AUR#736 Jul 20 Yanukovych Nominated By Coalition As Prime Minister; Moroz Meets US Amb Taylor & Former US Amb Miller; Amb Taylor Meets APM Yekhanurov

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   Party once again fails to live up the trust put in them by the voters
      Ukraine’s history is a long chain of too many missed opportunities.

      The parliamentary coalition of the Communist Party, Socialist Party and Party
  of Regions on July 18 submitted an official document of request to the Presidential
Secretariat to appoint the Party of Region’s leader Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister. 
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor  
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Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1800 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, July 19, 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

    Moroz tells Miller Ukraine will not deviate from European integration course

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, July 19, 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006


One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

                          GOVERNMENT NOT FORMED IN FULL
Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1253 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

9.                              THE ORANGE CRISIS IS RIPE
            The Orange besiege the parliament while the Party of Regions

                                   besiege the prime minister’s seat
Vladimir Solovyev
Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Orange Circle, New York, New York, Monday, July 10, 2006

11.                           TABLES TURNED IN UKRAINE
       Yushchenko loses control over cabinet as his popularity plummets
ANALYSIS AND COMMENT: By Oleg Varfolomeyev

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 139
Jamestown Foundation, Wash DC, Wed, July 19, 2006 

12.                    WEST WEARY OF UKRAINE ONCE AGAIN
OP-ED: By Taras Kuzio, Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, July 20, 2006

            Unquestionably, President Yushchenko deserves full blame for
                  the collapse of the new Orange coalition in parliament.
By Walter Parchomenko, Kyiv Post
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 20 2006

14.                                THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE
            Ukraine’s probable next prime minister didn’t steal this election.
The Washington Post, Wash, D.C., Mon, July 17, 2006

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

By Natasha Lisova, Associated Press Writer
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 19, 2006

             “Kyiv of the 1910s-1930s was the mecca of ‘leftwing artists'”

               Exhibition in Chicago opens this Saturday, July 22, 2006
By Olena Shapiro, special to The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English #21
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 27 June 2006

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – The parliamentary coalition on July 18 submitted an official document
of request to the Presidential Secretariat to appoint the Party of Region’s
leader Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister. This was disclosed at a news
conference by the press secretary for President Viktor Yuschenko, Iryna

According to Heraschenko, the President is due to approve or dismiss the
request within the 15-day period allowed by the Constitution. The President
hails the fact that the deputies began acting in accordance with
constitutional requirements by declaring a coalition again on July 18 and
submitting a fresh request to approve their nominee for premiership, said

“The President hails the fact that the deputies began honoring the law and
the Constitution and – by declaring a coalition for the second time and
submitting an official request for the second time [to appoint their nominee
for premiership] – acknowledged that they violated the Constitution and the
law by doing so previously,” Heraschenko said.

It was precisely what the President demanded – that the Constitution and law
be complied with, she said. In decision making on the Prime Minister’s
nomination the President will act according to the Constitution and law, the
presidential press secretary said.

“The President of Ukraine’s position will rest on the letter of the law,”
she said. As Ukrainian News reported before, the ‘anti-crisis’ parliamentary
coalition of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist
Party on July 18 submitted an official petition to the President for the
second time requesting that he approve the nomination of Viktor Yanukovych
as Prime Minister.                                   -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

TV 5 Kanal, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1800 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – Ukrainian MPs began their first day of work in parliament committees
on 19 July. Parliament yesterday adopted a resolution on the leadership and
members of the committees. The resolution was supported by the majority
coalition of the Party of Regions, Communist Party and Socialist Party.

Around half of the pro-presidential Our Ukraine bloc supported the
resolution, while most of the opposition Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc did not
vote. The following is the text of a report by Ukrainian television TV 5
Kanal on 19 July:

[Presenter] We had the first calm day of the parliamentary week. MPs
renounced their political convictions for a time to work in committees.
Outside the parliament hall, MPs show tolerance and calm. Admittedly, the
greatest political enemies decided to avoid meeting today.

[Correspondent] The block around parliament was packed with cars. MPs
gathered for the first time for meetings in committees. A terrarium filled
with like-minded individuals is the association called up by the composition
of some of the newly-formed parliament committees.

However, members of the committee on legal policy did not have the chance to
observe [Party of Regions leader] Viktor Yanukovych, [Communist Party
leader] Petro Symonenko and [former Prime Minister] Yuliya Tymoshenko taking
part in the discussion of bills under the chairmanship of [Regions of
Ukraine MP] Yevhen Kushnaryov. The faction leaders did not grant their
subordinates the pleasure of their company.

[Our Ukraine MP] Ruslan Knyazevych, a former member of the Central Electoral
Commission who refused to recognize Viktor Yanukovych as president [after
disputed second round of 2004 presidential election], says that he feels OK
under the leadership of the deputy leader of the Party of Regions faction

[Knyazevych] In any case, the committee does not include any of the
individuals who were implicated in those events and were directly connected
with me.

[Correspondent] Another former CEC member, [Party of Regions MP] Valeriy
Bondyk, feels no less comfortable in the committee for the judiciary. He was
dismissed after accusations of vote-rigging at the presidential election.

The status quo is preserved. His immediate superior has not changed – as
before it is [Party of Regions MP and former CEC chairman] Serhiy Kivalov.
Bondyk hopes that his presence in the committee will allow him to restore

[Bondyk] The Supreme Court has still not considered the appeal that the
dismissal was for political motives. We will prove this.

[Correspondent] The committee for finance and banking is also filled with
harmony and mutual understanding.

The issue of the transit server during the presidential election has been
forgotten about. Party of Regions MP Serhiy Klyuyev and committee head

[Our Ukraine MP] Petro Poroshenko were diplomatically correct. Although the
committee members are seated according to faction membership, they insist
that economic expediency will prevail over politics when it comes to
developing laws.

[Klyuyev, in Russian] At least, on our side, we will stick firmly to
professional points of view.

[Socialist MP Vasyl Tsushko] There is never any political discussion in the
committee. I am sure that the committee will work like a technological

[Poroshenko] Believe me, we have no need for time to get warmed up. From

the first day, the committee will be working at full strength.

[Correspondent] According to tradition, the committee for free speech
started its work with the land issue. The CEC, which is located in the same
building, took the meeting room away from the MPs. They are in a mood to

get it back. There is political balance in the committee headed by Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc MP Andriy Shevchenko.

There are the same number of representatives from the opposition and the
coalition. The gender issue – three women and nine men – is resolved better
than in parliament as a whole. In future, the committee head wants his
colleagues to work together for the goals that he failed to achieve as vice
president of the national TV company.

[Shevchenko] I think this committee will go down in history as the committee
that helped the country obtain public-service TV and radio broadcasting and
as the committee that brought about the denationalization of the press.

[Correspondent] When it increased the number of committees, MPs did not just
increase the number of bosses, but also the requirement for premises,
special communications and transport. For example, when they separated a
committee for the judiciary off from the committee for legal policy, MPs
could not divide offices and staff.                          -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz and newly appointed United States
Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor have discussed the political situation
in Ukraine. Moroz announced this at a press conference after a meeting with

According to Moroz, Taylor expressed the readiness of the United States to
cooperate with the ‘anti-crisis’ parliamentary coalition formed by the Party
of the Regions, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party. ‘They are
prepared to cooperate with the coalition. This proceeds from the strategic
interests of the United States,’ Moroz said.

Moroz also told journalists that he informed Taylor about the current
political and economic situation in Ukraine. Moroz also said that he told
Taylor that he supported formation of a broad parliamentary coalition
including the Our Ukraine bloc’s parliamentary fraction. ‘Unity is
necessary, and cooperation among all branches of government is necessary,’
Moroz said.

He also said that the foreign-policy course of Ukraine would remain
unchanged when the parliamentary coalition formed by the Party of the
Regions, the Socialist Party, and the Communist Party comes to power.

According to him, the former and current United States ambassadors to
Ukraine William Green Miller and Taylor will objectively evaluate the events
taking place in Ukraine and objectively inform the leadership of their
country about the situation.

According to the press service of the parliament, Taylor said that the
United States was prepared to cooperate with any coalition formed
democratically. ‘It is important for the West to look at the first steps of
the coalition, at its work,’ Taylor is quoted as saying.

According to the press service, Taylor is confident of the success of
Ukraine’s bid for admission into the World Trade Organization. According to
Taylor, the United States supports simultaneous admission of Ukraine and
Russia into the WTO.

According to him, the United States also supports friendly relations between
Ukraine and Europe as well as between Ukraine and Russia.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the anti-crisis parliamentary coalition
formed by the Party of the Regions, the Socialist Party, and the Communist
Party proposed again on July 18 that President Viktor Yuschenko approve the
candidacy of the Party of the Regions’ leader Viktor Yanukovych for the post
of prime minister.

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Moroz tells Miller Ukraine will not deviate from European integration course

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – Parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz has said that the anti-crisis
coalition is ready to form a government within several days. “The Supreme
Council [parliament] could form [the government] in two days,” the head of
the Supreme Council press service, Viktoriya Shvedova, quoted Moroz as
saying after his meeting with former US ambassador William Miller.

She said that during the meeting Moroz stressed that President Viktor
Yushchenko must fulfil his constitutional function – submit the prime
minister candidacy to parliament for consideration. “The key to a solution
to the problem is in the president’s hands,” Moroz said.

Shvedova said that the speaker expressed his belief that, by submitting
[Party of Regions leader] Viktor Yanukovych’s candidacy for prime minister,
Yushchenko will get “unreserved support both in the Supreme Council and in

Moroz subjected the idea of parliament’s dissolution to scathing criticism,
dismissing it as holding no promise for Ukraine. Towards the end of the
meeting, Moroz assured Miller that Ukraine will not deviate from its
European integration course and also that “he (Moroz) will stand by all the
democratic achievements, including those won by Maydan [massive protests

in Kiev’s Independence Square, venue of the Orange Revolution in 2004]”.

Moroz also forecast that the [propresidential] Our Ukraine faction will join
the “anti-crisis” coalition of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of
Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine. Moroz began a meeting with the
present US ambassador to Ukraine, William Taylor, at noon [0900 gmt].

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – Acting Prime Minister Yurii Yekhanurov has familiarized U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor with the situation in Ukraine.
Ukrainian News learned this from the prime minister’s press service.

During their meeting Taylor indicated hope that his extensive professional
experience will be useful in further development of relations between
Ukraine and the United States of America.

Yekhanurov shared his vision of the ways to overcome the situation that
evoked in the Verkhovna Rada and laid accent on the need to stabilize the
situation and begin normal work in parliament and the newly appointed
government with the aim of pursuing economic reforms.

Taylor noted that the U.S. government in all ways supports the move of
Ukraine to join the World Trade Organization and expressed readiness to
provide consultative assistance in analysis of consequences of such entry
for some industries of Ukraine.

The officials also discussed development of the Ukrainian gas transportation
system. Yekhanurov stressed that the government of Ukraine is flatly opposed
to the possibility of privatization or transfer of the management of the

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz and
Taylor have met about political situation in Ukraine.

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1630 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

KIEV – A senior member of the propresidential Our Ukraine bloc, MP Petro
Poroshenko, has said in an interview with One Plus One TV on 19 July that
his parliamentary faction took part in the vote on the distribution of
standing committees to prevent the coalition from usurping power. He also
denied information that Our Ukraine is in talks with the Party of Region on
joining the coalition.

