Daily Archives: July 17, 2006

AUR#734 Jul 17 Ukraine Crisis: Sources, Outcomes & Potential Ways Forward; Judges Respecting Themselves; Stalemate; Congruities & Incongruities; Options

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              Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.               
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.                                            UKRAINE CRISIS:
Ukraine Strategic Insider, No.1, 2006
By Kuzio Associates, Washington DC – Kyiv, Ukraine
Published by the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #734, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 17, 2006

           “Judges will not be respected until they start respecting themselves.”
By Judge Bohdan A. Futey
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly in Ukrainian
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, July 1, 2006
The Ukrainian Weekly, Parsippany, NY, Sunday, July 16, 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #734, Article 2
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 17, 2006

3.                                            STALEMATE
Zerkalo Nedili On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year

     Yushchenko and Kuchma – What is an optimal way out of the situation?
Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year

5.                        EXPERIMENTING WITH OPTIONS
     What may emerge as the outcome of today’s developments? What are the
         possible alternatives for solving the crisis, and what are their possible
                        consequences? Let’s look at the possible options.
By Yulia Mostovaya
Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year
                               UKRAINE CRISIS:

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: Ukraine Strategic Insider, No.1, 2006
By Kuzio Associates, Washington DC – Kyiv, Ukraine
Published by the Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #734, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 17, 2006

                                   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ukraine is in the second year of an Orange administration following the
election of Viktor Yushchenko as President in January 2005. President
Yushchenko came to power on the back of an Orange Revolution, the third
democratic revolution in a post-communist state.

Ukraine’s Orange administration fell into crisis in September 2005 and has
been unable to reunite since that time. Negotiations to rebuild an Orange
parliamentary coalition took place over three months following the March
2006 parliamentary elections.

The resultant Orange coalition disintegrated before proposing its
government following the defection of the smallest of the three political
parties that created the coalition.

Since the collapse of the Orange coalition, Ukraine is in the midst of a
‘crisis of constitutional reform’, acting Secretary of the National Security
and Defense Council (NRBO) Volodymyr Horbulin said. Head of the
presidential secretariat Oleh Rybachuk believes that Ukraine has slipped
‘into a political and constitutional crisis’.

Ukraine’s summer 2006 crisis has the potential to lead to further
instability, conflict and the downfall of President Viktor Yushchenko.

[Abbreviations: Party of Regions (PR), Yulia Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT)
Our Ukraine (NU), Socialist Party (SPU), Communist Party (KPU)
National Security and Defense Council (NRBO)]


I. A revived Orange coalition would have been achievable following the
March 2006 elections if President Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine
(NU) had accepted the results by acknowledging the right of Yulia
Tymoshenko to become Prime Minister.

Subsequent events showed that they were not willing to accept Ms.
Tymoshenko’s return to the position of Prime Minister. The summer 2006
crisis signals that hopes for a revived Orange coalition are no longer

II. The Orange Revolution is over before it even began. The Orange coalition
lasted 9 months in 2005 and has been unable to reunite since then.
divisions in the Orange coalition deepened during the seven months prior to
the March 2006 elections. The three month coalition negotiations since the
elections were convincing proof that the Orange coalition cannot be put back

During the negotiations, NU showed itself to be unwilling to enter a
coalition where Yulia Tymoshenko would be Prime Minister. At the end of
the three month coalition negotiations, the Socialist Party (SPU) defected
to the Party of Regions.

III. Following three months of protracted coalition negotiations, the
defection of the SPU and the ensuing summer 2006 crisis, a revived Orange
coalition is no longer feasible and would not extract Ukraine from its
deepening crisis.

Following three months of simultaneous negotiations by NU with both the
Yulia Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) and the Party of Regions (PR), it is clear
that NU will not support Ms.Tymoshenko as Prime Minister.

The SPU’s defection from the Orange coalition  leaves BYuT and NU with
210 deputies and therefore unable to create a parliamentary coalition.

IV. The Anti-Crisis coalition is also unfeasible because it  includes the
Communist Party (KPU) and proposes PR leader Viktor Yanukovych as
Prime Minister.
The Anti-Crisis coalition would return Ukraine to
parliamentary-executive conflict prior to the adoption of the 1996
constitution and be perceived inside and outside of Ukraine, as a step
backwards from the pursuit of further reform and the democratic gains of
the Orange Revolution.

V. A second ‘Maidan’ (Orange Revolution) will not take place. Democratic
revolutions, as in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, took place during election
campaigns and at the end of the terms of unpopular and odious leaders.

After eighteen months of inefficient leadership by the Orange coalition,
Ukrainians are also turned off politics, disillusioned and feel ‘betrayed’
by their leaders.

The protests in Kyiv resemble the Ukraine without Kuchma protests of
2000-2001, rather than the 2004 Orange Revolution, with Kyivites largely
indifferent and protestors comprised mainly of young people and western
Ukrainians. NU is not backing the current protests, just as it did not back
the Ukraine without Kuchma protests.

The current protests have the backing of BYuT and the Pora (Its Time) youth
NGO and political party, but not the SPU who backed the Ukraine without
Kuchma protests. The PR failed to successfully counter-mobilize against the
Orange Revolution but has mobilized its supporters during he summer 2006
crisis, increasing the possibility of inter-regional and inter-party

VI. With an Orange coalition no longer feasible, there are only two ways out
of the summer 2006 crisis:

     [1] Grand Coalition of the PR and NU: A Grand Coalition, which would
possess 261 deputies, could also include the SPU, although NU may be
opposed to their inclusion following the ‘betrayal’ of SPU leader Oleksandr

         A Grand Coalition would need to find a compromise Prime Minister
acceptable to the PR and NU and a working relationship with President

         A Grand Coalition would reduce inter-regional tension and
facilitate mutual compromise over contentious issues (i.e. Russian language
and NATO in exchange for no re-privatization, security of property rights
and amnesty for election fraud).

        If a Grand Coalition proved successful, Ukraine’s parliament and
political system could gradually evolve towards a two party system with a
center-right (PR+NU) and center-left (BYuT having incorporated the SPU).

     [2] Early parliamentary elections: President Yushchenko would entertain
this step as a last resort as it would merely reinforce regional divisions
and increase support for the two polarized parties in parliament – the PR
and BYuT. The PR could increase its current 186 deputies to close to half
of deputies (225), thereby giving it fewer incentives to compromise by
launching a parliamentary coalition by itself.

          President Yushchenko could be deprived of his own political force
in parliament if NU were to lose significant support to BYuT. Early
parliamentary elections could also have unforeseen consequences by
leading to early presidential elections.

VII. The formation of a Grand Coalition and government should be
undertaken simultaneously with three other steps:

     [1] Constitutional Court: Swearing in by parliament of Constitutional
Court judges, thereby making the Constitutional Court a functioning

     [2] Presidential Secretariat: replacement of Oleh Rybachuk and the
secretariat’s re-organization to provide effective back-up for President
Yushchenko. Neither Oleksandr Zinchenko nor Mr. Rybachuk have
provided President Yushchenko with the required support;

     [3] National Security and Defense Council:  selection of a Secretary
who understands the link between domestic and foreign policies and is
an expert on international affairs and Ukraine’s national interests and

          Anatoliy Kinakh was a poor choice for such a position and
Volodymyr Horbulin can not move beyond acting Secretary [1].

                 ——- BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS ——-

The origins of Ukraine’s crisis lie in the failure of President Yushchenko
to not take  opportunity of his first year in power when he still possessed
a wide range of powers inherited under the July 1996 constitution.

These powers were never used to break with the Leonid Kuchma era, push
through a government program of radical reforms or institute criminal
charges against senior members of the Kuchma regime for abuse of office,

corruption, election fraud and violence against journalists and politicians.

With the majority of those who could have been potentially charged following
the Orange Revolution now inside the PR parliamentary faction, where they
have immunity, there is little likelihood of charges being introduced.

President Yushchenko’s inaction in 2005-2006 was followed by four key
strategic mistakes:

     [1] Removal of the Yulia Tymoshenko government, thereby dividing the
Orange Revolution camp, only seven months before the elections;

     [2] Signing a memorandum with defeated presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych that included proposals that pointed to President Yushchenko
back tracking from his 2004 election promises and those made during the
Orange Revolution.

          This perception of a President retreating from the values of the
Orange Revolution was reinforced by Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov’s
close relationship with the ‘national bourgeoisie’ (i.e. oligarchs).

     [3] Divisions in the Orange Revolution camp permitted the PR to grow
in support from an average of twenty percent throughout 2005 to over thirty
during the 2006 elections, culminating in the PR obtaining the largest
parliamentary faction of 186 deputies;

     [4] January 2006 gas agreement with Russia that reinforced divisions in
the Orange Revolution camp and furthered public perceptions of President
Yushchenko’s lack of strategy and being beholden to corrupt business

          The inclusion of the non-transparent Rosukrenergo in the gas deal
was either due to incompetence on the part of the executive and government,
continuation of corruption schemes from the Kuchma era, or both.

Weak strategy continued to plague the Orange Revolution camp during the
March 2006 elections and during coalition negotiations following the
elections. An informal agreement within the Orange Revolution camp agreed
that whoever came first would have the right to appoint the Prime Minister.

