AUR#674 Guide To Parliamentary Election March 26; Pora, Much Needed Young Blood; Orange Coalition

THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary
Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World
COMPLETE GUIDE TO UKRAINE’S IMPORTANT PARLIMENTARY ELECTION, SUNDAY, MARCH 26

THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT – AUR – Number 674
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., Kyiv, Ukraine, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 2006

——–INDEX OF ARTICLES——–
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to the Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article

1. GUIDE TO UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION MAR 26
Campaign Issues, new powers, parties and blocs, media, opinion polls
BBC Monitoring research in English 2 Mar 06 [Updated March 10]
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Mar 10, 2006
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

2. PORA: MUCH-NEEDED YOUNG BLOOD IN UKRAINE’S POLITICS
OP-ED: By Volodymyr Hrytsutenko, Associate Professor
English and History, Lviv Franko National University
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 2
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

3. ORANGE COALITION BUILDING DURING THE RADA
ELECTIONS AND BEYOND: POLITICS AS THE SYSTEMATIC
ORGANIZATION OF HATREDS
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Markian Bilynskyj [1]
The U.S-Ukraine Foundation, Kyiv, Ukraine
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 3
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

4 . UKRAINE VOTE MAY UNITE FOES
Weakened Yushchenko Weighs Coalition With Pro-Russian Faction
By Alan Cullison, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, March 13, 2006; Page A4

5. UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ON OFFENSIVE AHEAD
OF CRITICAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION
By Olena Horodetska, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue Mar 14, 2006

6. KIEV EXPECTS AN INVITATION TO JOIN NATO BY LATE SPRING
Election campaign turning into a race for American encouragement prizes
Official Kiev is obsessed with becoming a NATO member
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY:
By Tatiana Ivzhenko
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, March 14, 2006

7. YUSCHENKO: NEITHER MY TEAM NOR I WISH RUSSIA ILL
INTERVIEW: With President of Ukraine Viktor Yuschenko
Interview: By Yanina Vaskovskaya
Novaya Gazeta No 16 (1138)
Moscow, Russia, Monday, March 6-8, 2006

8 . UKRAINIAN TV CHANNEL IN KIEV ONE PLUS ONE STARTS
BROADCASTING TO USA AND CANADA
One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 14 Mar 06
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tuesday, Mar 14, 2006

9. “WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO MAKE IT EASIER TO HELP”
Kateryna Yushchenko reports on performance of Ukraine-3000 Foundation
founded by Viktor Yushchenko in 2001
INTERVIEW: With Kateryna Yushchenko
By Nadia Tysiachna, The Day Weekly Digest in English #7
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, March 7, 2006

10. UKRAINIAN MUSEUM OF STAMFORD IN CONNECTICUT
New website launched for outstanding museum and library
By Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 10
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006
========================================================
1
. GUIDE TO UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION MAR 26
Campaign Issues, new powers, parties and blocs, media, opinion polls

BBC Monitoring research in English 2 Mar 06 [Updated March 10]
BBC Monitoring Service, United Kingdom, Friday, Mar 10, 2006
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 1
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

INDEX:
1. Introduction; 2. Campaign Issues; 3. Electoral framework;
4. Parliament’s new powers; 5. Parties and blocs; 6. Media; 7. Opinion polls

[1] INTRODUCTION —————
Ukrainians will go to the polls on 26 March to elect a new parliament. The
election, the first after the introduction of constitutional amendments that
have transferred some of the president’s powers to the legislature, is set
to be a vote of confidence in the new pro-Western administration of Viktor
Yushchenko.

Following the acrimonious break-up of the “Orange” coalition that brought
Yushchenko to power in December 2004, a series of corruption scandals, and
with the economy languishing, the president’s approval ratings have
plummeted from their post-revolution highs.

The pro-Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc is a distant second or third in the
opinion polls, while the party of his main opponent in the presidential
election, Viktor Yanukovych, is leading with around 30 per cent of the vote.
The combined ratings of the main “Orange” forces – Our Ukraine, Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialists – remain somewhat higher but are
probably still not enough to form a majority on their own, coming to 30-40
per cent.

Whether the “Orange” forces or the Yanukovych-led opposition will be able to
form a working majority will depend on which of the smaller forces are
represented in parliament, which is far from certain given the wide
divergence in poll results. Centrist forces representing the old
establishment led by parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn may hold the
balance of power.

With tensions and personal rivalries running high between erstwhile
revolution allies, on current form there are four plausible outcomes of this
election, none of which are much to Yushchenko’s liking:

1. An uneasy coalition of former revolution allies – with popular former
Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko’s bloc being the most difficult partner –
and Lytvyn.
2. A politically risky and potentially unstable alliance between
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and the party of Viktor Yanukovych, Party

of Regions.
3. A hostile legislature dominated by Party of Regions and its allies,
possibly including the Communists or Lytvyn’s bloc.
4. A hung parliament, which Yushchenko will have the right to dissolve

if it fails to form a majority and a new cabinet.

After months of cold war between Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s parties
following Tymoshenko’s dismissal in September, the “Orange” forces stepped
up efforts to sign a coalition pact in January. However, the Socialists were
openly sceptical about the prospects for an agreement from the start, and
the talks failed to make much progress.

By the end of February, they appeared to have broken down altogether, with
Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko’s bloc accusing each other of negotiating in bad
faith.

While both sides appear to agree that the “Orange” parties should work
together in the new parliament, Tymoshenko insists that she must get her job
back if her bloc wins more seats than Our Ukraine. She is campaigning on the
premise that following the constitutional amendments, Ukrainians are
essentially electing the new prime minister, which will be the most
important state post.

Our Ukraine is prepared to give Tymoshenko’s bloc portfolios, but is
extremely reluctant to see her back at the helm of the cabinet. Current
Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, who leads the Our Ukraine list, has
indicated that he hopes to continue in the job after the election, and
Yushchenko himself has endorsed this position.

Both Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko have repeatedly ruled out an alliance with
the Party of Regions. However, Tymoshenko’s supporters have suggested that
Our Ukraine is engaged in talks with Regions.

Whatever the outcome, chances are high that Yushchenko’s pro-Western,
pro-market drive will be hampered by a reluctant or openly hostile
legislature.

[2] CAMPAIGN ISSUES —————
The Yushchenko administration’s handling of the economy is the main
campaign issue, as well as its alleged inability to deliver the sweeping
changes promised during the Orange Revolution over the year since it
came to power.

Although Ukrainians’ real incomes have been growing at the fastest pace
since independence, food and petrol prices have also risen sharply, and the
GDP growth has slowed from 12 per cent in 2004 to under 3 per cent in 2005.
The government blames a sharp drop in world metal prices, Ukraine’s main
export item, and a rise in energy prices.

Claims have also been made that the Yanukovych cabinet fudged GDP figures
during the presidential election campaign of 2004 to boost its economic
credentials. It has also been suggested that the figures were previously
overstated due to the allegedly widespread practice of reporting fictitious
exports in order to claim VAT refunds. But the government’s opponents
insist that the government’s belligerent reprivatization rhetoric of the early
2005 scared off investors.