Commenting Our Ukraine’s participation in the distribution of parliamentary
committees on 18 July, Poroshenko said: “This has always been our stance –
we are categorically against the usurpation of power by a political force or
a coalition.” In his view, by doing so his faction and the faction of the
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc managed “to maintain influence” over political
processes in parliament and society.

Poroshenko denied rumours that Our Ukraine is continuing informal talks with
the Party of Regions on joining the coalition. “Neither the Our Ukraine
People’s Union party nor the Our Ukraine bloc took a decision to task anyone
with conducting such talks,” he said.

On the contrary, he went on, the party is prepared to stand in a repeat
election although such a development of events would be “unwelcome”. “I
think today our position fully depends on the president’s decision,”
Poroshenko said.

Asked about a number of posts allocated to Our Ukraine in the coalition
cabinet, Poroshenko stressed that his political force is not a member of the
coalition, thus, it is not claiming any portfolios in the new cabinet. “I am
extremely doubtful that Our Ukraine may become a member of the anti-crisis
coalition,” he said.                               -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Wed, July 19, 2006

KYIV – The Pora party has placed Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz on

its blacklist of politicians who are destroying democracy in Ukraine. Andrii
Yusov, a member of the Pora party, announced this to journalists.

Representatives of the Pora party held an event simulating presentation of a
“black label” to Moroz on Wednesday. They placed a bucket containing six
roses in front of the Kyiv office of the Socialist Party on Hrushevskoho
Street and threw 1- and 2-kopeck coins into it.

According to Yusov, this means that the roses, which are symbols of the
Socialist Party, have been sold to the Party of the Regions. “These roses
have been sold because they are covered in coins… this is the Ukrainian
society’s view of the actions and betrayal of Oleksandr Moroz,” Yusov said.

According to him, those politicians that are included on Pora’s blacklist
should immediately be excluded from all political and public activities
because they have a negative influence on the development of the country

and are destroying democracy in the country.

As Ukrainian News earlier reported, the Party of the Regions, the Socialist
Party, and the Communist Party reached agreement on formation of a
parliamentary coalition on July 7. Before the formation of this coalition,
the Socialist Party was in a parliamentary coalition with the Our Ukraine
bloc and the Yulia Tymoshenko.                      -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
     NOTE: Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
                     GOVERNMENT NOT FORMED IN FULL

Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian 1253 gmt 19 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

KIEV – Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko can dissolve parliament if

the government is not formed in full, the presidential representative in the
Constitutional Court, Volodymyr Shapoval, told a briefing in Kiev today.

“The constitution envisages who is included in the government, so all the
government members should be appointed. There are no exceptions. All

the ministers should be there,” Shapoval said.

According to the constitution, the president has the right to dissolve
parliament if a new government is not formed within 60 days after the
resignation of the previous Cabinet. Asked if this applies to the ministers
who are submitted by the president, the defence and foreign ministers,
Shapoval said that they are no exception.

“If the Supreme Council [parliament] does not appoint those whom he
(president – Interfax) submits, then the president can use this right (to
dissolve parliament – Interfax),” the president’s representative in the
Constitutional Court said. [Passage omitted: President has 15 days to
approve the candidate for prime minister.]

Asked if the president has the right to dissolve parliament if he does not
submit the candidate for prime minister back to parliament within 15 days,
because 25 July is the deadline for parliament to fully form the government,
Shapoval said: “There are no grounds for this today, but the president has
the right to dissolve parliament during the 15-day term (after parliament
submits the candidate for prime minister to the Ukrainian president –

“It is possible that, with certain interpretation, nobody will doubt that he
can use this right after the 26th (of July – Interfax),” Shapoval said.

If Yushchenko does not submit the candidate for prime minister, then he can
simply dissolve the Supreme Council, the president’s representative
explained. Shapoval also said that Ukraine is the only country where the
president has the right to dissolve parliament legally, but this is his
right rather than obligation.

Yushchenko appointed Shapoval his representative in the Constitutional Court
in October 2005. Before that, Shapoval worked as Constitutional Court judge
for nine years.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

9.                          THE ORANGE CRISIS IS RIPE
          The Orange besiege the parliament while the Party of Regions
                                besiege the prime minister’s seat

Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, July 19, 2006

It is finally clear who holds power and who is in opposition in Ukraine. The
anti-crisis coalition formed by the Party of Regions said yesterday it is
determined to have Viktor Yanukovich back in the prime minister’s seat. The
president-loyal Our Ukraine stands on the defensive trying to foil these
plans. It threatens with the dissolution of the Supreme Rada and bargains
over a compromise candidate. The Yulia Timoshenko Bloc is in opposition and
back to the street again.

                             UNDER THE RADA’S WALLS 
Ukraine’s Supreme Rada had a session yesterday in the state of besiege with
a few thousand activists of conflicting political forces surrounding the
building. The Orange were represented with activists of the Pora party, the
Yulia Timoshenko Bloc and the pro-presidential Our Ukraine.

Members of the Pora were the most inventive. They spread out their
mattresses and lay down in front of the entrance to the parliament at five
o’clock in the morning.

After the party’s avant-garde had their stronghold by the doors, Evgeny
Zolotarev, the Pora’s leader, announced the start of the Orange forces’
protest rally, called Unfrozen Democracy. The aim of the rally is to prevent
the anti-crisis coalition of the Party of Regions, Socialists and Communists
from assuming power, he said.

“This coalition of traitors and separatists will curtail democracy in
Ukraine and hinder the country’s rapprochement with Europe,” Evgeny
Zolatarev made a prediction. “Therefore the Pora will stay not only on
Maidan but under the Rada’s walls as well.”

Meanwhile, Zolotarev’s associates executed the party’s order and sprawled in
front of the Rada’s doors trying not to let in the Party of Region’s
deputies who were coming for an important session. The most fearless
deputies stepped over the protestors while less conflict-prone ones entered
the parliament through the doors that the Party of Region’s squad had win
over from the Pora. “Let them step over. They may find it useful stepping
over their people and feel their real sentiment,” Evgeny Zolatarev

Yulia Timoshenko’s advocates stood on the defensive against the Regions out
on the street. They were waiving flags with the Timoshenko Bloc’s logo and
held posters reading “Moroz is a traitor!” [Alexander Moroz, the Rada’s
speaker.], “Dissolve the Supreme Rada!” “Justice Exists! We must fight for

They blocked traffic in the crossroads of Grushevsky and Shelkovichnaya
streets organizing a kind of check-point. They checked passes and didn’t let
in anyone apart from journalists and the parliament’s staff. At one point,
activists from the Timoshenko Bloc and the Regions’ Party started a fight
but the police soon stopped it.

                     TRIUMPH OF THE PARTY OF REGIONS 
The Rada’s session was held despite all the impediments and street fights.
The Party of Regions seemed to have gained control over all strategically
important objects. Their activists blocked the tribune, the presidium as
well as boxes for the government and courts’ representatives. To be on the
safe side, the White-and-Blue even occupied boxes for foreign delegations
and ambassadors.

Alexander Moroz, the parliament’s speaker, opened the session repeating the
announcement of setting up the anti-crisis coalition and disbanding the
alliance of the Timoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine and Socialists. Moroz also
informed that the new union nominated Viktor Yanukovich as prime minister.

Afterwards, the deputies started distributing the parliament’s committees.
Vladimir Rybak, chair of the Party of Regions’ executive committee, said
that the coalition would control 15 committees. His party will have nine of
them, and the other three will go to their allies, Socialists and
Communists. The Yulia Timoshenko Bloc and Our Ukraine are to share the
remaining 12 committees. The former will get seven and the latter will get
five committees.

The Party of Regions were in a cheerful mood yesterday. “We’ve done a good
job. We announced the coalition and nominated Yanukovich as prime minister,”
Anna German, Yanukovich’s aide shared her enthusiasm with Kommersant. “Now
we’ll have to wait till the president submits the candidacy of our leader to
the parliament. Once we have the prime minister, the government won’t be a

The new parliament can be shaped in two days as all seats have been
distributed, Ms. German noted. Asked if the anti-crisis coalition has other
candidates for the premiership, Anna German proudly replied. “Viktor
Fyodorovich’s candidacy is a matter of principle for us. It goes without
saying. He is a symbol and it’s no longer his personal decision. His
premiership is the people’s will.”

The Regions’s upbeat mood was not spoilt even by the news that President
Viktor Yushchenko’s staff are mapping out judicial and political plans to
dissolve the parliament. Oleg Rybachyuk, head of the staff, announced it
yesterday. “I’m not joking when I say that the coalition has an opportunity
to find an agreement by July 25 and shape the government that would unite
the country. This government has to be headed by a compromise prime
minister,” Rybachyuk insisted in an interview with the Ukrainian press.

The Party of Regions was not afraid of those threats. “All this talk about
dissolution of the Rada is merely putting up a bold face. We offered them a
coalition but they lost this chance. They could have had their own prime
minister, and they’re trying to find the way to lose the least,” Anna German
told Kommersant.

                               FEARS OF OUR UKRAINE 
The presidential staff’s threats about drafting plans to dissolve the Rada
mean that the bargain between the two political forces (pro-presidential Our
Ukraine and the Party of Regions) is still ongoing. The game is for the
premier’s seat. Our Ukraine does not really need to have the post. It’s more
important that Viktor Yanukovich will not occupy it. Otherwise, Viktor
Yushchenko will be spectacularly defeated after he rose to power overcoming

“They [Our Ukraine] are telling us now: ‘We’ll enter a coalition with you if
you call off Yanukovich’s nomination.'” Anna German said confirming rumors
in the parliament. “You can’t make business in this way! Their time has
gone! We are the party-in-power now and all others are opposition.”

Apparently, promises to dissolve the Rada are a part of political bargain
and Viktor Yushchenko’s strongest trump. Nikolay Poludenny, the president’s
aide for legislation, admitted that there are no real grounds for this step.
The Rada can be dissolved if a coalition is not created 30 days after the
legislature’s first session, he said. The coalition exists so there is no
reason for this move.

A reason for dissolving the parliament and staging early elections will
appear in case the anti-crisis coalition fails to shape the government
before July 25. The president’s law advisor called this rationale the
strongest one but added that this outcome would be highly unfavorable.

“Dissolving the Rada means early elections and a new confrontation. No one
wants it,” Mr. Poludenny told Kommersant. “This step is possible if the
parliament shows that it’s incapable to execute its powers, which it has
been doing since the first session. The president, however, did not make
this decision.”

Indeed, early election does not play in favor of Our Ukraine and Viktor
Yushchenko, and the opposing party is perfectly aware of this. “There’s no
way for the president to dissolve the parliament. He is the last person to
benefit from an early election. The latest polls held by our experts show
that Our Ukraine can muster the maximum of 7 percent of the vote. In the
worst case, we may even fail to enter the Rada,” Anna German said.

                       FAILURE OF YULIA TIMOSHENKO 
Meanwhile, the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc is trying hard to avoid any
compromising contacts with the Party of Regions. Yulia Timoshenko and her
supporters demand that the president disband the parliament. “We are
pressing for the dissolution of the Rada. This is the president’s
prerogative, and he has all the powers needed for it,” Vitaly Chepinoga,
spokesperson for Yulia Timoshenko, told Kommersant.

This tactics is the only valid option for the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc after
the anti-crisis coalition shattered Timoshenko’s hopes to head the
government. On top of it, some deputies from the bloc dashed to Viktor
Yanukovich’s camp once it became clear that she would not be prime minister.

