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Lecture: by Steven Pifer, Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Scowcroft Institute Lecture, George Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, Thursday, September 11, 2008
Opinion: By Denis Corboy, William Courtney, and Kenneth Yalowitz
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, Sunday, September 14, 2008
Op-Ed: by Jan Pieklo, European Voice, Brussels, Belgium, Thursday, September 4, 2008
Op-Ed: By Lubomyr Luciuk, Special to Kyiv Post
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, September 11, 2008
Cambridge MA, USA Thursday August 21, 2008
The ruling coalition is near collapse as the president and the prime minister spar over whether to treat Russia as foe or friend.
United Press International (UPI), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, Sept. 12, 2008
17. ENERGY OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE SEMINAR
“Achieving National Security for Ukraine Through Energy Independence and Diversification”
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
1932-1933 IN UKRAINE AND ADVISED ALL PARLIAMENTS TO DO THE SAME
1. WHAT DOES RUSSIA WANT? HOW DO WE RESPOND?
LECTURE: By Steven Pifer, Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Scowcroft Institute Lecture, George Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, Thursday, September 11, 2008
Today, I propose to address four subjects concerning Russia: First, what does Russia want from the outside world? Second, how did the U.S. government reach the point in this key bilateral relationship where it has so few tools to influence Kremlin behavior? Third, how should we now think about the balance between punishing and engaging Russia? Fourth, what are the options for the United States to respond?
RUSSIA IS BACK
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian people passed through turbulent times. The 1990s were a grim period: adjusting to the loss of empire; an economic collapse worse than the Great Depression; and a political system that, while incorporating democratic practices, often appeared chaotic and corrupt.
For many Russians, the nadir came in 1998, when an enfeebled President Boris Yeltsin led an unstable government, economic crisis struck, and the financial system collapsed. Since then, Russia has experienced a remarkable economic resurgence and demonstrated that assumptions in the 1990s about its long-term weakness were not well-grounded.
Rising prices for natural gas and oil exports fueled the recovery. By 2008, gross domestic product topped $1.3 trillion, four times the level in 1998. Russia’s international reserves today total more than $580 billion, and the Kremlin has established stabilization and national wealth funds that exceed $160 billion. Living standards are rising. Rightly or wrongly, the Russian population gives much of the credit to Vladimir Putin, who served as president from 2000 to earlier this year, when he became prime minister.
Moscow’s foreign policy has over the past several years adopted an increasingly assertive tone. To put the Kremlin’s message in a slogan: Russia is back. And, given a widely shared belief among Russians that the West took advantage of their weakness in the 1990s, Russia is back with a chip on its shoulder.
Georgia last month experienced just how large that chip is. This is not to fix all the blame for the August conflict on Russia. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s decision to send his army into South Ossetia on August 7 was ill-advised. He should have known that Moscow would not accept a Georgian bid to change the status of South Ossetia by force. The American narrative on the conflict sometimes overlooks this.
The speed of the Russian military response nonetheless was breathtaking. It suggests the Russians had planned and prepared to carry out a major combined arms operation in advance. They were awaiting a pretext. Saakashvili provided one. The scale of Russian operations made clear that they were not just about South Ossetia. Those operations and Moscow’s subsequent decision unilaterally to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states reflected the Russians’ broader unhappiness with Georgia’s pro-Western foreign policy course. They aimed to send a message not just to Tbilisi, but to other Russian neighbors, Europe and the United States as well.
WHAT DOES RUSSIA WANT?
As we consider the challenge that Russia poses today, it makes sense to ask: what does Russia want? Let me offer five suggestions.
FIRST, Russia wants to develop its own political and economic model, free of criticism from the West. As the Russians struggled in the 1990s to transform their political institutions, they welcomed democracy promotion assistance. But, for many Russians today, the 1990s experience with democracy evokes bad memories. They associate democracy not just with chaos and corruption, but with economic uncertainty and the country’s economic collapse.
Thus, when Putin began to roll back the democratic advances of the previous decade, he faced little pushback from a population that first and foremost valued economic security. Relatively few Russians protested the roll-back, which included eliminating the direct election of regional governors, sharply reducing the independence of the judicial and legislative branches, and bringing the major television networks under Kremlin control.
To be sure, Russians today enjoy more individual liberties than during Soviet times. But by any objective measure, democracy is significantly weaker than it was ten years ago. One basic criterion: is the outcome of elections uncertain? However flawed the 1996 Russian presidential ballot in which Yeltsin won reelection, there was uncertainty about the outcome. There was no uncertainty when Putin ran for reelection in 2004, or when Dmitriy Medvedev, Putin’s designated successor, ran for president this spring.
In the early Putin years, Kremlin pundits spoke of “managed democracy.” More recently, they have talked of “sovereign democracy.” Its key feature appears to be that it is solely up to Russia to decide its form of government, without Western interference. The Russians want no lectures, no advice, no criticism about how they structure their internal institutions. In their current robust economic circumstances, they feel they can ignore any lectures, advice or criticism that the West might offer.
SECOND, Russia wants a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. As Russia has regained its strength, it has escalated its expectations regarding its neighbors’ policies and behavior. Moscow does not seek to recreate the Soviet Union, but it does seek special deference in the former Soviet space to what it defines as its vital interests. President Medvedev recently cited a sphere of influence – or sphere of “privileged interests” – as one of five key principles underlying Russian foreign policy.
Russia’s stance has become most pointedly evident with regard to how it views the relationships between its neighbors and NATO. Although the Ukrainian government has sought constructive relations with Moscow in parallel with its pro-European, pro-Euro Atlantic course, the Russians insist the Ukrainians make a choice: either NATO and Europe, or good relations with Moscow. Interestingly, the shrillness of Russian rhetoric only increased after NATO leaders at the April Bucharest summit failed to reach consensus on giving Ukraine a NATO membership action plan.
Georgia’s expressed desire to join NATO predates Ukraine’s. Russia has over the past eight years applied even more intense pressure on Georgia, resorting to trade embargos, energy cut-offs, border closings, the occasional air raid and last month a full-scale military offensive. The Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems simmered for more than 15 years in large part because the Kremlin chose not to use its influence to resolve them; it instead kept the disputes alive as pressure points to exploit against Georgia.
Russia should have influence with its neighbors, and they with Russia. The problem is that Russia sees its sphere of influence largely in zero-sum terms: Moscow regards steps by Ukraine, Georgia or other neighbors to draw closer to Europe and the West, or by Western states or institutions to engage these countries, as a threat to Russian interests.
THIRD, Russia wants a seat when major European or global issues are being decided and to have its views accommodated. Moscow insists on this regardless of whether or not it can bring something to the table to facilitate resolution of the problem.
Russia regularly has a seat when major issues are discussed, but Moscow has not always been a helpful participant. On how to deal with Kosovo’s desire for independence, Russia rejected the proposal advanced by the United Nations point-man. In the subsequent EU-U.S.-Russian mediation attempt, the Russians put forward no new or creative ideas but instead slavishly backed Serbia’s refusal to concede independence.