The election results came as a shock to NU who had expected to come second
(i.e. first in the Orange Revolution camp). Until the September 2005 crisis,
NU had every opportunity to come first in the 2006 elections as President
Yushchenko is NU’s Honorary Chairman. Instead, NU dropped to third place
and received 9 percent fewer votes than in the 2002 elections.

The 2006 elections radically changed Ukraine’s political landscape, laying
the basis for the current political crisis:

     [1] The NU which entered the 2006 parliament is more centrist and less
nation-democratic than NU-2002. Major national democratic political forces
refused to join NU-2006 who had four years earlier joined NU-2002.

         These included well known national democratic leaders whose
presence in government and in parliament would have been a positive

development. The Reforms and Order-Pora and Yuriy-Kostenko blocs
failed to enter the 2006 parliament;

     [2] The only centrist political party to enter parliament was the PR.
In the 2002 elections the PR, the party that has traditionally represented
the Donetsk clan, campaigned together with four other parties in the pro-
Kuchma For a United Ukraine bloc. Three of these parties ran independently
in 2006 and failed to enter parliament (Agrarians [Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc],
the Labor Ukraine [TU], People’s Democratic Party [NDP].

          Anatoliy Kinakh’s Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the
fifth member of the For a United Ukraine bloc, defected to President

Yushchenko in the second round of the 2004 elections and joined NU-
2006[2]. The Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo), which had fought
the 2002 elections independently of the For a United Ukraine bloc, also
failed to enter the 2006 parliament;

     [3] BYuT expanded its support more than three fold on its 2002 results
by growing from 7 to 22 percent, coming first in the Orange Revolution
camp. NU’s support, meanwhile, declined from 23 to 14 percent;

Ukraine’s 2006 elected parliament was therefore the most polarized in
Ukraine’s fifteen year history. Former pro-Kuchma centrists who had
traditionally played the role of ‘buffer’ between eastern and western
Ukraine, were no longer present.

Two antagonistic political forces – PR and BYuT – were the largest factions
in parliament, with 310 deputies (or 70 percent of the total of 450). This
polarization inside parliament was heightened by contentious issues, such as
NATO membership and the Russian language, moving from low to high
issues of concern for voters.

Polarization inside parliament has been heightened by the PR’s attitudes to
the immediate past. The PR’s leadership and electorate believe that they won
the 2004 elections but were then ‘betrayed’ by President Kuchma and his then
head of presidential administration leader Viktor Medvedchuk. The PR is
therefore janus-faced; while being anti-Kuchma it is also a ‘post-Kuchma’

At the same time, the PR’s refusal to acknowledge President Yushchenko’s
legitimacy as deriving from a re-run of the fraudulent second round of the
2004 elections and its continued hostility to the Orange Revolution as a
‘conspiracy’, shows its inability to break fully with the political culture
of the Kuchma era. This is reflected in other policy areas, such as the PR’s
attitudes towards a free media.

The PR leadership’s unwillingness to accept its involvement in election
fraud in 2004, and therefore Mr.Yanukovych’s defeat, has only been deepened
by the lack of criminal charges instituted against senior Kuchma era

With no charges in place, PR leaders argue ‘election fraud, what fraud?’.
The possibility of criminal charges being instituted for election fraud in
2004 are now unlikely as those who could have been charged in 2005
now have parliamentary immunity.

                                     COALITION CHOICES

Following the 2006 elections, NU senior leader Roman Besmertnyi proposed
that NU recognize the results and accept that BYuT has a right to appoint
its candidate for Prime Minister in a new Orange coalition.

This correct strategic choice was ignored by both NU and President
Yushchenko who instead, conducted simultaneous negotiations over the next
three months with both Orange Revolution allies and the PR.

The reality of the 2004 and 2006 election results, both of which confirmed
Ukraine’s regional divide, pointed to three potential coalition
possibilities immediately following the March elections.

These three possible coalition formats remain largely unchanged:

     [1] Orange Revolution: NU, BYuT, SPU (243);
     [2] Grand Coalition: NU, PR (267) and possibly the SPU (300);
     [3] Kuchma Lite: PR and the KPU (207) and the SPU (240).

An Orange coalition would have been created immediately following the
elections if NU had come second (i.e. first in the Orange camp). The
dragging out of coalition talks simultaneously with BYuT and the PR was a
consequence of NU coming third.

The coalition marathon (April-June 2006) showed to what degree President
Yushchenko and NU were also janus-faced. While willing to accept credit for
holding free and fair elections, they were unwilling to accept the logic of
the outcome of the elections which had propelled the PR and BYuT to control
seventy percent of parliament and NU with reduced influence.

This unwillingness to accept the election outcome has directly led to the
summer 2006 political and constitutional crisis. President Yushchenko and
NU strove to negotiate simultaneously with BYuT and the PR in the hope
of extracting maximum advantage for themselves by NU not becoming the
smaller partner in any coalition.

NU hoped to prevent Ms.Tymoshenko from taking the position of Prime
Minister in the Orange coalition and, failing this, to balance her position
with the NU controlling the position of parliamentary speaker.

The choice of parliamentary speaker, Petro Poroshenko, reinforced two
prevalent views.

     [1] First, that there would be a return to the Yulia Tymoshenko-Petro
Poroshenko personal clashes that had plagued the first year of the Orange

     [2] Second, the likelihood of the Orange coalition again collapsing in
fall 2006 due to personal rivalries. In this event, a Grand Coalition of NU
and the PR would have emerged to replace a second failed Orange coalition.

In negotiations with the PR, the NU sought to obtain concessions over the
Prime Ministers position in return for the PR controlling the position of
parliamentary speaker. The PR agreed to leave Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime
Minister, whom they see as ideologically close and opposed to

The PR’s compromise over the position of Prime Minister aimed to block
the return of Ms.Tymoshenko which would have threatened their strategic
objectives of no further re-privatization and the sanctity of property

A re-united Orange coalition was eventually created three months after the
March 2006 parliamentary elections that would have seen Ms.Tymoshenko
return as Prime Minister.

But, the Orange coalition collapsed even before it could propose its
government when the smallest of the three Orange coalition partners, the
SPU, withdrew its support from the coalition.

The SPU officially claimed that the reason was its opposition to NU leading
member Mr.Poroshenko obtaining the post of parliamentary speaker in
exchange for Ms.Tymoshenko becoming Prime Minister.

In reality, the SPU had long sought the position of parliamentary speaker
for its leader, Mr. Moroz. The SPU had never raised its objections to
aspects of the coalition during the April-June negotiations and remained in
government with the center-right NU in 2005-2006.

Mr.Moroz was speaker on one previous occasion in the 1994-1998 parliament
where, again allied again with the KPU, he attempted to thwart economic
reforms and a pro-Western foreign policy. As parliamentary speaker, Mr.Moroz
and President Kuchma were in conflict over domestic and foreign policies.

NU’s candidate for parliamentary speaker, Mr.Poroshenko, merely provided the
excuse for the SPU to no longer abide by the Orange coalition agreement.
Mr.Poroshenko had been secretary of the National Security and Defense
Council (NRBO) in 2005, a position he had occupied at the presidents behest
to counter Prime Minister Tymoshenko.

                                    ANTI-CRISIS COALITION

The defection of the SPU to the PR and KPU has led to the creation of the
least expected Anti-Crisis coalition. The Anti-Crisis coalition controls 240
out of 450 deputies, a number similar to the 243 that the Orange coalition
was to have controlled. Alone, the PR and their KPU allies had insufficient
votes to create a parliamentary coalition, being 19 deputies short of a
minimum majority of 226.

The Anti-Crisis coalition removes the need for the PR to concede the
position of Prime Minister which it can now seek to obtain for itself, with
the SPU and KPU sharing control of the parliament leadership. The PR has
proposed Mr.Yanukovych for Prime Minister, a position he occupied in
2002-2004, the last two years of the Kuchma regime.

The inclusion of the KPU represents the first occasion in Ukraine that the
Communists have entered government, ironically during a Viktor Yushchenko
presidency. The KPU have entered government at a time when the KPU is in
terminal decline from its height of 120 deputies in the 1998 parliament to
only 21.

The two remaining parliamentary factions, BYuT and NU, have little choice
but to go into opposition to the Anti-Crisis coalition. BYuT has always
ruled out entering any coalition that included the PR. The NU will be forced
into simultaneous mild opposition to, and cohabitation with, the Anti-Crisis
coalition. NU’s national democrat wing will align with BYuT and its
centrist, business wing with the PR.

Informed sources have advised Ukraine Strategic Insider that President
Yushchenko will never accept Mr.Yanukovych for the position of Prime
Minister. The reasons are similar to those why he was disinclined to look
favorably on Ms.Tymoshenko returning to the position of Prime Minister.

Both Mr.Yanukovych and Ms.Tymoshenko are polarizing figures who, in
the position of Prime Minister, would serve to further divide – not unite –
Ukraine. Ukraine needs a centrist Prime Minister able to work with both the
PR and BYuT, and with the President.

NU will never join a coalition with PR if it includes the KPU and its Prime
Minister is Mr.Yanukovych. It is these two obstacles that are preventing any
negotiated solution to Ukraine’s deepening crisis. Both the PR and BYuT are
seeking to extract maximum advantages for themselves without taking heed of
the country’s overall national interests and the need to overcome the
deepening crisis and regional divide.

