceded to a ‘joint’ Russo-Ukrainian entity has not escaped notice in
Western capitals.

Neither are policy makers in these capitals blind to the risk that
Yanukovych will take things further and do everything to facilitate
Ukraine’s integration into Russia’s energy ‘space’.

They must also face the reality of Russian interests and Russian influence.
The Russian leadership has four reasons to welcome the scenario that has
developed:

[1] They recognised after March 2006 that the Party of Regions had
little chance of coming to power by democratic means;

[2] They have been determined to block Ukraine’s trajectory to NATO and
have been alarmed by Ukraine’s progress in defence reform over the past two
years;

[3] They are afraid of Yulia Tymoshenko who, whatever her deficiencies,
is an astute and courageous politician with the ability and determination to
oppose them;

[4] In particular, they feared that Tymoshenko would pick apart the gas
accords of January 2006, expose the schemes behind them and purge the energy
sector and security services of individuals aligned with or suborned by the
Kremlin.

This is a bleak picture. But the worst case is not the only one. It takes
insufficient account of the ambivalent business interests that shelter under
the Regions umbrella, not to say other business interests in eastern
Ukraine.

In 2004, Yanukovych wanted Ukraine to become closer to Russia without
becoming subordinate to it. He wanted the Russian vector to be Ukraine’s
primarily vector of policy, but not its sole vector.

He therefore needed the West and wanted to keep it in the equation. Is
there any reason for this to change? Is there any reason for him or for
Rinat Akhmetov to bargain less sharply with Russian business interests than
they did before?

Is it certain that they would cede important energy interests to Russia
without a solid quid pro quo, and does it stand to reason that they would be
more venal or half as incompetent as Yushchenko’s inner circle turned out to
be since the January 2006 gas accords were negotiated and RosUkrEnergo
established?

It is not axiomatic at all. Neither is it axiomatic that the West will lose
all of its leverage. The positive levers should continue to be what they
have been: the diminution of barriers between economies and a momentum
of relations that stimulates trade, investment and confidence.

The conditions should continue to be what they have been: democracy,
transparency, security and a rules based framework for conducting business.
Can Regions meet these conditions?

It is up to the West to show that cannot do so without making real choices
and without changing their behaviour. If Yanukovych embarks on this road,
he will soon discover the contradiction between his Party’s wishes and its
interests.

If he refuses to embark upon it, then perhaps someone else in Regions will.
If no one embarks upon it, then Regions and its coalition partners will be
left with brother Russia.

It is not absurdly optimistic to hope that this will not occur. It is not
absurd to believe that the quality of government and opposition will improve
in Ukraine if the West establishes this trade-off and enforces its terms.
But if it closes the book on Ukraine, everyone will lose.

Like Ukraine’s democrats, the West’s democrats have been defeated by the
Orange collapse and Regions’ ascendance. Much publicity in Ukraine has been
given to the relatively small number of Westerners who have called for an
equal coalition between the two, and much is bound to be said about the
still smaller number who welcome the hideously unequal coalition that has
now emerged.

Despite these individuals and their supposed influence, Western governments
are not celebrating. Most are saddened and worried. But Regions are now in
power, and we have to make the best of it.

Defeat is a harsh teacher. It also has its uses. It provides an opportunity
to cleanse the mind, go back to the beginning and renew one’s efforts on the
basis of a deeper and stronger wisdom.

Ukraine is not yet dead. Neither are its prospects in Europe. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
NOTE: The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the UK Ministry of Defence. James Sherr has been actively

involved in matters related to the government, politics and international
relations of Ukraine for many years. He is one of the top European experts
in the field and appears on the program at many conferences. He also
writes his analysis and commentary articles on a regular basis. The AUR
appreciates the opportunity to publish this article with the permission
of James Sherr. AUR EDITOR Morgan Williams.
————————————————————————————————-
Contact: James.Sherr@lincoln.oxford.ac.uk
————————————————————————————————-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
2. UKRAINE’S ORANGE BUST

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Ethan Wallison
RealQuickPolitics (RQP), America’s political web site
for intelligent opinion, news, polls and analysis.
Chicago, Illinois, Friday, July 21, 2006

KYIV – It is Oleksandr Moroz, the Socialist leader and newly minted
parliament Speaker, who will endure the greatest share of criticism for the
collapse of the so-called Orange coalition in Ukraine last week. Deservedly
so.

The Moroz-led defection of the Socialist Party to the pro-Russia bloc in
parliament could jeopardize efforts to enact further democratic reforms and
build stronger ties with the West – both essential to Ukraine’s further
development and well-being. Against such stakes, it seems churlish to point
out that the move has also nullified a signed agreement Moroz himself
negotiated.

Yet Moroz should not be made to bear the burden alone. His decision was
preceded by months of deceitful talks among the putative Orange allies,
culminating in an agreement that was marked for failure. And one ought look
no further than President Viktor Yushchenko for the blame here.

His disdain for one-time ally Yulia Tymoshenko, whom he fired as prime
minister last year, was the central animating feature of the talks, which in
reality could only have ended with her reappointment.

Throughout negotiations, in fact, Yushchenko advisors let it be known, sotto
voce, that they would or could or should or might be more amenable to a
coalition with Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of the Regions – an absurd
notion for a party devoted to joining NATO and integrating with Europe. In
any case, it seems Moroz and his Socialist bloc beat them to it.

Once the embodiment of Ukraine’s hopes for prestige and modernization,
Yushchenko has turned inward and insolent in his year-and-a-half as
president. The warning signs were apparent early in his administration. Wary
of Tymoshenko, he moved a top ally into the role of state security chief in
order to balance out her power.

The ensuing clash of wills dominated the first nine months of his
presidency, ending only when Yushchenko accepted the resignation of
the security adviser, Petro Poroshenko, and dissolved Tymoshenko’s
government.

By this point, Yushchenko was already exhibiting an unhealthy fixation on
enemies – not an unusual trait among leaders in this region, but also not
quite the spirit of “Maidan,” as the Orange protests are widely known in
Ukraine. In mid-summer last year he hinted darkly that opponents in the
state secret service were behind reports about the lavish lifestyle enjoyed
by his 19-year-old son, Andriy.

In truth, Andriy’s pampering was no less than the ordinary Ukrainian expects
from a scion of the elite; it was the news coverage of it that was so
unusual, in a country where fear once (in fact, quite recently) controlled
the media. Yushchenko botched an excellent teaching moment about the
democratic values he often extols.

All of Yushchenko’s flaws and failures might have been forgivable were it
not for his handling of the coalition talks. Having been pummeled in the
March parliamentary elections by both Yanukovich and Tymoshenko,
Yushchenko nevertheless struck a defiant stance.

He and his aides dragged their heels throughout the negotiations, evidently
in the hope that, facing a parliament deadline for organizing the new
government, Tymoshenko and her forces would accept something less
than her reappointment as prime minister. No such luck.

So in an act of jaw-dropping petulance, Yushchenko accepted her
reappointment – on the condition that Poroshenko be made Speaker of the
Rada. As if adopting the lioness meant adopting the lion-tamer. Beyond the
plain cynicism of this move, it also revealed that Yushchenko had no idea
how far Ukraine has traveled since the Orange Revolution.

His countrymen no longer view him as the heroic figure atop the stage in the
orange scarf, but rather as an inept and somewhat beleaguered administrator
who is perhaps in over his head.

His party’s 14 percent at the polls in the recent round of elections should
have been a clue to that. Yet now he was reassembling the same inevitable
mess he created when he first came to office, as if his position had
strengthened over time. Even if the ploy had succeeded, it sent an awful
message to weary Ukrainians who lost their faith in Yushchenko during the
first period of infighting.

Tymoshenko ought to accept her own share of the blame for the troubles.
(There’s plenty of blame for everyone, natch.) As the figure-head of her
eponymous party, she stressed the need to root out corruption in government
during the campaign season. Which is all well and good, since Ukraine
continues to struggle mightily with the problem.

Except that when Tymoshenko spoke of corruption, she cited not the
faceless multitude that populates Ukraine’s bureaucracy at every level,
rolling for bribes, but rather the circle of advisers surrounding
Yushchenko.

This, in fact, was a continuation of the same quarrel that brought about the
collapse of the first post-revolution government – a battle over who was
using his or her office for personal aggrandizement.

Coming in the wake of Tymoshenko’s grandstanding on the crisis-averting gas
agreement between Ukraine and Russia – she charged that the pact “sold out”
Ukraine – her attacks during the campaign were especially unhelpful, not to
say short-sighted. They alienated the very same people she would need to
deal with after the elections.

(On the other hand, Tymoshenko’s appeal comes from her fiery manner and
willingness to attack the powerful. A strong case could be made that her
party would have failed to muster its 25 percent in the parliamentary
balloting if she had held back.)

Moroz was undoubtedly correct when he averred, after his election as
Speaker, that the arrangement of personalities in the new power structure
would have inevitably – and quickly – brought about its collapse. (Less
clear is Moroz’s claim to have a document, which he has referred to but
not revealed, that “proves” the collapse was a foregone conclusion.)

But he made the agreement with the other Orange parties, without any
stipulations in that area. And his refusal to take his name out of
consideration for Speaker after Poroshenko did so suggests that concern
about the durability of an Orange majority coalition was the pretext for a
move that had been already settled.

The new majority coalition, which includes Regions, the Socialists and
Communists, is likely to have an even tougher time reaching any sort of
common accord, beyond degrees of opposition to further integration with
the West. The Communists never expected to be part of any coalition.

Now the 22-member bloc is the linchpin of the majority coalition.
Tymoshenko has taken to declaring that the new coalition will be “ruled
y the Communists.” It is just as likely that the Communists will bring about
its quick demise.

The real fallout from the Socialist defection is more psychological than
political. In the sense that the Socialists have formally aligned themselves
now with Regions and the Communists – at least, the larger segment of
Socialists that didn’t resign from the party hierarchy in protest – it is
the first real schism in the three-hearted Coalition of Democratic Forces
that formed during the Orange Revolution protests.

Yushchenko has threatened to dissolve parliament (perhaps as soon as July
20) and call new elections if the new majority coalition in parliament can’t
form a government. There are plenty of reasons to doubt its ability to do
so.

Yet even if Yushchenko calls early elections the outcome would probably
not lessen the existential confusion for Ukraine. There is not likely to be
any sense of what constitutes a “pro-Western” majority or mandate in the
near future.

Moroz himself said last week: “Today, we are living not in Asia and not in
Europe. It is shameful to name a place where we are living.” The confusion
will ensure that every policy decision of government is weighed against the
paranoia it might elicit in Russia.

That is a recipe for paralysis. It is a reversion to the state of affairs
that existed for the 13 years of unsettled independence that preceded the
Orange Revolution. -30-
————————————————————————————————-
NOTE: Ethan Wallison is a journalist living in Kyiv, and the proprietor
of http://www.Room12a.com. He used to live in Washington, D.C. and

wrote for the Roll Call newspaper on Capitol Hill.
————————————————————————————————-
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/07/ukraines_orange_bust.html
————————————————————————————————-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
3. UKRAINE: WHAT ABOUT THE MAIDAN?