Three deputies said yesterday they were leaving Timoshenko’s faction, and it
seems only the beginning. A great number of businessmen entered the
parliament in the Bloc’s list and they are unlikely to prefer to stay in
political opposition which will harm main trade. The party, however, tries
to tone down the developments.

“This is a real challenge for the deputies. It’s a positive thing that we
can get rid of the people who value money more than any aim or idea,” Ms.
Timoshenko commented on the deputies’ escape. “The Party of Regions has
acted as a wolf that is purifying the forest. At least, now we can see who
has sold themselves and who still remains human.”

Yulia Timoshenko and her allies now have to act as the staunchest Orange
force. This fact obviously is good for their image of the only true
revolutionaries and fighters against corruption. On the other hand, this
position does not imply any political responsibility as only the president
can dissolve the Rada.

Pressing for an early parliamentary election, the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc,
however, has taken an active part in distributing seats in the parliament’s
committees. What is more, the Bloc accepted the Party of Regions’s
suggestion and agreed to keep the seat of the parliament’s vice-speaker.

The post is reputed to go to Alexander Turchinov, Yulia Timoshenko’s closest
associate. “It doesn’t contradict other things. We want the Rada to be
dissolved but we are not sure that the president will do it,” Vitaly
Chepinoga explained. “Committees and the seat of the speaker are very
important achievements, and we will need them when we turn to opposition.”

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Orange Circle, New York, New York, Monday, July 10, 2006

NEW YORK – In response to recent political events in Ukraine, the Board
of Directors of the Orange Circle, a non-partisan, not-for-profit, non-
governmental organization headquartered in New York, today approved the

While the Orange democratic coalition has disintegrated, the effects of the
Orange Revolution are permanent. The values of the Orange Revolution have
remade Ukraine and created the basis for a more pluralistic society, with
free media, divided power among the branches of government, and economic
activity freed from government intimidation and blackmail.

The Orange Revolution stands as a reminder that society will not tolerate
the erosion of its hard-won rights, and anyone who holds power will be
reticent to test the public’s capacity to mobilize in defense of its rights.

Contrary to views of critics, the year and a half since the Maidan has not
been wasted. The private sector has grown more diverse, prosperous and
influential; many business leaders have become less politically engaged;
real incomes are up significantly; property values are booming; a middle
class is expanding; cultural and intellectual discourse has blossomed; media
have deepened their independent roots; a nationwide democratic election
based on open contestation and a level playing field was held; society and
government are more transparent as corrupt schemes and conflicts of interest
have been exposed.

There are important forces in the Regions and Socialist parties that
understand Ukraine’s future is in European integration and in the acceptance
of the social, market, and democratic values of the prosperous West.

However, in the circumstances of a likely Regions-Communist-Socialist
coalition, there will be serious dangers that anti-democratic and
anti-Western voices, as well as those who were involved with the criminal
falsification of elections, will have significant influence in the new
ruling team and on policy.

That anti-democratic influence can only be overcome by the consolidation of
supporters of the Orange Revolution’s democratic values around the President
of Ukraine, who retains significant powers and is responsible for the
security of the country and its foreign and defense policy.

The Orange Coalition collapsed as a result of great personal ambitions and
the failure to compromise for the sake of the common good. Today, when
vigilance on behalf of democracy is crucial, those in Ukraine who supported
the Orange Revolution need to set aside personal ambitions and consolidate
around the President as the guardian of democratic values.

The immediate and most crucial challenge to be faced is the struggle for
Ukraine’s heart and soul. To strengthen its integrity as an independent
nation, Ukraine must preserve its distinct national identity and the primacy
of the Ukrainian language and culture.

That challenge will be faced by the government and the President, but its
outcome will be determined by civic discourse, by media, and largely by
ordinary Ukrainian citizens and the private sector. Whatever the course of
events in the coming days, the friends of democratic Ukraine have a huge
obligation and opportunity now to offer assistance and support for those
democratic values.

Today as never before, those around the world who supported the Orange
Revolution must join together to support Ukraine’s reform voices and to
work with them, wherever they emerge.

Today, as never before, friends of democracy in Ukraine must work together
to strengthen the international standing and influence of President
Yushchenko, who is chief standard-bearer of democratic values, economic
vitality, and a Western orientation for Ukraine.           -30-
Headquartered in New York, with representation in Kyiv, the Orange Circle is
a non-partisan, not-for-profit, non-governmental organization that advocates
Ukraine’s integration into global and European institutions.

The Orange Circle promotes investment in Ukraine, works to strengthen
democratic values and market reform in Ukraine, and engages Ukraine’s
leaders in dialogue with their counterparts in North America and Europe.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

11.                        TABLES TURNED IN UKRAINE
     Yushchenko loses control over cabinet as his popularity plummets

ANALYSIS AND COMMENT: By Oleg Varfolomeyev

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 139
Jamestown Foundation, Wash DC, Wed, July 19, 2006 

Long-time opponents of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko allied with
defectors from his camp to outplay him in a bid to secure control over the
government. The Orange coalition, which was announced on June 20, barely
survived two weeks; instead a coalition built around the Party of Regions
(PRU) has secured a majority in parliament and is about to form a new

Yushchenko’s firebrand ally Yulia Tymoshenko has lost the opportunity to
become prime minister again; instead, the post of prime minister will most
probably go to Yushchenko’s bitter rival in the 2004 presidential election
and subsequent Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych.

The radical turn of events came on July 6, when the Socialist Party (SPU)
took back their promise to support a candidate for parliamentary speaker
nominated by Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, Petro Poroshenko. Unexpectedly
for their Orange allies, the SPU put forward their candidate, party leader
Oleksandr Moroz.

The PRU immediately saw this as an opportunity to jump on the government
train and voted for Moroz, rather than for their own candidate, Mykola
Azarov. Moroz was also backed by the Communist Party’s (CPU) votes.

On the following day, the three parties formed a new majority, naming it the
“anti-crisis coalition,” and the SPU quit the Orange camp.

This was a hard blow for Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine, who called Moroz a
traitor. Tymoshenko warned on July 7 of “a return to the Kuchma era in its
worst shape,” recalling that Yanukovych was former President Leonid Kuchma’s
faithful prime minister in 2002-2004.

Yushchenko initially seemed to hope that Our Ukraine would be admitted to
the new coalition, saying in a TV interview on the same day that he could
not imagine Our Ukraine in the opposition. At the same time, he said that he
might dissolve parliament, should talks with the PRU fall through.

On July 7, the anti-crisis coalition nominated Yanukovych for prime
minister. Our Ukraine reportedly tried to persuade the PRU to form a grand
coalition with the SPU, but without Tymoshenko and the CPU and on the
condition that an Our Ukraine representative would be prime minister — 
essentially the conditions the PRU had agreed to in the middle of June,
before the emergence of the abortive Orange coalition — but this time the
PRU did not accept Our Ukraine’s overtures.

Yushchenko insisted that he would not accept the new coalition, which, he
argued, was set up with procedural violations. He threatened to disband
parliament and call new elections. Yushchenko argued that he had the right
to do so, as the Orange parliamentary majority had fallen apart, and 30-day
term set by the constitution for a majority to take shape had elapsed. At
the same time, Our Ukraine was continuing fruitless talks with the PRU.

The new majority chose to meticulously adhere to procedures so as not to
provoke Yushchenko. On July 10, the SPU officially pulled out of the Orange
coalition, and on July 18, as requested by Yushchenko, the anti-crisis
coalition submitted Yanukovych’s candidacy for prime minister.

Communist MP Adam Martynyuk, who was elected deputy speaker on July 11,

said the majority would meet one of Yushchenko’s principal conditions for
approving Yanukovych as prime minister — to swear in the Constitutional
Court (CC) judges — very quickly, in order to have the CC on hand to appeal
against Yushchenko’s possible decision to dissolve parliament.

Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine tried to use the weapon that the PRU had wielded
in June — physically blockading parliament — in order to make opponents
accept their conditions. But this could not continue incessantly, and
Yushchenko eventually faced the dilemma of either disbanding parliament and
calling new elections, which Tymoshenko demanded, or recognizing the new

New elections, however, would have most probably been won by the PRU

hands down, as they are at the peak of their popularity. Instead, Yushchenko
decided to accept defeat. On July 18, Our Ukraine said that it recognized
the new majority coalition and announced it is going into the opposition.

The PRU is the only party clearly benefiting from the new coalition. The CPU
may find it hard to explain to their voters why they joined forces with a
party that they for years castigated as “a criminal clan.” The SPU may find
itself in an even worse position, even though its leader secured the post of

It is on the brink of a split — the SPU’s de facto number two man, Yosyp
Vinsky, publicly chastised Moroz for betraying the Orange Revolution and
resigned from the party’s governing body; Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
announced he was quitting the SPU; and there have been reports about mass
defections from the SPU in the regions.

Our Ukraine is probably hit hardest, as its protracted horse-trading with
the PRU and then subsequent defeat must have disillusioned its electorate.
The results of several public opinion polls, made public over July 15-17,
showed that Yushchenko’s popularity is probably at an all-time low, under
10%. Yanukovych and his party are supported by more than 30% of

Ukrainians and Tymoshenko by around 20%.

It is not only Yushchenko and Our Ukraine that face problems, however. The
anti-crisis majority may be even less stable than the Orange one. There are
differences in foreign policy matters — while the CPU is decidedly
pro-Russian, the PRU advocates a pragmatic approach, declaring the need to
continue the European integration course and the intention to mend relations
with Russia, as key PRU member, Borys Kolesnikov, said in an interview with
Invest gazeta.

Differences in economic matters are much deeper — the CPU opposes private
ownership, but the PRU professes economic liberalism. The SPU favors state
control over big industry, while the PRU’s opponents fear that this party is
prone to redistributing national wealth between the regional “clans” and
(Channel 5, July 6, 7, 10, 18; Inter TV, July 7; Ukrainian radio, July 8;
Zerkalo nedeli, July 15; Invest gazeta, July 18)(

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
 If you are receiving more than one copy of the AUR please contact us.

OP-ED: By Taras Kuzio, Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Thu, July 20, 2006

The deepening political and constitutional crisis in Ukraine has contributed
to growing Ukraine fatigue in the West. Unlike the Ukraine fatigue found in
the Leonid Kuchma era, today’s Ukraine fatigue is of a different ‘lighter’
nature. During Kuchma’s second term as president, Ukraine fatigue rested on
allegations of abuse of office, illegal arms sales and alleged involvement
in the murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze.

Today’s Ukraine fatigue-lite is of a different nature and can be divided
into genuine and disingenuous feelings. Genuine Ukraine fatigue-lite can be
found inside and outside Ukraine among those who welcomed the Orange
Revolution and hoped it would lead to a democratic breakthrough in Ukraine.
This, in turn, would have led to Ukraine’s integration into the West,
firstly into the WTO and NATO, and at a later date into the EU.

Genuine Ukraine fatigue-lite is exasperated by five policy failures.

FIRST, Viktor Yushchenko has been unable to grow into the president’s shoes.
Western media now openly talk of the lack of leadership in Ukraine. Since
January 2005, Ukraine has not had a ‘hospodar’ (master) at home.

Insiders in the president’s team say Yushchenko does not have loyal and
honest advisers whom he can trust to speak to him candidly. Yushchenko does
not have his own Condoleezza Rice or Dick Cheney, like U.S. President George

SECOND, loyalty to the president has been a more important factor than
competence. The past two heads of the presidential secretariat (Oleksandr
Zinchenko, Oleh Rybachuk) have failed to provide the president with an
efficient, strategic and competent support structure. Volodymyr Lytvyn and
Viktor Medvedchuk, who served under Kuchma, had many negative traits, but
they were nevertheless competent managers.