Faced with this escalating crisis, there are two scenarios facing Ukraine:

     [1] Collapse of the Coalition: The Anti-Crisis coalition collapses in
the fall and is replaced by a Grand Coalition of the PR and NU. Following
the betrayal of the SPU leadership, which defected from the Orange coalition,
it would be unlikely that the NU would agree to the SPU joining a Grand

     [2[ Early Elections: The dissolution  of parliament and repeat
elections. The election results would be unlikely to heal Ukraine’s regional
divide, which was confirmed in the 2004 and 2006 elections, and may
polarize parliament further by increasing the representation of the PR and
BYuT beyond their current 70 percent of deputies. NU, SPU and KPU
could be either elected with fewer deputies or fail to enter parliament, in
the case of the two left-wing parties.

NU could spare this outcome by creating a joint election bloc with BYuT,
which has been touted but seems a remote possibility. The SPU could well be
decimated if, as expected, Moroz could be removed by a pending extraordinary
congress called in protest at his alignment with the PR.

Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, a high profile SPU member active in
anti-regime protests during the Kuchma regime, has in protest resigned from
the SPU. Lutsenko represents the right-wing of the SPU. His criticism of the
SPU’s alignment with the PR is replicated by unlikely allies on the left of
the SPU in the shape of Yosyp Vinsky, who has also resigned as secretary of
the SPU’s Political Council.


Until the summer 2006 crisis, President Yushchenko was increasingly viewed
as a weak leader, lacking political will and strategy and unlikely to win a
second  presidential term in the 2009 elections. The summer 2006 crisis will
reinforce this growing view inside, and outside, Ukraine.

But, the crisis could well cut short his first term by the President being
forced to call early parliamentary and presidential elections. President
Leonid Krawchuk called early elections in summer 1994, two years early, and
was defeated by Mr.Kuchma.

President Yushchenko’s weaknesses closely resemble those of Krawchuk’s.
PR’s leaders have threatened to push for early presidential elections if
parliament is dissolved and early elections are called.

Early presidential elections would lead to the election of either
Ms.Tymoshenko or a PR candidate (if the PR’s candidate was to be
Mr.Yanukovych, Ms.Tymoshenko would certainly win the election). Neither
candidate would heal Ukraine’s regional divide and political polarization.
President Yushchenko’s amorphousness, indecisiveness and lack of
consistency are poor qualities but may be preferable.

Besides early presidential elections, a secondary threat to President
Yushchenko lies in the anti-presidential stance of the Anti-Crisis coalition
dominated by the anti-presidential institution left and anti-Yushchenko PR.
There could be attempts to either impeach President Yushchenko, that are
unlikely to be successful, but could still lead to a return to the conflict
between the executive and parliament that plagued Ukraine prior to the
adoption of the July 1996 constitution.

A return to such a conflict scenario would take place if Mr.Yanukovych
became Prime Minister; hence, President Yushchenko’s adamant refusal to
countenance this step.

The left have traditionally opposed the institution of presidency. The
Anti-Crisis coalition could attempt to abolish the presidency as an
institution through further constitutional reforms that would transform
Ukraine into a full parliamentary republic (where the President is elected
by parliament).

Such steps were first proposed by the Kuchma regime in 2003 when
constitutional reforms were first discussed. Moldova is a full parliamentary
republic since constitutional reforms were adopted in 2000.


The revived Orange coalition had internal contradictions between the
pro-business NU, left-wing SPU and right-left BYuT. These divisions rested
upon ideological and personal rivalries.

Throughout 2005, Mr. Poroshenko, Secretary of the NRBO, and Prime Minister
Tymoshenko, openly duelled over the direction of Ukraine’s economic and
political policies. Mr.Poroshenko’s conflict with Ms.Tymoshenko was deepened
by the September 2005 crisis  when the head of the presidential secretariat
Mr. Zinchenko made accusations of corruption against Mr.Poroshenko and
other business allies of the president.

Although these accusations have never been substantiated in a court of law,
they have damaged the reputations and public standing of Mr.Poroshenko
and the business wing of NU.

The Anti-Crisis coalition is also beset by internal divisions. The two
left-wing components (KPU, SPU) have different ideologies to the
pro-business PR that is dominated by Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarchs
(grouped in Renat Akhmetov’s Systems Capital Management) and other
large businessmen.

The Anti-Crisis coalition may be able to agree on reviving Kuchma era
multi-vector foreign and security policies, but it will be sharply divided
over domestic policies. The PR’s main purpose to enter government is to
ensure a halt to further re-privatisations, enforce the sanctity of property
rights and no criminal charges from abuse of office and election fraud
stemming from the Kuchma era.


Until the adoption of the constitution in 1996, Ukraine – like most CIS
states – was plagued by conflict over the division of powers between the
executive and parliament. The formation of an Anti-Crisis coalition will
return Ukraine to those conflicts of the first half of the 1990s.

Constitutional reforms have eroded the power of the president in favour of
parliament. The Anti-Crisis coalition will control the positions of Prime
Minister and parliamentary speaker. The government will be responsible to
the Anti-Crisis coalition, not to the President (unlike in the Kuchma era
when the executive controlled the government).

A strong willed Prime Minister Yanukovych, with the backing of the largest
parliamentary faction (PR), will out play the more indecisive and weak
willed President Yushchenko. Yanukovych would become de facto head of
state due to the enhanced powers given to the position of Prime Minister
following constitutional reforms.

President Yushchenko also lacks the backing of a functioning presidential
secretariat and NRBO, both institutions which are currently ineffectual but,
if functioning, could potentially provide him with greater authority
vis-à-vis the Anti-Crisis coalition.

President Yushchenko continues to control the appointment of the security
forces and foreign minister. He has though, been unwilling to use control
over these institutions to impose presidential authority over dissident
eastern Ukrainian and Crimean regions or to launch criminal charges against
higher members of the former Kuchma regime.

                               THE TWO VIKTOR’S: PART II

President Yushchenko has failed to formulate a coherent medium to long term
strategy since the March 2006 elections, instead reacting to events as they
have unfolded and preferring to stand above the crisis. His radio and press
addresses and television interviews have failed to clarify his position on
the crisis.

President Yushchenko only stated his preference for an Orange coalition in
June, three months following the March 2006 elections. President Yushchenko
had to have been aware of the NU simultaneously negotiating with its Orange
partners and the PR during the three month coalition negotiations.

President Yushchenko’s position on the summer 2006 crisis has therefore
evolved over the course of the crisis. This position include the following

     [1] The Anti-Crisis coalition is ‘illegitimate’ from a legal point of
view because the Orange Coalition was not dissolved over the
constitutionally correct time frame of ten days prior to the creation of a new


     [2] The candidate of Mr.Yanukovych is unacceptable as Prime Minister
and he will not propose it to parliament. The person holding the position of
Prime Minister should not be somebody who leads to confrontation in society,
a reference to Mr.Yanukovych and possibly also Ms. Tymoshenko.

     [3] The person who occupies the position of Prime Minister should also
not be involved in business;

     [4] There should be no change in Ukraine’s domestic and foreign
policies. In other words, there can be no return to the policies of the
Kuchma regime;

     [5] Any candidate for Prime Minister, other than Mr.Yanukovych, will be
proposed to parliament only if parliament agrees to simultaneously swear in
its quota of judges for the Constitutional Court, thereby making it

     [6] The President’s party, NU, will not join a coalition that includes
the KPU and the NU will only join a coalition if it is given the position of
Prime Minister.

The PR’s strategy has evolved during the three months since the elections.
The PR is seeking legitimacy as a post-Kuchma political party which it could
not achieve in a coalition with the SPU, and especially the KPU. The PR
therefore seeks to include the NU within its coalition (either in the
Anti-Crisis or Grand Coalitions) because only in a coalition with the NU can
the PR achieve domestic and international legitimacy.

During the three month coalition negotiations, the PR offered to give the NU
the position of Prime Minister but the PR may be unwilling to do this after
the creation of the Anti-Crisis coalition.

The NU’s position is to only join a Grand Coalition if the KPU withdraws
from the Anti-Crisis coalition, and the NU obtains the position of Prime
Minister, in return for the PR obtaining the position of parliamentary

This is the same agreement that the NU and PR agreed upon during the three
month coalition negotiations, but the NU chose instead to go along with an
Orange coalition.

The PR claims that its priorities in any coalition  are adopting new
legislation on corruption, the president, cabinet of ministers, the
opposition, elections, local referendums and foreign policy.

The PR also seeks to secure legal recognition of property rights, an end to
re-privatization, state support for business, and the separation of business
and politics. Most of these objectives seem laudable but, given the PR’s
background and composition, may be unattainable.


An Anti-Crisis coalition will be in conflict with the president over foreign
and security policies. The Anti-Crisis coalition is seeking to adopt new
legislative guidelines on foreign policy, an area that it will come into
conflict with President Yushchenko who has stated that he will not
countenance any change in foreign policy. Under constitutional reforms,
President Yushchenko continues to have the right to conduct foreign policy.

New foreign policy guidelines are to stress a ‘strategic partnership’ with
Russia by seeking to repair relations with Russia. The Anti-Crisis coalition
will be disinterested in Ukraine’s continued participation in the GUAM
(Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) regional group or the  Community of
Democratic Choice.