The gas agreement with Russia – the ostensible reason for parliament’s
decision to sack the Yekhanurov cabinet on 10 January – also features
prominently as an election issue.

While the Yushchenko administration takes credit for the deal reached after
Russia shut down gas supplies to Ukraine on 1 January 2006 over a price
disagreement and insists that there was no alternative, its opponents allege
that the price Ukraine has agreed to pay is too high and potentially fatal
for the economy, and the deal serves the interests of corrupt officials both
in Ukraine and in Russia.

The Ukrainian media has also reflected a general sentiment that the
administration has failed to tackle corruption – one of the key promises of
the Orange Revolution. While Yushchenko himself has so far largely managed
to stay above the corruption scandals, his key allies in the Our Ukraine
bloc have been tarnished by sleaze allegations made by former Orange
Revolution partners. However, some opposition figures have alleged that
Yushchenko’s family benefited from the gas deal.

The government is also taking flak over its treatment of officials from the
Kuchma administration. While Party of Regions accuses the administration of
waging a campaign of political persecution against its opponents, the Yuliya
Tymoshenko Bloc says Kuchma officials implicated in corruption and
vote-rigging are still at large, and bemoans Yushchenko’s decision to sign a
memorandum of understanding with Viktor Yanukovych in the autumn of 2005.

One common campaign issue of all the recent elections in Ukraine – the use
of government machinery and unfair campaigning by the party in power – does
not appear to be a major factor in this election.

Ukrainian analysts say all the key players have access to the media, and the
few cases of the alleged use of “administrative resource” reported so far
appear to be sporadic, ineffectual and not centrally coordinated. However,
Yanukovych has alleged that the authorities are planning large-scale
vote-rigging.

[3] ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK —————
The 26 March election is the first to be contested exclusively by parties
and blocs of parties. Unlike all previous Ukrainian parliamentary elections,
there will be no single-seat constituencies contested by individuals on a
first-past-the-post basis.


Two of the Darkest Days in Modern Ukrainian History
[FOOTNOTE: Two of the darkest days in modern Ukrainian history were
the two days in which the Parliament took away from the people their real
power, their right to vote directly for members of Parliament. The first
time Parliament took away one-half of this right, this grass-roots power,
and gave it to political parties. What is amazing, under Ukraine’s
constitution, the Parliament could take away, ‘steal’ as many would say,
the people’s real power without a vote of the people.

The second time, in the spring of 2004, the Parliament took away ‘stole’
the last-half of the peoples real power and now in Ukraine there is no
direct election of any members of Parliament by the people of Ukraine.
All members of Parliament are now selected by a handful of powerful
political party bosses.

Members of Parliament now represent ‘everyone’ and experience shows
that in most cases this means ‘no-one’ but themselves and their business
operations. Parliament took all the power away from the people as those
in Parliament knew having political parties select the members of Parliament
instead of the people was a way by which they could much more easily
manipulate and control the government of Ukraine than by having direct
election of the Parliament. ‘Power to the people’ is now mostly only a
theory, an idea, not much of a reality in Ukraine once again. [AUR EDITOR]

The election will be held on a proportional basis, whereby parties and blocs
scoring more than 3 per cent of the popular vote will be elected to the
single-chamber parliament by direct, popular, universal suffrage in
proportion to the percentage of votes scored. The parties scoring less than
3 per cent will not be represented in parliament.

Only Ukrainian citizens older than 21 years of age can be elected to
parliament.

The election will be held according to the parliamentary election law which
was passed on 25 March 2004. The law was amended on 7 July 2005 to
incorporate changes required by the constitutional reform package which was
passed in December 2004.

Major differences from the law according to which the previous election was
held in 2002, apart from the proportional ballot and the 3-per-cent minimum
vote barrier (lowered from 4 per cent), include the following:

1. Parliament will be elected for five, rather than four years.
2. Individuals elected to parliament will be barred, under the so-called
imperative mandate clause, from quitting the faction of the party or

bloc from which they were elected.
3. The official campaign period is extended from 90 to 120 days.
4. Ballot boxes will be made of a transparent material.

Parties and blocs are allowed to finance their campaigns only from their own
funds and from the funds allocated to the campaign from the state budget.

Campaign advertising is allowed from 13 January to 24 March. The official
results of the election are to be announced within five days after polling
day.

[4] PARLIAMENT’S NEW POWERS —————
The parliament elected on 26 March 2006 will be institutionally stronger
than its predecessor, though there will be no transition to a fully
parliamentary republic.

This is the consequence of the constitutional reform package which was
passed on 8 December 2004, at the height of the Orange Revolution, as part
of a compromise deal between the then opposition led by current President
Viktor Yushchenko and the supporters of rival presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych.

Parliament will acquire the following new powers:
1. A majority in parliament, rather than the president, will nominate
the prime minister and most of the cabinet ministers.
2. The president retains the right to appoint the foreign minister and
the defence minister, as well as the prosecutor-general and the head
of the Security Service, but it will be up to parliament to approve the
appointments, as well as dismissals from those posts.
3. It will be up to parliament, rather than the president, to dismiss the
prime minister or any of the cabinet ministers.
4. The cabinet will have to resign when a new parliament is elected,
rather than when a new president is elected.
5. The prime minister will report to parliament and the president,
rather than to the president only.

To preserve the balance of power, the president, under the reform, obtains
the right to dissolve parliament if it fails to form a majority within 30
days after the first sitting following the election or to form a new cabinet
within 60 days after the dismissal or resignation of the previous cabinet.

[5] PARTIES AND BLOCS —————
While a total of 45 parties and blocs are running in the election, opinion
polls conducted in February 2006 indicated that only about eight of them
stand any chance of overcoming the 3 per cent barrier and gaining seats in
parliament, while most of the others will receive less than 1 per cent.
Front-runners (certain to overcome 3 per cent barrier)

[5-1] PARTY OF REGIONS —–
The opposition Party of Regions ( www.partyofregions.org.ua, in Russian) has
its power base in the densely-populated industrial regions of eastern
Ukraine, which overwhelmingly backed party leader and former Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych’s unsuccessful presidential bid in the 2004 election. It
is also bidding for the support of all those disappointed in the results of
the Orange Revolution nationwide.

The party’s campaign advertising highlights the alleged decline in living
standards over the past year, and promises to restore the economic growth
and stability that the country enjoyed when Yanukovych was prime minister.
It is critical of the authorities’ pro-Western foreign policy and opposes
NATO membership.

It blames the authorities for the gas dispute with Russia, and has condemned
what it describes as the “dirty deal” that resolved it.
However, Yanukovych also voiced mild criticism of Russia over the gas
dispute. The party promises to rebuild “a special relationship” with Russia
and to work to form a Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and
Kazakhstan.

The party’s major financial backer is reported to be Donetsk tycoon Rinat
Akhmetov, who is No 7 on the party’s election list. Observers have counted
up to 37 representatives of Akhmetov’s business empire who are likely to
enter parliament on the party’s election list.

The list also includes numerous officials from former President Leonid
Kuchma’s administration, a number of whom have been investigated over
allegations of election fraud and separatism during the 2004 presidential
election, as well as other criminal offences.