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Tammy Lynch,
THE ISCIP ANALYST, Volume XII, Number 7
Boston University, Boston, MA, Thursday, July 20, 2006

Almost two years ago in Ukraine, up to one million people joined
together to protest against a regime that had suppressed their freedom,
supported a culture of deep corruption, rigged an election and been
implicated in at least one murder. In Independence Square, these
people they chanted slogans demanding “bandits to jail,” “freedom,”
and “Yushchenko – President!”

Their chants followed a presidential election found by all
internationally accredited election monitoring organizations to be
unfair and not free. During the election, then-Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich’s government reportedly used state resources and well-
paid “private” security services to, among other things, bribe and
intimidate voters, while altering the vote counts in some areas.

After 17 days of protest, the election was invalidated, a new ballot
was held, and Ukraine welcomed its new President Viktor Yushchenko.

“The people won!” said Anya, after the announcement that Yushchenko
had been elected. “For 70 years we were slaves,” said Andriy. “In 1991,
we received freedom on paper, but it was still slavery, just different
masters. Now, people want to hold their heads up. People want
freedom. … This was a victory of the nation.” (1)

What a difference two years make.

On 18 July, Viktor Yanukovich was nominated by the new parliamentary
majority to return as prime minister. Since Ukraine has now become a
parliamentary-presidential republic, Yanukovich – the man disgraced,
discredited and literally chased out of town in 2004 – could now become
more powerful than the president.

Two days later, the bloc of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko
walked out of parliament in protest, calling on the president to
disband the parliament, with bloc members draping their seats in a
massive Ukrainian flag as they went. (2)

The return of Yanukovich officially occurred as a result of the
disintegration on 7 July of the “orange coalition of democratic
forces,” comprised of the parties that had led the revolution protests
– Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
(BYUT) and the Socialist Party. But it was actually a much longer
process – beginning in September 2005, when Yushchenko dismissed
Tymoshenko from her position as prime minister, thus splintering the
“orange team” – and intensifying after the parliamentary elections of
March 2006.

Following the parliamentary elections, the three “orange” parties
together could have secured a slim majority, and should have been
able quickly to put together a coalition to create a government.

But the disappointing third place finish of President Yushchenko’s
party, following a series of (legally unproven) corruption charges
against some of the top names on his party’s electoral list, made
negotiations difficult. Neither Yushchenko nor his allies appeared
able to accept that their party had finished behind the bloc of former
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko – until then, always a junior ally.

But, in March, Tymoshenko’s calls to clean up corruption and fulfill
the “goals of the Maidan” (Independence Square), resonated with
voters. Her party’s 22 percent of the electorate placed it well ahead
of the 14 percent gained by Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, and the 5% of
the Socialists. When seats were redistributed after subtracting the votes
given to parties that did not pass the electoral threshold, the three
partners would have had a majority of 239 out of 450 deputies.

Still, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine delayed, seemingly hoping that by
postponing a coalition agreement, they could extract bigger dividends.
The biggest, of course, was the prime minister’s post, which Tymoshenko
immediately claimed, as the leader of the largest party in the
potential coalition. Our Ukraine officially balked, suggesting that
their party, as the party of the president, should choose the prime
minister.

Our Ukraine also undertook “secret” negotiations (although they were
reported throughout the media and confirmed by individual party
members) with the party that placed first in the poll– Viktor
Yanukovich’s Party of Regions. Drawing on the heavily populated,
Russian-speaking Eastern regions of the country, Yanukovich’s party
received 32 percent of the vote.

The Our Ukraine cat-and-mouse game with BYUT and the Party of Regions
continued for almost three months, leaving the country with a caretaker
government. Clearly, Our Ukraine and the president had a difficult job
and a difficult choice – one not made easier at all times by the
demands of BYUT.

But Yushchenko’s delay in choosing to unite with his former revolution
partners was costly. By that time, the Party of Regions had badly
outmaneuvered the “orange” team. Regions had gone behind Yushchenko’s
back to “steal” the Socialist Party.

Just days after Our Ukraine, BYUT and the Socialists announced their
“coalition of democratic forces,” Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz
switched sides and joined his party with the Communists and Yanukovich,
creating a new majority. (3) From the parliamentary tribune,
Tymoshenko claimed that large amounts of money had changed hands, while
the deputies in her faction chanted, “Moroz is Judas!” Regardless, the
“democratic majority” was over before it began. (4)

The episode was oddly and ominously similar to the situation following
the parliamentary election in 2002.

Then, Our Ukraine, BYUT and the Socialists officially attempted to form
a majority with certain members of the Communist Party and other
unaffiliated deputies. However, throughout the negotiations to form
Ukraine’s first ever “democratic majority,” Yushchenko also negotiated
with then-President Kuchma’s United Ukraine Party.

In exchange for a promise to name him prime minister, Yushchenko
reportedly agreed to work with United Ukraine instead of the Socialists
and BYUT. But at the last moment, United Ukraine reneged on its
promises, used various techniques to convince individual deputies to
desert the “democratic forces,” and created a majority without Yushchenko,
BYUT or the Socialists.

“The agreement to appoint Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister was
brilliant bait,” Yulia Tymoshenko said at the time. “While the
businessmen of United Ukraine made a show of discussing details of the
agreement with Yushchenko, the authorities were actively pulling away
people’s deputies from the opposition majority.” (5)

The Party of Regions also used the prime minister position as bait in
2006. The party reportedly said it would allow Our Ukraine to name the
prime minister – something the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc would not do.

It seems, however, that this offer may have been intended to be fulfilled;
Yanukovich told several officials privately that he had agreed to give
up the position. In the end, Yushchenko turned this offer down. But,
it appears the delay had irreparably damaged the orange coalition.

This damage, ironically, had been predicted by Tymoshenko. “It would
be a tragedy,” she said on 29 March, “if we lost the chance to form the
coalition of our three forces. All these votes could be lost . . . if
we lose time. . . . In 2002, we lost this chance to create such a
coalition. I don’t want to repeat this mistake and these bad results.

I don’t want this to finish the same way. I appeal to Our Ukraine and
all the leaders of the bloc not to postpone under any circumstances
these negotiations.” (6)

At that time, Tymoshenko’s allies privately suggested that
representatives from the Party of Regions had begun calling individual
deputies and offering various incentives to leave the coalition. It
appears that, with enough time, these incentives worked.

Following the announcement of the new Communist-Socialist-Party of
Regions majority, several citizens groups set up a new “tent camp” on
the Maidan to protest a possible government led by Yanukovich, and to
urge the president to dissolve parliament and call new elections. BYUT
and the Ukrainian People’s Party (Rukh-Kostenko) quickly joined them.
Our Ukraine did not.

After negotiating again with both BYUT and Regions, Our Ukraine
declared itself in opposition. But a number of media reported that
negotiations continue with Yanukovich, to try to bring Our Ukraine into
the government. “Our Ukraine has no right to be in the opposition,”
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk said. “We must influence the process
of development of our state whoever the Prime Minister is and whatever
coalition is formed.” (7)

Our Ukraine’s desire to influence the government makes it unlikely that
Yushchenko will take the drastic step of dissolving parliament, as BYUT
suggests. Even more, Our Ukraine’s poll ratings have slipped
considerably since March, meaning a new election is likely to diminish
the party’s influence further.

In Ukraine, where a central power has always ruled strongly and
exclusively, there is a limited understanding of an opposition’s role.
Nevertheless, a number of politicians within the Our Ukraine party –
reform-oriented politicians who have always supported a “democratic
coalition,” and who worked hard to unite the parties – have announced
their intention to construct a “shadow government.”

The Our Ukraine members also are working with BYUT to determine
how they will influence and monitor the cabinet. This assumes, of course,
that BYUT will return to the parliament, and that Our Ukraine will remain
in the opposition.

Since the government will likely include a number of individuals
previously charged with crimes, the monitoring function of the
opposition will be essential. Should the new “democratic opposition”
prove able to effectively monitor and influence the government in
power, Ukrainians will be able to say that the gains of the orange
revolution have not disappeared. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
SOURCE NOTES:
(1) Author interviews, Dec 04, Independence Square, Kyiv.
(2) Parliamentary Session, 19 Jul 06 via Rada TV/5 Kanal.
(3) Agence France Presse, 1210 GMT, 7 Jul 06 via Lexis-Nexis.
(4) Parliamentary Session, 8 Jul 06 via Rada TV/5 Kanal.
(5) “Ukrainian Former Deputy PM Claims Role of Opposition Leader,”
Segodnya, 17 Jun 02, p. 4.
(6) Press Conference of Yulia Tymoshenko, 29 Mar 06.
(7) ForUm, 1124 GMT, 7 Jul 06.
————————————————————————————————
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

========================================================
4. UKRAINE: FIRMLY PLANTED IN EAST AND WEST

COMMENTARY: By Victor Pinchuk
This article was partially published in the
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, July 11, 2006
Full article was published in the Dela newspaper, Kyiv, Ukraine
Full article in the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article 4
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

Orange or blue? West or east? EU or CIS? Ukraine seems to be confined to
making “either-or” choices and thus condemned to cutting the Gordian knot.
But must it be resolved like this? For Ukrainians and those interested in
Ukraine, the answer is no.

Geographically, we are located between the European Union on one side and
Russia on the other. From a cultural standpoint – whether languages,
religions or history are involved – our heritages are intertwined. From an
economic standpoint, we exchange almost equal amounts of goods and raw
materials with the European Union as we do with Russia.

Such a position should push us towards building bridges rather than erecting
walls. We should be thinking more of “and”, and less of “or”. Not Russia
“or” the European Union, but Russia “and” the European Union. It is in the
interest of Ukraine to develop good and strong relationships with its
neighbors rather than conflicts.

It is also in our interest not to allow Ukraine to be a pawn in an
international geo-strategic game between east and west. For the good of
Ukraine, we must develop our own ambitious, proactive and modernizing
approach based on a clear assessment of our strategic needs.

Some of our specific challenges need to be overcome with deeper relations
with the east, some others with the west. And they all should be implemented
synergistically.

Our relationship with Russia is essential, historic and strategic for the
future. One third of the Ukrainian population has Russian as its
mother-tongue and about twenty percent consider themselves ethnic Russians.
We also have strong and extremely important economic links with Russia,
including in the field of energy.

For the benefit of Ukraine, it is therefore vital to develop our cooperation
and to exercise vigilance so as to not damage our general relationship.
Ukrainians would have a lot to lose in doing so, both economically and in
terms of cohesion and unity of the Ukrainian nation.

This is why for example the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support
Ukraine joining NATO, as it would be more divisive than uniting. The
benefits are not clear, but the risks are.