Anatoliy Kinakh, with little knowledge of international affairs, was not the
right secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. While
trumpeting the virtues of cooperation with NATO, his own parliamentary
faction was backing the left and Party of Regions in voting against it.
Kinakh’s support for Ukraine joining the WTO together with Russia was at
odds with government policy.

Continued support for Oleksiy Ivchenko as head of Naftogaz Ukrainy until his
resignation in May was another poor cadre choice. One energy expert compared
former Naftogaz Ukrainy head Yuriy Boyko to Ivchenko. While Boyko was
corrupt, he noted, Ivchenko was both incompetent and corrupt.

THIRD, the division of the Orange camp in September 2005, following
Yushchenko’s dismissal of the Yulia Tymoshenko government, has proved
impossible to heal. After three months of negotiations, an Orange coalition
collapsed in June before it could even propose a government.

The dragging out of coalition negotiations increased Ukraine fatigue in the
West and overshadowed the holding of a free and fair election in March 2006.

This year’s controversial gas agreement with Moscow showed how the
authorities reacted to, rather than formulated policy toward important
strategic issues.

There has also been a poor understanding of the link between domestic and
foreign policy factors. The choice of which coalition and government would
be created, and how long it would take to create them following the
elections was bound to have an impact on Ukraine’s integration into the WTO,
NATO and EU.

FOURTH, if Yushchenko has shown how difficult it is to move from central
banker to revolutionary, then this is even more the case for Prime Minister
Yuriy Yekhanurov. A good technocrat does not always have the right qualities
for a politician, as seen in Mr. Yekhanurov’s weak leadership of the
pro-presidential Our Ukraine party during the 2006 elections and since.

FIFTH, a lack of leadership following the elections is to blame for Ukraine’s
current crisis. Why couldn’t the president have stated his support for an
Orange coalition immediately following the elections, rather than wait until

Why did the president permit Our Ukraine to simultaneously hold talks with
its two Orange partners as well as the Party of Regions, whose leader Viktor
Yanukovych had challenged Yushchenko for the presidency in 2004?

While accepting credit for holding a free and fair election, Yushchenko and
Our Ukraine were unwilling to accept its logical outcome, as party leader
Roman Besmertnyiy had argued in favor of doing. In holding simultaneous
talks, Our Ukraine sought to secure for itself an upper hand in either an
Orange or Grand coalition, thereby negating the fact that it had come in
third in the elections.

Disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite fails to take into account the positive
legacies of the Orange Revolution, which remain numerous, no matter how
poorly Orange politicians have mismanaged the country since Yushchenko’s
election. Ukraine is both a different country to that of the Kuchma era and
very different from the norm in the CIS. One has only to compare Russia and
Ukraine to see how this is indeed the case.

Disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite can be better understood by comparing that
felt by Ukraine’s supporters in the West and those who were always cynically
predisposed toward the Orange Revolution. The U.S., Canada, Scandinavia and
Central-Eastern Europe welcomed the Orange Revolution and supported Ukraine’s
rapid integration into the West.

Among these countries, genuine disappointment is akin to that found among
Orange supporters inside Ukraine, who feel let down and who are today
recreating a Maidan-2, or protest tent camp, in Kyiv.

NATO as an organization welcomed the Orange Revolution and reiterated its
open door policy toward membership. Until the June anti-NATO demonstrations
in the Crimea, which cancelled planned military exercises, and the creation
of the Anti-Crisis coalition, NATO was ready to invite Ukraine into a
Membership Action Plan this year and membership in 2008-2010.

Western Europeans, particularly in the EU, exhibit a disingenuous Ukraine
fatigue-lite. The EU has largely cold-shouldered the Orange Revolution,
citing the failed referendum votes on the EU constitution, enlargement
fatigue and the Turkish membership question for the EU not opening its doors
to Ukraine. The European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan that Ukraine signed
in February 2005 is no different than what would have been offered to Viktor
Yanukovych if he had won the 2004 elections.

Western European EU members have had a cynical view of the likelihood of the
Orange Revolution succeeding. This view is surprisingly similar to that
found among Yanukovych’s voters and supporters of the Party of Regions, who
repeatedly stated their pessimism of the chances of the Orange coalition
remaining united. The crises in Ukraine are pointed to by Western European
EU members as alleged proof of the correctness of their cautious position
toward the country.

Unlike the U.S. and NATO, the EU has been unwilling to accept the important
strategic ramifications of Ukraine’s integration into the West. West
European EU members have been unwilling to upset relations with Russia,
which is a vital source of energy supplies. Russophilia has fed a
disingenuous Ukraine fatigue-lite.
Dr. Taras Kuzio is a Senior Trans-Atlantic Fellow, German Marshal Fund,

and Adjunct Professor, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies,
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
             Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
           Unquestionably, President Yushchenko deserves full blame for
                 the collapse of the new Orange coalition in parliament.

OP-ED: By Walter Parchomenko, Kyiv Post
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Jul 20 2006

With each passing day there is an increasing likelihood that President
Viktor Yushchenko will be remembered in Ukraine’s history books as little
more than a Maidan (Independence Square) legend during the Orange
Revolution, a convenient rallying figure for Ukrainian citizens fed up with
the corruption of Yushchenko’s predecessor, Leonid Kuchma, and
Yushchenko’s rival in the extremely fraudulent 2004 presidential race,
Viktor Yanukovych.

Yushchenko may very well be seen by future generations as a weak,
indecisive, and ineffective one-term president who routinely placed personal
interests and political ambitions above the public interest; and as a
president who intentionally squandered a rare second chance to revive a
splintered Orange coalition and its Maidan ideals because of his deep hatred
of former Orange ally Yulia Tymoshenko and fear that this charismatic leader
of uncompromising principles would rob him of a second presidential term.

After 18 months in office and the collapse of the new Orange coalition in
parliament last week, a coalition which the president promised would last
five years but which did not even last five days, it is time to
demythologize Yushchenko.

MYTH 1: GOOD CZAR, BAD BOYARS. For the longest time, many
citizens here in Ukraine, including critics of the president, almost
instinctively described him as a good and moral person, who unfortunately

was surrounded by bad and very politically ambitious advisors – a twist on
the old notion of the good Czar and his bad boyars.

However, after a year in office, more and more Ukrainians began to question
this image in the light of the president’s failure to send “bandits to
prison” as promised on the Maidan, and his political compromise with his
arch enemy, Viktor Yanukovych.

By last March’s parliamentary elections, it seemed that the good Czar and
bad boyars myth had been largely debunked. To the assertion that the
president is good but his advisors bad, here in Ukraine one increasingly
hears many of his former ardent supporters exclaim: “Vin sam takiy!”
Translation: “He’s no different!”

Moreover, during his turbulent 18 months in office, replete with
mini-scandals (his own and those of his inner circle) and assorted political
and economic crises, Yushchenko has never once taken personal
responsibility for any of these troubles.

Instead, he has consistently portrayed himself as an innocent victim,
betrayed by close associates, and has taken the art of blame-game politics
to new heights. Nor has Yushchenko ever fired any members of his inner
circle who have been accused of unethical, or even corrupt, practices.

Roman Zwarych, for example, the president’s first Minister of Justice back
in 2005, lied egregiously to reporters over a protracted period about his
professional qualifications for high office. Rather than call for his
immediate resignation and send an important signal to the nation’s younger
generation, Yushchenko downplayed and defended Zwarych’s unethical
behavior and later even promoted him, making him one of his key spokesmen
and political negotiators.

MYTH 2: PRESIDENT OF ALL UKRAINIANS. Yushchenko frequently
reminds his citizenry, “I am president of all Ukrainians.” However,
parliamentary elections last March provided clear and unambiguous evidence

that the majority of Ukrainians do not support their president and that public
confidence in him is steadily declining. During his 18 months in office he
has done nothing to de-polarize a greatly divided country.

Close scrutiny of his record during this period shows that he has not
undertaken a single systematic project in support of this goal. In fact, the
pre-March parliamentary election campaign launched by the president’s Our
Ukraine bloc aggravated an already very tense situation with its
drum-beating television and radio commercials, ironically, telling citizens
not to betray the Maidan because Kuchmism could return.

As is well known here in Ukraine, these commercials backfired and were
quickly pulled because they insulted citizens who felt it was the president
who had betrayed the Maidan with his accord with opposition leader Viktor
Yanukovych in the fall of 2005.

chief executive, the president is ultimately responsible for ensuring that
the government implement reform programs and foreign assistance in a timely

However, during his 18 months in office, Yushchenko has not made any effort
to tackle the very serious problem of entrenched, largely unresponsive
Soviet-style bureaucracies.

A single case may illustrate the gravity of the problem. According to a 12
April press release by the World Bank (as reported by the Kyiv Post), last
April the World Bank suspended a $60 million loan to Ukraine intended to
help stop the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis because of the
institutional incapacity of the Ministry of Health to purchase life-saving
drugs and medical equipment, and provide country-wide training for doctors
as required by the project.

Amazingly, only 2 percent of the World Bank loan was disbursed in the two
years since the project began in January 2004, and this was misappropriated
and used to buy new office furniture and the latest computers for
bureaucrats within the Ministry of Health.

What is especially troubling is that President Yushchenko, despite his
stated concern about Ukraine’s demographic crisis, has done nothing during
his tenure to break through the bureaucratic permafrost at the Ministry of
Health and release funds which could save the lives of Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, thousands of his citizens infected with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis
move closer each day to premature death primarily because of an uncaring and
incompetent bureaucracy.

Moreover, according to Peter Piot, executive director of the Joint UN
Program on HIV/AIDS, Ukraine stands on the verge of a major AIDS pandemic.
Significantly, this institutional incapacity to implement reform, with
countless excuses and promises given instead of action, is typical of the
Ukrainian government’s bureaucracies.

Contrary to conventional
wisdom, President Yushchenko never intended the new Orange coalition to be
more than a virtual coalition, a facade to conceal the bare-knuckled,
behind-the-scene fight to undermine Tymoshenko’s reputation as the country’s

new premier, and her chances to be a major contender in the 2009 presidential

Thus, from the outset, the president and his inner circle approached the
idea of forming a new Orange coalition in bad faith.

The mechanism intended to ensure the success of their plan was the new
coalition document, which was signed only after more than 100 days of
tortuous negotiations, finally produced a result that was to the president’s
liking. As soon as the new coalition document was signed, the president’s
true intentions became painfully evident.

Compelling evidence to support this claim of bad faith on the president’s
part, notably includes the nomination by Yushchenko’s party of his close
advisor and family friend, the very confrontational Petro Poroshenko, to the
key post of parliamentary speaker in the new parliament, an obvious effort
to rein in Yulia Tymoshenko in her job as the new premier.

Tellingly, in an interview on his Channel 5 TV station shortly before last
March’s parliamentary elections, a very emotional Poroshenko showed his

true face. He bitterly attacked Tymoshenko and literally called her a liar no
less than a handful of times.

Keenly aware of the bad blood between these two individuals and the negative
reaction Poroshenko’s nomination would receive from Orange coalition
partners in general, Yushchenko, nevertheless, aggressively pushed it

Not surprisingly, Orange coalition partner and Socialist party leader
Oleksandr Moroz reacted very negatively and appealed to the president with
the reasonable request that he nominate any other non-confrontational leader
from his Our Ukraine bloc in place of Poroshenko for the post of Speaker. In
return, he guaranteed to deliver his party’s votes for the new nominee.