Long a participant in the Middle East quartet, Moscow’s embrace of Hamas last year did little to facilitate the thorny effort to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Moscow stands today the most important player in the effort to persuade Iran to desist from its effort to acquire nuclear weapons. The Russians certainly do not want a nuclear-armed Iran. But Russia’s broad geopolitical and economic interests with the Iranians mean that Russian diplomats spend as much time watering down proposals for UN sanctions against Iran as they do pressuring Tehran to end its nuclear enrichment effort.
So Russia sits at the table, even if it does not always exercise influence to promote solutions. Russian leaders assert that no world problem can be resolved without their participation; simply being there appears important to Moscow, something seen as part of Russia’s due as a recovered great power.
FOURTH, Russia does not seek isolation and wants better relations with Europe and the United States, but on its terms. Autarky makes little sense for the Kremlin. Integration has spurred Russian economic growth. Medvedev recognizes this and talks about integrating fully into the global economy and a greater Europe. The Russians would like better relations with the West, but they insist that that be on Russia’s terms. This appears to include recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space.
Just two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made this point explicitly. He said the United States and the West must choose between support for Georgia and good relations with Russia. The Kremlin feels its energy exports to Europe give it leverage to insist on its terms. Western Europe receives 20-30 percent of the natural gas that it uses each year from Russia or from Central Asia via pipelines that transit Russia. This dependence emboldens the Kremlin.
FIFTH, Russia wants freedom for its major economic entities to take part in global commercial and investment markets. This is smart for the Russian economy, as Russian companies derive significant profits from overseas operations and access to foreign capital markets. A major goal of Russian foreign policy is to support the penetration of large companies, such as Gazprom, into global markets.
THE PRICE OF NEGLECT IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Russia’s assertive course has left the United States struggling for ideas on how to respond. This was painfully evident in August, as reports came in of Russian tanks moving into South Ossetia and then into undisputed Georgian territory. Administration officials looked for ways to influence the Kremlin but found that the thin state of the U.S.-Russia relationship yielded few useful levers. Bilateral relations had deteriorated to the point where there was little cooperation that the U.S. government could threaten to halt that the Russians cared much about.
U.S.-Russian relations have declined markedly since May 2002, when Putin hosted President George Bush to a summit meeting in Moscow. The two leaders signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and issued joint statements outlining broad areas for cooperation, from economics and energy to missile defense and people-to-people contacts. Officials on both sides spoke of a qualitative change in the relationship, one that would move increasingly to partnership and, on some issues, alliance. But that meeting proved the high point of Bush-Putin summitry; thereafter, it was all downhill.
Washington and Moscow share responsibility for the downturn, but the effects are now being felt more acutely on the Potomac. More so than any other bilateral relationship, U.S.-Russian relations require focused attention and guidance from the top. After 2002, however, the two presidents became distracted with other issues. Bush focused on Iraq; his administration did not see Russia as all that relevant for its key policy goals. For his part, Putin focused on increasing the Kremlin’s hold on key domestic power levers.
As presidential attention turned elsewhere, the National Security Council and its Kremlin counterpart failed to press their bureaucracies to implement presidential commitments. For example, neither the Pentagon nor the Russian Ministry of Defense showed much interest in missile defense cooperation in 2002-2003, regardless of what the presidents said.
One other problem on the American side complicated management of U.S.-Russia relations. While bureaucratic in nature, it had strategic ramifications. Many of the key questions in U.S.-Russian relations – bilateral issues, strategic arms control, missile defense, Iran and NATO enlargement – have been handled by different interagency groups.
Drift turned to clear decline in 2004, as the extent of Russia’s democratic roll-back became clear. The Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine caused new anxieties within the Kremlin, which regarded those events not as manifestations of democratic unrest but as U.S.-organized special operations to hem Russia in. At the same time, the more assertive Russian stance in the region raised alarm in Washington.
Difficult problems thereafter piled up, with no resolution, including: Iran’s nuclear effort, U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe, the fate of strategic arms control, Kosovo’s status, NATO outreach, and the adapted treaty on conventional forces in Europe. The result of this deteriorating relationship hit home when the Georgia crisis erupted: concern about the relationship with the United States did not give the Kremlin any reason for pause before it sent its forces into South Ossetia and Georgia, and with a military response clearly not in the cards, the U.S. government could threaten little that had serious impact on Russian decision-makers.
SHAPING A RESPONSE – WASHINGTON’S DILEMMA
Washington and the West now face the challenge of shaping a response in light of Russia’s August actions. Some suggest punishment and isolating Moscow. Proposed measures include halting ongoing diplomatic discussions, booting Russia out of the G-8, and blocking Russian entry into the World Trade Organization and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Others suggest a boycott of the 2014 Olympic Games, scheduled to be held in Sochi, which just happens to border Abkhazia.
The logic behind such suggestions is understandable. By its military action against Georgia and unilateral attempt to redraw post-Soviet borders, Russia has egregiously violated international rules. If the international community does not respond, it runs the risk that Moscow will conclude it can take such actions in the future without penalty.
On the other hand, does isolating Moscow offer the wisest course? Some areas of cooperation, such as controlling nuclear materials, make sense even if relations are at a low point. Getting Russia into the World Trade Organization and OECD would encourage Russia to play by the rules of institutions that have served the United States and the West well. Likewise, participation in the G-8 creates incentives for more cooperative Russian approaches to problems on the G-8 agenda.
Threats to exclude Russia may well be useful, because the Kremlin cares. Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s convening of teleconferences among the G-7 foreign ministers sent a useful reminder to Moscow that the G-8 format is not sacrosanct. Actually excluding Russia on a permanent basis, however, could undermine U.S. and Western interests as well as punish Moscow.
We also need to be careful about a spiral of tit-for-tat exchanges. The Kremlin has some serious cards to play: the Russians could withhold oil from the global market, tamp down gas flows to Europe, use their veto more actively in the UN Security Council, or dump the U.S. treasury notes that they hold.
Crafting a policy response to Russia requires a deft balance. It is important to make clear to the Kremlin the unacceptability of its assertion of a sphere of influence that denies its neighbors the freedom to choose their own foreign policy course. Moreover, it is unwise to let Moscow conclude that its pressure tactics have succeeded at little or no cost.
At the same time, the West retains an interest in Russian cooperation on numerous issues. The West likewise has an interest in seeing Russia become a stakeholder in the existing international order. That requires, of course, that Russia accept and play by international norms and rules.
We should want Russia to choose integration and cooperation over self-isolation. And, just as it was a mistake in the 1990s to assume long-term Russian weakness, we should not now overestimate Moscow’s strength. In the coming years, Russia faces significant vulnerabilities: overdependence on energy exports, lack of a diversified economy, fragile infrastructure, abysmal demographics. Russia may come to see integration in its interest.
THE CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST IN COOPERATION
Despite the current chill with Moscow, Washington and the administration that takes office in January 2009 will have an interest in exploring whether U.S.-Russian relations could be put on a more solid footing.
SECOND, the greater the interest that Moscow has in the bilateral relationship, the greater the leverage Washington has with Moscow. Building areas of cooperation not only advances specific U.S. policy goals, but it can give Washington things to threaten should Moscow misbehave – or better yet give reasons that dissuade Moscow from misbehaving in the first place. We should seek to have more levers than was the case in August.