Russia has already reacted to the Anti-Crisis coalition by resisting raising
gas prices in July, as it is entitled to in the January gas agreement. The
Anti-Crisis coalition will be unlikely to dissolve the gas agreement, a step
which Ms.Tymoshenko as re-installed Prime Minister had planned on

Candidates proposed by President Yushchenko for foreign, defence and
interior ministers will be unable to work inside a Viktor Yanukovych
government. Foreign and Defence ministers Borys Tarasiuk and Anatoliy
Hrytsenko are advocates of Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership and critical
of Russian policies towards Ukraine and the CIS. Internal affairs minister
Lutsenko has stated his refusal to work inside a Yanukovych government.

The likelihood of Ukraine’s WTO membership in the fall could be postponed
again, as the two left-wing members of the Anti-Crisis coalition are opposed
to the legislation required for WTO membership. The PR’s position is also
unclear as it also voted against WTO-required legislation during the
2002-2006 parliament.

The presence of the three parties opposed to NATO membership in the
Anti-Crisis coalition will rule out NATO inviting Ukraine into a Membership
Action Plan at its Riga November summit. Ukraine’s invitation into NATO
membership at the 2008 enlargement summit was already under question
following anti-NATO demonstrations in the Crimea in June that led to the
cancellation of ‘In the Spirit of PfP (Partnership for Peace)’ exercises.

Although President Yushchenko continues to back NATO membership, the
Anti-Crisis coalition would return to the Kuchma era policy of being in
favour of cooperation, but opposed to membership, of NATO.

The Anti-Crisis coalition may seek to revitalise Ukraine’s participation in
the CIS Single Economic Space (SND YES). Under former President Kuchma
and President Yushchenko, Ukraine’s official position was to only agree to
step one (free trade zone) while ruling out steps two and three (customs and
monetary unions). While the KPU’s position of full CIS integration is long
standing the SPU might baulk at going beyond step one.

The PR campaigned during the 2006 elections in favour of Ukraine’s ‘full’
participation in the SND YES. As with the PR’s foreign policy stance in
general, this step was never explained and it is unclear if the PR will
support Ukraine’s participation in the SND YES beyond step one.

In the event of such a move, it would imperil Ukraine’s participation in a
customs union with the EU, which Brussels has offered after Ukraine joins
the WTO.

In a Grand Coalition, the PR should be made to compromise over foreign
policy issues in exchange for its strategic domestic priorities (no
re-privatization, sanctity of property rights, amnesty for criminal charges
stemming from the Kuchma regime).

This compromise should include:

     [1] WTO: PR’s support for WTO membership, independent of
Russia’s membership;

     [2] SND YES: Continuation of the Kuchma regime’s policy of
only agreeing to step one of the SND YES (free trade zone);

     [3] NATO: support for Ukraine’s participation in a Membership
Action Plan. Membership would follow a referendum to be held close
to the date of invitation to join NATO (i.e. not immediately, but in 4-5
years at a minimum);

     [4] EU: Membership of the EU as a medium term objective.  -30-

Party of Regions (PR)
Yulia Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT)
Our Ukraine (NU)
Socialist Party (SPU)
Communist Party (KPU)
National Security and Defense Council (NRBO)


Party of Regions (PR)                     186
Yulia Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT)      129
Our Ukraine (NU)                             81
Socialist Party (SPU)                        33
Communist Party (KPU)                   21
[1] Acting Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin is beyond the legal retirement
age and cannot therefore move from acting Secretary to Secretary.
[2] Two defectors from NU to the Anti-Crisis coalition are from Kinakh’s
wing of NU, Volodymyr Zaplatynskyi and Oleksandr Volkov.

                                    KUZIO ASSOCIATES
NOTE: Kuzio Associates is an independent political-economic consultancy
and government communications group with offices in Washington DC and
Kyiv. Kuzio Associates draws upon two decades of expertise by its
President, Dr. Taras Kuzio, an internationally recognised authority on
Ukraine, central-eastern Europe, and the CIS.

Kuzio Associates provides strategic advice to political clients on
government relations and strategy,  due diligence  on Ukrainian companies
and investment climate and opportunities in Ukraine, and individually
tailored Strategic Counsel to clients in written and oral form.

Kuzio Associates will publish Ukraine Strategic Insider, drawing on insider
intelligence and critically honest evaluations, geared towards clients, and
a public on-line magazine.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is President of Kuzio Associates, Senior Transatlantic
Fellow, German Marshal Fund, and Adjunct Professor, Institute for
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International
Affairs, George Washington University. 

Dr. Kuzio always welcomes comments and feedback, tkuzio@gwu.edu.
The analysis and commentary from Kuzio Associate’s is published
with the specific permission of Dr. Taras Kuzio. The Action Ukraine
Report (AUR) appreciates the opportunity to publish the very first issue
of Kuzio Associates’ ‘Ukraine Strategic Insider.’
AUR EDITOR Morgan Williams, morganw@patriot.net.  
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
         “Judges will not be respected until they start respecting themselves.”

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Judge Bohdan A. Futey
Zerkalo Nedeli, Mirror-Weekly in Ukrainian
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, July 1, 2006
The Ukrainian Weekly, Parsippany, NY, Sunday, July 16, 2006
Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #734, Article 2
Washington, D.C., Monday, July 17, 2006

On March 22, 2006, the National Committee to strengthen democracy and
the rule of law in Ukraine adopted a new Concept Paper for the judiciary in
Ukraine.  This Concept Paper was the result of the mandate given by
President Yuschenko during his inaugural address on January 23, 2005, to
establish an independent judiciary and a civil society based on the rule of

Therefore, the aim is clear, to strengthen judicial independence and the
rule of law in accordance with Ukraine’s Constitution, as well as standards
approved by the European community and the rest of the free world.

In my opinion, this Concept is a valiant effort to strengthen some aspects
of court proceedings and guarantee citizens access to the courts, but as a
whole it seems to me that it fails to address the problem of reforming the
judiciary in-depth, and provides for additional ways to exercise control
over the judiciary.

Furthermore, it may be in conflict with the Constitution as enacted on June
28, 1996, it violates the principal of separation of powers (Article 6), and
the rule of law commitment (Article 8).  The idea of having government
inspectors for the judiciary is not an encouraging practice (guarantee) for
judicial independence.

Also, it fails to address many aspects of the present law on the judiciary
and it undertakes to provide solutions that are not very democratic.  It
barely touches on aspects of education at law schools and the role of
legal/professional organizations (like the ABA in the US).

I will not make any additional comments at this time, but I am willing to do
so at a Roundtable discussion, conference or other fora on this subject.

The judiciary in Ukraine, the United States and Europe, should be somewhat
alarmed.  Judges should be participants in the discussion of these issues as
they relate to Ukraine’s Constitution, the Law on the Judiciary, and the Law
on the status of Judges.

Naturally, they should reserve their comments strictly to the relationship
of the proposed Concept on judicial independence, the Constitution of
Ukraine and the Rule of Law.   Judicial independence does not mean the
judges do as they choose, but do as they must in accordance with the
Constitution and laws of the country.

Judicial independence in the final analysis will depend largely on the
conscience and courage of the judges themselves. Judges will not be
respected until they respect themselves.

There are two aspects in which judges must be independent.

FIRST, they must be honest-brokers, in that they are independent from and
neutral among the parties that appear before them.  Judges must decide
matters before them impartially, on the basis of the facts and the law,
without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, or threats,
direct or indirect, from any party or institution or for any reason.

A judge’s moral commitment to this form of independence eliminates
favoritism and corruption from the nation’s judicial system.  If judges fail
in this duty the public will lose confidence in the basic equity of its
society, generating cynicism, anger and instability.

SECOND, the judiciary, and hence each individual judge, must act as co-equal
and independent of the other branches of government.  Judges are independent
in this sense if they are not beholden to any other branch of government or
political party.

It is vital that courts have jurisdiction and the power to restrain the
legislature or executive by declaring laws and official acts
unconstitutional when they abridge the rights of citizens.  Further, for
judicial independence to have practical effect, the courts’ interpretation
must be accepted and enforced by the legislative and executive branches of

As there cannot be a market economy without private ownership of property,
there cannot be a system based on the rule of law without judicial

In addition, the judiciary needs to have its own constituency, primarily the
legal profession and strong bar associations.  These will be responsible to
expose unethical practices of the judges, and/or coercive tactics upon
judges and enlist the press on their side.

 In the United States the major defenders or critics of the judiciary are
members of the legal profession themselves (ABA), law school professors,
as well as the media.

It would be refreshing and welcome news if professors of law schools in
Ukraine would start to speak out, as well as the association of lawyers,
jurists, the Ukrainian Bar Association, and hopefully the World Congress of
Ukrainian Jurists.

There is no questions that the judiciary in Ukraine needs to be reformed.
Key issues and/or problems with the judiciary are not addressed.  For
example, the legal crisis with the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, which
since October of last year lacks a quorum, is not addressed at all.

What is needed is to strengthen the checks and balances – not control over
the judiciary by the executive.  Provide adequate salaries for judges,
insuring appropriate funding and assistance for the courts, prompt
publication and availability for judicial decisions, transparency in
decision making, enforcement of judicial decisions are ways to eliminate
corruption among the judiciary.

Nevertheless, greater access of citizens to judges should not mean or
indicate ex parte communications behind closed doors.  This practice
should be eliminated completely.