However, Yushchenko stubbornly refused to honor Moroz’s request. Moroz

then reneged on the binding voting requirement that he and other Orange
coalition partners agreed to when they signed the new coalition document.

He publicly announced that he could not in good conscience vote for
Poroshenko as speaker because he firmly believed that this would place
Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, as the new premier, on a daily collision course
that would ultimately destroy the new Orange coalition.

Realizing that without Moroz’s vote, and that of his Socialist Party, he had
no realistic chance of obtaining the majority vote in parliament needed to
become speaker, a very angry Poroshenko withdrew his nomination. Quickly
thereafter, the new Orange coalition collapsed.

Unquestionably, President Yushchenko deserves full blame for the collapse

of the new Orange coalition in parliament. He put the final nail in the coffin
of the new coalition with his arrogant refusal to consider Oleksandr Moroz’s
very reasonable request.

Yushchenko mistakenly assumed, as did his “best and brightest” advisors, no
doubt, that Moroz and others within the new coalition would be bound by the
iron-clad voting scheme they shrewdly devised as part of the new coalition

In their planning, they apparently never allowed for a factor virtually
non-existent in Ukrainian politics and unrecognizable by most Ukrainian
politicians, namely political courage. In an act of astounding integrity,
Oleksandr Moroz stood alone against tremendous political and social pressure
and took a very principled position which he firmly believed to be in the
nation’s best interests.

The president and his “best and brightest” gambled in a very high stakes
game, miscalculated, and lost. Yushchenko squandered a rare second chance

to revive the ideals of the Maidan, which he compromised during his first year
as president, because he once again put his personal ambitions above the
public interest.

Today President Yushchenko is politically irrelevant. Although he retains
all of the formal powers he had before the collapse of the new Orange
coalition last week, his political and moral authority is virtually zero.

The locomotive pulling Ukraine today is Viktor Yanukovych.     -30-
Walter Parchomenko, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council

of the United States and currently based in Ukraine. The views expressed
here are purely his own.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
14.                                THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE
             Ukraine’s probable next prime minister didn’t steal this election.

EDITORIAL: The Washington Post, Wash, D.C., Mon, July 17, 2006

TWO YEARS AGO, politics in Ukraine seemed to be a battle between good
and evil. Now the picture is more complicated. The good guy is president,
but the bad guy is likely to become the next prime minister. Some say it’s a
failure of democracy. We disagree.

In the uproar after Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, there were clear
principles at stake. Viktor Yanukovich, the Russia-backed candidate, tried
to steal the presidential election through massive voting fraud. His
pro-West opponent, Viktor Yushchenko, nearly died after a poison attack that
no one has yet explained.

Ukraine’s weak democratic institutions were crumbling under the weight of
election rigging and political violence. Massive popular demonstrations
forced a rerun of the presidential race and ultimately kept a vote-rigger
out of the presidential palace.

But since then, Mr. Yushchenko and his Orange coalition have faltered. The
government has had to face Russian bullying and a bevy of domestic problems
while the momentum of revolution waned. In March’s parliamentary elections,
the party of Mr. Yanukovich claimed the most seats. And after months of
parliamentary wrangling, he won the nomination for prime minister last week.

It’s not an outcome the West will like; Mr. Yanukovich as prime minister
will do his best to keep Ukraine in Moscow’s orbit. Even if he doesn’t get
the parliament’s top job, which is still a possibility given the volatility
of Ukrainian politics, Mr. Yanukovich will rank among the most influential
politicians in government.

It is tempting to wish that Ukraine’s president would call for new
parliamentary elections, a move he called a last resort on Saturday, in the
hope that a pro-West coalition would get more seats.

But Ukrainians elected the current parliament only three months ago, and
there was no evidence of widespread vote tampering. The emerging political
settlement in Ukraine reflects the current divisions within the country,
which has a large ethnic Russian population in the east, Mr. Yanukovich’s
natural constituency, and a fierce Ukrainian nationalist movement in the
west, Mr. Yushchenko’s power base.

It should be no surprise that the leader of the parliament might represent
one end of the country and the president the other. The continued political
instability that new elections would cause and the distrust in the east that
they would encourage wouldn’t help cement Ukraine’s democratic institutions.

This is a chance for the United States and Europe to show that they favor
democracy first, not a particular democratic outcome in a single
parliamentary election. That means being ready to support Ukraine’s
aspirations to join NATO or to assist Mr. Yushchenko in claiming energy
independence from Russia — if the Ukrainian government asks.

Providing an attractive alternative to Russian domination through deference
to the democratic process and willingness to act in partnership with Ukraine
will further the West’s cause much more than would a pliant pro-West

Mr. Yanukovich may not be the prime minister we would have voted for.
But we respect the honest choice Ukrainians made.           -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Ukrayinska Pravda website, Kiev, in Ukrainian 14 Jul 06
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Wed, Jul 19, 2006

The new majority consisting of the Communists, the Socialists, and the Party
of Regions which has been formed in the Ukrainian parliament, has made
public its coalition agreement, a website has reported. The majority pledged
to continue European integration, mend relations with Russia and hold a
referendum on NATO entry.

It also guaranteed the inviolability of private property. The following is
an excerpt from the agreement including an introduction by an unnamed
journalist, as published on the Ukrainian website Ukrayinska Pravda on 14
July; the subheadings are as in the original:


After a week of the anti-crisis coalition being in existence and in
fulfilment of the law, it finally made its agreement public.

In contrast to the Orange agreement which was over 100 pages long, the
anti-crisis agreement is significantly more laconic. It is 12 pages of pious

In the economic sector the programme principles of the coalition statement
guarantee the inviolability of property by the state and the strengthening
of the institution of ownership, support for enterprises, the development of
competition, assisting the formation of national capital, bringing the
economy out of the shadows and legalizing capital gained in non-criminal

So, the businessmen in the Party of Regions [of prime minister designate
Viktor Yanukovych] will be able to live peacefully.

The agreement also speaks about carrying out a stable and rational tax
policy, intensifying investment and innovative activity, stimulating the
population’s investment and using economic stimuli to modernize
manufacturing and innovation.

Quite a large piece of the text concerns the agricultural sector. And here
one must admit a victory for the Socialist Party of Ukraine [SPU] – the
coalition agreed to extend the moratorium on land sales until 1 January

In the sphere of internal policy, it is stated that foreign policy will be
carried out in accordance with the constitution of Ukraine.
And then comes a very significant point: creating the conditions for
attaining full-fledged membership in the European Union.

It would be interesting to known how the Communist Party of Ukraine [CPU]
weighed in on such a point? Though a few lines later, there is a point for
them with a different strategic direction: developing equal and good
neighbourly relations with the Russian Federation and other neighbouring

As far as the issue of NATO is concerned, which is a sore point for all the
members of the coalition, there is no special categorical remark. The
agreement reads that passing a resolution on joining NATO will take place
exclusively as a legal consequence of a nationwide Ukrainian referendum.

The coalition did not include the issue of dividing posts. The document just
has three points on nominating the prime minister and that nominations of
candidates to the cabinet of ministers are made ahead of time in coalition
member factions.


We, the representatives of political forces, recognizing the will and
democratic choice of the Ukrainian people and relying on the support and
trust of our voters and sharing common responsibility for realizing the
hopes and desires of all citizens and also confessing the values of
democracy and being led in our actions by the priorities of people’s rights
and freedoms and the principle of the supremacy of the law and defending the
interests of the state and also understanding the critical state of the
country’s development and the social and economic situation, declare the
establishment of an anti-crisis coalition in the Supreme Council
[parliament] of Ukraine of the fifth convocation.

It is open to all parliamentary factions and individual MPs.

We are convinced that the anti-crisis coalition has a calling to provide
dignified conditions of life and equal possibilities for the
all-encompassing development of every citizen, the strengthening of society
and the confirmation of effective and responsible authorities on all levels,
building a competitive national economy and making Ukraine an equal member
of the community of developed European states.

With this goal, the MPs and representatives of deputy factions conclude this
agreement on establishing an anti-crisis coalition in the Supreme Council of
Ukraine of the fifth convocation which envisions setting up a parliamentary
majority and forming a coalition government.

The sides take responsibility upon themselves to consistently and
steadfastly bring to life the Coalition Action Plan and cooperate in making
decisions on clauses in the Regulations which are inseparable parts of this

The Agreement to establish an ant-crisis coalition in the Supreme Council of
Ukraine of the fifth convocation is composed of these parts:

A Preamble; One, the Programme of the Anti-crisis coalition which includes
the principles of domestic and foreign policies; Two, the regulations for
coalition activity.

The Programme of the anti-crisis coalition is built upon the principles of
patriotism, honesty and open political processes and on professionalism and
effectiveness in decision making. The Programme reflects the agreed position
of the sides.

The Anticrisis Coalition Action Plan comprises the principles of domestic
and foreign policy which put forth its goals and priority tasks.
1.1. The principles of domestic and foreign policy
The principles of domestic and foreign policy formulate the underlying goals
of the anti-crisis coalition and are the agreed priority tasks for all its
participants – that is, Ukrainian MPs who are members of factions which are
in turn members of this given agreement, the prime minister of Ukraine and
the members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – and these tasks must be
taken into account when working out the programme of the government’s
actions, in determining and conceptualizing laws and state-wide programmes
and in confirming the state budget of Ukraine.

[Passage omitted: various commitments in the sphere of humanitarian issues
and sport]
8. Transforming policy in the sphere of employment and the labour market,
raising the standard of living for wide sectors of the population;
– overcoming poverty;
– moving to a new social standard – a minimum hourly wage;
– decreasing the level of social stratification;
– assisting the population in becoming self-employed and assisting family,
small and medium business;
– making legal provisions for paying dividends to minority shareholders;
– decreasing labour emigration among the population, [providing] state
assistance for citizens abroad;
– simplifying the conditions for opening a new business;
– providing social payments [when such] are the main source of income at a
level not lower than the minimum subsistence level;
– eradicating wage debt and not allowing wage debt to appear at enterprises,
institutions and organizations of all kinds of ownership.
9. Pension reform
– creating the conditions for a dignified life for the elderly;
– stimulating the development of a non-government system of pension
10. Reforming the communal housing sector.