THIRD, institutions such as the World Trade Organization and NATO-Russia Council can advance U.S. goals. Provided that Russia is prepared to accept the norms of those institutions, the United States has every reason to be inclusive. Having Russia at the table in a cooperative frame of mind is vastly preferable to a self-isolated, truculent Russia that tries to undermine those institutions or create alternatives.
HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES RESPOND?
At the same time, the incoming administration should consider ways to give a new substance and tenor to bilateral relations. The next president can develop options to advance specific U.S. national interests and, by broadening the relationship, secure greater influence with Moscow.
FIRST, revive the nuclear arms reduction process. The Bush administration signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002 and then essentially shut down nuclear arms control. The 2002 treaty allows the United States and Russia each to deploy 2200 strategic nuclear warheads. Those levels exceed deterrent requirements and make no sense today.
Such an offer would be good not just for reducing the nuclear threat to the United States. It could exert a positive impact on the broader bilateral relationship. The Russians value a nuclear arms dialogue with Washington in part because such a dialogue acknowledges Russia’s standing as a nuclear superpower. Washington should take advantage of this.
In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan skillfully made nuclear arms reductions a central element of a broader agenda with the Soviet Union. Reagan and Secretary George Shultz recognized that the Kremlin’s interest in arms control created diplomatic space and opportunities to press other questions such as human rights. Their strategy succeeded: as Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty banning medium-range missiles, parallel discussions won exit permission for Soviet dissidents and secured more helpful Soviet approaches on issues such as the Middle East peace process.
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton also gave arms control a special place in their dealings with Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Arms control progress contributed to more positive relations, greater confidence and a better atmosphere. All this helped advance other U.S. interests: Russia went along with German reunification, withdrew its military from Central Europe and the Baltics, lent diplomatic support during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, and cooperated in ending the Bosnia conflict, including deploying Russian peacekeeping troops under U.S. command alongside NATO forces.
Trying to link strategic arms cuts directly to Russian concessions on specific questions would fail. But the next administration should be able to employ deft diplomacy and a restored nuclear arms dialogue to give the broader relationship a badly needed boost, create a more positive atmosphere, and carve out space to make progress on other issues.
SECOND, consider dealing seriously on missile defense. The Bush administration has pressed forward with its plan to deploy a missile defense radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland. It has doggedly resisted any Moscow proposal that would affect that deployment plan.
The Russians object sharply. This results in part from their unhappiness at seeing new U.S. military infrastructure appear closer to their borders. Moscow, moreover, does not accept that the missile defense system is oriented against an Iranian threat, given the cost and the fact that Iran does not yet have a missile capable of reaching the United States or Europe. Concern about breakout potential further fuels Russian suspicions – ten missile interceptors today, but how many later on?
The next administration should consider adjusting the pace of missile defense deployment in Central Europe. The Defense Department budget indicates that it will take two years to construct the radar and missile interceptor sites. The intelligence community should be asked to estimate when Iran might produce a missile capable of reaching the United States or most of Europe. If the answer is, say, 2014, the president could offer to delay the start of construction at the radar and interceptor sites until 2012.
He could offer further delays if the Iranian missile program were slowed. This would create incentives for the Russians, who have far more influence in Tehran than we do, to press the Iranians to abandon their long-range missile program. While the odds of success might be low, such an offer at least would defuse the missile defense issue with Moscow by making clear that the system is aimed against an Iranian threat.
THIRD, promote NATO-Russia cooperation. In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict, NATO-Russia relations are at a standstill. If they can be moved from their current impasse, it would be useful to explore with allies the possibility of a more productive NATO-Russia relationship. Transnational dangers such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten NATO members and Russia equally, and there exists potential for greater cooperation in these areas.
NATO might also offer to make more concrete the assurances that the Alliance gave Russia in 1997 regarding restraint on the deployment of NATO forces on the territory of new member states. Such cooperation and greater transparency regarding Alliance intentions hopefully would alter Russian attitudes toward NATO.
The desire of Ukraine and Georgia to draw closer to NATO and have membership action plans (or MAPs) provokes particular concern in Moscow. That concern made some NATO leaders reluctant to grant Ukraine and Georgia MAPs in April. They may be more reluctant now. NATO should ask itself, however, whether yielding to Russian pressure tactics would be wise.
A key question is whether Russia can get past its phobia regarding NATO. The Alliance has changed radically over the past 20 years. For example, the number of American troops in NATO Europe is a fifth of what it was. NATO missions have changed as well; the Alliance no longer focuses on deterring a Soviet threat; it instead concentrates on Balkan peacekeeping, coalition operations in Afghanistan and counter-proliferation.
Despite this, changing Russian attitudes will be difficult. Moscow feels aggrieved by NATO actions over the past 15 years. Some official American comments during the negotiations on German reunification in 1990 implied no enlargement of NATO once Germany was united. While the U.S. missile defense planned for Central Europe is aimed at Iran, not Russia, and the establishment of U.S. military headquarters in Bulgaria and Romania was driven by Middle East requirements, not Russia, Moscow sees things differently. Moscow sees U.S. flags going up on the territory of new NATO member states, ever closer to Russian borders. We need to understand this better in Washington.
The primary motivation for NATO enlargement has not been anti-Russian but to foster a more stable and secure Europe. The Russians do not understand it that way. Bilateral and multilateral dialogues might develop ways to allay some Russian concerns. Russia’s neighbors, such as Ukraine, would gain greater freedom of maneuver in their own relations with NATO if NATO-Russian relations improved.
FOURTH, broaden economic relations. Broadening trade and investment links would facilitate the access of American companies to a $1.3 trillion economy with a growing and more prosperous middle class. It would also add economic ballast that could cushion the overall relationship against unpredictable swings caused by political differences.
Anemic U.S.-Russian commercial relations fall well below their potential. In 2007, two-way trade totaled $27 billion. Russia represented just the thirtieth largest market for U.S. exports. These numbers create little incentive for Moscow (or Washington) to adopt more measured stances when differences arise.
Consider the U.S.-Chinese relationship by contrast. Two-way trade between the United States and China totaled almost $387 billion in 2007. U.S. exports were more than $65 billion, making China America’s third largest export market. This is real money, which factors into the calculations of political leaders as they manage the overall relationship.
SECOND, the Russian atomic energy agency, RosAtom, wants to store nuclear waste from third-country reactors, an activity that it sees as worth tens of billions of dollars in a world where most prefer not to have nuclear waste in their backyard. Much of the waste would come from U.S.-origin nuclear fuel, provided under agreements by which the U.S. government must approve where the waste gets stored.
Russia has felt some serious economic consequences over Georgia. No government imposed them; the market did. By one estimate, the Russian stock market has lost $290 billion in value since August 7. During the same period, the ruble saw its biggest monthly decline against the dollar in nine years. And $20-25 billion in capital flowed out of Russia during the last three weeks of August. These are numbers that the Kremlin may find hard to ignore. They result from Russia’s integration into the global economy.
STYLES OF ENGAGING RUSSIA
In diplomacy, style can matter as much as substance. The next president will need to engage his Russian counterpart to define the future of U.S.-Russian relations. He should return to the Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton models for talking with Russian leaders.