For a time in early 2005, the opposition was in disarray and Yanukovych and
his party appeared to be a spent force, with other more radical opposition
forces encroaching on its support base even in its eastern strongholds.
Yanukovych was virtually invisible during the first half of the year, while
Akhmetov left the country for an extended period as the Interior Ministry
probed his background.

However, with the acrimonious break up of the Orange team over the summer
and growing public disillusionment at the perceived incompetence and
corruption of the new authorities, the Party of Regions bounced back
strongly.

Recent opinion polls have shown its rating settling at around 30 per cent of
the vote, meaning it is likely to have the largest single faction in
parliament.

THE PARTY OF REGIONS’ MANIFESTO
The party’s manifesto “Welfare to the people! Power to the regions!”
promises:
– to preserve Ukraine’s nonaligned status and hold a referendum on
NATO membership;
– to promote Ukraine’s European integration – “not by slogans, but by
practical actions”;
– to normalize relations with Russia, and complete formation of the
Single Economic Space;
– to grant Russian the status of a second state language;
– to devolve greater powers to the regions, with gradual transition to
a federal structure;
– to cut taxes followed by a two year moratorium on changes to the
tax system;
– to treat human rights as a priority, and ensure full rights for the
opposition.

Manifesto quotes: “The so-called ‘orange revolution’ disrupted the normal
course of events. The year 2005 was a year of losses and disappointments.
The new authorities have completely bankrupted themselves in all directions
of state policy. Economic growth has slowed. Living standards have fallen.
Ukraine has become an unreliable and unpredictable partner.”

“Unity in diversity is an objective reality of our society, and it must be
embodied in the state structure of Ukraine.”

“The Party of the Regions is the only party in Ukraine that formulates its
commitments as full responsibility to the people. We guarantee that our MPs
and the government they form will ensure the fulfilment of the provisions of
this programme over a three-year period. Otherwise, they will resign of
their own accord.”

THE PARTY’S TOP 10:
Viktor Yanukovych;
parliament human rights ombudsman Nina Karpachova;
MP and industrialist Heorhiy Skudar;
MP Taras Chornovil (son of late nationalist leader and Soviet era dissident
Vyacheslav Chornovil);
industrialist Vyacheslav Bohuslayev;
MP and Regions of Ukraine faction leader Rayisa Bohatyryova;
Rinat Akhmetov;
Luhansk regional council head Viktor Tykhonov;
MP and mine owner Yukhym Zvyahilskyy;
Donetsk regional council head Borys Kolesnykov.

The party’s list contains 445 names, including: former Kharkiv regional
governor Yevhen Kushnaryov (No 11); former First Deputy Prime Minister and
Finance Minister Mykola Azarov (No 12); MP and former Deputy Prime Minister
Andriy Klyuyev (No 14); accordionist Yakiv (Yan) Tabachnyk (No 20); former
Luhansk regional governor Oleksandr Yefremov; former Central Electoral
Commission head Serhiy Kivalov (No 26); former Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav
Piskun (No 96); Yanukovych’s former press secretary Hanna Herman (No 106).

[5-2] OUR UKRAINE BLOC ———-
The Our Ukraine bloc ( www.razom.org.ua, in Ukrainian, partially available in
English) was formed in December 2005 from six pro-presidential parties: the
Our Ukraine People’s Union, the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the Party of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the Christian Democratic Union, the
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Republican Party Sobor.

Strongly committed to Ukraine’s European integration, the bloc defines its
goal as the implementation of President Viktor Yushchenko’s policies in the
future parliament.

The bloc’s list is headed by Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, who is a
member of the presidium of the Our Ukraine People’s Union. The bloc’s list
also includes several former top officials from Yushchenko’s inner circle
who lost their jobs as a result of the corruption scandal that tore the
Orange team apart in September.

The bloc’s campaign advertising initially focused on its commitment to the
ideals of the Orange Revolution under the slogan “Do not betray Maydan!”
and warned of the danger of a comeback by members of the previous
administration, whom it describes as “bandits”.

In recent weeks, however, it has begun presenting a more positive message,
praising the achievements of the authorities – including the fulfilment of
Yushchenko’s campaign promises to reprivatize the Kryvorizhstal steelworks
and bring Ukrainian troops home from Iraq.

The bloc has called for the reformation of the Orange team and urged its
former allies – including the Socialist Party, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc
and the Pora-Reforms and Order Bloc – to sign an agreement on forming a
coalition in the future parliament.

However, it has strongly criticized the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, especially
since it voted with the opposition on 10 January to dismiss Yekhanurov’s
government. It is very reluctant to accept Tymoshenko’s demand that she
should be restored to the post of prime minister.

Recent opinion polls give the bloc 15-20 per cent of the vote.

THE OUR UKRAINE BLOC’S MANIFESTO
The bloc’s manifesto “We have one Ukraine” promises:
– to make European integration the main foreign policy priority (the
manifesto nowhere mentions Russia);
– to complete WTO accession in 2006 and to obtain associate EU
membership as quickly as possible;
– to deregulate business;
– to simplify the tax system and reduce tax rates;
– to increase the powers and resources of local self-government;
– to reform the judiciary and eradicate corruption;
– to form a professional army by 2010.

Manifesto quotes: “After a year, we have something to report: society has
become more democratic; freedom of speech has taken root; wages and
pensions have increased; financial support for the birth of children has
increased; the term for military service has been reduced; the simplified
system of taxation has been preserved. Kryvorizhstal [reprivatized steelworks]
was sold for a fair price – we have returned to people what was stolen by
oligarchs. Our task is to continue this work and ensure the changes are
irreversible. The time for mistakes is over.”

“We have united because we have one Ukraine. We see it as a democratic,
law-based and European state with a social-market economy, where everyone
can realize their possibilities, and the state helps those who need it.”

“We have united to say ‘Yes!’ to the ideals of the Orange Revolution and
‘No!’ to a comeback by those who supported the anti-people regime of
Kuchma-[former presidential administration chief Viktor]
Medvedchuk-Yanukovych and falsified the result of the presidential election.
We will never be with those who betrayed Ukraine’s interests.”

“Partnership relations between the state and religious organizations will
promote spiritual and moral health.”

THE BLOC’S TOP 10:
Yuriy Yekhanurov;
National Security and Defence Council Secretary and Party of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs leader Anatoliy Kinakh;
Foreign Minister and People’s Movement of Ukraine leader Borys Tarasyuk;
One Plus One TV producer-general and talk show host Olha Herasymyuk;
Eurovision-winning singer Ruslana Lyzhychko;
Deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kyrylenko;
MP Kseniya Lyapina;
MP Mykola Katerynchuk;
Central Electoral Commission member Ruslan Knyazevych;
MP Liliya Hryhorovych.

The bloc’s list contains 393 names, including: presidential secretariat
deputy head and Ukrainian Republican Party Sobor leader Anatoliy Matviyenko
(No 12); MP and Our Ukraine faction leader Mykola Martynenko; former Deputy
Prime Minister and Our Ukraine People’s Union leader Roman Bezsmertniy (No
23); Naftohaz Ukrayiny board chairman and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
leader Oleksiy Ivchenko (No 25); businessman and former National Security
and Defence Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko (No 33); MP and banker Fedir
Shpyh; MP Petro Yushchenko (the president’s brother) (No 40); former first
presidential aide Oleksandr Tretyakov (No 41); Crimean Tatar leader and MP
Mustafa Dzhemilyev (No 45); former Emergencies Minister Davyd Zhvaniya (No
69); Dnipropetrovsk regional council head Mykola Shvets (No 97); Yaroslav
Yushchenko (the president’s nephew) (No 99).