1. Completing and perfecting political reforms;
– optimizing the division of authority between the branches of power and
creating a working balance of checks and balances;
– clearly, and via legislation, identifying the status and mechanism of
forming, and the elements of, the activity of the president of Ukraine, the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (the rights and duties of the prime minister
of Ukraine and other members of the government), the Supreme Council of
Ukraine and regulating the procedures for their carrying out their authority
through legislation;
– developing parliamentarism and its institutional bases: a party system and
perfecting the proportional system of elections to parliament and local
councils and also regulating the status of the parliamentary majority (the
coalition of deputy factions) and the parliamentary minority through
– limiting the immunity of national MPs.
2. Bringing order to and gradually eliminating unfounded privileges for
civil servants, judges and deputies on all levels.
3. Reforming the higher and central level of executive power, establishing a
new model of public administration, democratizing the government, bringing
it closer to the needs and requests of each citizen.
Administrative-territorial reform based on the principles of economic
expedience and social need.
Strengthening the role of local self-government. Reforming the system of
municipal power based on principles of decentralizing and subsidies and
bringing them into accordance with generally accepted European principles as
laid out in the European charter on local self-government, which was
ratified by the Ukrainian parliament.
Finishing work on the above taking into account the bill adopted by the
previous parliament “On amendments to the constitution of Ukraine concerning
perfecting the system of local self-government” (number 3207-1) and passing
it with a date to take effect on 1 January 2007.
4. Providing accessible, quality and just courts.
5. Reforming the law enforcement agencies, the system of lawyers and the
system of enforcing court decisions and the institution of notaries.
6. Putting into practice the National Programme for Fighting Corruption.
7. Carrying out reforms in the armed forces and improving the defence
capabilities of the nation.
1. Raising income and wages on the basis of growing productive work.
2. Providing the conditions for realizing the human potential of the nation
in accordance with European standards.
3. Guaranteeing the inviolability of property rights by the state and
strengthening the institute of property as the basis of a market system of
4. Building a favourable environment for the development and all-around
support of entrepreneurship.
5. Developing competition as a basic factor in raising the effectiveness of
the economy.
6. Assisting processes for forming national capital as the basis of the
national macroeconomic stability and competitiveness.
7. Bringing the economy out of the shadows and legalizing capital from
non-criminal sources.
8. Providing a stable, low level of inflation.
9. Raising the effectiveness of management of the money supply.
10. Agreeing the budget policy of Ukraine with the goals of long-term
economic growth and making budget policy into an active instrument for
social and economic development under the conditions of a market economy.
11. Carrying out a stable and rational tax policy.
12. Intensifying investment and innovation activity:
– improving the investment climate and encouraging the investment of funds
by enterprises and the population;
– providing an innovation component in investment;
– confirming an effective system of insurance for investment risks;
– stimulating an increase in the volume of the population’s savings and
directing these funds towards investment in the economy;
carrying out a system of economic stimuli for encouraging the modernization
of Ukrainian manufacturing;
– modernizing the scientific-technology sector and motivating businesses to
13. Activating the resource potential of the regions and providing for the
development of their scientific-technological and innovation potential,
overcoming depression of the territories.
14. Providing for the effective use of state property and carrying out a
transparent and effective mechanism for the state to sell its ownership
rights and raise the quality of management of state property.
15. Implementing an optimal ratio of forms of ownership and organizational
models of stewardship.
16. Developing a liquid, transparent and reliable securities market.
17. Achieving a high level of energy security as a component of Ukrainian
national security.
18. Forming a competitive agricultural sector.
Working out and realizing by 1 January 2008 the necessary actions, which
will provide the conditions for a functioning land market (including
completion of distribution of acts granting ownership to land, distributing
land plots themselves and setting up a land cadastre, marking the boundaries
of territorial units, carrying out a monetary evaluation of land, mechanisms
to regulate the land market and so on). Introducing by 1 December 2006
additions to the Land Code of Ukraine in accordance with which the right to
realize rights to the sale of land are not allowed before the above work is
19. Forming the foreign policy of Ukraine on the basis of the priority of
national economic interests:
– optimising the state of the payment balance;
– stimulating export and the calculated regulation of imports;
– defending Ukrainian economic interests abroad.

1. Carrying out a foreign policy course in accordance with the constitution
of Ukraine, current legislation and generally accepted principles and norms
of international law.
2. Creating the conditions for achieving full membership in the European
Union. Finishing work on establishing the Single Economic Space [an economic
union with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan].
3. Passing a decision on joining NATO exclusively based on the legal
ramifications of a nationwide, Ukrainian referendum.
4. Developing equal and good-neighbourly relations with the Russian
Federation and other neighbouring countries.
5. Providing diplomatic and other means foreseen in international law to
defend the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and inviolability
of the state borders of Ukraine, its political, trade and economic,
scientific, cultural and other interests as well as the legal rights of
citizens of Ukraine and its legal entities abroad.

1. The general principles for the formation and activity of the coalition
1.1. The coalition is a voluntary association of MP factions which is formed
in the Ukrainian parliament based on the results of elections and on the
basis of agreement between political positions. A majority of Ukrainian MPs
within the constitutional make-up of parliament join the coalition.
1.2. The coalition is formed of MP factions formed in the manner instituted
by the regulations of the parliament of Ukraine.
1.3. The members of the coalition are those factions of parliament which
make a decision to join the coalition, which decision is testified by the
signatures of the heads (deputy heads) of the factions.
The coalition also envisions individual membership in such cases when a
Ukrainian MP shares the principles of the creation and functioning of the
coalition, but is not a member of any faction which is a member of the
In such a case, the Ukrainian MP submits a statement to the Coalition
Council which takes his statement to the general meeting for adoption.
1.4. The coalition is considered formed from the moment it is officially
announced by the presiding chair at a plenary session on the basis of
documents submitted parliamentary apparatus.
1.5. The main tasks of the coalition in the sphere of legislative action
1.5.1. To initiate and work out bills and resolutions on the basis of the
Coalition Programme and appealing to have them put on the agendas of plenary
sessions in parliament, its committees and other operational bodies.
The coalition supports only those bills and resolutions which have passed
approval in the government, by consensus in the Coalition Council and which
meet the content of the agreement on forming the coalition.
The disagreement of a coalition member faction to support a bill or other
project decided in parliament is in fact the application of the right to
veto. Such bill or decision is withdrawn from consideration until it is
fully agreed by all Coalition member factions.
1.5.2. Forming and carrying out agreed personnel policies, control over the
effective work appointed officials and providing for their accounting to the
1.5.3. Expert review of bills which are reviewed in parliament and
initiating work and remarks and proposals on bills which are presented for
second (or third) readings.
1.5.4. Adopting statements, appeals and other documents adopted by the
coalition and disseminating them among national MPs, within parliament and
to the mass media.
1.6. An MP, the member of a faction which is part of the coalition, or an MP
who is a member of the coalition on individual terms, has the rights stated
in the constitution and in the law of Ukraine “On the status of an MP” and
in the regulations of parliament and by this agreement and other normative
1.7. Necessary specialists and experts, working or other groups (including
specialists in relevant fields) which are approved by the Coalition Council
can be established to provide for the functioning of coalition activity.

2.1. The bodies of coordination and interaction in the coalition are:
2.1.1. The general meeting of the coalition.
2.1.2. The Coalition Council.
2.2. The general meeting of the coalition.
2.2.1. The general meeting of the coalition is composed of MPs who are
members of factions which are in the coalition and also MPs who have been
approved for individual membership.
2.2.2. The general meeting of the coalition meets no less than once per
parliamentary session and also when necessary.
2.2.3. The general meeting of the coalition reviews projects of decisions
after positions are agreed between the Coalition member factions and the
Coalition Council.
2.2.4. The following issues fall under the authority of the general Meeting
of the Coalition: Accepting new members are accepted to the coalition (as far as
individual MPs – by a simple majority of coalition member MP votes; as far
as factions – no less than two thirds of coalition member votes). Reviewing the issue of introducing proposals concerning the
candidate for prime minister of Ukraine and other member of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine. The candidate for the post of prime minister of
Ukraine is considered approved is more than half of the MPs in the coalition
vote for him or her. Discussing and adopting decisions on differences and arguments
which arise between members of the coalition if it is not possible to
resolve them in the Coalition Council. Ceasing the activity of the coalition. Excluding MPs in the coalition from the coalition. The general meeting of the coalition has the right to resolve any
issue linked to the activity of the coalition in the order determined by the
2.2.5 The general meeting of the coalition is competent if no less than half
the MPs of each coalition member faction take part in it. The general
meeting of the coalition is called in extraordinary order at the demand of
the Coalition Coordinator or the Coalition Council or by no less than
one-third of the number of MPs in each coalition member MP faction and also
of individual coalition member MPs, who have individual membership by way

of written statement from each coalition member MP.
2.2.6. The decisions of the general meeting of the coalition are passed
exclusively at meetings of the same. A decision of the general meeting of
the coalition is considered adopted if over one half of the general number
of each coalition member faction votes for it.
2.2.7. Protocols signed by the heads of coalition member factions are kept
of general coalition meetings and meetings of the Coalition Council. The
protocols are composed within a three-day period from the day the general
meetings are finished.
2.3. The coalition coordinator.
2.3.1. In revolving order at each session of parliament, the duties of
coalition coordinator are fulfilled by the leaders of the coalition member
factions. During a period in which the coordinator is absent, his duties are
fulfilled by the leader of the faction which is to coordinate the subsequent
parliamentary session. The order in which the authorities of the coalition
coordinator is determined for the entire term of the parliament of the fifth
convocation is upon the agreement of the leaders of coalition member MP
2.3.2. The functions and duties of the coalition coordinator: Organizing the activity of the coalition. Chairing the general meetings of the coalition and the Coalition
Council. Calling extraordinary meetings of the coalition and conducting
regular (or extraordinary) meetings of the coalition. Informing the speaker of parliament and the leadership bodies of
parliament on the make-up of the coalition, its goals and decisions adopted
and so on. Making agreed statements in the name of the coalition. Coordinating the work of the Coalition Secretariat. Introducing submissions on appointing and dismissing the leader and
workers of the Coalition Secretariat with the approval of the Coalition
Council. Implementing control over the execution of the decisions of the
Coalition and the Coalition Council.
2.4. The Coalition Council.
2.4.1. The Coalition Council is composed of the heads of coalition member
factions and five representatives from each coalition member faction.
2.4.2. The form of the Coalition Council’s work is the meeting.
2.4.2. The coordinator of the coalition chairs Coalition Council meetings.
2.4.4. The Coalition Coordinator organizes the work of the Coalition Council
by way of holdings regular meetings, councils and systematic consultations
and agreements.
2.4.5. A Coalition Council Meeting can be held with the participation of the
president of Ukraine, the speaker of parliament, the prime minister of
Ukraine, members of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and other
specially-invited persons.
2.4.6. The relevant coalition member heads or deputy heads of the relevant
committees report during the review of drafts decisions of the Ukrainian
2.4.7. Coalition Council decisions are adopted by consensus and each
coalition member faction has one vote.
2.4.8. Coalition Council meetings are held as needed but no less than once a
week ahead of the parliamentary session meetings and the regular meetings of
the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.
2.4.9. The Coalition Council: handles the operative coordination of coalition activity. Works out a common coalition position on legislative activity in
parliament or on other items on the day’s agenda. Adopts decisions on agreeing the candidates for the posts of
speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, the prime minister of Ukraine, the
members of the Cabinet of Ministers and other officials who are appointed by
parliament or who are approved for appointment by parliament, for final
adoption of these decisions at the general meeting of the coalition. Reviews the activity of the cabinet on a monthly basis to see that
it is executing this agreement and also evaluates the social and economic
situation in the country. Agrees the candidates for the posts of parliamentary committee
chairs. [Number as received] confirms the prospects and current plans of
coalition work. Adopts preliminary decisions on including or expelling members of
the coalition which are then presented for confirmation at the general
meeting of the coalition. Accepts preliminary decisions on reorganizing the coalition which
are presented for confirmation at the general meeting of the coalition. Fulfils other functions given by the Coalition Council based on the
decisions of the general meeting of the coalition.
2.4.10. Based on the programme and organizational principles of the
coalition, the Coalition Council may independently adopt statements and
appeals and disseminate informational, analytical and other materials.