Summits between Reagan and Gorbachev, George H. W. Bush and Gorbachev, and Clinton and Yeltsin allowed plenty of time for presidential discussions. Summits typically included two or three working sessions, each of which could range in length from 90 minutes to three hours. This ensured that the presidents had the time to address not only the burning problems of the day but the broad range of questions on the agenda.
By contrast, while George Bush and Putin met far more frequently than their predecessors – almost 30 times by one count – their meetings usually were short. Time limitations invariably meant that some problems received at best cursory review. A personal relationship between the two presidents that was by all appearances extremely warm did little to arrest the downslide in U.S.-Russian relations.
The next president also should want to have in place a national security mechanism that ensures follow-through on presidential agreements. Moreover, building a successful U.S.-Russian relationship, one in which cooperative issues increasingly outnumber problem areas and in which Russian help can be secured on questions of key interest, requires letting Moscow sometimes “win.”
One final point: the next president will have to work closely with Europe to forge a common Western position. This is no simple task. The European Union comprises 27 countries, while NATO numbers 26, with two others invited to join. It often takes time for Europe to find its voice. But Europe has levers that the United States lacks to affect Russian behavior. As frustrating as it sometimes can be to coordinate with Europe, a common Western stance will have much greater resonance in Moscow than a tougher but unilateral Washington policy.
CONCLUSION
U.S. and Western relations with a more assertive Russia have entered a new and more difficult stage. Striking the right balance between engaging Russia, sanctioning its bad behavior, and steering Moscow toward acceptance of international norms and rules will pose a challenge for Western policymakers. Our policy must be firm and principled, but it also should aim to move Russia back toward a path of cooperation and integration, in which Russia is an accepted international actor rather than a self-isolated renegade, a Russia that is more a partner than a problem.
Can we get there? That remains to be seen. It will depend in part on some decisions beyond our control, in the Kremlin. But the West faced a similar challenge in dealing with Moscow between 1949 and 1989, and it met that challenge with great success. What we need now is a similar combination of determination, skill and patience.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: Steven Pifer is a visiting fellow with the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution and a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as on arms control and security issues.
2. GEORGIA’S FUTURE: WHAT THE WEST WANTS
OPINION: By Denis Corboy, William Courtney, and Kenneth Yalowitz
International Herald Tribune (IHT), Paris, France, Sunday, September 14, 2008
News about Georgia has focused on the war with Russia, its disproportionate action and Western aid to help Georgia recover. The time has come to begin reflecting on the conflict and draw lessons for the future, including for European and U.S. policy. The determined negotiating of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has set the stage for a key, positive Western role.
Without doubt the United States and European Union will help rebuild Georgia. Sustained support, however, will depend on reforms and new directions. This reality is obscured in the heady rush to aid Georgia and cajole Russia to pull back. But political honeymoons can be brief.
Already calls are heard in Georgia for investigations, and EU foreign ministers have rightly called for an international inquiry. Western publics tend to believe that, despite Russian provocation and subsequent aggression, impetuous action by Georgia compounded tragedy. Georgia has an interest in building Western confidence.
Transparency in governance is essential to allay Western concern. Georgia has made great strides toward democracy, before and especially after the 2003 Rose revolution when peaceful demonstrations toppled a lethargic government. Nonetheless, Georgia today faces severe challenges. These include the lingering impact of questionable elections even after the Rose revolution, a lop-sided, compliant Parliament, and declining influence of independent NGOs.
The out-of-character crackdown on peaceful opposition demonstrators last November sent a shock wave through the West about arrogance and abuse of power in Tbilisi. To rebuild Western confidence, the government must reverse course. It should foster an open and critical dialogue with the people of Georgia and their elected representatives. The current crisis should not be used as an excuse to limit debate.
The government ought to work with the opposition to build consensus about channels for dialogue and policy debate. Calls for vaguely defined councils and charters engender concern in the West when they create divisions rather than consensus. While the printed press is reasonably free, there is an urgent need to re-establish an independent TV channel not subject to government control.
Georgia needs an independent, 9/11-style commission. It should assess the conditions which made war more likely, Georgia’s conduct during the conflict, and the immediate aftermath, including allegations on both sides of ethnic cleansing.
Commission members must be widely respected in Georgia and come from various political persuasions and institutions. Ideally, the commission should be chaired by a respected international figure. At this point Georgia needs an examination more than a “Patriot Act,” which might cause the West to doubt the leadership’s commitment to allowing alternative voices to be heard.
EU foreign ministers have agreed unanimously that an international inquiry is needed into what led to the war. As Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany has pointed out, the results should influence future Western relations with Georgia and Russia. Both countries ought to grant full access for the inquiry. A comprehensive, balanced examination will do much to avert misplaced suspicion and create a climate for a stronger Western role.
The scope of the inquiry, however, ought to go beyond the origins of the war to encompass as well what the West could have done to mitigate risks. Did it err in not acting on signals earlier in the year of an impending conflict? Or in the 1990s should the West have offered to augment Russian peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
Finally, Europe and the U.S. will gain added confidence from open debate in Georgia about its future policies, and a commitment to accelerate reform as the best way to strengthen the country. This will bolster Georgia’s position and unity in addressing the critical challenge of dealing with Russia.
Developing a dialogue will be not be easy in light of authoritarian and revanchist trends there, but many Georgians live in Russia and it is a huge, natural export market. Balanced assessments and policies will do much to help Europe and the U.S. mobilize support for a strong and sustained role in Georgia. This will advance its security and prosperity and foster its ties to the EU and NATO.
NOTE: Denis Corboy is director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at the University of London and a former European Commission ambassador to Georgia. William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz are former U.S. ambassadors to Georgia.
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3. BRING UKRAINE INTO NATO
In Eastern Europe, Ukraine is the name of the game. With close to 50 million people, it is, by far, more populous and important than any other former Soviet republic or satellite. Russia, with a population of 142 million and dropping, needs to take over Ukraine to reassert itself as a global power. Moscow is terrified that Ukraine will become part of the West.
The clear implication of the invasion of Georgia is that Russia cannot be trusted to live in peace with its neighbors. The impetus to imperial conquest predated and has outlasted communism. As Henry Kissinger argues, Russia must either be expanding or contracting. With so many divergent and often hostile nationalities inside and around Russia, the momentum of conquest is the only way to avoid an inertia that leads to decomposition.
Ukraine wants to enter NATO, but our European allies, led by Germany, are so dependent on Russian gas that they are reluctant to antagonize the bear. Until now, the case for expanding NATO’s protection to Ukraine has been hypothetical, based on fear of Russian intentions. But by breaking the civilized rules of national conduct, Russia has demonstrated the folly of leaving smaller democracies exposed on its border.
Some — initially including Barack Obama — treated the Russian invasion as a border war for which both sides were responsible. The Democratic candidate called for mutual restraint; only after two days had elapsed did he label the Russian actions as “aggression.”
Of course, NATO cannot extend its protection to every nation in Europe. It is, in the final analysis, a military alliance and it must be certain that it can back its guarantees with adequate might. The location of Georgia makes this difficult to assure. But Ukraine, located right next to NATO members Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, can and must be defended by NATO.