[5-3] YULIYA TYMOSHENKO BLOC ———-
The bloc is made up of forces loyal to former Prime Minister Yuliya
Tymoshenko (www.tymoshenko.com.ua, in Ukrainian, partially available in
English).

Previously a close ally of Yushchenko and a driving force of the Orange
Revolution, Tymoshenko has since her dismissal as prime minister in
September moved into opposition to the authorities on certain issues – in
particular, the recent gas deal with Russia, which she has described as a
“betrayal of national interests” and “corrupt”.

Dissatisfaction with the gas deal caused Tymoshenko’s parliament faction to
vote with the opposition for the dismissal of the Yekhanurov government.

While she has left the door open for cooperation with Our Ukraine in the new
parliament, she has made clear that she expects this to be on her own terms.
She has said that, under the new constitution that came into force on 1
January 2006, voters will in effect be electing the most important person in
the country, the prime minister. She has made clear that she thinks the
choice is between herself and Yanukovych.

Tymoshenko appears to be somewhat less pro-Western in orientation than
Yushchenko’s supporters, and there have been suggestions that the Kremlin
sees her as a more acceptable partner than Yushchenko. As prime minister,
Tymoshenko was accused of “populism” and employing “socialist” methods in
contrast to Yushchenko’s more free-market approach.

Recently, Tymoshenko has advocated a “third way” ideology between capitalism
and socialism, which she refers to “solidarism”.
Tymoshenko’s team includes economic liberals, radical nationalists,
anti-corruption campaigners, former political supporters of Leonid Kuchma,
and a number of big businessmen.

The bloc’s campaign advertising focuses almost entirely on the personality
of Tymoshenko, who features prominently on its billboards along with the
bloc’s logo, a red heart-shaped tick. The bloc did not start advertising on
TV until mid-February, many weeks after its main competitors. Its
advertisement features an image of Tymoshenko cupping a beating-heart logo
in her hands, with the slogan “Justice exists, it’s worth fighting for!”

The bloc’s election broadcast on state TV described Tymoshenko as “the last
samurai of Ukrainian politics” who is ready “to fight even when you have no
strength left, to believe in success when there are no grounds to do so, and
not to surrender even when everyone else is giving up”. Recent opinion polls
give the bloc 10-20 per cent of the vote.

THE TYMOSHENKO BLOC’S MANIFESTO
The bloc’s manifesto promises:
– to understand people’s problems and social conflicts and restore justice
taking account of the interests of all;
– to make morality and spirituality the country’s main development priority;
– to make the penal system less severe, especially for economic crimes;
– to make the tax system more humane;
– to hold regular referendums;
– to use the Internet to give the public greater influence over the
legislative process;
– to reform the judiciary and introduce election of judges;
– to abolish VAT.

Manifesto quotes: “Our manifesto is based on what we firmly believe: the
ideological extremes the world has seen – both socialism, which has
demonstrated its non-viability, and extreme market fundamentalism, which has
given rise to cynicism, the total rule of money, complete amorality, when
profit is placed above warm human relations, above love, above all that has
been most valued in people – these extremes are features of humanity’s
youth.

We must build a harmonic path of love. I would like for our Ukrainian idea
to gain a specific content. Therefore today, I can pronounce, perhaps for
the first time at such a high gathering, the word ‘solidarism’ – an ideology
that was born at the beginning of the 20th century and was presented to
society by the world’s greatest philosophers, including Ukrainians. In fact,
solidarism in its pure form is harmony and justice.”

“The more referendums a country holds, the more honest the authorities. So
we will build legislation so that referendums become something just as
normal as breathing fresh air.”

THE BLOC’S TOP 10:
Yuliya Tymoshenko;
former Security Service (SBU) chief Oleksandr Turchynov;
former Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko;
MP Vasyl Onopenko;
TV journalist Andriy Shevchenko;
MP and former Soviet political prisoner Levko Lukyanenko;
MP Hryhoriy Omelchenko;
Luhansk pedagogical university rector Vitaliy Kurylo;
ground forces commander Mykola Petruk;
25-year-old Skvira mayor Yevhen Suslov.

The bloc’s list includes 403 names, including: MP Andriy Shkil (No 13);
former Economics Minister Serhiy Teryokhin (No 16); former SBU deputy head
Andriy Kozhemyakin (No 25); journalist Oleh Lyashko (No 26); MP Bohdan
Hubskyy (No 27); industrialist and MP Tariel Vasadze (No 41); industrialist
and MP Vasyl Khmelnytskyy (No 60); industrialist and MP Kostyantyn Zhevaho
(No 62).
Second rank (likely to overcome 3 per cent barrier)

[5-4] SOCIALIST PARTY ———-
The centre-left Socialist Party ( www.spu.org.ua, in Ukrainian) defines
itself as a party of “European socialism”. Its leader Oleksandr Moroz, a
former parliament speaker and long-time opponent of President Leonid
Kuchma, came third in the first round of the 2004 presidential election
with 5.8 per cent of the vote.

Despite clear ideological differences, Moroz backed Viktor Yushchenko in the
run-off on condition that he pledge support for political reforms shifting
power from the presidency to parliament.

The party was one of the driving forces behind the Orange Revolution. It was
rewarded with three ministerial posts, including the Interior Ministry, as
well as the chairmanship of the State Property Fund and several regional
governorships.

It has continued to support President Viktor Yushchenko, though it is often
critical of his actions. Its faction did not support the dismissal of the
Yekhanurov government. The party continues to support the political reforms,
which came into force on 1 January 2006, and has reacted sensitively to
Yushchenko’s suggestions that it may be reviewed or put to a referendum.

Recent polls have given the party 3-10 per cent of the vote.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY’S MANIFESTO
The party’s manifesto “We will build Europe in Ukraine” promises:
– to introduce state control of prices for some monopoly products;
– to create 1million new jobs a year;
– to restore state financing for education and health care;
– to cancel immunity from prosecution for local council deputies;
– not to privatize strategic plants or monopolies;
– to hold a referendum on NATO membership.

Manifesto quotes: “The removal of the former regime from power and reform
of the system of power are our joint victory with the people. This has
allowed the people to elect honest authorities in 2006.”

“We are ready to answer all today’s challenges. Because behind us we have
150-year experience of European socialism, the best examples from Soviet
times, and almost 15 years’ experience of our own political struggle.”

“In order to carry out the changes that people need, it is necessary for the
authorities to move from a liberal to a social policy.”

THE PARTY’S TOP TEN:
Oleksandr Moroz;
State Property Fund head Valentyna Semenyuk;
Education Minister Stanislav Nikolayenko;
MP and Silski Visti newspaper editor Ivan Spodarenko;
Afghan War Veterans Union head Serhiy Chervonopyskyy;
MP Yosip Vinskyy;
MP Ivan Bokyy;
MP and industrialist Volodymyr Boyko;
MP and media owner Andriy Derkach;
MP Oleksiy Malynovksyy.