3.1. Pursuant to the constitution of Ukraine, the coalition of MP factions
in parliament submits agreed proposals to the president of Ukraine on the
candidate for prime minister of Ukraine. Review of the issue of submitting
proposals on the candidate for the prime minister of Ukraine is carried out
beforehand in coalition member factions.
3.2. Pursuant to the constitution of Ukraine, the coalition of MP factions
in parliament submits agreed proposals to the prime minister of Ukraine on
candidates for the Cabinet of Ministers. Review of the issue of submitting
proposals on candidates for the Cabinet of Ministers is carried out
beforehand in coalition member factions.
3.3. The issue of submitting the proposal on the candidate for prime
minister of Ukraine and other members of the Cabinet of Ministers is
reviewed at a general meeting of the coalition only after the preliminary
adoption of a decision by the Coalition Council on agreeing the candidacies.

4.1. The coalition can hold consultations with the president on any issue
which is of state or public interest.
4.2. The coalition holds obligatory consultations with the president of
Ukraine on the following issues:
4.2.1. Introducing proposals concerning the candidate for the post of prime
minister of Ukraine.
4.2.2. Introducing proposals concerning the candidates for the posts of
foreign minister of Ukraine and defence minister of Ukraine.
4.2.3. Introducing proposals concerning the candidates for official leaders
of central and local executive bodies which by procedure of appointment fall
under his [the president’s] competency.
4.3. In consultations with the president, the coalition is represented by
the Coalition Council.
4.4. The speaker of parliament and the prime minister of Ukraine can take
part in the coalition’s consultations with the president.


5.1. The coalition consults with the prime minister of Ukraine on any issue
which is of interest to the state or society.
5.2. The coalition interacts with the prime minister of Ukraine by way of
holding obligatory consultations on issues of:
5.2.1. Presenting proposals on candidates for the make-up of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine.
5.2.2. Presenting proposals on candidates for the posts of directors and
deputy directors of central bodies of the executive branch and the directors
of state enterprises, institutions and organizations which are appointed by
the Cabinet of Ministers.
5.2.3. Presenting proposals on candidates for the chairs of local state
5.2.4. Presenting proposals on dismissing members of the Cabinet of
Ministers, directors and deputy directors of central bodies of the executive
branch and the directors of state enterprises, institutions and
organizations which are appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers.
5.3. The Coalition Council represents the coalition in consultations with
the prime minister of Ukraine.
5.4. The Cabinet of Ministers sends draft daily agendas and accompanying
materials about cabinet meetings to the Coalition Council for coalition
member factions no later than three days before the cabinet meeting.
5.5. The prime minister agrees the plan for the cabinet’s legislative work
with the Coalition Council and determines the key positions of bills which
will be presented for review in parliament.
5.6. The prime minister and the members of the government will refrain from
adopting government decisions which may provoke dissent within the coalition
or which violate the programme principles of the coalition’s activity.
5.7. The speaker of parliament may take part in consultations between the
coalition and the prime minister.
5.8. The Cabinet of Ministers can submit for review by the Coalition Council
the issue of dismissing a minister in connection with his unprofessional
execution of his duties.


6.1. The coalition holds consultations with the speaker of the Ukrainian
parliament on the following issues:
6.1.1. Forming the daily working agenda in parliament.
6.1.2. Forming the calendar of the parliament’s work plan.
6.1.3. Carrying out parliamentary hearings and government day in parliament.

7.1. In cases when differences arise between the positions of the coalition
members, the coalition members and the cabinet make use of conciliatory
procedures which begin without a special decision by the Coalition Council
at the initiative of any faction which is part of the coalition by way of
concluding a protocol on the differences and a detail of the content of the
7.2. The conciliatory processes include:
7.2.1. Setting up a conciliatory group with representatives of coalition
member factions (at three representatives from each coalition member
faction), the Cabinet of Ministers (in case of the presence of differences
between the coalition and the Cabinet of Ministers).
7.2.2. Determining the subject of review in a conciliatory group and the
duration of its work.
7.2.3. Reviewing the issue of a conciliatory group in the work of which
external experts may be included.
7.2.4. Accepting the conclusions by a conciliatory group and taking the
draft decision to review by the Coalition Council.
7.2.5. the Coalition Council adopting a decision on a contentious issue.
7.3. Should the Coalition Council fail to adopt a decision on an issue which
has caused a difference, the coalition and the Cabinet of Ministers refrain
from the unilateral and unagreed adoption of decisions on the issue. In such
a case, the Coalition Council is obliged to convene a general meeting of the
coalition at the demand of even just one coalition member faction.

8.1. The prime minister, the speaker of parliament and his deputies, the
ministers and officials and MPs of Ukraine who are members of factions in
the coalition, in their actions associated with carrying out their
authorities, in sessions in parliament, in the process of working in
committees and commissions and in their positions and in speaking with the
media, will be led by the programme principles and decisions of the
leadership bodies of the coalition adopted in the established order.
Public discrediting of the official decisions of the bodies of the
coalition, the Cabinet of Ministers and officials is not allowed.
8.2. After an official decision is adopted by leadership bodies of the
coalition or by the coalition government, members of the coalition are
obligated to fulfil them or quit their relevant positions of their own will
in light of not accepting the political course of the coalition.
Any official who violates this principle must be replaced in the obligatory
order in the course of two weeks from the moment a decision on this is
passed at a general meeting of the coalition without disrupting the
personnel quota of the coalition member factions.
A relevant decision is passed by the Coalition Council by consensus after
relevant discussion among the factions.
8.3. A coalition member faction may use its own decision to recall from his
post any official person who has been delegated to that post by a coalition
member and may nominate a new candidate.

9.1. The organizational and technical-analytical provisions for coalition
activity are placed upon the Coalition Secretariat. The activity of the
secretariat is regulated by the laws of Ukraine, the regulations of
parliament and the clause on the Coalition Secretariat which is confirmed by
the Coalition Council.
9.2. The Coalition Secretariat provides for coordination among the
secretariats of the factions which are members of the coalition. It does so
by exchanging information, analytical materials, consultations and so on.
The Coalition Secretariat is obliged to send a factions which are members of
the coalition, decisions adopted at general meetings of the coalition and at
Coalition Councils no later than 48 hours after they are adopted.

10.1. An MP faction which is not a member of the coalition, or a national MP
who is not a member of any of the coalition member factions, may of his own
will and pursuant to the coalition agreement enter its composition by
joining the coalition agreement. The order for giving agreement to join the
coalition is given in this agreement.
10.2. An MP faction has the right to leave the coalition at any time,
announcing this in written form at a meeting of the Coalition Council no
less than 10 days before the date of departure and also having this
confirmed in written form with a statement by the leaders of other coalition
MP factions no less than 10 days before departure.
Over the duration of these periods, such an MP faction has the right at any
time to retract its statement in written form. If the MP faction does not
retract its statement, the chair of the next session of parliament declares
the exit of the MP faction from the coalition.

11.1 The activity of the coalition will be stopped in a case where:
11.1.1. The authority of the parliament of the relevant convocation ceases.
11.1.2. One or more factions quits the coalition.
11.1.3. The number of MPs in the coalition falls below the number determined
in the constitution of Ukraine.
11.1.4. The coalition adopts a decision on ending its activity.

On behalf of the factions:
Viktor Yanukovych for the Party of Regions
Vasyl Tsushko for he Socialist Party of Ukraine
Petro Symonenko for the Communist Party of Ukraine
7 July 2006

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

By Natasha Lisova, Associated Press Writer
Kyiv, Ukraine, Wednesday, July 19, 2006

KIEV, Ukraine — Ukraine’s government said Wednesday it had drafted a bill
offering anti-Soviet guerrillas the same privileges currently provided to
World War II veterans – a measure likely to meet a strong opposition in

Deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kyrylenko said the measure, which is
subject to approval by parliament, would apply to members of militant groups
that fought against the Soviets in 1939-1956. The bill would require
additional spending of about $9.9 million, he said in a statement.

Since Western-leaning President Viktor Yushchenko came to power last year,
his government has been striving to win recognition for the 100,000
partisans who fought both the Nazis and the Soviets as Ukrainian patriots
who struggled to create an independent homeland. Communists and war

veterans say such a move would be a mockery of the Soviet Red Army dead.

About 10,000 partisans are believed to still be alive, while there are 3.8
million World War II veterans still living.

Hostility toward the partisans runs deep in Ukraine because in the war’s
early years, the anti-Soviet partisans aligned themselves with the Nazis who
overran the country before the Red Army drove them out in 1944.

During Soviet times, Ukrainian schoolchildren were taught that the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its guerrilla force, the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, were enemies of the people who committed

horrific atrocities alongside Nazi troops.

An estimated 7 million Ukrainians died in the fighting against the Nazis,
and 2.4 million people were sent to Nazi concentration camps. Yushchenko’s
father was a Soviet Red Army soldier who spent four years in a Nazi camp.

Yushchenko has repeatedly urged Red Army veterans and anti-Soviet guerrillas
to forgive each other for the sake of the national unity, but his attempts
have caused several protests by Communists and other pro-Russian parties.

The new bill is likely to meet strong resistance from the majority coalition
in the Ukrainian parliament consisting of the pro-Russian Party of Regions,
Communists and Socialists.

Communist lawmaker Petro Tsybenko strongly criticized the government’s move.
“These people supported the Nazis. It is immoral and criminal to give them
the same status and benefits the Red Army veterans have,” he told The
Associated Press.                                   -30-

[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
             “Kyiv of the 1910s-1930s was the mecca of ‘leftwing artists'”
               Exhibition in Chicago opens this Saturday, July 22, 2006

By Olena Shapiro, special to The Day
The Day Weekly Digest in English #21
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, 27 June 2006

This July the Chicago Arts Center and New York’s Ukrainian Museum will
hold an exhibit of paintings by Malevich, Bohomazov, Yermilov, Burliuk,
Maksymovych, and many other noted Ukrainian artists.

Entitled “Ukrainian Modernism: 1910-30,” the show is being organized on the
initiative of Prince Nikita Lobanov-Rostovsky, a member of the board of
directors of the Foundation for International Arts and Education
(Washington, DC), in collaboration with art specialist Dr. Dmytro Horbachov,
and with the support of Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the
National Art Museum of Ukraine.

My conversation with Dr. Horbachov touched on the upcoming exhibit and the
unique artworks that will be on display. We also talked about a longstanding
problem, namely whether works by renowned Ukrainian artists will be returned
from private collections to Ukraine.

“Nikita Lobanov-Rostovsky, a noted collector, art patron, and consultant to
Christie’s and Sotheby’s, recently visited Ukraine,” Dr. Horbachov told The
Day. “He and I visited various regions in search of masterpieces. It all
started after Lobanov-Rostovsky spotted artworks of world caliber at the
Kyiv Theatrical Art Museum on the grounds of the Kyivan Cave Monastery. He
was also shocked by the lamentable state of Ukrainian museums. Stunning
paintings were gathering dust in sealed-off museum ‘fund’ rooms.

“The unique set designs of the early 20 th century were an unparalleled
phenomenon. Nowhere in the world did set designers make easel works. As a
rule, Western artists prepared working sketches for the theater (including
Picasso, Braque, and Chagall). Our artists, starting with Bakst, did two
versions: a working sketch for the stage and a full-fledged easel painting,
as in Petrytsky’s case.

This is proof that our artists worked not only on commissions but also
painted works for themselves, for the sake of pure art.

“Lobanov-Rostovsky, who has been closely following creative life in Ukraine
for a long time, conceived the idea of holding a Ukrainian modernist art
exhibit in the West.