On the other hand, I believe that the rapprochement with the European Union
is also absolutely essential as Ukraine faces three specific challenges:

The first challenge is the development of a more robust democracy, one that
serves both the will of the people and the good of the country. Ukraine has
made undeniable progress over the last years.

However, having free and fair elections is far from being enough.
Participative democracy, professional and effective civil service, mature and

dedicated political servants – those are what is needed to build upon the
progress.

The second challenge is the realization of a society truly governed by the
rule of law. There are huge obstacles to overcome, but for the good of the
country we must move from justice “à la carte” to justice dispensed by an
efficient, non-corrupted and independent judiciary system.

The third challenge is the nurturing of a legitimate, prosperous and
independent market economy, free from political interference. Much remains
to be accomplished in order to modernize the economy, to simplify its
regulatory and fiscal framework, and to create an environment that is
favorable for investment and job creation. Political leaders need to
understand what the Soviets taught us: a government cannot successfully
micro-manage a market economy.

I believe that the rapprochement with the European Union is the galvanizing
political project that can unite the Ukrainian society and inspire our
leaders to modernize our country in these directions. The prospect of
membership in the European Union is a powerful driving force that will goad
our political elites in the face of painful but essential reforms.

History can be our guide. Look at what happened in the ten countries that
joined the EU in 2004: in the space of ten years, they brought about reforms
in a manner and to an extent that would have been impossible without the
prospect of membership.

Recently, without the constant pressure from Brussels, Romania and Bulgaria
never would have initiated their courageous and necessary reform of their
judicial systems. Similarly, such an EU carrot-and-stick approach is
essential if Ukraine is to overcome these three internal political
challenges.

Clearly then, Ukraine should start an EU-integration process, not because my
country should turn west and not east, but because this process of joining
the EU is a way to force change. It is also in the EU’s best interest to
have a more democratic neighbor, subject to the rule of law and thriving
with a growing economy.

This is a very ambitious goal, which will require much work, because neither
the European Union nor Ukraine are ready for membership in the near future.

That is why more than two years ago I took the initiative with others of
launching YES (Yalta European Strategy – www.yes-urkraine.org), an
international network aimed precisely at promoting and concretely supporting
the membership of Ukraine in the European Union.

The path – i.e. the reforms – matter more than the objective – i.e. EU
membership. Indeed, the present EU is far from perfect. And no one knows
what the EU of the future will look like when Ukraine is ready to take its
place there, or even if it will be attractive. Presently, the European Union
is in crisis and does not have a clear vision for its future. Defining its
identity, its role and its frontiers is the imperative challenge for the EU.

The world of tomorrow will be very different than that of today, because it
will be multipolar and dominated by several regional superpowers. If the EU
wants to play an important role on the international stage and defend its
interests, it must extend its influence and consequently its perimeter. In
that context, Ukraine’s accession will become an obvious necessity, not a
question, as will the strengthening of the EU’s ties with Russia.

Here is my dream. That today the European Union will initiate rapprochement
with Ukraine in order to help and encourage my country to institute
reforms – this is in the interest of everyone. And that tomorrow, a newly
ambitious, prosperous European Union, with a vision and a plan for the
future, will unite all the countries of Europe and defend our common
interests and values in an ever more complex world. -30-

————————————————————————————————
NOTE: Victor Pinchuk, Founder and Board Member of the Yalta European
Strategy (YES), is the Founder of Interpipe Corporation, one of Ukraine’s
largest industrial holding companies. He served in Ukraine’s Parliament from
1998 to 2006.
————————————————————————————————
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
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========================================================
5. YALTA EUROPEAN STRATEGY (YES) ANNUAL MEETING PRESENTED
PLAN “AGENDA 2020 FOR UKRAINE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION”
Yalta European Strategy (YES), Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

The Third Annual Meeting of the international network Yalta European
Strategy (YES) took place from 13th to 16th July in Yalta (Crimea, Ukraine).
The meeting culminated in a presentation of the “Agenda 2020”, a strategic
document developed by YES.

This Agenda defines all the specific steps to be made by Ukraine and the EU
from the full implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, through the
Association Agreement, to the start of the formal process of Ukraine’s
accession to the EU.

The “Agenda 2020 for Ukraine in the European Union” shows the way in

which the objective of Ukraine’s accession to the EU can be reached through
successive stages. In other words: what needs to happen for Ukraine to join
the European Union in 2020?

2005-2007: EU-Ukraine Action Plan
— Enhancing effective and participative democracy
— Reforming the judiciary system to reinforce rule of law
— Joining the World Trade Organization and moving towards

EU-Ukraine free trade area
— Developing market economy with a friendly business climate
— Enhancing energy cooperation
— Visa facilitation
— Common foreign and security policy

2005-2008: Association Agreement
— Soon, review Action Plan implementation process to include

negotiation on Association Agreement
— 2006 : preparatory work on the framework of Association Agreement
— 2007 : conclusion of negotiations
— 1st January 2008: Association Agreement comes into force

Association Agreement: The basic objectives of the Association

Agreement should be:
— the further extension of the 4 freedoms: free flow of goods,
capital, services and people
— enhanced political cooperation
— involvement in common foreign and security policy
— a separate chapter should deal with issues of energy security.

2010-2012: EU Accession Strategy
— 2010: Ukraine should implement an EU Accession Strategy

which should be accompanied by an intensive diplomatic campaign.
— 2011: Ukraine application to the EU could be submitted during the
Polish Presidency.

2014-2019: Accession Negotiations
— 2014 : Opening of talks
— Spring 2019 : Conclusion of talks
This will coincide with the conclusion of negotiations on the

Financial Perspective 2021-2027.

2020: 1st January Accession

UKRAINE IN THE EU: AGENDA 2020
Marek Siwiek, Member of the European Parliament, Poland Chairman of the
Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and

member of the Board of YES, declared: “This scenario is within reach. Its
fulfillment rests on the political will. The European Union has rarely been
in the position to do more for a neighboring country as well as for itself
than by inviting Ukraine to become a member.”

Stephen Byers, Chairman of YES, declared: “This agenda will enable each of
the actors of Ukraine’s future to measure the work to be done to reach this
largely shared objective. This is also a strong incentive to implement the
reforms that Ukraine needs.”

On July 13-16, 2006, the Third Yalta Annual Meeting took place in Yalta and
gathered key politicians, experts, civic activist and representatives of the
business community from Ukraine, the European Union, Russia and the United
States.

The key issues addressed at the meeting included the new Ukrainian political
landscape, the vision of the EU in Ukraine, the energy challenge, the
establishment of the rule of law in Ukraine and the reform of the judiciary,
the economic reforms and the investment
climate.

The participants of the Meeting focused on practical tasks faced by Ukraine
in order to enable better understanding of Ukraine’s prospects by the EU,
and increasing interest of the EU in moving from the existing neighbourhood
policy to wider and closer engagement prospects, while supporting Ukraine’s
reform and modernization path.

YALTA EUROPEAN STRATEGY
YES is an international network established to promote the development of a
just, free and prosperous Ukraine, to open the country to the rest of the
world and to support Ukraine’s membership to the European Union. We

believe the debate of new ideas and fresh thinking is at the heart of a strong
and healthy democracy.

YES is an open forum for the exchange of views which allows to learn from
international best practices, and operates beyond the traditional ways of
looking at issues. It also proposes and promotes concrete policy solutions.

YES is an independent organization which brings together high-level
participants in Ukraine and internationally: policy-makers, business leaders,

thinkers, researchers and journalists.

YES hosts lectures, working groups and public debates in Ukraine and in the
European Union, publishes regular contributions and organizes an annual

summit in Yalta. -30-
————————————————————————————————-
Yalta European Strategy – www.yes-urkraine.org
————————————————————————————————-
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
6. FORMER PRESIDENT OF POLAND KWASNIEWSKI APPOINTED
TO BOARD OF YALTA EUROPEAN STRATEGY (YES)

Yalta European Strategy, Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

KYIV – Stephen Byers, President of the Board of the international network
Yalta European Strategy (YES) announces the appointment of Alexandr
Kwasniewski as Member of the Board of YES. YES organized its Third Yalta
Annual Meeting from 13th to 16th July in Yalta (Crimea, Ukraine).

Alexandr Kwasniewski, former President of Poland (1995-2005), will join the
Board of YES, which is currently composed of Stephen Byers (President of the
Board), Mario David, Victor Pinchuk, Stéphane Fouks, Alexander Rahr,
Jean-Pierre Saltiel and Marek Siwiec.

Alexandr Kwasniewski declared: “I am very grateful to have been chosen as a
new Member of the Board of YES. I am very happy and I hope it will help for
integration of Ukraine in the European Union.”

Victor Pinchuk, founder of YES, declared: “Alexandr Kwasniewski has a unique
experience of political reforms and integration process in the European
Union. He has made a strong work as President of Poland to support a closer
co-operation between Poland and Ukraine. I am sure this experience and his
enthusiasm will be of great help to YES.”

On July 13-16, 2006, the Third Yalta Annual Meeting took place in Yalta and
gathered key politicians, experts, civic activist and representatives of the
business community from Ukraine, the European Union, Russia and the United
States.

The key issues addressed at the meeting included the new Ukrainian political
landscape, the vision of the EU in Ukraine, the energy
challenge, the establishment of the rule of law in Ukraine and the reform of
the judiciary, the economic reforms and the investment
climate.

The participants of the Meeting focused on practical tasks faced by Ukraine
in order to enable better understanding of Ukraine’s prospects by the EU,
and increasing interest of the EU in moving from the existing neighbourhood
policy to wider and closer engagement prospects, while supporting Ukraine’s
reform and modernization path. -30-

————————————————————————————————
Yalta European Strategy – www.yes-urkraine.org
————————————————————————————————
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
7. KNOCKING ON A CLOSED DOOR
Ukraine is keen to join the EU, but existing members are less
than excited at the prospect writes Nicholas Watt

By Nicholas Watt, Guardian Unlimited
London, United Kingdom, Friday, July 21, 2006

Passing under an ornate marble arch and into the Livadia Palace, high on a
hill above the Black Sea resort of Yalta, a hush descends. No explanation is
needed as visitors brush past the large round table where Stalin, Roosevelt
and Churchill carved up Europe in the last months of the second world war.

The simple table, decorated with the flags of Britain, the US and the former
USSR, provokes powerful emotions for Poles whose country was thrown
behind the iron curtain when Stalin staked his claim to his neighbour with
the chilling declaration: “Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor
through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Poland is a question of life
and death for Russia.”

Aleksander Kwasniewski, the former president of Poland who first visited the
Livadia Palace in the 1980s when he served as a communist minister in
Warsaw, highlighted the emotions Poles feel when he recently made a return
visit.

“We were victims of the treaty signed in this palace. When I was first here,
this table and these chairs were much bigger. Today, the table is not big
and the chairs are modest. This is a sign that the Yalta treaty does not
exist anymore. Europe is not divided, but now we have new challenges.”