In the United States, the Federal Judicial Conference is authorized by
Congress to create and enforce rules of procedure and evidence, which the
Supreme Court may adopt, modify, or reject. (1)  The Federal Judicial
Conference employs various advisory committees, whose members include
judges and lawyers, to propose new rules and modify existing ones. (2)

Meetings of the advisory committees are open to the public and members of
the bar may attend to give their suggestions.  They may also mail their
comments to the committees at any time.  Judges and attorneys often hold
conferences to discuss the procedural and evidentiary rules and submit
comments to the advisory committees and publish articles in scholarly
journals criticizing the rules and proposing changes.  If the rules are
adopted by the Supreme Court, these rules become binding.

Also, it would be worthwhile for the National Committee to review the
recent assessment done by the ABA CEELI and incorporate suggestions
provided in that analysis.

This report, the Judicial Reform Index for Ukraine, assesses how the
conditions related to judicial reform and judicial independence in Ukraine
correlate with fundamental international standards in this area.  The
judiciary is analyzed through a prism of 30 factors covering areas such as
judicial qualification and education, judicial powers, financial resources,
structural safeguards, accountability and transparency, and efficiency of
the judicial system.

Unfortunately, the results illustrate that Ukraine scored positively only on
four of these factors.  On the other hand, 15 factors received a negative
correlation, including most factors related to lack of independence in the
judicial decision-making and external interference in other aspects of the
work of the judiciary, dire financial conditions of the courts, and lack of
transparency of court proceedings and documents.

It is hoped that a debate on judicial reforms will continue and that the
parliament of Ukraine, after it begins functioning, will seriously take all
views, including the judges of Ukraine, before it adopts a reform that will
affect judicial independence for many years to come.

1. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, A Short History of
Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 679 (2000)
2. Id.
NOTE: Bohdan A. Futey is a Judge on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
in Washington, DC, appointed by President Ronald Reagan in May 1987.
Judge Futey has been active in various Rule of Law and Democratization
Programs in Ukraine since 1991.  He served as an advisor to the Working
Group on Ukraine’s Constitution, adopted June 28, 1996.] The article is
republished with the specific permission of Bohdan A. Futey.  Action
Ukraine Report (AUR) Editor Morgan Williams, morganw@patriot.net.
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
3.                                          STALEMATE

Zerkalo Nedili On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year

Looking at the developments in the Ukrainian parliament from a different
perspective, many political players and many more of their fans are
speculating whether or not the President will dissolve it. The negative
answer looks more likely as Viktor Yushchenko is known to refrain from
risky ventures. But besides his political will, such a serious step has
weighty legal repercussions.

Many politicians of various caliber and rank insist the parliament be
dissolved.. Their calls for saving democracy sound very earnest but can
hardly serve as a legal tool. They also claim that the Constitution and the
Parliament Regulations were violated.

This accusation, leveled at the motley coalition [of the Regions Party, the
Socialists, and the Communists], deserves a closer look.
The political reform cut the presidential powers but gave him (as
compensation) two additional pretexts for dissolving the parliament: if the
newly-elected parliament fails to form a majority within 30 days or if it
fails to form a new government within 60 days.

The countdown started on May 25, when the newly-elected MPs were
sworn in and the Yuri Yekhanurov led Cabinet resigned.

The lawmakers still have some time to live up to the second requirement.
But there are already controversial arguments about the first one: some hot
heads even believe that the President has the legal right to dissolve the
parliament today. They contend that the coalition is illegitimate because it
was formed after the Speaker was elected.

However, there is not a single document to establish a connection between
these two processes. Others contend that the so-called “anti-crisis
coalition” was formed after the deadline set by the Constitution. Both are
wrong: the Constitution clearly states that if a coalition majority falls
apart, the parliament has one month to form another coalition majority.

The builders of the new majority were very prompt: [Socialist Party leader]
Oleksandr Moroz simultaneously announced the death of the “orange coalition”
and the birth of the “anti-crisis coalition”. Did he have the right to do

Neither the Constitution nor the Parliament Regulations prohibit the
factions from forming a new coalition immediately after the previous
coalition breaks up. But, in the rush of their alliance, Moroz and [Regions
Party leader Viktor] Yanukovych ignored Article 61 of the Parliament
Regulations, which obliges a faction wishing to secede from the coalition to
notify the other allies at least ten days prior to secession. The Socialists
did not comply with that requirement.

But even such a serious breach is unlikely to entail serious legal
consequences because of the ambiguities present in the amended Constitution.
Article 83 says that the rules of a parliament coalition’s existence and
activities “shall be set by the Regulations”.

At the same time, Article 92 stipulates that all parliamentary activities
“shall be regulated exclusively by laws”. And Article 19 says that all
individual and corporate bodies of authority only have a right to do what
is allowed by the Constitution and laws.

In the legal sense, this means that the Parliament Regulations, as a
normative document, are only valid within the parliament. If someone
violates the Law on Parliament Regulations, then the violation can be
challenged at the Constitutional Court or any administrative court.

But it is impossible to decide that the lawmakers’ decision is illegitimate
or unconstitutional just because they violated the Regulations, which are
not laws. If those who hastily amended the Constitution in late 2004 had not
abrogated the norm of mandatory adoption of the law on regulations, then
any current violations of the parliamentary statute would entail legal

Even after the political reform was enacted, it was still possible to set
things right. Lawmakers could have simply adopted their new Regulations as
a law. Instead they adopted the document as a resolution. Therefore, the
Parliament Regulations do not have serious political value or a actual legal

The conclusions look rather disappointing for those who insist on dissolving
the parliament. Firstly, there are no legal grounds to challenge the
decision that was adopted despite certain violations of the Parliament
Regulations. Secondly, the new coalition complied with all constitutional
norms when announcing its establishment and electing Moroz Parliament

The latter procedure did violate the regulations: the decision to prolong
the plenary session was adopted in the afternoon, not in the morning. But it
was hardly a “crime” against the Constitution.

There may be another scenario of the parliament’s dissolution. Yushchenko
may refuse to submit the candidature for premiership nominated by the
coalition until the parliament swears in Constitutional Court judges.

In accordance with the amended Constitution, the procedure of the Prime
Minister’s appointment is as follows. Step one: the coalition majority
chooses a candidate for premiership and refers its decision to the
President. Step two: the President has 15 days to consider the candidature;
if he approves of it, he submits it to the parliament. Step three: the
candidature is put to vote in the session hall and has to collect at least
226 votes.

Could Yushchenko refuse to submit the candidature chosen by the coalition?
The majority of the independent experts (including experts with the Venetian
Commission) give a negative answer. The amended Constitution reduces the
President’s role to that of a mailman as it does not describe a single
circumstance under which he could turn down the coalition’s candidature.

But Yushchenko has a different opinion. Moreover, he puts forward irrational
and unconstitutional conditions.

[1] Firstly, it is a normative act but not the Constitution that obliges the
parliament to swear in Constitutional Court judges prior to submission of
the candidate.

[2] Secondly, the Law on the Constitutional Court says that the swear-in
ceremony is to take place in the presence of the President, the Speaker, and
the Premier. Yuri Yekhanurov in his capacity of Acting Prime Minister is not
the one. Demanding that the parliament swear in CC judges before the
Premier’s appointment, Yushchenko violates the Constitution.

[3] And thirdly, the Law on the Constitutional Court sets a time limit for
swearing in CC judges. The deadline is long over, so the lawmakers have no
one to swear in until new candidatures are nominated by the Supreme Justice
Council and the President Yushchenko either does not know or does not want
to know about it.

Thus, the lawmakers do not violate the Constitution or active laws by not
swearing in CC judges. But the President actually coerces them to a
violation by demanding they swear in CC judges.

Now there is a question: what if the President refuses to submit the
proposed candidature for endorsement? Yanukovych was nominated on July

If the President takes the full 15 days he has, the process will exceed the
60-day term set for staffing the government and he will have formal grounds
to dissolve the parliament.

But Clause 4 of Article 115 of the Constitution says: “The Cabinet of
Ministers, having resigned before the newly elected Verkhovna Rada, shall
continue discharging their duties until a new Cabinet of Ministers takes
office.” There are no time limits. The Yekhanurov government did resign, but
that happened in December of 2005, not in May of 2006.

More than six months have elapsed since the previous parliament passed a
vote of no confidence, which was absolutely legitimate but not recognized by
Yushchenko or the members of government.

Yushchenko may do so post factum to untie his hands for dissolving the
parliament. But then he would have to admit that an illegitimate executive
government has been in office for seven months with his knowledge.  -30-
LINK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/606/53987/
[return to index] [Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

      Yushchenko and Kuchma – What is an optimal way out of the situation?

Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year

The ZN asked President Viktor Yushchenko and his predecessor Leonid
Kuchma the same question: What is an optimal way out of the situation?

Viktor Yushchenko was not available, but his reply was forwarded by his
press secretary Irina Gerashchenko. Leonid Kuchma gave his answer in

According to President Yushchenko’s press secretary, he stated his position
in his address to the Verkhovna Rada of July 13. He called upon the
lawmakers to refrain from misinterpreting the active legislation, saying
that “Ukraine needs a legitimate authority”.

He insisted that they comply with every regulatory norm and the
Constitution. “The President will not allow anyone to take a single step
that may later call into question the government’s legitimacy and demands
the same from the people’s representatives,” Yushchenko said in his address.