The Washington-based Foundation for International Arts and Education has the
funds for organizing such an exhibit and renting the premises; that was how
the idea of showing Ukrainian avant-garde artists in the United States

“One of the conditions was that only large works could be submitted because
US audiences appear to have special optical characteristics; they seem
unable to “see” small-format paintings. In contrast, the Japanese prefer
miniature works of art and can look at them for a long time. We discovered
several magnificent works of art in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.

But Lobanov-Rostovsky was sad because there wasn’t enough ‘critical mass’
for a full-fledged exhibit, so he proposed to expand its format and call it
‘Ukrainian Modernism,’ meaning modern plus avant-garde. Apart from the
gifted Novakivsky, another talented Ukrainian artist by the name of
Maksymovych specialized in the field.

He was destined to live a short life – he committed suicide at the age of 20
but left behind interesting works as the number-one artist of the ‘Ukrainian
school’. Nevertheless, by force of Soviet mental habits, Maksymovych is
still regarded as a dilettante.

“The arrangements for the exhibit took six years, and during that period
Lobanov-Rostovsky and I became real experts on Ukrainian private and museum
collections. We unearthed around 100 works of art that will be displayed at
the Chicago Arts Center and the new Ukrainian museum in New York City. We
managed to carry out this creative project thanks to the personal support of
President Viktor Yushchenko.

“By the way, this is not the first time that Lobanov-Rostovsky has
undertaken a benevolent project. He is well known to Ukrainian museums as a
patron and art collector. For example, he donated 15 stage designs sketched
by Sonja Terk Delone and Ilya Repin’s study A Zaporozhian Cossack, along
with a watercolor landscape by Shevchenko, which he donated to the
Shevchenko Museum.

Lobanov-Rostovsky’s private collection boasts works by Ukrainian artists,
such as Anatol Petrytsky, Kazimir Malevych, Oleksandr Khvostenko-Khvostov,
Vladimir Tatlin, I. Rabynovych, Oleksandr Tyshler, Oleksandr Bohomazov, and
other gifted artists.”

We know that most of the works created by Ukrainian avant-garde and
modernist artists were destroyed. What happened to their creators? Surviving
inventories state: “Artist shot, painting was destroyed.” Dr. Horbachov
succeeded in processing part of the collection and using the newly
discovered paintings to create a fundamental study entitled The Ukrainian
Avant-Garde, 1919-1930.

You have studied and rediscovered works created by artists who were banned
by the Soviet government, and returned them to the National Art Museum.
Today the names of Malevich, Petrytsky, Ekster, and Bohomazov comprise the
museum’s “gold fund.” Could you describe your work on the “Ukrainian avant-
garde?” How was it conceived?

D. H.: “In the 1930s-1940s all formalist works of art, so-called
“anti-Soviet” paintings, were denounced. The museum had a separate room in
which all condemned works of art, with their canvases removed from their
frames and rolled up, were stored. They were supposed to be burned. However,
since the size of these paintings ranged from small to large, disposing of
them required special vans. So the pictures were stored there, awaiting

“Eventually, the authorities must have forgotten about them and that was how
they survived. Some artists were not lucky, as their paintings were scrubbed
off the canvas or even shredded. During that period paintings banned by the
authorities was regarded as the creativity of “enemies of the people.” For
example, there was a whole saga around Petrytsky’s portraits.

Some of the writers he had portrayed (Liubchenko, Khvylovy) were purged and
their portraits were burned. But there were cases where museum employees
would hide “taboo” works by rolling up the canvases and storing them in
their “fund” rooms. When I started working as the museum’s chief security
officer, I was told to accept shipments of canvases without actually
examining them. I was supposed to just check the number, sign the invoice,
and forget all about it.

“In the early 1960s there was an exhibit by the artist Sayenko in Kyiv. An
art critic named Vorona declared during the opening ceremony that we were
praising Sayenko because he was a pupil of Boichuk. We should explore
Boichuk’s works again and see if we were wrong in our previous estimation of

This statement prompted Boichuk’s opponents, who had cut up his canvases in
1937, to forward a complaint to the Central Committee. Several days later I
was instructed from “upstairs” to find Boichuk’s works, look at them again,
and submit my findings on his kind of pictorial art.

“I remember hanging the wrinkled, damaged paintings on the walls of the
cellar. Right next to the rolls of Boichuk’s paintings, I spotted the works
of Palmov and Bohomazov. I was impressed by their work. Boichuk’s supporters
were keen innovators.

Even today Western art critics are unable to assess their true value when
they are exploring their works for the first time because it is difficult to
establish criteria for Biochip and his school. I believe that the works of
Palmov, Yermilov, Petrytsky, and Bohomazov look “Western,” judging by their
creative language; at the same time they are very germane to Ukrainian

“I found works by Maksymovych stored in that museum storeroom, which, like
Shekhtman’s, were once described by a Central Committee commission as being
incompatible with “the image of Soviet man” and thus could not be publicly
displayed. After examining these paintings, the aggressive Comrade Skoba
declared that they were all “counterrevolutionary,” even though among them
were portraits of Lenin and Stalin – but those were the times.

The Soviet Ukrainian culture minister, Babiychuk, staged “pogroms” by not
allowing the works of Boichuk’s followers to be included in public exhibits.
Instead, he cited “realists” as worthy models: “Consider Pymonenko as an
example; he is our artist.”

“But contemporary art critics know that our supremacist Malevich was
Pymonenko’s pupil and that he must have acquired some knowledge from his
teacher. Years later, the artworks of Boichuk’s followers found their way to
the art museum.

“You know, when I started studying the canvases hidden in the museum’s
storerooms, I realized that Ukraine in the 1920s had its own, inimitable,
and very talented school of art. At the time our Kyiv Art Institute was a
kind of Bauhaus, and Kyiv was a mecca for leftwing artists for several

During this period Tatlin, Malevich, Petrytsky, and Arkhypenko [Archipenko]
worked in the Ukrainian capital. The film director, Oleksandr Dovzhenko, was
working on his film Earth. In those days Kyiv boasted the world’s only
professional theater of the absurd known as “SoZ,” an acronym meaning
“socialist emulation.” Here every creative endeavor signified a novel trend,
a desire to reach world standards. Then the Diaspora “became inspired” and
joined in.

“By the way, people of Ukrainian descent who lived in Leningrad proudly
identified themselves as Ukrainians. It was a matter of prestige. Parisian
Ukrainians, among them Radko, Babiy, and Burliuk, wrote that they were true
sons of Ukraine. A number of Russians visited Kyiv at the time simply
because they knew they could accomplish something here that they would never
be allowed in Moscow.

Dziga Vertov made the first documentary in Kyiv, entitled Man with a Movie
Camera, now regarded as a classic of cinematography. Vertov was seen in
Russia in the 1930s-1940s as a rank-and-file Mosfilm Studios film editor in
Moscow; no one wanted him. He was scared and depressed. There was no way
to go abroad during the Iron Curtain era.

“After I became interested in the Kyiv art school of the early 20th century,
I made a discovery: Bohomazov. We visited the artist’s widow and saw
mind-boggling works of art; they are now scattered throughout the world and
cost a fortune. In the Bohomazov archives I found a portrait of Karl Marx. I
brought the engraving to the curator of our museum, but he refused to put it
on display, saying that Bohomazov was a formalist.

“I had to resort to subterfuge. The centenary of the International was
approaching and the museum was staging an exhibit. It didn’t have a single
portrait of Marx, so I talked the management into displaying Bohomazov’s
portrait. The caption read “Karl Marx” in block letters and had Bohomazov’s
name underneath in small print. That was how we first displayed that
“formalist.” We got press reviews, and Bohomazov’s name appeared in print
after long years of being ignored by the media.

“Gradually, art lovers began to discover his creative heritage. In 1966
Pavlo Zahrebelny helped us organize a Bohomazov exhibit at the Writers’
Home, although he had to listen to a lot of reproaches from “a group of
outraged members” of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine. The exhibit did take
place, contrary to bureaucratic hurdles, and was followed by articles in
newspapers and journals.

A number of distinguished foreign specialists and art collectors took an
interest in Bohomazov’s art. Prince Nikita Lobanov-Rostovsky visited Kyiv.
He purchased some Bohomazovs and took them with him. He later donated
them to the Guggenheim Museum.

“Some of Bohomazov’s paintings found their way abroad thanks to Serhiy
Hryhoriants, who smuggled them out in diplomatic pouches (this would later
cost him a term in a Soviet prison, on charges of “illegal currency
transactions”). Despite all sorts of obstacles, the works of our artists
were displayed in the West.

Nakov, the famous Russian art historian, noted that there was an avalanche
of rapturous reviews. Art critics were unanimous in declaring that a new
name of world rank had been discovered. Analyzing his discoveries in
Ukraine, Nakov wrote that there were many avant-garde painters here,
including Malevich, Ekster, Tyshler, Arkhypenko, and Bohomazov, and that
behind these names unquestionably stood a real school of art.

“Later Lobanov-Rostovsky asked me to prepare a long article about the Ekster
school in Kyiv. The cubist-futurist set designs eventually grew from these
roots. I was interested in this study and discovered a number of facts that
even took me by surprise.

“In the 1960s and 1970s, when I was unearthing paintings by Palmov,
Bohomazov, and other artists in the museum basement, Ukrainian intellectuals
began to visit the museum. The news of these “vernissages in museum
storerooms” reached Moscow. Then foreigners started visiting the museum,
and I was fired from the museum because in its storerooms I had shown
works by officially banned Ukrainian avant-garde artists to the noted French
art specialist Jean-Claude Marcade.

                              MORE ROOM FOR MUSEUMS
Dr. Horbachov, in 2000 you broached the fate of Prince Nikita
Lobanov-Rostovsky’s collection during an interview with The Day. He had
suggested that it be acquired for a museum in Kyiv, so that the priceless
works created by Ukrainian artists would remain in Ukraine. Six years have
elapsed and the question remains open.

D.H.: “It took Lobanov-Rostovsky years to purchase paintings for his
collection. The prince doesn’t have a direct heir. He wants his collection
to be kept intact. He has had offers in the West, but the prospective buyers
made it clear that they would start selling the paintings from his
collection. The prince wants his collection kept in a state-run museum.

Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov was interested, but ill-wishers succeeded in
convincing him that the collection includes counterfeit works. This is not
true! I know every work of art there.

“However, it has been difficult to find interested people in Kyiv. I visited
the mayor’s office. They listened to me carefully and asked, “How much does
this collection cost?” I told them that, according to Sotheby’s estimates,
it was in the neighborhood of three million dollars. This is not a large
sum, considering the Ukrainian capital’s budget.

Then we studied the question of suitable premises for the collection:
there’s an old building on Moskovska St. (the Cultural Heritage Museum).

We even found a patron, a young Kyiv millionaire, who showed an interest
in the prince’s collection. He met Lobanov-Rostovsky, they signed a
tentative agreement, but the Ukrainian businessman went bankrupt before it

came time to transfer the agreed sum to the prince’s bank account.

“You know, there are not many European-standard museums in Kyiv. We
have sustained many losses historically and there are quite a few
unfavorable circumstances that we have to put up with. We have missed

a great many opportunities in the cultural domain. Ukraine’s entire
history is a long chain of missed opportunities.

As for Nikita Lobanov-Rostovsky and his collection of set designs by early
20th-century artists, we could use these works to set up a museum of
international caliber. This project’s recoupment would be quick because
these kinds of art collections are popular all over the world. I believe
that we need a civilized approach and understanding on the part of those
who are responsible for the future of our cultural heritage.”     -30-
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