Mr Kwasniewski was speaking at a conference where leading political figures
from across Europe contemplated the ultimate trashing of the legacy of the
Yalta treaty: charting a course to admit the very soil where the iron
curtain was created into the European family.

The world’s worst butcher will probably be turning in his grave at the news
that a cross-border group, the Yalta European Strategy (YES), wants to admit
Ukraine, the bread basket of the Soviet Union, into the European Union.
(Stalin has his nemesis to blame for this. Nikita Khrushchev handed Crimea,
then part of Russia, to Ukraine in 1955.)

At its annual conference in Yalta this month, YES outlined a timetable that
would see Ukraine join the EU by 2020. This is an ambitious aim that would
be launched with a formal application when Poland holds the union’s rotating
presidency in 2011.

Mr Kwasniewski, who was instrumental in admitting Ukraine’s neighbour,
Poland, into the EU in 2004, threw his weight behind this goal when he told
the conference: “My deepest conviction is that Ukraine should occupy a place
in European institutions. You cannot talk about an integrated Europe in the
21st century without Ukraine. It has a place in the European family.”

Ukraine has every right to expect a place in the EU. As the largest country
by land mass in Europe, Ukraine has the right under the union’s founding
rules to be considered for membership.

But Ukraine will be lucky if it makes it in this generation, or the next, as
a series of factors conspire against the country of nearly 47 million
people. In the first place, Ukraine appears ungovernable as the orange
revolution collapses into a rather pathetic mess.

Victor Yushchenko, whose victory in 2004 over forces who appeared to think
that life revolved around awaiting the next set of instructions from Moscow,
pulled out of the conference as he struggled to cobble together a new
government. Mr Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party may now have to share
power with Moscow favourite Viktor Yanukovich.

The dismal petty back-biting of Ukrainian politics was highlighted by a
cross-party group of politicians who bickered at the conference and
offered no vision for their country.

Mr Kwasniewski told the conference: “I am a bit afraid. The political
leaders are so engaged in this small place – the tactical place of
parliament – that they are forgetting about Ukraine.”

This is not lost on European leaders who are growing tired of an
ever-enlarging EU and who are wary of upsetting Vladimir Putin. “Russia
still sees Ukraine as part of an integrated space organised by Russia,” Mr
Kwasniewski said. “That is not just a political strategy. It is also part of
history. Ukraine is not a neighbour, it is a part of the family.”

Germany, which takes over the EU’s rotating presidency in January, believes
it has struck on the right formula to keep alive Ukraine’s membership hopes
while ensuring that nothing happens overnight.

Berlin is planning to rewrite the European neighbourhood policy for
countries whose membership hopes are distant or impossible. Germany will
reach out to Ukraine, which could join, by separating it from countries,
such as Algeria, which could never join because they are not in Europe.

But Ukraine appears to be stuck in an awkward place. It is keen to join the
EU, while there is little appetite for this in Brussels. The one institution
in the west that appears to be keen to admit Kiev — Nato — is hugely
unpopular in Ukraine.

Some Ukrainians appear to be realistic about their chances. Victor Pinchuk,
one of the country’s richest men who is the driving force behind the YES
group, admits that membership is a long way off. “I am not sure that in 10
to 15 years Ukraine will be a member of the EU,” he said. “But we need
these reforms: democracy, a market economy and the rule of law.”

His intervention is highly significant: Mr Pinchuk is the son-in-law of
Leonid Kuchma, the former Ukrainian president whose authoritarian rule
fuelled the orange revolution.

In Mr Kuchma’s last days in office, Mr Pinchuk bought the giant
Kryvorizhstal steel mill for a bargain Euro670m, to the outrage of the
Orange revolutionaries. The state bought it back and later sold the mill for
its true market price of Euro4bn to the Mittal group.

Mr Pinchuk gave Mr Kuchma pride of place in the conference’s front row,
but he would be wise to retire his father-in-law before next year’s
conference.

Promoting a former authoritarian leader, with a questionable record on human
rights, may not be the best way to impress the EU. -30-
————————————————————————————————-
NOTE: The travel, accommodation and food costs of the Guardian were
met by the conference organisers.
————————————————————————————————-
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,1826224,00.html?gusrc=rss
————————————————————————————————
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========================================================
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========================================================
8. UKRAINE: POLAND DISAPPOINTED, BUT WON’T GIVE UP
ON ITS NEIGHBOR
Some actors who should be very active, including President Viktor
Yushchenko, are not doing their job properly.

INTERVIEW: With Eugeniusz Smolar, President
Center for International Relations in Warsaw
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 21, 2006

PRAGUE – Among the countries looking with greatest dismay at the political
chaos in Kyiv is Poland, with its strong cultural and historical ties to
Ukraine. Polish officials have actively sought to bring Kyiv into the
Western fold since Warsaw joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.

The ongoing parliamentary impasse in Ukraine has alarmed many in Poland, who
see it as a shift away from the promise of the Orange Revolution. Eugeniusz
Smolar, the president of the Center for International Relations in Warsaw,
talks to RFE/RL about Poland’s perspective on Ukraine’s political struggle.

RFE/RL: Over the past four months, we have watched Ukraine try, but fail, to
form a coalition uniting the allies of the Orange Revolution. This was no
doubt a very disappointing development for many in Poland.

Eugeniusz Smolar: Poland has never tried to suggest to Ukraine how they
should solve their own problems. However, of course, as democrats and those
who have fought for democracy in the past, we have our own preferences. And
of course, the preference for many, many people here who feel very warmly
about Ukraine, who feel very passionate about it, is for the Orange
Revolution camp to form a government.

For many people here who do not have the opportunity to follow Ukrainian
events on a day-to-day basis, [the failure to create an Orange coalition] is
quite a shock, and many people can’t understand why it didn’t happen.

RFE/RL: How do you explain this protracted political impasse?

Smolar: To many of us, it seems that too much politics based on personality
clashes, rather than programmatic differences, is actually occurring. So if
you ask what we think about it, we think it’s very bad, we are shocked, we
don’t understand the situation.

We feel that some of the personalities are pushing their line very strongly,
maybe even too strongly. And some other actors who should be very active,
including President Viktor Yushchenko, are not doing their job properly.
Full stop.

RFE/RL: Polish officials have continued to express support for Ukraine’s
integration into the European Union and NATO. Former President Aleksander
Kwasniewski was in Kyiv as recently as last week attempting to mediate
discussions, but said he emerged “pessimistic” about the fate of the
Ukrainian government. In Poland’s view, can a working government emerge
from the chaos in Ukraine?

Smolar: Kwasniewski has the political and moral authority to get involved.
He knows all the personalities. I know he talked to each and every one of
them, to all the major actors. He tried to persuade them to get some kind of
a working agreement.

But at the end of the day, Poland, as a country — starting with the top
politician and ending with civil society here — is going to work with
anyone who has the authority to hold power and who is a democrat.

RFE/RL: The final composition of the government is still unclear, but right
now we’re facing the scenario of a parliament dominated by the pro-Russia
Party of Regions, and with the pro-Western president, Yushchenko, in the
opposition. Is it important for Poland which of the major players ends up on
top?

Smolar: If the situation is Ukraine ends with the decision that the only
working coalition could be a coalition of two currently warring factions,
well then, let it be that way. For us, the most important thing is not who’s
running the country, but what the program is — whether it’s
Western-oriented, whether it’s aimed at European and trans-Atlantic
alliance.

Whether they are going to continue with the policy of democracy and respect
for human rights and Euro-Atlantic integration. These are the most important
questions and Poland will work with anyone who will go that way.

RFE/RL: What about Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko’s rival in the election
that sparked the Orange Revolution? Is he a man Poland can work with?

Smolar: It’s very difficult to say. When I was in Ukraine I heard different
stories about him, and some of what’s being said is that he’s a very
pragmatic politician. But the only worry I have, from what I know of him, is
that he’s not a totally independent politician.

RFE/RL: Does Poland remain suspicious of Russia’s influence in Ukraine?

Smolar: People who know more about it than I do, they say this is one of the
important factors in the whole game. And of course, knowing what Moscow’s
reaction to the Orange Revolution was, and also the pressure that was put on
Ukraine in the context of gas negotiations, I believe that the game has not
ended.

RFE/RL: Ultimately, the failure of the Orange coalition appears to be due,
as you said, to personality clashes — specifically between Yushchenko and
Yuliya Tymoshenko, his one-time prime minister. Are these power struggles
the reason that Ukraine has no government nearly four months after
parliamentary elections?

Smolar: This seems to be the basis of the existing situation. Whether this
is in fact so is not for me to say. But the fact that the politics of such
an important country as Ukraine is being reduced to the personal
confrontation between major personalities is not helping Ukraine and its
image in the world.

RFE/RL: Kwasniewski’s recent remarks on Ukraine have been very bitter,
almost resigned. Is there a sense that Poland has given up on Ukraine, or is
there more that it can do to keep Kyiv on a pro-Western course?

Smolar: Poland will never give up where Ukraine is concerned because we
believe in democracy. And we have this feeling that we ourselves achieved as
much as we did not only because of our own efforts, but also because of the
assistance which was provided by the government trade unions, Amnesty
International, and international organizations which construct civil
society.

And what we are doing at the moment — what all of us are doing —
is giving something back. We are actually trying to help those who, at the
moment, are less fortunate than ourselves.

RFE/RL: How much does geographic and historical proximity affect

Poland’s allegiance to Ukraine?

Smolar: Ukraine for us — and Belarus as well — are very close to our
borders, and they are very close people to us. And even if there are some
political difficulties, it will not influence our general attitude.

Poland will never abandon Ukraine or Belarus. More specifically, we will
never abandon democracy and human rights in those countries.

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9. YUSHCHENKO FACES GRIM CHOICE TO SOLVE UKRAINE CRISIS

By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev, Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 22 2006

KIEV – Viktor Yushchenko has cancelled a visit to Moscow this weekend to
attend a meeting of leaders of ex-Soviet states, as time runs out for the
Ukrainian president to end the country’s worst political crisis since the
Orange revolution of 2004.

Mr Yushchenko is facing a grim choice: to work out a compromise with the
coalition backing the candidacy of his arch-rival Viktor Yanukovich or to
dissolve parliament – a move that would prevent Mr Yanukovich from becoming
prime minister.

The Moscow-leaning former prime minister appeared confident on Thursday at

a meeting with Mr Yushchenko, despite having not received guarantees that his
candidacy would be supported. “I saw a great desire on the part of the
president to unite efforts,” Mr Yanukovich said.

He is hoping to make an extraordinary comeback since losing the contested
2004 presidential vote to Mr Yushchenko, whose public approval ratings have
sunk in recent months.

The return of Mr Yanukovich, who was backed by Moscow in the 2004
presidential vote, would raise questions about Mr Yushchenko’s ability to
push through his programme of western integration through membership of

Nato and the European Union.