The first seven weeks of the new parliament’s work have proven that none of
the five political forces represented in the new parliament was prepared to
work in the parliamentary-presidential republic.

Their leaders lacked wisdom, diplomacy, and commitment to ideals. These
seven weeks have shown that democracy in Ukraine is too feeble and that
Ukrainian political leaders have not learned to live by European rules.

Yushchenko believes that not all possibilities for a compromise solution
through negotiations have been exhausted. He is aware that this parliament
was elected democratically for the first-ever time and accepts the people’s
choice. He insists that the parliament return to normal lawmaking work and
form a new government as soon as possible.

He stresses that both the legislative and executive branches must work
towards consolidating the country, ensuring its stability, and defending its
strategic national interests so that no other nation can influence Ukraine
or its individual political leaders.

In 2004 the people of Ukraine vocally expressed their support for Ukraine’s
course toward European integration. The President, the parliament, and the
government must act according to the people’s will and stick to this course.
Yushchenko sees the purpose of his presidency as being to bring Ukraine
closer to Europe.

Therefore, he insists on resuming the coalition talks. The country is
interested in stability and unity, and the political leaders must look for a
way out of the protracted parliamentary crisis, which is already turning
into a political crisis.

The President has the exclusive prerogative to dissolve the parliament, and
all politicians ought to be aware of it. However, there are no
constitutional grounds for such a step till July 25. At the same time, they
ought to bear in mind that the parliament’s dissolution or any other
forcible measure would inevitably aggravate tensions and controversies.

The President calls upon the political leaders to think of Ukraine first but
admits with regret that his pre-election forecast has come true: the
contention for positions still dominates and determines their political

“I see nothing abnormal in the political situation in Ukraine,” says Leonid
Kuchma, explaining that he means that this is a continuation of the crisis
that hit Ukraine 18 months ago. According to him, the crisis is due to the
political leadership’s systemic debilitation.

‘It has proven to be too weak as a collective manager and reformer. It never
embarked on a single vital reform. Whatever it promised to do was frustrated
at the very initial stages.

‘The new political leaders were unprepared for the political reform, which
literally took them unawares. Now they contend that the Constitution was
amended prematurely and want to reinstitute the previous version. They
believe that the President would thus take control of the situation. But
such expectations are naive.

‘The President has had more than enough time, authority, and opportunities
to influence the political processes and the country’s life in general.

‘This country is weak as never before, and for eighteen months we have been
witnessing this fierce struggle for power, in which no one trusts anyone and
all available means and methods “justify the ends”. This political
leadership is not only weak. It is irresponsible. In these eighteen months
nothing has been done to unite the country.

‘Nobody seems to care about the cleft that divided the country during the
2004 presidential election campaign. And that’s not just weakness. That’s
what I call irresponsibility. Relations with Russia were spoiled, but no
steps have been taken to mend them. That’s irresponsible, too. It reflects
badly on Ukraine’s international image.

‘There are only subjective reasons why the parliament is still inactive. The
parliamentary election showed a clear picture: we received winners and they
received the constitutional right to ally in a coalition and form a
government. But certain political forces started their own game and lost.

‘I don’t think their attempts to organize mass protest actions like in 2004
can work out, because they have lost the people’s trust and it’s very
difficult to regain.

‘What can be done about it? – I have some ideas, but let me say first what
must not be done. The political reform must not be touched. After all, it
has nothing to do with what is happening today. This political reform was
necessary objectively. And it is within its frameworks that a way out can be
found. It shows the direction and gives certain levers.

‘The idea of a pre-term parliamentary election is irrational, because it
wouldn’t change anything. It would only cost Ukrainian taxpayers heavily and
aggravate tensions. Moreover, the Regions Party would collect even more
votes than it did in March.

‘I see a feasible way out in the idea of a “grand coalition”. Proceeding
from the political reform, this parliament can form a capable and
responsible government. All it takes is strong and sound-minded
professionals. I can say openly that the idea of confining the Regions Party
faction to the opposition status was wrong and anti-national.

‘The “orange leaders” were too selfish to understand what Ukraine really
needed. They simply wanted to leave out and do without such a serious
political force.

‘I believe that the President, as the guarantor of the Constitution and the
Head of State, must assume the political responsibility for resolving this
post-election crisis. I understand that Yushchenko may favor his political
party as a politician, but as Head of State he must make a decision that
benefits the entire nation rather than one political party.

‘His decision should be based on political compromise and tolerance. That’s
why I would advise Yushchenko to initiate a new formula for the parliament
coalition – a formula of national compromise. A coalition of national
compromise would pacify, reconcile, and unite the members of the present
anti-crisis coalition and the former orange coalition. Instead of trying to
destroy the potential alliance, Yushchenko should strengthen it with his
word and stance.

‘In my opinion, it is the President, as the head of state, who could
initiate a broad pact of national reconciliation, subscribing all the
parliament factions as well as other political forces, public organizations,
and all citizens of Ukraine. Then we would see who is for the nation’s unity
and who is after power at any cost. I do believe that only a grand coalition
can save this country.

‘The Regions Party faction demonstrates responsibility and real patriotism,
suggesting this option. The Our Ukraine should join this coalition if it
doesn’t want to be a total loser. It shouldn’t repeat the mistakes made by
well-known figures in our history.

‘It is unpardonable and disgraceful to ruin the country in the 21st century.
A grand coalition with the participation of Our Ukraine is one of the
powerful levers available for re-uniting Ukraine and reviving its economy.”
LINK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/606/53988/

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5.                         EXPERIMENTING WITH OPTIONS
     What may emerge as the outcome of today’s developments? What are the
          possible alternatives for solving the crisis, and what are their possible
                      consequences? Let’s look at the possible options.

Zerkalo Nedeli On The Web, Mirror-Weekly, No. 27 (606)
International Social Political Weekly
Kyiv, Ukraine, Saturday, 15 – 21 July 2006 year

In the deep waters of the chaotic negotiation process observed in all Kyiv
offices and restaurants, I did not expect, frankly speaking, to find so many
different positions, tossing between voters’ sympathies and money,
principles and absurdity, comfort and responsibility.

I have a strong feeling that, in the most difficult Maidan period, many
politicians had a more conscientious and definite position than they have
now. This week, confusion, anger and the sporadic search for a decision that
would result in minimum losses, were characteristic of all parties involved
in the vigorous political process.

What may emerge as the outcome of today’s developments? What are the
possible alternatives for solving the crisis, and what are their possible
consequences? Let’s look at the possible options.

OPTION No. 1- It might be called classic: the “anti-crisis” coalition

forms the government, while BYUT and Our Ukraine become an opposition.
Today, this course of development is most actively promoted by the “dear

What are the pluses of this option?

[1] First, political brands are being preserved, which does not happen if a
wide coalition is established. Our Ukraine preserves its voters, and, while
restructuring and restoring its form, quite possibly improves its rating.

[2] Second, this option is an opportunity for the country to finally obtain
a comprehensible opposition that operates in a European fashion – It
establishes a shadow government, develops alternative draft laws, reports on
urgent issues of national importance, and actively uses the mechanisms of
parliamentary committees. The latter should include – as was required by the
Party of Regions while they were in the opposition – Rules and Procedures,
Budget, Legal Policy, Fighting Organized Crime, Freedom of Expression and
other parliamentary committees.

[3] Third, behaving in a civilized manner, Ukraine demonstrates that it is
able – after completion of a democratic parliamentary election – to build
civilized relations between the ruling party and the opposition. This is an
important factor, considering the overall degrading of Ukrainian politicians
in the eyes of Europe and the US.

It removes the trump cards from the hands of those political forces that
stand for freezing relations with Ukraine for four – five years because of
the inadequacy and inoperability of Ukraine’s current political elite.

Now, the minuses.

[1 ] The first question – Will BYU? succeed in preventing its
members to join the “anti-crisis” coalition? Today, in the “Regions”
hallways and corridors, they proudly speak about seven BYUT deputies who
are 100% ready to join the majority. In fact, there are about thirty potential
“traitors” among BYUT members who are ready to join the majority.

Quite an impressive number, though not critical. The exit of Our Ukraine
deputies is absolutely possible – it has been common knowledge for a long
time that Yuriy Yekhanurov, Anatoliy Kinakh, and even Boris Tarasiuk stand
for a wide coalition.

For now, the future of a coalition government made up of Party of Regions,
Communist Party and Socialist members is unclear, but the swing may occur
any moment. The situation will change radically when Yanukovich becomes the
premier. When in opposition, keeping a critical mass of deputies is
essential for both orange factions.

Our Ukraine has developed a scheme to prevent the “exit” of its deputies;
they are ready to share their know-how with Yulia Tymoshenko, but not with
the media, at the moment.

[Second Minus] The second minus of this option – the President, together
with his political power, is in opposition to the parliament and the Cabinet
(we do not expect Yushchenko to abandon his party, do we?). If this is the
case, he preserves the odds and ends of his voters, but loses control over
the country.

Of course, the President still enjoys the right to veto laws and direct any
decision by the Cabinet of Ministers for the review of the Constitutional
Court. But the Constitutional Court is lacking so far, and little is known
about its composition or the date of its emergence.