Russia is rapidly losing its population. It has the lowest birth rate in Europe and loses half a million people every year. Its GDP is only $1.7 trillion, a tenth of the Euro Zone’s. It is only through energy reserves that Russia is able to project its influence. And Russia must realize that the West’s likely movement away from oil and toward alternative fuels may make the energy card obsolete in the future.
NOTE: Dick Morris is a former Clinton adviser and now a Fox News contributor. He and his wife Eileen McGann are the co-authors of the best-selling new book Fleeced. His website is www.dickmorris.com.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
4. UKRAINIAN MISSILE DEFENSELESS
it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression.
The nuclear force would not have to have been large. For instance, the 46 SS-24s, which Ukraine’s President Kravchuk once suggested keeping, each held 10 warheads.
NOTE: Doug Bandow is the Bastiat Scholar in Free Enterprise, Competitive Enterprise Institute; Vice President for Policy, Citizen Outreach; Robert A. Taft Fellow, American Conservative Defense Alliance and the Cobden Fellow in International Economics, Institute for Policy Innovation. He is a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several books, including “Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire” (Xulon).
Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire: http://xulonpress.com/book_detail.php?id=3558
LINK: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=19758
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5. UKRAINE: CHENEY IOU AGAINST RUSSIA
THE BACKGROUND
“Ukraine, as the 3rd largest nuclear power in the world, came out of the Soviet Union and had ICBM missiles and big SS24s, the most deadly of the Soviet arsenal of weapons and they were all aimed at Europe’s capital cities and other targets,” he said. “The debate among Ukrainians, after 1991, was whether Ukraine should give them up or what else they would want to do with them.”
THE DEAL IS FAR-REACHING
EXCERPTS
The agreement welcomes Ukraine into the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. It was signed in Budapest on December 5, 1994 and here are some excerpts:
LINK: http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/francis/archive/2008/09/08/day-four-republicans.aspx
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6. U.S. SAYS IT WILL SUPPORT UKRAINE IF THREATENED
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7. UKRAINE: FRESH RECRUITS NEEDED
A new breed of younger politicians needs to be brought up in the political ranks to bring fresh ideas and constructive work in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine desperately needs a new generation of politicians to rejuvenate, and bring fresh ideas and constructive work to its paralyzing politics.
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8. NATO’S GEORGIA & UKRAINE APRIL HESITATION EMBOLDENED RUSSIA
”I think if we had taken a stronger position on the membership of these countries, we would not have had the Russian aggression,” he told the National Post newspaper.
”I think that showing weakness or hesitation encourages this type of behavior on the part of Russia.” Harper expressed respect for Russia but said whether or not countries join NATO was a decision between the alliance and that country. ”Russia does not have a right to dictate decisions outside its own borders,” the Conservative prime minister said.
Canada and the United States had been among those at the Bucharest summit in April advocating offering a membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia, but they met opposition led by Germany and France.
In the end the NATO summit promised the two countries they could join in the future but the timing was left indefinite. Russia sent forces into Georgia in August after repelling an attempt by Tbilisi to retake the breakaway, pro-Russian South Ossetia region.
http://www.deepikaglobal.com/ENG4_sub.asp?ccode=ENG4&newscode=25854
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9. WILL PUTIN UNITE EUROPE?
OP-ED: by Jan Pieklo, European Voice, Brussels, Belgium, Thursday, September 4, 2008
Sevastopol, the naval base from which the Russian Black Sea Fleet sailed to help crush Georgia, is in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, placed under
Ukrainian jurisdiction by Nikita Khrushchev in February 1954. Russia’s lease on the port is due to run out in 2017. Will it respect the deadline? The auguries are unpromising.
After hostilities broke out in Georgia, Ukraine’s President Victor Yushchenko – a close ally of Georgia’s Mikhail Saakashvili – required the Russian fleet to give 72 hours’ notice of any ship movements in or out of the port. The order was ignored.
Ukraine’s foreign minister then demanded that “Russia should start, without delay, to make preparations for the withdrawal of its fleet in 2017”. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded that he was prepared to negotiate, but Kyiv would not be allowed to dictate terms.
This ominous tug-of-war takes place against the background of what looks like a terminal falling-out between President Yushchenko and his arch-rival
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, princess of the 2004 Orange Revolution.
The president’s aides publicly accuse her of making a treasonable secret deal with Russia in return for Kremlin backing in next year’s presidential election, and of promising to drop support for Georgia and to postpone Ukraine’s plans to join NATO.
According to Yushchenko’s staff, some US $1 billion dollars has been put aside by the Kremlin to implement “the Yulia Tymoshenko project”.
Ukrainian authorities are also investigating claims that Russia is distributing passports to the citizens of Sevastopol, the same tactic used in the newly-independent (at least according to Russia) Georgian enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where Russia claimed the right to “defend our citizens”.
One scenario being discussed in the feverish, rumour-filled Ukrainian capital is for Russia at some point to call for a regional referendum on secession from Ukraine.
This may take some manipulating: in the 1991 referendum on Ukrainian independence 54.2 % in Crimea were for it, and in Sevastopol itself, 57.1 %. But installing a pro-Russian leadership under FSB control would no doubt help to improve these figures. Later, the leaders of a breakaway Crimea may feel the need for a show of Russian military solidarity.
As the smoke from Georgia clears, the future status of the Crimea, and of Ukraine – the historical Kiyevan Rus whose loss Russia has never really accepted – is set to test the mettle of the EU, and of the next US administration.
The debacle in Georgia and its worrying implications can in part be laid at the door of wishful thinking on the part of the outgoing US president. But he can hardly be blamed for the weak, disunited, and on occasion frankly unserious tactics adopted by the EU 27 towards Russia and its confetti of empire.
Divisions over energy supplies and pipelines, notably the separate deal between Germany and Russia, have laid bare the EU’s vulnerability and lack
of leverage.
Recognising past mistakes, and how much is at stake, should not be a cause for paralysis but for leadership, however belated. It is conceivable, just, that the Georgian imbroglio will prove the catalyst for the strong, united Europe which has been needed for so long.
NOTE: The writer is Director of the Kyiv and Warsaw-based Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI.
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10. GEORGIA-INVADING TROOPS LEAVE STALIN SHRINE INTACT. PITY.
OP-ED: By Lubomyr Luciuk, Special to Kyiv Post
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, September 11, 2008
Despite my genuine sympathy for the many innocent Georgians now falling victim to resurgent Russian revanchism, the gutting of Gori was long overdue.
For it is a cursed site and not so much because it’s where Iosif Dzhugashvili – better known by his pseudonym of Stalin – was born on Dec. 21, 1879, as for its post-Soviet transgressions.
Inexplicably, the government of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili and Gori’s city fathers permitted it to remain a center for the whitewashing of
Stalin’s brutal legacy, allowing for the veneration of the greatest mass-murderer in 20th Century Europe.
Not only did its Stalin Square frame what is, quite probably, the last original Stalin statue standing in Europe, but even the hovel in which he first stole breath was enshrined in a colonnaded building, part of a museum complex that once attracted thousands.