The party’s list contains 390 names, including: Poltava regional governor
Stepan Bulba (No 11); Odessa regional governor Vasyl Tsushko (No 12); head
of the supervisory board of the Severodonetsk Azot chemical plant Oleksiy
Kunchenko (No 13); MP Mykola Rudkovskyy (No 14); Agriculture Minister
Oleksandr Baranivskyy (No 20).

[5-5] COMMUNIST PARTY ———-
The Communist Party ( www.kpu.net.ua, in Russian/Ukrainian) is
anti-market, anti-Western and pro-Russian. With its nostalgic attitude to
the Soviet past, the party draws its support from the many elderly people
impoverished after the collapse of the Soviet welfare system. Party leader
Petro Symonenko came fourth in the first round of the 2004 presidential
election with 5.0 per cent of the vote.

Support for the Communist Party appears to have declined significantly since
the 2002 parliamentary election, when it took just under 20 per cent of the
vote for the 225 seats (half the total number) allotted by proportional
representation.

In an apparent attempt to dispel stereotypes about the party, its TV
campaign has included advertisements aimed at young people with the
slogan “Vote for Communists. That’s cool!” and others featuring
“geniuses” who supported communist ideas such as Spanish artist Pablo
Picasso and Chilean poet Pablo Neruda.

Recent opinion polls give the party 3-10 per cent of the vote.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S MANIFESTO
The party’s manifesto “Power and ownership to the people of Ukraine!”
promises:
– to abolish VAT;
– to set a single national price for main food products, medicines and other
necessities, and introduce a moratorium on price increases;
– to oppose Ukraine joining NATO;
– to strengthen ties with the CIS and give real content to the agreement on
the Single Economic Space;
– to guarantee freedom of conscience and prevent the destruction of
“canonical Orthodoxy”;
– to give Russian the status of a second state language;
– to nationalize strategic sectors of the economy and plants;
– to introduce a state monopoly on liquor and tobacco production;
– to introduce a state monopoly on foreign trade.

Manifesto quotes: “The Ukrainian people is waiting for change. It is tired
of poverty and the lies of presidents and governments, the cynical
experiments of woeful economists, and the rapid change of personnel. It is
tired of officials’ wilfulness and of unemployment, diseases that were
forgotten about in Soviet times, the constant growth of prices and fees,
total corruption and crime, and television’s daily brainwashing.”

“We will halt propaganda for the cult of profit, cruelty, violence,
drunkenness and licentiousness. We will not allow the rehabilitation of the
fascist cut-throats of OUN-UPA [an anti-Soviet guerrilla movement active
during and after World War II].”

THE PARTY’S TOP 10:
Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko;
First deputy parliament speaker Adam Martynyuk;
84-year-old MP Ivan Herasymyuk;
MP Kateryna Samoylyk;
MP Omelyan Parubok;
MP Valeriya Zaklunna Myronenko;
MP Oleksandr Holub;
MP Valentyn Matveyev;
MP Oleksandr Tkachenko;
MP Petro Tsybenko.
The party’s list contains 449 names.

[5-6] PEOPLE’S BLOC OF LYTVYN ———-
This centrist bloc (also known as “We”) is made up of parliament speaker
Volodymyr Lytvyn’s People’s Party ( www.narodna.info, in Ukrainian), the
all-Ukrainian left-wing association Justice, and the Peasant Democratic
Party.

A former chief-of-staff to President Leonid Kuchma who headed the
pro-presidential For a United Ukraine bloc list at the 2002 parliamentary
election, Lytvyn was widely-credited with ensuring a peaceful resolution of
the political crisis that followed the disputed second round of the 2004
presidential election.

During 2005, Lytvyn became increasingly critical of the authorities. He was
frequently at odds with the government of Yuliya Tymoshenko, and his
factions were instrumental in the parliamentary vote to dismiss the
government of Yuriy Yekhanurov in September 2005.

The bloc’s campaign advertising capitalizes on Lytvyn’s reputation as a
peacemaker capable of overcoming divisions in society and promoting
reconciliation between the authorities and the opposition.

The bloc’s list contains a number of figures close to Kuchma. However, it
appears to have avoided including any of the more notorious “oligarchs”,
such as Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, who was reportedly seeking a
place.

The bloc’s manifesto is strongly socially-oriented. It appears rather vague
about foreign policy objectives, promising a policy of “good-neighbourliness
and balance in relations with strategic partners” and “a strategy of special
relations with Russia”.
Recent opinion polls give the bloc 3-10 per cent of the vote.

THE PEOPLE BLOC OF LYTVYN’S MANIFESTO
The bloc’s manifesto “People’s values. Justice. Legality.” promises:
– to introduce price controls on food products and other necessities;
– to abolish VAT;
– to decentralize power while preserving a unitary state structure;
– to separate political power from business and strictly monitor compliance
with anti-corruption legislation;
– to increase to 60 per cent the share of budget revenues that are left in
the regions where they are raised;
– to allocate 5 per cent of budget spending for health care;
– to double state funding for education;
– to cleanse the media of violence and cruelty;
– to prevent Ukraine from “being used” in military conflicts.

Manifesto quotes: “The People’s Bloc of Lytvyn sees its priority task as
preserving the country and protecting the people from new shocks,
instability and absence of governance. To this end, we are ready to do all
that is necessary: to overcome divisions and the state’s internal
instability, people’s weariness and their uncertainty about their future, to
strengthen the nation, to consolidate territory, to apply fundamentally new
approaches for lifting the economy and social sphere, making
moral-psychological conditions more healthy, maintaining civil peace in
society.”

“We advocate a policy of good-neighbourliness and balance in relations with
countries that are strategic partners. In this context, we will build on the
principles of equal rights, mutual trust, respect and pragmatism a strategy
of special relations with Russia, and strengthen Slavic solidarity.”

“We will put an emphasis on ‘people’s diplomacy’ as an effective means
ofbroadening international cooperation in all spheres.”

THE BLOC’S TOP 10:
Parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn;
singer Sofiya Rotaru;
MP and former astronaut Leonid Kadenyuk;
academic historian Valeriy Smoliy;
Supreme Court Chief Justice Vasyl Malyarenko;
MP Kateryna Fomenko;
MP and businessman Ihor Yeremeyev;
MP Oleh Zarubinskyy;
MP Vasyl Kalynchuk;
MP Vadym Hurov.

The bloc’s list contains 440 names, including: former first aide to
President Kuchma Serhiy Lyovochkin (No 13); State Committee for TV
and Radio Broadcasting chairman Ivan Chyzh (No 20); former First
Deputy Prime Minister Oleh Dubyna (No 25).
Hopefuls (may overcome 3 per cent barrier)

[5-7] PEOPLE’S OPPOSITION BLOC OF VITRENKO ———-
A radical left-wing opposition bloc formed by the Progressive Socialist
Party of Ukraine (PSPU) and the Rus-Ukrainian Union party. PSPU leader
Nataliya Vitrenko ( www.vitrenko.org.ua, in Russian) has built her career on
a strongly anti-Western platform and advocates Ukraine joining the Union
State of Russia and Belarus. She came fifth in the first round of the 2004
presidential election with 1.5 per cent of the vote.