And if the Regions’ faction succeeds, and increases itself by sixty deputies
at the expense of the orange opposition – the traitors from BYUT and Our
Ukraine – then the President’s veto stops being an effective “checks and
balances” mechanism as it can be overruled by the constitutional majority in

If Our Ukraine does not join the coalition, the Regions’ faction will most
probably force the President to live by the Constitution and closely follow
its rules. This would mean constant conflict, because many issues are not
regulated by the Constitution. But who said the majority in parliament will
not be able to quickly adopt the laws on the President of Ukraine and on the
Cabinet of Ministers, and eventually make an effort and protect them from
the President’s veto?

Tales that (1) the Minister of Interior should be appointed by the
President, which contradicts the Constitution; (2) all governors have to be
the people from the President’s team, even though the Constitution states
that the list of governors is compiled by the Cabinet and is submitted to
the President for approval; (3) all state monopolies will be headed by the
President’s appointees; (4) the Cabinet is obliged to fulfill “assignments”
of the President; (5) presidential decrees are void from review and
coordination with the Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Justice – were
for Tymoshenko. Victor Yanukovich will hardly listen to them.

But the most difficult thing for a president who is deprived of support in
the government, and leading a political force that belongs to the opposition
in the legislature, would be to accept the complete shift in practical
accents. Personally, I did not see the line of people waiting to greet
Victor Yanukovych on his birthday on July 9, but those who witnessed it
called is a complete deja vu.

Only Leonid Danylovych Kuchma was able to gather such crowds of devotees.
When Victor Yanukovich becomes a premier, no matter if Our Ukraine becomes

a party in opposition or joins the wide coalition, the entrance hall in the
President’s office will be empty, and the Premier’s – jam-packed since all
the issues will be resolved there.

It is worth mentioning that until now Victor Yushchenko was rarely involved
in decision making – only when a very narrow circle of his closest
associates was involved. If the coalition is viable and capable of reaching
agreements, the decision-making process will be relocated to Hrushevsky

Levers concentrated in Yanukovich’s hands will allow him to increase his
stake in the solving of issues. In the majority of cases, he will be the
sole decision-maker, with no other alternative.

[Third Minus] And finally – the third drawback of the classic scheme. Today,
nobody has the answer to what degree the Party of Regions intends to deal
with public issues, and to what degree they plan to engage with their own
personal interests. What is the correlation between public and personal?

To what degree are the Regions interested in implementing common business
schemes with the Kremlin? Such relations transform international
intergovernmental relations into relations between corporations, and thus
eradicate the possibility of safeguarding national interests.

How many Regions’ deputies side with deputy Kalashnikov and not with deputy
Herman in the conflict with the STB TV company? If the answers to all three
questions are negative, then entree of the Party of Regions to power is
indeed a very risky experiment. In addition, the opposition will have
significant difficulties amending and affecting the actions of the party in
power. I mean the representatives of the opposition who are not confined or

OPTION NO. 2 Wide coalition. “We will see who the traitors are,” the
negotiators from the Party of Regions said to their colleagues from Our
Ukraine who were ready to discuss Moroz’ betrayal. “We negotiated
everything, reached an agreement with you, gave you all the positions you
wanted, and you deceived us.”

This is the position of the Party of Regions. Today, as ZN predicted in the
previous issue – drawing from our own information sources – Regions firmly
stands by two points: Moroz remains speaker and Yanukovich becomes premier.

What about the Communists? With them, things are not so simple. The Party of
Regions will not let the Communists go if the goal of negotiations is to
bring them to a deadlock with the help of ultimatums. If not, and Our
Ukraine will join the wide coalition – not certain groups but the faction as
a whole – then they will thank Petro Simonenko, pay him (with the help of
parliamentary committees, of course) and set him free.

Today, the demands of the Communists – who ask for three-four ministerial
positions – do not make the Party of Regions or the Socialists happy,.
Therefore, the issue of the Communists can be resolved quite easily.

This is not the case with Yanukovich as premier. The majority of influential
Regions’ deputies admit that they are not sure if the firm position of their
leadership is appropriate in this case. But, nobody has ever met a person
who has enough courage to confront Victor Yanukovich with a question about
the rationale for his refusing the position of premier.

Such kamikazes are missing, because Yanukovich was already persuaded once

by the shareholders of the Party of Regions to give up the premier post in
favor of an Our Ukraine candidate. Now, there are virtually no arguments
that could force him do it again. He desires power and is confident that he
deserves it. Rinat Akhmetov, who previously did not support the idea of
Yanukovich as premier, has changed his position today.

He is offended by Our Ukraine’s behavior, rejecting partnership with the
Party of Regions on June 22, and he will not even hear about replacing
Yanukovich with anyone else. Additionally, the Party of Regions is lacking
arguments that could be used to explain to their voters the surrender of the
premier’s post.

In principle, the situation could be changed by Oleksandr Moroz, who is the
brain of the “anti-crisis coalition.”

Resorting to his political Jesuit experience, Moroz might hint to the
stubborn Regions’ deputies that replacing Yanukovich with a more
 “compromise” politician, conditioned upon the massive entry of Regions

and Socialist representatives into the government, with the minimum
participation of Our Ukraine, would allow the Party of Regions either to
fully control an Our Ukraine premier (especially if Yekhanurov is
appointed), or, using the majority in parliament, to dismiss the premier any
time and appoint a suitable figure.

But it seems that Moroz is not interested in Our Ukraine’s entry into the
current coalition – what role will Socialists play then?

To make a long story short, in spite of several official – and a great
number of unofficial – consultations between Our Ukraine and the Party of
Regions, Yanukovich’s party has not changed its position: Yanukovich is to
be premier. At this moment, they will not even hear about alternative
candidates, especially from the Our Ukraine faction.

What do they have to offer? Everything. Everything that is not the speaker
or the premier. Once, Mykola Azarov, who has a reputation as the most
“greedy” party member, said, “You want ten ministers – take ten. You want
more – you are welcome.”

Summing up, what are the pluses and minuses of the coalition comprised of
the Party of Regions, Our Ukraine and the Socialists? Those who think that
this arrangement will really contribute to the unification of the country
are deluded by the justifications and excuses of those who constructed this
parliamentary majority.

But it is obvious that, for a while, this union is capable of calming down
the situation. If Yanukovich gives up the premier’s post, a significant part
of the population in Western Ukraine may perceive the wide coalition as an
unpleasant but necessary and reasonable solution.

Further on, the decision of the President’s faction to join the coalition
will allow him to play the role of a political arbiter and mediator,
sacrificing his principles for the sake of country’s unification. Victor
Yushchenko has nothing to lose as his ratings testify.

Therefore, he can try to play his own game, being quite distant from both
the government and the legislature (whether he wants it or not, remoteness
and distance from power are guaranteed). In addition, and this is important
for the President, he is rescued from the threat of Tymoshenko’s entree into
the government.

As for the minuses of these developments, Our Ukraine’s presence in a
coalition headed by Prime Minister Yanukovich would result for it in a
complete and irreversible loss of voters. Before making this decision, Our
Ukraine has to review its goals and objectives once again. Whether it unites
with Tymoshenko, or with the Party of Regions, in parliament or the Cabinet
of Ministers, Our Ukraine will be in the minority.

As a minority shareholder, Our Ukraine has been twisting for four months
between its potential partners, trying to identify where its dividends are
higher. Not an easy question. If electoral dividends are meant, Yanukovich’s
government will not bring any – in this case, Our Ukraine is bankrupt. If
not Yanukovich, but in the company of Regions and the Socialists,
electoral dividends are tiny, too. If Our Ukraine stays in opposition, the
dividends are higher, but far from desirable.

But if material dividends are meant, the answer is evident – of course, Our
Ukraine has to be with the Party of Regions. Now, not all, but many members
of Our Ukraine faction, recognize this. It remains to be seen how this
dilemma will be approached; the decision of the faction, the wealth of its
members, and the future of the project Our Ukraine all depend upon it.

A coalition between Our Ukraine, Regions and the Socialists (Communists are
a priori excluded – on this, the consensus has been reached) wipes off the
electoral benchmarks. And artificial ideology, especially that developed by
PR companies, stops being effective, slogans sink, and political portraits
erode. In an attempt to formally unite the country, the baby – the
structuring of society – may be washed out.

One more moment. Again, the President, who is to submit the candidature of
Victor Yanukovich to the parliament. Let us leave it for the lawyers to
discuss whether it is the duty or the right of the President. If the
President chooses the confrontational approach and regards it as his right,
then the Party of Regions has three options.

First, adopt the Law on the President that clearly regulates this norm, and
later Andriy Kliuev will cover the costs and provide for the necessary
number of votes to overrule the President’s veto.

Second, the coalition, in the absence of the Constitutional Court, may
appeal to Pechersky District Court, asking the court to oblige the President
to fulfill his constitutional duty and submit the candidature of Victor
Yanukovich to parliament. Take a guess – what will the court’s decision be?
And the third option was already voiced by Yevheniy Kushnarev; the
parliament will itself vote for Victor Yanukovich as premier and sit him in
the premier’s chair.

This is a possibility, of course, if Victor Yanukovich intends to limit his
international activity to contacts to Putin and Lukashenko. This option is
regarded by Regions as the last possible alternative. But some of our
sources state that this alternative is being elaborated with the
participation of the largest non-governmental US democratic party institute.
Do you remember the story of Kuchma and Gore in 1994? Similar contacts
inspire leaders of the Party of Regions.