The most recent tourists were Russian soldiers, who began infiltrating Gori around Aug. 13, although they have since decamped.
Just before they rolled in, the shrine’s intrepid director, a Stalin apologist named Robert Maglakelidze, spirited various unique artifacts away to safety, including the dictator’s military greatcoat, boots, pen, glasses, a used shaving brush, an open pack of cigarettes with 10 left untouched inside, and even one of his trademark pipes.
Now secured in the Tbilisi state museum, these items will be repatriated and put back on display when the museum re-opens, which is scheduled to happen
today. Remarkably, given the firestorm Gori sustained under air and artillery bombardment and its subsequent looting by Ossetian irregulars, the Stalin museum was left unscathed, albeit dustier for all the shelling nearby.
It seems Georgia’s violators knew where they were going and what they were shelling.
Some troopers even erected a sign outside the city announcing: “J Stalin’s Home Country – Gori,” which begs the question – why would combat soldiers
pause to do that? Was it out of admiration? That might seem preposterous, but it’s not if one reads Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber’s article “Failing the Stalin Test,” published in the January-February 2006 issue of the prestigious journal, Foreign Affairs.
Their extensive survey research confirmed how “a majority of young Russians … do not view Stalin – a man responsible for millions of deaths and
They began their commentary with a provocative statement: “Imagine that a scientific survey revealed that most Germans under 30 today viewed Hitler
with ambivalence and that a majority thought he had done more good than bad. Imagine that about 20 percent said they would vote for him if he ran for
president tomorrow. Now try to envision the horrified international response that would follow.”
Yet, when their results were revealed, no significant outcry was heard. The crimes of communism, as personified by “Uncle Joe,” just do not excite us as
much as Adolf’s evildoing.
Only a month or so before Georgia’s dismemberment, other interesting, if preliminary, poll results were released.
Sponsored by the state-funded Rossiya TV channel, online respondents identified the most popular Russian. A commanding majority selected Stalin,
even though his father was Ossetian and his mother Georgian. Meanwhile his “comrade” Lenin scored a distant third.
Stalin’s rehabilitation, which began around the centenary of his birth in 1979, is yet again being promoted from the Kremlin, as plans for incorporating South Ossetia and Abkhazia into the Russian Federation were announced, international protests be damned.
How these minorities will fare inside a Russian-dominated imperium, whose masters have never shown any patience for regional autonomy or human
rights – just go ask the Chechens – remains to be seen.
Of course, there are Georgians who know what Stalin was. They are not nostalgic for an imagined past when they were supposedly much better off under Moscow’s rule. These Georgians appreciate that their culture and historical experience give them a right, and good reason, to want to reconnect with the Western civilization of which they are part.
Their way back to where they, and for that matter, Ukraine, also belongs, can come only through membership in the European Union and NATO. Lado Vardzelashvili, the Georgian governor whose office overlooks Stalin’s monument, gets that.
Pointing out that both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev “think exactly the same way as Stalin,” he tried to cut a deal with the Russian general
commanding troops around Gori, asking that they take the Stalin statue with them and “never come back.”
His offer was not accepted. That’s a pity.
Europe’s last statue of Stalin would be far more appropriately located in today’s Moscow than in tomorrow’s Gori.
NOTE: Lubomyr Luciuk is a professor of political geography at The Royal Military College of Canada. This article is reprinted with the author’s
permission and was originally published in the Kingston Whig-Standard in Ontario, Canada.
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Analysis: by Lada L. Roslycky, Harvard Black Sea Security Program
Cambridge MA, USA Thursday August 21, 2008
As news of another war sped through the fiber optic wires all over the world, decision-making presidents were entertained by Olympic Games in distant Beijing. What would the Olympian gods have done peering down upon the benighted mortals unable to envision the beauty and peace of democracy?
What would leaders with wisdom do in this situation? In a perfect world Russia would get off of foreign territory and mind its own. Georgia would pack away its arms, head to the tables and negotiate with its South Ossetian people. The South Ossetians would take this opportunity to embrace their ancient language and culture; allowing it to flourish in a peaceful, democratic and genuine manner. Genuine, un-manipulated Ossetian separatism would demand that Russia and Georgia give up both, North and South Ossetia and allowing them to reunite as a nation-state.
Unfortunately, wisdom is lacking and many decision-makers do not fit the mold of the proverbial “reasonable man”. Rather, they are infected with the geopolitical virus obsessing about the perception of their power. Men are compelled to choose sides, parties, colors and often the perceived “lesser of two evils”. This is what has happened here. States chose to realize their independence and sovereignty.
What is happening in Georgia is not unique. It can and may happen in other former Soviet States. For many years, since their independence, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan have been struggling with Russian-backed separatism. Their populations are ready for freedom which is supposed to be guaranteed by sovereign independence.
Sovereignty. The word has become a cynical joke to international lawyers and laymen with a critical eye. Its violation has been witnessed in so many wars including Former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, a pivotal difference here is that the violation of Georgia’s sovereignty occurred in complete absence of consent or support from any international institution except, perhaps, the institution of silence. This violation of sovereignty can be likened to rape in which silence is perceived by Russia as acquiescence; by Georgia as a lack of allied care or support requiring the ultimate form of defense.
For years, little of substance has been said about the Black Sea Region’s frozen conflicts. Nevertheless, the war in Georgia should not come as a surprise to anyone who has been paying even the slightest attention to developments there. The Russian Federation has become proficient at playing the game of strategic separatism on the territory of weak states.
The consequences of this war are not limited to Georgia and Russia. It should not be perceived as an isolated matter in which credible UN approved peace keepers are promoting peace and stability. Rather, it is a geopolitical labor pain in the birth of the new Eurasian heartland. At stake lies the freedom and prosperity of millions of people, energy security, and democratic freedom in the Black Sea Region, the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, European freedom, and American reputation. It would be shameful if the West were to remain ambivalent.
The war between Georgia and Russia is a direct challenge to (what some have already stopped calling) “the West”. Now more than ever, the European Union, the United States and the Trans-Atlantic community as embodied in NATO, are in a position to operate jointly and severally toward rebuilding their reputations. They must reestablish themselves as reliable, democratic states which honor the rule of law they so adamantly promote. While others focus on cataloguing the destabilizing damage, I choose to focus on the opportunities here.
First and foremost it is an opportunity for all the orchestrated separatism in the Black Sea region to cease. By invading Georgia, the neutrality of the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping missions (100 percent Russian manned) on other territories of the Former Soviet States has been discredited. It is no secret that the Russian peacekeepers do not satisfy UN standards. Those who did not see the conflict of interest in the past may now recognize that Russia is in fact, and in deed, a participant in these conflicts, not an unbiased mediator.
It is an opportunity for the advancement of international law. International law is the bases of any new world order based on international cooperation. The juridical infrastructure to handle situations such as these has been in place for many years. The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility provide guidance. The Russians have argued that they were obliged to invade Georgia.
It is an opportunity for reputation saving. In recent years, the reputations of all of the players involved have been severely tarnished.