The head of the Interpol bureau in Ukraine has said that the bloc’s election
list contains a number of former officials who are on international wanted
lists. Recent opinion polls give the bloc around 3 per cent of the vote.

THE PEOPLE’S OPPOSITION BLOC OF VITRENKO’S MANIFESTO
The party’s manifesto “Justice, Prosperity, People’s Power, Union with
Russia and Belarus” promises:
– to prevent Ukraine joining NATO, the WTO and EU;
– to form an interstate union with Russia and Belarus;
– to introduce a federal state structure, with autonomy for the
Transcarpathian Region and Halychyna (Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk
regions);
– to grant Russian the status of a state language;
– to abolish immunity for MPs, president and judges;
– to propose special programmes for developing tourism in Crimea and the
Transcarpathian region.

Manifesto quotes: “The authorities pro-Western policy will inevitably lead
our country to national catastrophe, loss of sovereignty, and deprive
Ukraine of the prospect of rebirth as a highly-developed industrial-agrarian
state.”

“Reforms prescribed by the IMF are destroying the national economy and
labour resources, and are distorting our spiritual and cultural values. In
essence, a policy of genocide is being conducted against the Ukrainian
people.”

“We demand that Ukraine leave the IMF. We defend Eastern Slavonic
civilization and canonical Orthodoxy.”

THE BLOC’S TOP FIVE:
Nataliya Vitrenko;
PSPU member Volodymyr Marchenko;
PSPU member Pavlo Baulin;
pensioner and PSPU member Lyudmyla Bezuhla;
Motor-Sich engine plant senior manager Leonid Anisimov.

The bloc’s list contains 395 names, including: the former head of western
regional customs office, Taras Kozak (No 15); fugitive former Lviv Region
police chief Oleh Salo (No 24); fugitive former Transcarpathian Region
police chief Vasyl Vartsaba (No 26).

[5-8] NE TAK OPPOSITION BLOC ———-
The Ne Tak (Not right) bloc was formed in December by the United Social
Democratic Party (USDP), the Women for the Future Party, the All-Ukrainian
Centre Association and the Republican Party. The bloc is led by Leonid
Kravchuk, an USDP MP and a former president.

The bloc’s senior partner is clearly the USDP ( www.sdpuo.org.ua, in
Ukrainian), one of the most influential parties under the previous
authorities. Its leader, Viktor Medvedchuk, was President Leonid Kuchma’s
much-feared chief-of-staff from mid-2002 until January 2005.

The party has never enjoyed wide public support, and its ruthless pursuit of
its political and business interests meant it was feared and distrusted even
by its allies in the pro-Kuchma camp. Deprived of administrative influence
after the Orange Revolution, the party found itself with few friends and saw
its support dwindle even further.

The USDP has found an ally in the Republican Party ( http://www.rpu.org.ua,
in Ukrainian/Russian). Set up in April 2005, the party is led by the former
head of state oil and gas company Naftohaz Ukrayiny, Yuriy Boyko. Despite
the party’s distinctly pro-Russian orientation, its members include
Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, a western-leaning former foreign minister and
ambassador to the USA. Boyko has said that his party shares with its US
namesake “and other friendly parties” the goal of cutting taxes.

Strongly opposed to NATO membership and sceptical about the European Union,
the Ne Tak bloc has been vociferous in its criticism of what it describes as
the economic and political incompetence of the authorities. Some recent
polls give the bloc around 3 per cent of the vote.

THE NE TAK OPPOSITION BLOC’S MANIFESTO
The bloc’s manifesto promises:
– to “categorically” oppose Ukraine joining NATO;
– to participate fully in the Single Economic Space;
– to join the WTO and move towards the EU on condition that national
interests are protected, and to coordinate WTO accession with Russia;
– to give priority to domestic investors over transnational corporations;
– to overcome sex discrimination, including unequal pay for men and women;
– to ensure that Russian-speakers are able to use their native language
freely.

Manifesto quotes: “We have united in a bloc for the sake of a strong and
viable Ukraine that will cooperate with east and west and take part in the
Single Economic Space. We are determined to protect Ukrainian industry and
agriculture, to maintain heat and light in homes, not to allow Ukraine to be
dragged into NATO, and to ensure legality and democracy.”

“Joining NATO will ruin the country’s military industrial complex and put an
end to related scientific research, transform Russia from a strategic
partner into a potential enemy, and build an insurmountable wall at the
Russian border.”

“Within months of the change of power at the beginning of 2005, Ukraine was
in danger of losing all the positive economic achievements of recent years.”

“The alternative for the future of Ukraine today is: degradation of its
potential, or renewal of positive economic trends through responsible
political forces coming to power.”

THE BLOC’S TOP 10:
Leonid Kravchuk;
Women for the Future head Valentyna Dovzhenko;
Viktor Medvedchuk;
MP Nestor Shufrych;
Republican Party leader Yuriy Boyko;
MP and businessman Hryhoryy Surkis;
MP Stepan Havrysh;
former Labour Minister Mykhaylo Papiyev;
former Transcarpathian Region governor Ivan Rizak;
MP and national football team trainer Oleh Blokhin.

The bloc’s list contains 440 names, including: MP Yuliy Ioffe (No 12);
former Foreign Minister and ambassador to US Kostyantyn Hryshchenko
(No 18); MP Ihor Shurma (No 22).
Also running (unlikely to overcome 3 per cent barrier)

[5-9] PORA-REFORM AND ORDER PARTY CIVIC BLOC ——–
A bloc formed from the liberal Reform and Order Party (prp.org.ua, in
Ukrainian) and the Pora party ( http://pora.org.ua, in Ukrainian/English).
The Pora party was founded in early 2005 on the basis of a pro-democracy
youth organization that played a major role in the Orange Revolution. The
bloc describes its main goal as to build civil society in Ukraine.

THE PORA-REFORM AND ORDER BLOC’S MANIFESTO
The bloc’s manifesto “It’s time to build, act and live!” promises:
– to reform the system of governance;
– to promote business initiative;
– to simplify the tax system;
– to promote Ukraine’s WTO accession, Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO
membership) and EU membership;
– to create tax-incentives for businesses to reduce pollution.

Manifesto quotes: “The Orange Revolution was not a choice of personalities
to whom power was delegated. It was a choice of the values on which a New
Ukraine is to be built.

Millions went out to the streets to stand up not for their mercantile
interests, but for the high ideals of freedom, dignity and self-realization
of the individual – namely, for the fundamental components of civil society.
The Pora-Reform and Order Party civic bloc is a political force that
consistently stands up for these values.”

THE PARTY’S TOP TEN INCLUDES:
former heavyweight boxer Vitaliy Klitschko;
Reform and Order leader and Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk;
Pora political council head Vladyslav Kaskiv;
MP and former National TV Company President Taras Stetskiv;
Pora member Yevhen Zolotaryov;
Pora member and former Deputy State Secretary Markiyan Lubkivskyy;
MP Serhiy Sobolev;
Pora member Serhiy Yevtushenko;
MP Ihor Hryniv;
publisher and poet Ivan Malkovych.
The bloc’s list contains 298 names, including: MP Volodymyr Filenko (No 11);
MP Volodymyr Bondarenko (No 13); ICTV chief executive Oleksandr Bohutskyy
(No 17).