For the President, participation in the coalition headed by Premier
Yanukovich is a serious blow. Only the role of the Father of the Nation,
very well played, can save him from a complete election failure. Meanwhile,
he will be accused of every ruined business and every abused journalist.

If the coalition does not demonstrate significant economic progress, and if
some coalition members live up to the worst forecasts for a cutback of
democratic rights and freedoms, Victor Yushchenko’s position will be very
fragile. He will not win much affection in the East, and he will lose all
love and support in the West. In Washington, disappointment will be complete
and final; no matter how hard he tries, he will not win any extra hearts in
Moscow. A gloomy picture.

Nevertheless, the wide coalition option today seems most realistic. It (1)
helps to end the confrontation, (2) provides minority shareholders in
Government Ltd the opportunity to earn some dividends, (3) does not require
competition in the same niche as Tymoshenko and allows three factions to
consolidate their forces to jointly fight against her, (4) gives the
President an opportunity to obtain more than the two ministerial positions
guaranteed by the Constitution, and (5) provides the possibility to
consolidate the efforts of business elites in the East and elsewhere in
protecting their territory from Moscow’s seizure.

Option 3. Early elections. Yulia Tymoshenko is the proponent of this
option. For President Yushchenko, this option is a non-trump card.

Yanukovich and Akhmetov are not afraid of this option, but other members
of the faction would prefer to save the effort and extra expense. As for the
people, they are rather against early election.

On what condition is an early election possible? If the new government is
not formed by July 25, the President has the right to suspend parliament.
This is because the 60 days foreseen by the Constitution for formation of
the new Cabinet by the coalition are expired.

The major pluses of re-election were summed up by Yulia Tymoshenko during
her interview with ZN.
“By no means should we be afraid to grant people the
right to dot all the “I”s. Early election is a world practice. If the
politicians are in a deadlock – which is the case with us – they should give
the people of Ukraine the opportunity to pass their verdict during an

‘The events that took, and are still taking, place allowed our society to
closely look at and x-ray all the politicians who are fighting for power in
Ukraine. People are wiser and smarter than many politicians think. I am
absolutely positive that, making a decision about early elections, nobody is
sure to win.

‘Therefore, we are all given a unique opportunity to agree about two things
before the election campaign:

‘[1] First, the allocation of powers between the government and the
opposition. The fact that nobody knows the winner in advance will allow us
to make rules for allocating the functions between the winning party and the
opposition more straightforward and honest. Once we endorse the document
with our signatures, it will be implemented, no matter who wins. The single
fact that we build a relationship between the ruling party and the
opposition for many years ahead makes this election worthwhile.

‘[2] The second point should deal with conditions for holding an early
election. All political forces should confirm their readiness to conduct the
election campaign in a democratic way, without black PR campaigns, without
creating negative feelings or resorting to administrative resource.

‘Meanwhile, every political force should be ready to accept the results of
the election. Let the people decide our fate. We are ready for any outcome,
but we want it to be grounded in the people’s will expressed honestly and
democratically, but not rooted in bribery and betrayals.

I proposed to Our Ukraine to sign a coalition agreement based on the earlier
reached agreements, and to form the Cabinet of Ministers before the
elections. Moreover, I proposed to form the Cabinet regardless of the number
of votes my bloc and Our Ukraine receive in the early election. We should go
to people without “a pig in a poke” and tell them clearly who will take the
posts and which posts they will take in this government as well as what they
are going to do in case of coming to power.”

There is something in what Yulia Tymoshenko is saying: Only before the
beginning of early elections is there a chance to agree in public about the
strategic rules of the game between the government and opposition. However,
it is possible to ad one more point to Tymoshenko’s two. The fact is that if
the Presidents makes a decision to dissolve parliament, the current
parliament will not be working because these are not the regularly scheduled

Consequently, the Cabinet remains the only body holding all economic levers
in its hands and not controlled by anyone. What will happen to Ukraine in
this case at the moment when the new Cabinet comes to power, I wonder? That
is why a certain list of decisions, which deputies would delegate to
Cabinet, and a lists of steps could become the third point.

Tymoshenko is sure that the threat of Viktor Yanukovich becoming a Prime
Minister in a parliamentary-presidential republic would consolidate and
activate the disappointed and indifferent “orange” voters. She believes that
her popularity will increase significantly and that early elections will
enable her and the president to establish in parliament the orange coalition
together with Our Ukraine.

Her major argument is that early elections are the only chance to save
Ukraine from the Donetsk team coming to power. “Regardless of who will
become the Prime Minister in the so-called ‘anti-crisis’ coalition, the
Regions will rule the state and use their typical methods. In this
situation, Yanukovich’s coming to power is the matter of few months. And
nobody will be able to scratch them out of there.”

And now, the weak points of the plan. Our Ukraine does not want early
elections because it has a very weak election positions. The entire
right-bank Ukraine has witnessed it tossing from one side to another and was
confused because of its many-sided fidelity to principles. Only Tymoshenko
stands a chance to improve her election results, and neither the president
nor Our Ukraine is interested in this.

Early elections would mean that the parliament formed as a result of them
will have one year of immunity. This means that it will be impossible to
change the election results. Under current circumstances, there is a good
chance that Regions will receive such a percentage of the vote that they
will be able to create a majority either by themselves or in coalition with
some modest political force — for example, that of Lytvyn.

Early elections could further divide the society. Such a division may well
result into bloodshed in the streets and a free-for-all format of the
elections. As soon as someone violates the rule, all the agreements would be

And finally, repeat elections will not change the quality of membership in
the factions. First, nobody would let the new persons in. Second,, there are
no new persons able to work in parliament.

Early elections seem to be the only chance to try to prevent Yanukovich and
Ko from coming to power. But on the other hand, may be it is better not to
publicize the names of the members of the Cabinet of BYUT and Our Ukraine
before the elections so as to not undermine their credibility?

What we indeed have to fear in the case of a creation of a wide coalition is
the conscious attempt to kill the opposition. In fact, if repeat elections
are not held, most likely only Tymoshenko will remain in the opposition. All
the rest will be trying to restrict and weaken her faction.

Tymoshenko will need much strength to withstand in this situation. To tell
the truth, I do not see parties among the potential members of the wide
parliamentary coalition who realize that the development of the state is
impossible without the opposition. Currently, many experts predict the
decline of Tymoshenko and believe that she will not be able to transfer her
faction and herself from the street to parliamentary methods of struggle.

If a wide coalition is created, quite possibly Yulia Tymoshenko’s faction
will have to survive through a serious crisis, on the one hand. Yet on the
other, if all the forecasts concerning the Regions’ methods of governing the
state come true, where would the aggrieved seek protection? One should not
forget about the electors either.

Currently, the issue of the quality of the opposition is as high on the
agenda as the issue of the government. While there are plenty of contenders
for the governing post, only Tymoshenko will most likely have to claim the
functions of the opposition.

But then, the events are changing so fast that there is no point in making

Thus, we have reviewed three possible scenarios of future developments with
their major pluses, minuses and points of interest. There is no good way out
of the situation. Moreover, there are no “good” candidates in this
situation. We’ve seen them all, we know what they are capable of and we know
what the result could be. One can blame the president for what is currently
going on in Ukraine, as many do now.

One can blame the parties, Moscow, Washington or even Honduras. One can
blame the society, which woke up on the Maidan and then once again fall
asleep. But in the long run, Ukraine’s political bosses are to be blamed for
all going on now. I deliberately avoid the word “elite,” because this word
means that its members have responsibility, a clear idea of national
interests, principles, high morals and necessary intellect – political IQ.
But what do we have in actual fact?

By no means do I insist that there are silly people in the government and
opposition. The size of their capital testifies to the opposite. But after
Leonid Kuchma left power, his team left with him. This team represented the
Soviet school, which had many things incongruous with the requirements of
modern state management. Most of them were corrupt. But this is a common

At the same time, the representatives of this school knew three things: 1)
the type of demeanor that should be used in government, 2) that corruption
should not become marauding and kill the milk cow; 3) the way in which the
vertical of power should function.

In theory, the representatives of this school should be substituted with new
people – young, educated, with a clear understanding that the functioning of
the state should be based on the rule of law, while all of their activities
should be based on state interest. But they did not come, because there were
no such people.

As a result, there are a great number of occasional people in the
presidential secretariat, government and parliament. Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of the members of Verkhovna Rada are people who

have succeeded in business. To succeed in a country with vague rules, a
businessman should have quick wit, sharp teeth, long claws, sharp heels and
no principles and moral limits.

How could people who earned their fortunes by robbing this country directly
or indirectly stand up for its interests? How can politicians reach a
consensus if subconsciously they are only interested in the distribution of

Having responded to the slogans, people outside the buildings on Bankova and
Hrushevskoho are breaking lances over language, NATO and the EU, Russia

and Europe. Inside these buildings, everything is determined by totally
different tasks. That is why we should not expect any civilized, logical, or
moreover permanent, consensus of our politicians. Only the threat of losing
their right to manage the business territory called Ukraine can force them
to reach it.

That is why there is not good way out of the situation, but there is hope
for a good way out. However, it will take at least three to five years to
come to it. Meanwhile, we need to preserve all those small but very
important achievements gained as a result of the change of the political
bosses.                                           -30-

LINK: http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/606/53994/
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