This is an opportunity for UN Security Council to show that the controversial veto right does not veto effective and honest cooperation. The EU’s willingness to send peace keepers on the condition of UN approval is a good test.
Russia can have the most to gain by backing off, withdrawing its troops and demonstrating to the international community that it is a responsible state respectful of international institutions and human rights. It could demonstrate that it can be a dependable partner. It could dispel the perceptions that its intentions with energy and gas are imperialist and not open to international investment or fair competition.
The US has lost much of its moral high ground because of what are widely perceived as unjust wars being pursued in the name of democracy and the war on international terrorism. By imposing sanctions America can show nations in transition that it truly does value their support, their struggle for peace and democracy. This is an opportunity for America to show that it genuinely supports democracy, particularly the sovereignty of its key allies.
The EU can show the world that, despite recent rough weather with the United States, it has learned from its past mistakes and is willing to cooperate towards peace with its oldest and most faithful democratic ally. The EU can become more unified and realize that energy security and energy diversification are faces of one coin. By coordinating a peacekeeping mission, the EU can stand united for security and defense and show that the European Neighborhood Program is not just another sham.
The Newly Independent States in the Black Sea Region can use this opportunity to show that in the face of adversity their governments are capable of standing united. They can put aside all the ceaseless internal “colored-revolution bickering” and realize that their responsibility – first and foremost – is to their young states and to their people. Internationally they can support one another in the maintenance of their sovereignty and in their reach for democracy. It is an opportunity for strengthening national unity and regional solidarity.
NATO has the opportunity to show that it is everything it claims to be. It can show that it is a united transatlantic organization based on the foundations of peace and international stability. NATO can adjust Russia’s perception of it as a threat and demonstrate it as an institution that cooperates for international peace and stability.
This war is an opportunity to evolve away from Realpolitik. It offers a unique opportunity for peace. It is an opportunity for the internationalization of a new style of international relations based on international cooperation, not aggression and fear.
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12. KIEV ACCUSES RUSSIA OF ‘DESTABILISING’ UKRAINE
Russia employed this policy extensively in the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both now recognised as independent states by Moscow.
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13. GEORGIA WAR SPARKS POLITICAL BATTLE IN UKRAINE
The ruling coalition is near collapse as the president and the prime minister spar over whether to treat Russia as foe or friend.
The president’s office now calls Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko a traitor who refuses to speak out against Moscow. She shoots back that President Viktor Yushchenko is a loose cannon who has antagonized Russia to the point of endangering Ukraine.
The war in Georgia is over. But the war over the war in Georgia rages unabated in Ukraine, the former Soviet state that, like Georgia, has drawn the wrath of Moscow by building ties with the West. The collapse of this country’s ruling coalition is widely expected to become official this week, the final gasp of a threadbare alliance that has barely hung together in recent months.
The delicate balance was upended by a widening dispute over how to respond to a newly aggressive Russia. The political turmoil is, in part, early jockeying between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko for the 2010 presidential election, but it is also a clash over the existential angst that bedevils this country, where identity is stretched awkwardly between Russia and the West.
The war between Russia and Georgia has brought a sense of crisis and anxiety to the region. Fattened on oil and gas riches, Moscow has made it plain that it intends to exert power on neighbors formerly part of the Soviet Union, that it feels justified in demanding “privileged interests,” as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev explained last month.
More than anyplace else, that means Ukraine, bonded to Moscow by deep, ancient imperial and cultural ties. To the fury of Moscow, Ukraine has emerged as a close ally of the United States, its leaders berating Russia as they lobby for membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But many Ukrainians continue to feel a strong affection and loyalty toward Russia.
Today, instead of pulling together and steeling for geopolitical maneuvers, the leaders of Ukraine are mired in internecine squabbles over what kind of country it should be and which loyalties it should foster. Like nothing else since the fall of the Soviet Union, the war in Georgia has laid bare Ukraine’s weaknesses.
When Russia sent warplanes, tank columns and thousands of soldiers into Georgia last month, Yushchenko, long an outspoken critic of Moscow, was outraged. He flew to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, to stand in solidarity with the Caucasus nation’s president and imposed restrictions on Russia’s Black Sea fleet, based in Ukraine under a long-standing agreement.
Tymoshenko, in contrast, drew attention with her silence. The prime minister dispatched an envoy to Tbilisi and sent humanitarian aid. But there was no condemnation of Russia.
The president’s office accused her of “high treason and political corruption” and hinted it would open a criminal case against her. “I think she struck a deal with the Kremlin. . . ,” said Roman Zvarych, a lawmaker from Yushchenko’s party. “You can’t have a prime minister of a country be silent when your sovereign territory is being used as a base to attack your ally.”
Last week, Tymoshenko was abruptly summoned by the prosecutor general for questioning in the near-fatal dioxin poisoning of Yushchenko in 2004. The inquiry is nothing but a political ploy, her followers say.
For their part, they say the president has gone too far in criticizing Moscow. Not only has he whipped up tensions to a dangerous height, they say, but he also has alienated those Ukrainians who have ethnic and cultural ties to Russia and who are leery of invoking its wrath. That view seems to be gaining credibility. Yushchenko’s approval ratings are in the single digits, analysts from all camps say.
“Support for [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili by Yushchenko angered Russia and woke up that bear that’s been sleeping for a long time,” said Hanna Herman, a lawmaker with the Moscow-friendly Party of Regions. “Now, Ukraine has the worst relations with Russia in the history of its independence.”
Today’s Kiev, the capital, is a battle-hardened place long drained of the pro-democracy, anti-Russia fervor of the 2004 Orange Revolution, which swept Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to power. The onetime tent city of Independence Square is a clot of black-clad youth, locked into clinging embraces, drinking cheap beer and bellowing rock songs.
Kiev hums with politics: local politics, politics for their own sake, games for stakes of power and cash. Everybody has a press aide. Even the press aides seem to have press aides. All of them want to talk to the media, unless they are plotting some new, subtle subterfuge, then they stay silent.
You get the sense sometimes that in this city, Russia and the West have been carved down to shadows of themselves, to symbols wielded like weapons in the ceaseless churn of gladiator-style matches: invoked for their associations, for the blocs of voters they move, and later discarded for the same reasons.
Many analysts here believe Ukrainian politics are drifting closer to Moscow’s sway, as evidenced by the prime minister’s reticence about criticizing Russia and the enduring popularity of the pro-Moscow politician Viktor Yanukovich, a former prime minister whose Party of Regions holds the most parliamentary votes and who is widely seen as the third contender in the presidential election.
Some analysts are convinced that Moscow engineered the current crisis to send Yushchenko into oblivion and forestall Ukraine from joining NATO or moving closer to Europe.
“All of these changes, Russia had a hand in it . . . to bring people who are loyal to power,” said Vadim Karasyov, director of the Institute of Global Strategies, a Kiev think tank. “There’s no need for them to adopt the tactics we saw in Georgia. In Ukraine, they can use soft power and slowly adapt Ukraine to their liking.”