[5-10] UKRAINIAN PEOPLE’S BLOC OF KOSTENKO AND PLYUSHCH —
A bloc formed from the centre-right Ukrainian People’s Party
( www.unp-ua.org, in Ukraine), the Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs,
the United Ukraine Party and the Republican Christian Party.

Ukrainian People’s Party leader Yuriy Kostenko has said that the bloc
supports President Viktor Yushchenko, but it refused to join the Our Ukraine
bloc and aims to pick up the votes of those disappointed in the Orange team.

The bloc is said to have a strong power base in Rivne Region, whose governor
Vasyl Chervoniy is a leading member of the Ukrainian People’s Party.

The bloc’s list contains 219 names, including: Yuriy Kostenko (No 1); MP
Ivan Plyushch (No 2); MP Oleksandr Slobodyan (No 3); MP Ivan Zayets (No 4);
Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Melnyk (No 6); First Deputy Foreign Minister
Anton Buteyko (No 19).
No-hopers (very unlikely to overcome the 3 per cent barrier)

[5-11] People’s Democratic Party (PDP) bloc , 409 names, including: MP
Lyudmyla Suprun (No 1); PDP leader and MP Valeriy Pustovoytenko (No 2);
former Crimean Prime Minister Serhiy Kunitsyn (No 4); former SBU head and
MP Leonid Derkach (No 13).

[5-12] Third Force party, 208 names, including: MP Vasyl Havrylyuk (No 1);
singer and MP Mykhaylo Poplavskyy (No 2).
New Force all-Ukrainian party, 207 names, including: party leader and former
presidential candidate Yuriy Zbitnyev (No 1).
Yuriy Karmazin Bloc, 188 names, including: MP Yuriy Karmazin (No 1).

[5-13] Party of Ecological Rescue ECO+25 political party, 158 names,
including: former Energy Minister Serhiy Yermilov (No 2); MP and businessman
Petro Dyminskyy (No 9); former Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers Anatoliy
Tolstoukhov (No 11).

[5-14] ]Sun bloc of non-party members, 129 names, including: United Family
political association head and former presidential candidate Oleksandr
Rzhavskyy (No 1).

[5-15] Lazarenko Bloc, 127 names, including: former Prime Minister Pavlo
Lazarenko (who is currently facing trial in the USA) (No 1).

[5-16] Freedom all-Ukrainian association, 123 names, including: MP Oleh
Tyahnybok (No 1); film director Yuriy Illyenko (No 2); actor Bohdan Benyuk
(No 4).

[5-17] Party of Patriotic Forces of Ukraine, 105 names, including: party
leader and former State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko (No 1).

[5-18] Election Bloc of Borys Oliynyk and Mykola Syrota , 99 names,
including: MP Borys Oliynyk (No 1); Labour Party leader Mykola Syrota (No
2); lawyer Andriy Fedur (No 4).

[5-19] For Union election bloc, 95 names, including; MP Oleksandr
Hoshovskyy; Union party leader and MP Lev Myrymskyy (No 2); Slavic Party
leader and former presidential candidate Oleksandr Bazylyuk (No 4).

[5-20] Yevhen Marchuk Unity election bloc , 88 names, including: Freedom
Party leader and former Defence Minister Yevhen Marchuk (No 1); former
Deputy Defence Minister Valentyna Hoshovska (No 3).

[5-21] Green Party of Ukraine , 87 names, including: party leader Vitaliy
Kononov (No 1).

[5-22] Rebirth party, 86 names, including: state railway company
Ukrzaliznytsya head Vasyl Hladkikh (No 1); former Defence Minister and MP
Oleksandr Kuzmuk (No 3); MP Ihor Franchuk (No 5).

[5-23] Ukrainian Conservative Party, 85 names, including: party leader and
Interregional Academy of Personnel Management President Heorhiy Shchokin
(No 1).

[5-24] Forward Ukraine party, 77 names, including: MP Viktor Musiyaka
(No 1).

[5-25] Ukrainian National Assembly, 69 names, including; party leader
Yuriy-Bohdan Shukhevych (No 1).

[5-26] Viche party, 61 names, including: lawyer Inna Bohoslovska (No 1);
political scientist Vadym Karasyov (No 2).

[5-27] People’s Movement of Ukraine for Unity , 41 names, including: party
leader and former presidential candidate Bohdan Boyko (No 1).

[5-28] European Capital party, 35 names, including: Kiev businessman Lev
Partskhaladze (No 1).

[5-29] Labour Ukraine party, 33 names, including: party leader and MP
Valeriy Konovalyuk (No 1).

OTHERS
The following parties and blocs, whose lists do not appear to contain
individuals with any public profile, are also taking part in the election
(the number of names on their lists is given in brackets):

Derzhava-Labour Union bloc (351); Party of Putin’s Policy Ukrainian
political party (192); Power to the People election bloc (186); Patriots of
Ukraine bloc (127); Party of Pensioners of Ukraine (99); Peasants Party of
Ukraine (63); Union. Chernobyl. Ukraine ecological party (54); Liberal Party
of Ukraine (47); Ukrainian Party of Honour and Fighting Organized Crime and
Corruption (44); All-Ukrainian Party of People’s Trust (41); Green Planet
Ukrainian party (40); Social-Christian Party (36); Party of National
Economic Development of Ukraine (24); Social Protection Party (20).

[6] MEDIA —————
In comparison with the 2004 presidential election and the 2002 parliamentary
election, media coverage of the 2006 campaign has been more fair and
balanced.

At the major national TV channels, the notorious temnyks – instructions on
how to spin the news allegedly drafted by consultants close to President
Leonid Kuchma’s administration – appear to be a thing of the past. Criticism
of the authorities is no longer taboo. Although targetted political smear
stories do appear from time to time, the opposition is not generally ignored
or portrayed in a relentlessly negative manner.

In addition to more objective news bulletins, many of the popular channels
now broadcast regular political talk shows with more or less sophisticated
formats during which controversial topics are discussed by politicians from
all camps – though not generally in prime time.

A wide range of views is also to be found in the press and the Internet. A
number of new daily newspapers and business weeklies have appeared over
the last year, some of which clearly favour the opposition. Several strongly
pro-opposition web-sites have also appeared. Meanwhile, some of the
newspapers and web sites that were at the forefront of opposition to former
President Leonid Kuchma are now almost equally critical of Viktor
Yushchenko and his administration.

[6-1] TELEVISION ———-
Television remains the single most important source of news for Ukrainians.
Over the last year, the two most-popular national channels, Inter and One
Plus One, have overhauled their management and reviewed editorial policy.
The two channels were previously strongly influenced by Kuchma’s
administration and closely followed the temnyks – a policy that sparked
staff rebellion during the Orange Revolution.