Ahead of March parliamentary elections, Mr Yanukovich’s camp vowed to

revive strong ties with Russia, while seeking long-term opportunities for EU
membership. But it opposed Mr Yushchenko’s rapid Nato integration agenda.
Mr Yanukovich’s party mustered just over 30 per cent voter support, the most
of all Ukrainian parties.

The political crisis arose this month when the previous coalition comprised
of camps that backed Mr Yushchenko in the Orange coalition collapsed after
the Socialists backed out to join Mr Yanukovich.

Constitutional changes that took effect this year require Ukraine’s
president to submit the candidacy of a coalition for prime minister within
15 days of receiving it. Mr Yushchenko has the option of dissolving
parliament if a new government is not formed by July 25, or 60 days after
the previous government tendered its resignation.

The president has warned he will not allow his reform plans to be derailed.
He could avoid a repeat of last March’s elections by striking a compromise
involving support for his agenda and possible top posts in the government.
But this could prove challenging, given the divisions on reforms and foreign
policy that exist between him and members of Mr Yanukovich’s coalition.

Mr Yushchenko has also urged legislators to swear in new judges for the
constitutional court, which has not functioned since last autumn.

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10. HERITAGE SURVIVES COMPLICATED PAST IN LVIV, UKRAINE

Joseph Sywenkyj for The New York Times
New York, New York, Sunday, July 23, 2006

LVIV – OUT of the blue, my nine young companions broke into a folk song,
their plaintive melody sung in Ukrainian and delivered slightly off-key. I
hadn’t a clue what it was about, but the cognac-fueled tune was moving. It
was around midnight at a cafe in Lviv’s historic city center, and we were
the only customers in the house.

Earlier that evening, Katarina, a woman with auburn hair and one of this
clique of early 20-something artist types, had described the burgeoning arts
scene in Lviv. Yuriy, bright-eyed and happy-go-lucky, wanted to practice his
English and wrote down each slang word I uttered. Several others were
curious about what I thought of Ukraine and their city.

Such friendliness was in short supply during my prior four days in Kiev, the
capital of this Eastern European nation. But this was Lviv, a city of
830,000 people, the so-called capital of western Ukraine, an architectural
gem of a city that’s the hub of a culture in a country that, in many ways,
still feels Russian.

Roughly 45 miles from the Polish border, Lviv has a polyglot past and
precious few years of independence during its 750-year history. In the 20th
century alone it changed hands between Austria-Hungary, Poland and the
Soviet Union, and was called Lemberg, Lwow and Lvov depending upon
who was in charge.

With its ornately handsome buildings and its gala Viennese ball, Lviv still
bears vestiges of its days as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But
behind the Old Europe vibe is a city that has reclaimed its Ukrainian
heritage in a bi-polar country still trying to find its identity after
gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 installed a West-leaning government with
aspirations of European Union membership, but the nation’s predominately
Russian-speaking eastern half wants to maintain strong ties with Russia.

The peaceful, populist-driven Orange Revolution essentially was a free
marketing campaign that raised Ukraine’s profile and helped attract more
tourists to one of Europe’s last travel frontiers.

The attention, coupled with Lviv’s proximity to the West, provide the city a
spotlight to shine alongside better-known Eastern and Central European
cities similarly rich in history and architecture.

Lviv’s medieval layout can be a warren of confusion, as I discovered last
May soon after I arrived and tried to find breakfast at Café Veronika, one
of the city’s more popular restaurants. But my meandering along cobblestone
streets lined with shoulder-to-shoulder buildings and centuries-old churches
of various faiths was a pleasant way to meet the city’s people and its
history.

My wanderings took me through a downtown market where old women in
scarves sold flowers and vegetables from the countryside.

I ambled past the trove of old buildings in Renaissance, Baroque, Rococo and
neo-Classical styles in central Lviv that make the district a Unesco World
Heritage site, and stopped at the bronze statue of Danylo, a 13th-century
Galician prince who founded the city as a trade route fortress and named it
for his son, Lev.

Lviv’s location along trade routes made it a gathering place of Germans,
Poles, Austrians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Jews and others. But
its east-west straddle also left Lviv vulnerable to military and political
invasions over the centuries.

Yet, somehow, Lviv maintained its Old World charm. Unlike Kiev, which was
devastated by both the Nazis and the Soviets during World War II and, some
might say, devastated even more after the war by Soviet architects, Lviv
survived its conquerors with its old structures intact.

I arranged a tour with Oleksandr Ruchko, an artist and tour guide. Alex, as
he’s called in English, looked to be in his mid 30’s and bore a resemblance
to the late Clash frontman Joe Strummer.

He took me to Plosha Rynok, or Market Square, the heart of the old city
where the 210-foot-tall Town Hall is ringed by 44 three- and four-story
buildings in earth tones and charcoal that were once 16th-century town
houses for the nobility and wealthy merchants.

Over the centuries, the buildings have been refurbished and reflect various
styles, including Baroque, Gothic and Renaissance. Fountains with statues
of Greek gods and goddesses frame the four corners of the square.

Here, German and Polish tour groups wandered about, and at the cafe in front
of the Town Hall people sipped beer under the green and white Lvivske beer
umbrellas.

During our tour, Alex and I looked up at many ceilings. “We have the most
beautiful frescos in our town,” said Alex as we gazed upon those in the
Armenian Cathedral, one of the city’s oldest buildings. But Alex seemed more
of a street-level person with his finger on the pulse of Lviv.

We stopped at an outdoor cafe near Market Square, ordered a round of Lvivske
Premium Lagers, a potent local brew, and Alex talked about his participation
in the Orange Revolution, of how the throng that was jammed into
Independence Square in Kiev drummed its feet to create an earthquakelike
effect he believes rattled the powers that be.

Lviv has become “an open-minded place that’s good for creative people,” he
said. “Those over 40 years old here don’t interest me because they’re too
old to change. They complain too much and they’re too complacent. My
20-year-old friends here are very optimistic and are trying to do good
things.”

It was here, at a cafe on Shevska Street called Bookva Punkt, or Letter
Point, that we met up with his young friends who would give me a taste of
Ukrainian folk music as we drank late into the night.

The next morning I returned for breakfast at Café Veronika, a Vienna-style
coffee shop and restaurant on Shevchenka Street. The day before, I had dined
downstairs in the dark, cozy brick grotto lighted only by Tiffany-style
lamps. This time I dined alfresco on homemade pastries and an omelet full of
veggies. My meals there were delicious, but the service – like that just
about everywhere in Ukraine – was very slow.

Later I returned to a museum that Alex and I visited the day before on
Virmenska Street, a narrow thoroughfare that encapsulates both old – the
1363 cut-stone Armenian Cathedral, for instance – and new.

A couple of blocks up is the Dzyga Cultural Center, a museum of contemporary
art housed in a former Dominican monastery of an 18th-century Baroque church
that is currently showing the ceramic artworks of two local artists, Lesya
and Oleksandr Ros. The indoor cafe displayed a portrait of the former
President Leonid D. Kuchma dressed as a peasant woman.

DZYGA, or “spinning top,” is the nexus of bohemian life in Lviv. It’s run by
an association that puts together music and ballet performances and art
events across the city. A few people wandered through the gallery; others
sipped beverages in the indoor cafe or sat, as I did, under an umbrella on
the patio.

From my vantage point, I could see that Lviv was showing its age. Virmenska
Street, for instance, is lined with 19th-century buildings painted rust,
tawny, yellow and pale green. Some were pockmarked by crumbling cement

and frayed cornices. The cobblestone street itself was sunken in spots.

Although outwardly attractive, Lviv is a relatively poor city, and many
centuries-old buildings that seem in need of a little plastic surgery will
have to wait because the city has other pressing needs, like trying to
provide a 24-hour water supply to the outlying sections of the city.

“It’s hard to make money here,” said Katarina, one of the artists I had met
the night before, as we walked along Prospekt Svobody, or Freedom Avenue,
the main thoroughfare.

Tough economic conditions aren’t as evident on the avenue’s wide,
chestnut-lined esplanade, which is usually crowded with strollers and lined
with packed benches, some with chess matches going on that never fail to
attract spectators.

Nearby, the plaza in front of the Lviv Opera and Ballet House, a majestic
1900 building with a richly decorated, neo-Renaissance facade, is a busy
playground of horseback rides and kiddie go-karts. At night, people cram the
restaurants and outdoor cafes along Prospekt Svobody, and ubiquitous
Eurobeat dance music is everywhere.

The following day at dusk, I was near Prospekt Svobody when I heard the
throaty, operatic roar of beautiful singing coming from what I thought was
an outdoor performance at the Opera House. Instead, it came from a crowd of
older people standing informally farther down the esplanade.

They sang a song, stopped, chatted and lingered, then sang again. And on it
went for an hour or so. “You have seen people who enjoy their independence
and they prefer to demonstrate it by singing folk songs,” Alex, my guide,
explained later. “This is possible to see quite often.”
VISITOR INFORMATION
GETTING THERE Direct flights from New York to Kiev cost about $1,100.

The overnight train from Kiev to Lviv costs $30 a person in a four-person
compartment. The country dialing code is 380; the city dialing code, 322.
WHERE TO STAY
The Grand Hotel, 13 Prospekt Svobody; 72-40-42 or 72-76-65,
www.ghgroup.com.ua. The Grand, in the heart of Lviv, is the city’s most
upscale hotel. Built in 1892, it reflects the ornate stylings of
turn-of-the-last-century Austria-Hungary. Doubles from 795 to 1,590 hryvnia
(about $170 to $340 at 5.35 hryvnia to the dollar).
Hotel George, 1 Mickiewicz Square; 72-59-52, www.georgehotel.ukrbiz.net.
Also in central Lviv, this 1901 Neo-Renaissance structure combines Viennese
charm with amazingly affordable rates. Doubles range from 185 to 535
hryvnia, including breakfast.
Apartments in or near central Lviv are a slice-of-life alternative to
hotels. I rented a comfortable apartment for $50 a night through Astro
Travel, 2204 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M6S 1N4; (905) 804-8826;
www.ukrainetour.com .
WHERE TO EAT
Café Veronika, 21 Shevchenka Street; 97-81-28. Best breakfast in Lviv,
including fabulous pastries. Full-scale dinner menu, too. Dine outdoors, or
choose from two downstairs dining rooms. Entrees from 25 to 100 hryvnia.
Videnska Kavyarnya, 12 Prospekt Svobody; 72-20-21. Fine food, with
ground-level and rooftop patios. Entrees 25 to 75 hryvnia.
WHAT TO SEE AND DO
Dzyga Cultural Center, 35 Virmenska Street; 75-21-01. A contemporary art
space with a music hall and bar.
The National Museum in Lviv comprises two buildings: the original museum
at 42 Drahomanov Street, 72-57-45; and the newer museum at 20 Prospekt
Svobody, 74-22-82 or 72-89-60, across from the Grand Hotel. Highlights
includes Ukrainian icons from the 14th through the 17th century.