Karasyov, who is seen as close to the president, contends that Russia is on a gradual campaign to reestablish control over Ukraine. “This is all about changing Ukraine’s foreign policy and international identity,” he said. “Everything else is just a consequence.” [megan.stack@latimes.com]
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14. UKRAINE MIRED IN BICKERING
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16. UKRAINE OFFICIAL: ODESSA-BRODY A RUSSIAN MONOPOLY BUSTER
United Press International (UPI), Kiev, Ukraine, Friday, Sept. 12, 2008
KIEV, Ukraine – The Odessa-Brody oil pipeline shows the value of Central Europe as an energy supplier to the region and a deterrent to Russian energy
aims, officials said.
In an interview with the Azeri Press Agency Friday, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Burzu Aliyev said the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline serves as a major
rival to Russian aggression in the regional energy market. “The main goal of the Odessa-Brody pipeline is to dispose of Russian monopoly,” he said.
The Odessa-Brody pipeline currently runs in the reverse direction, eastward toward Russia. Aliyev said Kiev told the Russian oil pipeline firm Transneft
the direction will shift to its intended direction Nov. 1.
“Russian oil is transported from Odessa to Brody currently, and we intend to transport the oil from Odessa to Brody as it is considered in the project,” the deputy minister said. He blamed a lack of production at Ukrainian refineries for creating artificial market conditions, leaving the sector unprofitable.
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17. ENERGY OPTIONS FOR UKRAINE SEMINAR
“Achieving National Security for Ukraine Through Energy Independence and Diversification,”
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
(walking distance from the Dupont Circle Metro station, red line)
Ukraine presently relies on natural gas, oil, and nuclear fuel imported from Russia for more than half of its energy needs – a situation that poses serious risks to Ukraine’s national security, as evidenced by the current conflict between Russia and Georgia. The Russian-Georgian conflict underscores Need for Ukraine to slash reliance on import of Russian energy.
SPEAKERS:
2. Michael Mariotte, Executive Director – Nuclear Information and Resource Service: Nuclear Energy (con).
3. Edward Chow, Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Energy Program: Fossil Fuels (oil, gas, and coal).
4. Brian Castelli, Chief Operating Officer – Alliance to Save Energy: Energy Efficiency.
5. Ken Bossong, Co-Director – Ukrainian-American Environmental Association: Renewable Energy (solar, wind, geothermal, biomass/biofuels, water power).
WHERE: Rome Auditorium, Rome Building, Johns Hopkins University
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
(walking distance from the Dupont Circle Metro station, red line)
WEBCAST REGISTRATION:
To register for the free-of-charge live video webcast, please go to: http://thewashingtongroup.org/Events/2008/energy091508.php
Due to limited space, those planning to attend in person are encouraged – but not required – to RSVP. Please contact Andriy Blokhin at andriy.blokhin@gmail.com or 202-297-2484.
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18. MCDONALD’S UKRAINE OPENS FAST-FOOD RESTAURANT NUMBER 60
KYIV – McDonald’s Ukraine Ltd opens first fast-food restaurant in Poltava which is a center of famous Ukrainian halushkas. Construction of the restaurant is worth USD 1 million.
According to the press-service of the Poltava City Council, the city authorities approved the act of the state commission on putting into operation
McDonald’s Ukraine Ltd plans to increase the number of its restaurants in Ukraine fourfold up to 240. In 2008 the company will open its new
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19. PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO HANDS OVER LISTS OF GERMANS WHO
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20. OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY RECOGNIZED THE HOLODOMOR OF
1932-1933 IN UKRAINE AND ADVISED ALL PARLIAMENTS TO DO THE SAME
KYIV – The 17th session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) passed a resolution on the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine last Sunday in Astana.
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21. HOLODOMOR WILL BE RECOGNIZED IN TORONTO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Holodomor, an event during the early 1930s in the Ukraine where millions died of famine, will now be recognized on the fourth Friday of November in all Toronto public schools starting this year. The motion by Ward 12 (Willowdale) Trustee Mari Rutka to honour those who died during the Holodomor was unanimously approved at the last Toronto District School Board meeting in late August.
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22. BUCHACH: A UKRAINE TOWN DETERMINED TO SUFFER AMNESIA
Lee Strasberg, a great teacher of actors in America, was born there in 1901; and Simon Wiesenthal, the famous pursuer of war criminals, in 1908. In the 1930s, thousands of Jews still lived in Buchach.
It was Polish territory until 1939, when the Soviets (following their agreement with Germany) annexed it as part of their Ukrainian republic. The Poles, made unwelcome, soon left. Then the Germans came and most Jews were murdered by Nazis and their Ukrainian collaborators.
Today in Buchach you can easily find evidence of the Polish community; there’s a Roman Catholic church that they built, which is well maintained. But it’s hard to see any sign of the Jews. Evidence of their presence seems to be carefully eradicated.
The study house has a place in literary history as a crucial setting for the novels of S.Y. Agnon, a Jew who was born in Buchach, settled in Palestine in 1909, and won the 1966 Nobel Prize for literature. In the town’s little museum, several glass cases hold books by Agnon, most of them donated by visiting Israelis in 2001, but there’s nothing to explain why he’s part of Buchach’s past.
Buchach, like many other Ukrainian towns, practices a kind of reverse archaeology. It obliterates the civilization of the past rather than uncovering it. That’s the point of an unsettling and highly revealing book, “Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine” (Princeton University Press), by Omer Bartov, an Israeli-born, Oxford-educated historian who now teaches at Brown University in Providence, R.I.
Bartov has a special interest in Buchach. That was his mother’s town, until she left for Palestine with her family in 1935. Bartov sees its monocultural character as typical of the region. He describes in detail 20 towns and cities in western Ukraine where the pattern repeats itself again and again. The local people, while devoted to their nation’s history, have developed an amnesia about their one-time Jewish neighbours.
Bartov writes about this phenomenon with an understated emotion, fact piled upon fact, until his evidence becomes overwhelming.
These empty spaces in history have become a major subject for Bartov. He’s now writing a book entirely devoted to Buchach, a biography of the town and its residents from the 14th century to the end of its multi-ethnic tradition in the 1940s. He wants to understand what transformed a community based on co-
operation into a community of genocide. In this process, he’s found himself rethinking the nature of the Holocaust.
The killing of the Jews in the towns of western Ukraine (about 500,000 died there) was not, he points out, a neatly organized undertaking, directed from far away. It was “a vast wave of brutal, intimate, and endlessly bloody massacres.”
There are Ukrainians today who refuse to take part in consigning the local Jews to oblivion, just as (Bartov notes) there were Ukrainians who risked everything to save Jews during the Holocaust.
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Chance discovery leads couple to visit relatives in native land,
One of the most common mistakes is calling the country “The Ukraine.” When the country split from the Soviet Union in 1991, it dropped the article before its name. When a writer or broadcaster adds the article, they can expect a letter from Washinsky. “Ukrainians don’t even have the article ‘the’ in their language,” she said.
“For so long, Ukrainians were denied so many things,” he said. “They were not allowed to practice their traditions and their art forms.”
A few times each year, a box of goods arrives at their house. “There’s a certain smell to the embroidery and the varnish. When a box arrives, you feel like Ukraine is here today,” John Washinsky said.
[Lisa O’Donnell can be reached at 727-7420 or at lodonnell@wsjournal.com.]
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