The 220 spiral metal steps of Castle Hill, northeast of the city center,
lead to the crumbling remains of a castle that is supposedly on the spot
where Danylo founded Lviv. Here you’ll find spectacular views of the city
and the distant Carpathian Mountains.
Oleksandr Ruchko, 75-59-35 or 38 067 9243309 on his cellphone,
www.guides.lviv.ua, serves as guide and interpreter in and around Lviv.

Very reasonable prices and reliable service. -30-
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11. SOCCER: UKRAINE IN THE EXPRESS LANE

FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking, FIFA.com, Thu, 20 Jul 2006

“You never forget the first time,” so they say. Ukraine’s first bite at the
FIFA World CupT cherry certainly lends weight to this old adage. In their
first steps on the most prestigious of stages, the erstwhile Soviet republic
surprised everyone by venturing all the way to the quarter finals. Thanks in
part to their admirable exploits in Germany, the eastern Europeans have made
a spectacular leap up the FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking.

Born in 1991 following the break-up of the Soviet Union and adopted by the
FIFA family the following year, the 15-year-old Ukrainian nation may still
be an adolescent in world football terms, but the summer of 2006 brought
with it early rites of passage into adulthood.

Having hovered between 40th and 50th place in the world ranking for the last
two years, Ukraine currently occupy a well-deserved 15th position following
their commendable first FIFA World Cup campaign. In what was their first
involvement in football’s flagship event, Oleg Blokhin’s charges went all
the way to the last-eight stage before being felled by the future world
champions from Italy.

This achievement is all the more remarkable given that Ukraine’s debut at
the tournament had begun badly. Presumably a touch overawed by the occasion,
the new boys slumped to a 4-0 defeat at the hands of Group H opponents
Spain. Many observers drew the conclusion that the standard of Blokhin’s
charges had been vastly overestimated and predicted that their stay on
German soil would be a short one. One such doubter was the Saudi Arabian
boss, Marcos Paqueta, who unwisely described his next opponents as “weak”.

Paqueta was soon forced to eat his words, as Ukraine proceeded to silence
their critics by dishing out their own 4-0 thrashing to the Sons of the
Desert. The yellow and blue machine was now ticking over nicely and would
not stall again until the quarter-final, by which time it had contested
three encounters without conceding a single goal. “I’m not disappointed at
all. In fact, I’m satisfied,” declared Blokhin after their elimination by
the Azzurri. “We’ve achieved something unique for Ukraine by reaching the
quarter-finals at our first World Cup.”

However, it must be remembered that Ukraine’s leap of 30 places is only
partly accountable to their achievements in Germany. The eastern Europeans
are greatly benefitting from the reduction of the Ranking evaluation period
which is now four years rather than eight. Therefore, their excellent
results during the preliminary phase have helped as much their feats in
Germany. So, to unearth the real reason for their rise to prominence, it is
necessary to look further back.

A great player and a great coach
As recently as September 2004, Ukraine were languishing at lowly 87th place
in the international ranking. They had never qualified for a major
tournament and had just flunked another qualifying campaign in the race for
UEFA EURO 2004 in Portugal. It was at this moment that the Ukrainian
federation decided to entrust their team’s destiny to Oleg Blokhin.

Crowned European Footballer of the Year in 1975 and nothing short of a
living legend amongst followers of Dinamo Kiev and the former Soviet Union,
the retired striker was given the task of securing qualification for the
2006 FIFA World CupT.

In a group containing reigning European champions Greece, Turkey,
third-place finishers at Korea/Japan 2002T, and those veterans of major
international competitions Denmark, the task facing Blokhin’s boys was a
daunting one. But the fledgling national coach never baulked at the
challenge, predicting from day one that Ukraine would reach Germany without
having to go through the play-offs.

Such bullishness provoked general incredulity on the streets of Kiev, but
not for long. Just 12 matches later, Ukraine joined their German hosts in
the draw for the tournament when they became the first European country to
secure their place at the Finals. In the process, they had risen from their
unremarkable 87th place to a healthy 45th position by May 2006, having even
peaked at 35th in June 2005.

The former Ballon d’Or winner has transformed his team into a winning
machine, instilling not only the self-assurance needed to compete with the
best, but also the maturity and motivation required not to drop points
against lesser nations.

The other key to Blokhin’s success has been the judicious blend created
between bright young talents such as Oleg Gusev and Andriy Rusol, and
reliable old hands like Serhiy Rebrov and Andriy Gusin.

Ukrainian forward Artem Milevskiy (L) fights for the ball with Italian
defender Fabio Cannavaro (R) during the World Cup 2006 quarter final
football game Italy vs. Ukraine, 30 June 2006 at Hamburg stadium.

Established talent confirmed and fresh buds unearthed
With such assets at their disposal, Ukraine’s presence in planet football’s
top 15 is hardly surprising. And given the team’s displays in Germany, this
best-ever global ranking could well be a mere staging post on route to
higher places. In the course of their feats in Germany, the FIFA World Cup
novices’ big-name players were able to showcase their skills while their
rising stars revealed great promise for the future.

Although scarcely over a serious injury, Chelsea’s new acquisition Andriy
Shevchenko scored two goals at the tournament, while Bayer Leverkusen’s
Andriy Voronin was a thorn in the side of opposing defences before picking
up an injury against Switzerland.

At the back, the 23-year-old Andriy Rusol has continued to belie his years
to stake his claim as one of Europe’s most accomplished performers, while
Oleksandr Shokovski kept his goal inviolate for three consecutive games and
achieved a notable FIFA World Cup first by not conceding a single penalty in
the shootout with the Swiss.

Among the revelations, midfielders Maksym Kalinichenko and Anatoliy
Timoshchuk stood out on two counts: their long blond locks and prodigious
ability. But the greatest hope for Ukrainian football surely lies in the
feet of Artem Milevskiy, the heir apparent to the great Shevchenko and one
of the four budding talents plucked by Blokhin from the U-21 side that
recently finished as European runners-up.

During the tournament, the Ukrainian coach declared that “my team played
results-based football.” Call it what you like, but their quarter-final
finish and world ranking of 15th show it is certainly effective.

With the qualifying campaign for the next European Championship commencing
in the autumn, Ukraine could well put the experience acquired in Germany to
good advantage to claw their way a few more places up the global pecking
order. -30-

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12. WHAT IS RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION?

COMMENTARY: By Edvard Radzinsky, The Wall Street Journal Online
New York, New York, Monday, July 10, 2006; Page A10

Russia is an exceptional place. In the 20th century, over a single
lifetime — 70 years — it saw three civilizations. Each of the first two
was rejected by its successor, forcing people to renounce their convictions.
You can imagine the chaos of ideas and beliefs in their hearts.

The era of Muscovite czars and the following 300 years of Romanov reign was
one of ruthless autocrats. The opportunity to destroy the autocracy appeared
rarely, but it did appear. For example, in the early 1540s, the boyars (or
nobility) ruled the country as regents of an infant czar. They could have
established an aristocratic republic.

Instead, they squabbled furiously, without forgetting the main occupation of
Asiatic bureaucracy — stealing. The military governor in Pskov robbed the
city so thoroughly that, as a chronicler recorded, “There were no rich or
poor left — everyone became impoverished.” While the boyars argued and
stole, the fledgling czar grew up.

Teenaged, he set his hounds on the most highborn boyar before the boyars’
own eyes. And the people sighed in relief, for stealing by officials in
Russia could only be limited by the choke-leash of a czar.

But amazingly, the boyars themselves sighed in relief because their habitual
servility before the czar was restor! ed. As an historian wrote, “It is
easier to imagine Russia without the people than without a czar.” The
teenage czar grew to be Ivan the Terrible.

THE TIME OF TROUBLES
The suppression of the dynasty of Muscovy czars led to the Time of Troubles
(from 1598 to 1613). But upheavals and chaos, even as they take away the
people’s well-being, are supposed to give rise to new ideas. One would think
that Russia, having lived through years of turmoil, would start building a
new order when the old collapsed. But it ended the way it began. Muscovy
gave birth, again, to an Asiatic autocracy — the Romanov dynasty. The
foreshadow of 1917 lay in the 17th century.

The reign of Alexander II was another of those rare times when autocracy
could have been transformed. This Russian Lincoln not only emancipated the
serfs in 1861; he became the father of perestroika, reforming all parts of
Russian life. But he was a typical Russian reformer, a Janus with one head
facing forward, the other looking back.

The reforms stopped in the first half of his reign. A contemporary wrote
what could serve as the epigraph to all Russian perestroikas: “For some
reason everything good in Russia is fated to start but not conclude. With
one hand we create . .improvements, with the other, we undermine them . .”

The czar was hated by liberals for stopping reforms, and by conservatives
for starting them. Russia was still an autocracy, and the young — seduced
by the reforms — felt deceived. They thirsted for a parliament and a
constitution, but were repressed.

Alexander II, as did Gorbachev a century later, came to understand a bitter
truth: If starting reforms is dangerous, it is much more so to stop them. An
unprecedented terrorist organization was born in Russia, and in some
measure, the czar was to blame. The nihilists called terrorism “the strength
of the powerless.”

The most insightful realized that the child they had created was long-lived.
“When we are gone, there will be others,” wrote their leader. The “young
people pure of heart,” as a contemporary called them, gradually turned into
cold killers, assassinating Alexander II in 1881. When the prosecutor
spoke — at the regicides’ trial — of the innocent bystanders who were
killed, the terrorist leader laughed. The prosecutor! ‘s response, repeated
throughout Russia, was: “When people weep, they laugh.”

“Balancing on the edge of the abyss” was Dostoyevsky’s description of Russia
then. After Alexander II’s death, society was persuaded that the way forward
was the way back. His son, Alexander III, returned Russia to the ruthless
autocracy so dear to the hearts of its rulers. He dreamed of reverting to
the times of his grandfather, Nicholas I (1796-1855), who had said,
“Despotism exists in Russia because only it is in accordance with the spirit
of the people.”

But toward the end of his reign, Alexander III asked his adjutant-general:
“[T]here is still something wrong in Russia, isn’t there?” The reply should
be memorized by all of Russia’s rulers: “Your majesty, imagine an enormous
steam boiler filled with simmering gases. But there are people with hammers
around it diligently riveting the smallest openings. One day the gases will
break though a section that they will not be able to rivet back.” The czar,
according to accounts, “groaned, as if in pain.”

His son, Czar Nicholas II, became the victim of the explosion. That is how
the first Atlantis, the autocracy of the Romanovs, perished.

Astonishingly, it was members of the ruling class, the intellectual nobility
who would not accept autocracy, who fomented the revolution. A poet wrote in
the 19th century: “In Paris the cobbler revolts to become a landowner —
that’s understandable. In Russia, when the nobility makes a revolution, is
it because they want to be cobblers?” In Russia, poets are often prophets.
The son of a shoemaker, Joseph Stalin, became the first Bolshevik czar, and
the No. 3 man in his government was a former shoemaker.

The fantastical came to pass as a result of the Russian Revolution. In pious
Russia, unknown radical Bolsheviks took power. Lenin seized power with the
dream of destroying the state, only to create the most ruthless state, and
of destroying the bureaucracy, only to create the most powerful bureaucracy.
The Romanov Atlantis drowned, but autocracy was immortal.

The essayist Alexander Herzen predicted back in the mid-19th century:
“Communism is merely Nicholas I’s barracks transformed.” The Bolshevik state
created by Lenin became ridiculously similar to Nicholas I’s ruthless
monarchy. The barracks were completed by Stalin, child of the Russian
Thermidor, an Asiatic Napoleon come to consummate the new Bolshevik
civilization.

This civilization was astounding. It had a Nocturnal Life and a Daytime
Life. In the Daytime, the population awoke to the unsilenceable radio,
zealously rushed to work, enthusiastically attended daily rallies where they
condemned the enemies of the USSR, and attentively read the thin newspapers
with reports on the trials of the enemies of the people, which proved the
reliability of the NKVD, the Bolshevik secret police.

Deprived of freedom, not daring to have their own opinion, leading miserable
lives with several families to a communal flat, they sincerely pitied the
exploited workers in the West, the oppressed Negroes and everyone else who
did not have the fortune to live in the USSR.

On Bolshevik holidays, they went with their families to Red Square and
joyously recounted how they had seen Stalin. Did they fear the NKVD? They
would have been outraged by the question: The NKVD was feared only by
enemies. Did they know about the arrests, the hundreds of thousands of their
fellow citizens in the camps? Of course! Many of their acquaintances had
been arrested.

But they were obliged to believe, and did believe, that they had been
enemies. They were surrounded by enemies! Anyway, arrests usually took place
after midnight, in the Nocturnal Life. They did not affect them.

The Daytime Life was like the one William Shirer described in Nazi Germany:
“The observer would be surprised to see that the Germans did not consider
themselves victims of threats or pressure from a heartless and cruel
dictatorship. On the contrary, they supported that dictatorship with
unfeigned enthusiasm.”

Stalin worked at creating a sense of conquest in the people. The radio
blared cheerful marches, as it should in the land of conquerors. They had
conquered czarism and the monarchists. Now they were conquerors in their
Daytime Life.

In the course of two or three Five-Year Plans they were going to surpass the
rest of the world. At every trial, they conquered enemies and spies. And
they had conquered religion: All that was left of Holy Russia were beheaded
churches.

But Stalin had studied in a seminary, and said that Russia needed god and
czar. He gave it a new religion: Asiatic Marxism. As befitted medieval
religions, dissent was heresy, punished ruthlessly by death. The greatest
temple was the Mausoleum, where, following the model of the imperishable
saints, lay the body of imperishable Lenin. Many in the West did not believe
in the “eternally living Lenin” and insisted that there was a wax dummy in
the Mausoleum.

In the 1930s, Stalin decided to prove the great power of the party that had
conquered death to a group of Western journalists. Louis Fischer, a
biographer of Lenin, was among them. He wrote: “Zbarsky [the biochemist who
mummified the body] opened the glass case, and . . . pinched Lenin’s nose
and then turned his head right and left. We all could tell that it was not
wax. It was Lenin.”

The passionate atheist and iconoclast had been turned into a holy relic. The
Mausoleum workers felt like priests, keeping watch over that horri! fic
parody of the Lord’s Coffin. (Zbarsky recounted: “I was on call to the
Mausoleum 24 hours a day. I taught the workers there: If even a fly gets
into the sarcophagus, I categorically forbid you to get rid of it without
me. All my life I had this nightmare — they call from the Mausoleum:
‘Comrade Zbarsky, there’s a fly in the sarcophagus!?’ And I jump up and rush
over like a madman* Then I would wake up in a cold sweat.”)

Parks turned into centers of collective merrymaking, and Stalin personally
oversaw the religious propaganda there. Every path had posters quoting the
Bolshevik New Testament — the words of God Stalin and God Lenin. Through
the trees glistened the mandatory white statues of holy martyrs: the pioneer
Pavlik Morozov, who had informed on his father, a kulak (or wealthy
peasant), and was then murdered by other kulaks; and party functionary
Sergei Kirov, who was also murdered (allegedly by Trotskyites).

A great number of statues of these martyrs were required and sculptors
worked round the clock. Sometimes their efforts ended in tragic farce. The
sculptor Viktoria Solomonovich, who specialized in Pavlik Morozov, was let
down by a carelessly made skeletal frame. One of her plaster Morozovs
collapsed on a poor woman, who was killed by Pavlik’s plaster bugle.

CARNIVALS FOR LABOR
The collective, the masses, were everywhere, as befits a barracks: The
collective at work and at home (since most apartments were communal). The
collective at rest: All the professions had their own holiday (Day of the
Miner, Day of the Construction Worker, Day of the Metallurgist, etc.), so
that the collectives could have a day to drink and be merry (together, of
course).

At the height of the terror, in 1938, there were carnivals for labor
collectives in Moscow’s Central Park of Culture and Rest. Millions relaxed
insouciantly, happily. This constant massivity, this dissolution of the
individual in the collective, brought about the most valued attribute of
Bolshevik civilization: collective conscience. Personal responsibility died
out and collective responsibility remained.

Woe to those who felt the stirrings of personal conscience. The writer
Arkady Gaidar ended up in a psychiatric ward and described his symptoms to a
friend: “I am tormented by a thought — I’ve lied too much! * Sometimes I
feel close to the truth* sometimes it’s ready to leap from my tongue, but
some voice harshly warns me: Beware! Don’t say it! Or you’ll be lost!” He
left the hospital only when he stopped hearing that call of the truth.

Stalin gave the country a new religion and he gave it czar and god in one
person. Lavrenty Beria, chief of his security apparatus, explained the task
of the film, “The Vow,” to its director during production: “‘The Vow’ must
be an exalted film, where Lenin is the biblical John the Baptist and Stalin
is the Messiah Himself.” Stalin’s name was repeated all day on the radio.

“Stalin this and Stalin that. You can’t go to the kitchen or sit down on the
toilet, or eat lunch without Stalin pursuing you: He got into your guts,
your brain, he filled in all the holes, he ran nipping at your heels, called
into your soul, got under the covers with you, and shadowed memory and
sleep,” wrote a woman in her diary.

At the end of his life, Stalin signed a resolution to create a statue which
could be compared only with the Colossus of Rhodes. Almost 50 meters tall,
it was erected on the Volga-Don canal, built by convicts. One day, the
keeper discovered that birds liked to rest on the head. You ! can imagine
what the new god’s face would look like.

You couldn’t punish birds, but the local authorities, smelling danger, found
a solution: high-tension electricity passed through the giant head. Now the
statue stood surrounded by a carpet of dead birds. Every morning the keeper
buried the little bodies, and the earth, so fertilized, flowered.

This was the symbol of the Bolshevik civilization built by Stalin, the
second Atlantis, which drowned in 1991.

Now is the time of the third civilization. Russia, a sphinx that seemed to
have fallen asleep forever beneath the strict supervision of its autocrats,
woke up not long before the end of the second millennium — and did so
rather peacefully, as never before in its history.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin — the two names of the last rulers of
the 20th century — will be side by side in Russian history, despite the
fact that they heartily disliked each other. This is not a paradox, but is
very Russian. As an 18th-century nobleman said: “We Russians don’t need
bread, we devour one another and are sated.”

Gorbachev began the path toward freedom, Moses moving eternally through the
desert. It was a difficult journey. The republics spoke up. Stalin had built
the USSR in an inviolable way, the republics held together by economic
chains. Gigantic collapse was looming.

The center did not want separatism, but the republics did. Young people in
the republics, hot-headed, were ready to die for independence. Civil war
stood on the doorstep of a country filled with nuclear warheads. A world
catastrophe was very near.

The peaceful dissolution of the USSR will be Yeltsin’s greatest contribution
to the history of the new Russia, which is only starting on its path. How
difficult it is to build capitalism in a country where the unrighteousness
of wealth is a beloved popular idea, a country without rule of law for a
millennium, where the concept of “law” successfully substitutes for the
concept of “justice,” and where the bourgeoisie is brilliant at making money
and totally useless at governing.

The sad fact of Russian history is that the bourgeoisie has no experience of
state leadership. How difficult it is to build democracy in a country where
the dream of equality always trumped the dream of freedom. How difficult it
is — not only for the rulers, but, alas, for the people as well — to
reject ruthless autocracy in a country where it has reigned for centuries.

A major reason for Gorbachev’s fall was that he did not understand this. He
tried to become an ordinary politician, a political dancer — step to the
left, skip to the right. But the public, after a millennium of autocracy,
needed yet another czar, albeit in democratic garb. A czar does not dance, a
czar commands. Yeltsin was like that.

If an American president commanded the dollar to stop falling, he would
certainly be deemed mad. But during the default of 1998, outraged by the
ruble’s capricious behavior, Yeltsin commanded it to stop falling. And, for
a period, the ruble froze in fright.

Yeltsin’s tragedy was that he was an autocrat who sincerely tried to be a
democrat. He forced himself to put up with what is most odious for a czar —
freedom of speech, that is, public insults from Communists and other
opposition parties. He knew how to shut them up, of course.

He knew, but did not do it, for he was a democrat, and what would his best
friends — Friend Clinton and Friend Kohl — say! This constant tension, of
knowing what to do but not being able to do it, made him seek solace in the
bottle and destroyed his colossal health. The end of his reign was marked by
chaos and wild corruption.

AN UNKNOWN PERSON
So once again, the people, as in the days of Ivan the Terrible, wanted a
strict father. Yeltsin’s majesty lay in doing the impossible for a Russian
czar: voluntarily giving up power. Surprising the country, he turned the
reins over to an unknown person. His fantastic sixth sense did not let him
down. He selected a man the country wanted to see.

After a president who made people wonder whether he would be able to get up
from a chair, came a normal, modern and young man. He skied, and spoke
breezily, without notes. He was probably the first Russian leader that
teenage girls got crushes on.

Vladimir Putin has ended the era of Kremlin ancients who elicited sarcasm in
the West. He decisively executes what the majority wants from him: Authority
has been strengthened, stability established, and the concept of “super
power,” without which Russians cannot live, is being returned to Russia.

He deals with the oligarchs in a manner that befits a czar. (As Paul I, son
of Catherine the Great, said: “In Russia an important person is only the one
I am talking to and only as long as I am talking to him.”)

But besides the will of the people there is the will of History, and they do
not always coincide. Does History want a continuation of Yeltsin’s royal
democracy? Or does it demand an understanding of what Alexander II saw much
too late? — that it is dangerous to begin reforms in Russia, but much more
dangerous to stop them.

“Russia! Where are you speeding? Answer me!” the great Gogol once asked,

in vain. In 1916, in a village above the Polar Circle, where it gets to 40
below, lived an exiled prisoner. He was 38, his wife was dead; he belonged
to a pathetic, underground party, with most of its members in prison and the
rest fled abroad. He would spend days at a time lying in bed, face to the
wall.

Who would have guessed that just two years later that exiled Georgian,
Joseph Stalin, would be in the Kremlin, ruler of half the world? Who would
have guessed that a middle-aged provincial party functionary, Boris Yeltsin,
appointed to lead the Moscow Communists, would destroy the USSR just

a few years later?

Gogol gave the only truthful answer to the question he asked Russia: “It
does not answer.” -30-
————————————————————————————-
Mr. Radzinsky is the author of “Alexander II: The Last Great Tsar” (Free
Press, 2005). (This essay was translated from the original Russian by
Antonina W. Bouis.)
———————————————————————————————–
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13 . EUROPE & AMERICA ARE LOST ON THE ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE
Places where things are getting worse such as the weakening of the
democratic, pro-western camp in Ukraine

COMMENT & ANALYSIS: By Gideon Rachman, Columnist
Financial Times, London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, July 18 2006

In a crisis people fall back on familiar instincts. So, as the fighting in
the Middle East escalated, the Americans defended Israel, the French
condemned Israel, the British searched for the middle ground and the United
Nations called for restraint. The Group of Eight in Moscow nonetheless
managed to issue a joint statement. But this facade of unity could soon
crack.

The fighting has broken out at a time when Americans and Europeans were
already facing an unusual number of serious and worsening security threats.
The latest – and possibly gravest – crisis will severely test an unheralded
new period of transatlantic co-operation that had been quietly closing the
divisions opened up over Iraq.

On the day the Israelis began to bomb Beirut airport, I met a European Union
diplomat in Brussels. In an effort to lighten the gloom, I asked him if he
could think of a part of the world where western diplomacy was working well.
After a long silence, he said: “Moldova”.

I intend no disrespect to the Moldovans, but this seems a small item to mark
on the positive side of the ledger compared with the other places where
things are getting worse – Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, Palestine,
Lebanon. Western diplomats are also worried about the weakening of the
democratic, pro-western camp in Ukraine and a looming crisis in European and
US relations with Turkey.

Even a couple of months ago, things looked a lot better. In April, George W.
Bush, US president, was greeting Fouad Siniora, the Lebanese prime minister,
at the White House and proclaiming that Lebanon “can serve as a great
example of what is possible in the broader Middle East”. That same month,
John Reid, then Britain’s defence secretary, visited Helmand province in
Afghanistan and expressed the hope that British troops would be able to
complete their deployment there “without a shot being fired”. Then, at the
end of May, hopes for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis
received a boost, when the US offered to open direct talks with Iran in
exchange for Iran stopping enrichment of uranium.

Just a couple of months later, Lebanon has been plunged into bloody chaos.
In Afghanistan, it is clear that previous declarations of victory over the
Taliban were premature: the British are losing men and having to bring in
reinforcements. In Iran, hopes that the government might accept the nuclear
deal are dwindling away; and the British and the French think that the
Iranians may be six to 12 months away from acquiring the ability to build a
nuclear bomb. This month, North Korea resumed missile tests for the first
time since 1998. Meanwhile, in Iraq the conflict is claiming more than 1,000
lives a month.

Europeans have taken a certain grim pleasure in sticking a “made in
Washington” label on to the Iraq crisis. But take a look at the other items
on the list of crises and it is striking that these are all issues on which
the Americans and Europeans have been working closely together.

In fact, European diplomats have been quietly delighted by the ascendancy
of the State Department since Mr Bush’s re-election and the renewed
American commitment to working with its allies. “The truth about the
second Bush term”, said a senior British diplomat recently and with evident
satisfaction, “is that Condi rules.”

Ironically, some of the first public evidence that the transatlantic
partnership was working again came in Lebanon last year, when the French and
Americans co-operated to get the Syrians out. The Americans and Europeans
have also been pushing a joint position over the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict – promoting the “road-map” to peace and a two-state solution that
Mr Bush committed himself to in 2003. As the fighting escalated in Gaza last
week, Condoleezza Rice’s first instinct was to appeal for both sides to
recommit to the road map – an appeal that sounded as forlorn as any
statement issued by a Brussels bureaucrat.

So what conclusion should be drawn, now that all these splendid examples of
transatlantic co-operation have run into difficulties? The uninspiring truth
is that foreign policy is difficult. Just because military force and US
leadership have run into trouble in Iraq does not mean that diplomacy and
multilateralism are going to succeed elsewhere.

Pre-September 11 2001, Mr Bush was all too aware of this. In his first
presidential election campaign, he called for a “humble” foreign policy that
was realistic about America’s ability to change the world and warned against
the idea that “our military is the answer to every difficult foreign policy
situation”.

The current array of crises may encourage Mr Bush to relearn that lesson.
But there is also an alternative and powerful interpretation doing the
rounds in Washington. This argues that the problems America is encountering
round the world are precisely the result of the Bush administration’s
renewed willingness to work with its allies.

According to this thinking, weak-kneed Europeans have lured the US down the
path of appeasement in Iran, North Korea and the Middle East. The result is
that America’s enemies have been emboldened.

William Kristol, the editor of The Weekly Standard and one of the
intellectual godfathers of neo-conservatism, argued this weekend that the
fighting in the Middle East was part of a broad-based attack on “liberal,
democratic civilisation” and had been encouraged by western weakness:
“Weakness is provocative . . . The right response is renewed strength – in
supporting the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, in standing with Israel
and in pursuing regime change in Syria and Iran.”

He urged Mr Bush to order an immediate “military strike against Iranian
nuclear facilities” and to fly from Moscow to Jerusalem to demonstrate
solidarity with Israel.

Mr Kristol’s argument is characteristic of the neo-conservative world-view –
both in the seductive ease with which it links different crises and proposes
a simple solution; and in its alarmingly casual attitude to military
escalation. This neo-con combination of “moral clarity”, radicalism and an
appeal to military force carried the day after 9/11.

After America’s experience in Iraq, it seems less likely that Mr Bush will
take his advice from this quarter. But crises can shift attitudes quickly.
If Mr Bush heeds even half the advice he is now getting from the radicals in
Washington, the European-American divisions that were evident in Moscow this
weekend will be just a foretaste.
—————————————————————————————————
Gideon Rachman’s column appears every Tuesday. Gideon.Rachman@ft.com.

—————————————————————————————————
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f3dc3a68-15f9-11db-9950-0000779e2340.html
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AUR#738 Jul 23 The School Of Defeat; Ukraine’s Orange Bust; What About The Maidan? Yalta European Strategy; What Is Russian Civilization?

ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR

An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary

Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World

THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT
By James Sherr, Zerkalo Nedeli, Article One
WHAT IS RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION?
By Edvard Radzinsky, The Wall Street Journal Online, Article 12
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – NUMBER 738
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
PUBLISHED IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2006
Help Build the Worldwide Action Ukraine Network
Send the AUR to your colleagues and friends, urge them to sign up.
——- INDEX OF ARTICLES ——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published in Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, No 28 (607)
In Ukrainian, Russian and (on the web) in English
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 22-28 July 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article One in English
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

2. UKRAINE’S ORANGE BUST
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Ethan Wallison
RealQuickPolitics (RQP), America’s political web site
for intelligent opinion, news, polls and analysis.
Chicago, Illinois, Friday, July 21, 2006

3. UKRAINE: WHAT ABOUT THE MAIDAN?
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Tammy Lynch,

THE ISCIP ANALYST, Volume XII, Number 7
Boston University, Boston, MA, Thursday, July 20, 2006

4. UKRAINE: FIRMLY PLANTED IN EAST AND WEST
COMMENTARY:
By Victor Pinchuk
This article was partially published in the

International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, July 11, 2006
Full article was published in the Dela newspaper, Kyiv, Ukraine
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article 4
Yalta European Strategy (YES), Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006
6. FORMER PRESIDENT OF POLAND KWASNIEWSKI APPOINTED
TO BOARD OF YALTA EUROPEAN STRATEGY (YES)
Yalta European Strategy (YES), Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, July 17, 2006

7. KNOCKING ON A CLOSED DOOR
Ukraine is keen to join the EU, but existing members are less
than excited at the prospect writes Nicholas Watt
By Nicholas Watt, Guardian Unlimited
London, United Kingdom, Friday, July 21, 2006

8. UKRAINE: POLAND DISAPPOINTED, BUT WON’T GIVE UP

ON ITS NEIGHBOR
Some actors who should be very active, including President Viktor
Yushchenko, are not doing their job properly.
INTERVIEW:
With Eugeniusz Smolar, President
Center for International Relations in Warsaw
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
Prague, Czech Republic, Friday, July 21, 2006

9. YUSHCHENKO FACES GRIM CHOICE TO SOLVE UKRAINE CRISIS
By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev, Financial Times
London, United Kingdom, Saturday, July 22 2006

10 . HERITAGE SURVIVES COMPLICATED PAST IN LVIV, UKRAINE
Joseph Sywenkyj for The New York Times
New York, New York, Sunday, July 23, 2006

11. SOCCER: UKRAINE IN THE EXPRESS LANE
FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking, FIFA.com, Thu, 20 Jul 2006

12. WHAT IS RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION?
COMMENTARY: By Edvard Radzinsky, The Wall Street Journal Online
New York, New York, Monday, July 10, 2006; Page A10

13. EUROPE & AMERICA ARE LOST ON THE ROAD MAP TO NOWHERE
Places where things are getting worse such as the weakening of the
democratic, pro-western camp in Ukraine
COMMENT & ANALYSIS:
By Gideon Rachman, Columnist
Financial Times, London, United Kingdom, Tuesday, July 18 2006
========================================================
1
. THE SCHOOL OF DEFEAT

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY:
By James Sherr
CSRC, UK Defence Academy, United Kingdom
Published in Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly, No 28 (607)
In Ukrainian, Russian and (on the web) in English
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 22-28 July 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #738, Article One in English
Washington, D.C., Sunday, July 23, 2006

The period between 22 January 2005 and 7 July 2006 has been an object
lesson in the perils of victory. In a democracy, even an unrefined one,
victory is never supremacy, and it is always temporary.

The victor’s challenge is to alter the terms of the contest, so that when
the opponent comes back to power, he has to accept new rules, a new
discourse and a new reality. In other words, the opponent must come
back transformed.

That is what Margaret Thatcher achieved when she defeated the Labour
Party three times, and that is what Tony Blair accepted when he transformed
Labour into New Labour, embracing key elements of her consensus, which
he then artfully made his own.