[6-1-A] INTER ———-
The top-rated channel Inter, which used to be directly controlled by the
pro-Kuchma United Social Democratic Party (USDP), now appears to be
owned by Russian-based investors. Inter’s main shareholder, USDP MP
Ihor Pluzhnykov, died suddenly of hepatitis in June.

Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy, a former Ukrainian economics minister who is now
vice president of Russian steel producer Evraz Holding, later said that he
had acquired the channel. Khoroshkovskyy, who became head of Inter’s
supervisory board, has said that he sees the channel as a long-term
investment and has pledged that its news coverage will be politically
neutral.

Inter’s chief news editor, Oleksiy Mustafin, resigned in November. A deputy
leader of the USDP, Mustafin reportedly enforced the temnyky at the channel.
He has been replaced by Maksym Karyzskyy, the director of the
Khoroshkovskyy-owned AHT public relations company.

It was initially rumoured that former National Security and Defence Council
Secretary Petro Poroshenko brokered the Inter sale, and that the channel
would support him in his feud with then Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko.

Poroshenko himself denied having anything to do with the deal and, if such
plans existed, they appear to have fallen through after Poroshenko was
forced to resign in September following corruption allegations.

In fact, Tymoshenko chose Inter as a platform for a tour-de-force 90-minute
post-dismissal interview, in which she bitterly attacked Poroshenko and
other members of Yushchenko’s inner circle.

Tymoshenko also made a dramatic live appearance on the channel’s evening
news in December bulletin to denounce the authorities’ handling of the gas
dispute with Russia and allege continuing corruption in the country’s energy
sector.

[6-1-B] ONE PLUS ONE ———-
One Plus One, which was apparently pressurized by the former authorities
into following a pro-Kuchma line, has also pledged to ensure objective
coverage in future.

In a newspaper interview in September, US investor Ronald Lauder, whose
Bermuda-based Central European Media Enterprises controls 60 per cent of
the channel, apologized to Yushchenko and viewers for the channel’s previous
bias, and promised to take measures to prevent such a situation arising
again.

At the start of the Orange Revolution in November 2004, the channel’s
general producer and co-owner Oleksandr Rodnyanskyy had gone on air to
apologize for previous bias and promise impartial news.

The head of the channel’s news service, Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, was demoted
and his “Epicentre” analytical programme was discontinued. Pikhovshek
returned to broadcasting in March as co-host with Olha Herasymyuk of a
new political talk show “I Challenge You”.

In August, Herasymyuk replaced Rodnyanskyy as the channel’s
producer-general. The channel’s director-general was also replaced.
Herasymyuk is now running for parliament as No 4 on the pro-presidential Our
Ukraine bloc list. She stepped down as the co-host of “I Challenge You” for
the duration of the campaign.

It was reported in mid-2005 that the Dnipropetrovsk-based Pryvat business
group was trying to obtain a 40 per cent stake in One Plus One from
Rodnyanskyy and his partner Boris Fuchsmann. It was expected that Pryvat
would use its minority stake in the channel to support Tymoshenko. However,
CME appears to have blocked the deal and said it was seeking to buy the
stake itself.

[6-1-C] VIKTOR PINCHUK CHANNELS ———-
The three smaller “second-tier” channels controlled by industrial magnate
Viktor Pinchuk – ICTV, STB and Novyy Kanal – are generally neutral in their
reporting. However, ICTV invariably makes a big deal out of stories
involving Pinchuk’s business interests like the reprivatization dispute at
the Nikopol ferroalloys plant.

In a newspaper interview in August, ICTV general-director Oleksandr
Bohutskyy apologized to Yushchenko for its personal attacks during the 2004
election campaign. Bohutskyy is running for parliament as No 17 on the list
of the liberal Pora-Reform and Order bloc.

ICTV’s Russian presenter Dmitriy Kiselyov, who attacked Yushchenko
aggressively over the poisoning incident during the presidential campaign,
has remained on staff and continues to host a weekly talk show, though not
in prime time now.

[6-1-D] UT1 ———–
Despite the efforts of new management installed after the Orange Revolution,
state-owned UT1 appears to have made little progress in raising its
miniscule rating, and ambitious plans to transform the channel into a public
broadcaster appear to have been put on hold after Yushchenko loyalist
Vitaliy Dokalenko replaced Taras Stetskiv as National TV Company president.

Despite a slogan that it is “the country’s main news”, UT1’s flagship
evening bulletin often appears lightweight in comparison with Inter and One
Plus One.

6-1-E] 5 KANAL ———-
The one important channel that backed Yushchenko when he was in
opposition, 5 Kanal, is apparently still controlled by his ally Poroshenko.
Early in 2005, it expanded its news coverage to something like a
rolling-news format.

In addition to its hourly news bulletins, it regularly broadcasts parliament
sessions and major political events live. In September, for example, it
broadcast the devastating press conference by former State Secretary
Oleksandr Zinchenko, at which he accused members of Yushchenko’s inner
circle, in particular Poroshenko, of corruption.

5 Kanal has retained its policy of inviting politicians representing a wide
range of views to appear on its two-hour evening news programme. The
channel also shows a number of weekly investigative and analytical
programmes.

[6-1-F] UKRAYINA, NTN ———-
The opposition gets most favourable coverage on two small channels
reportedly owned by figures close to Party of Regions leader Viktor
Yanukovych – Donetsk-based Ukrayina and Kiev-based NTN. However,
they both present the news objectively and avoid outright attacks on the
authorities.

Legal problems over NTN’s licence for broadcasting nationwide, which led
to a protest campaign in early 2005, appear to have been sorted out. The
channels do not appear to be coming under pressure from the authorities.

[6-2] PRESS AND THE INTERNET ———
Ukraine’s daily newspaper market caters to all political tastes. Among the
popular tabloids, Fakty i Kommentarii is apolitical, Kiyevskiye Vedomosti
and Segodnya favour the opposition, while Ukrayina Moloda (whose
editor-in-chief reportedly hails from Yushchenko’s home village) is firmly
in the pro-presidential camp.

Vecherniye Vesti backs Tymoshenko, as does Gazeta Po-Kiyevski. The
business daily Ekonomicheskiye Izvestiya is consistently critical of the
authorities. The broadsheet Den maintains its critical independence.

The serious weekly Zerkalo Nedeli (whose deputy editor-in-chief is married
to Defence Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko) strongly supported the Orange
Revolution, but its reporting is now often highly critical of the
authorities, regularly berating Yushchenko for alleged violations of the
constitution. It has also run a series of extremely negative articles about
the gas deal with Russia, which it has depicted as a disastrous defeat for
Ukraine.

Ukraine has more than a dozen popular news websites, neutral, pro-
opposition and pro-government. Internet usage is still relatively low across
the country, but web sites such as Ukrayinska Pravda or Glavred are highly
influential and often carry exclusive interviews with politicians from
across the political spectrum.

[7] OPINION POLLS —————
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions took an early lead in opinion polls,
reflecting the support Yanukovych had as presidential candidate in eastern
and southern Ukraine and the relative lack of any credible non-Communist
opposition alternative for the disaffected voters. The party’s ratings have
grown steadily and appear to have settled at around 30 per cent.

Meanwhile, the votes of the supporters of the Orange Revolution have split
between the pro-Yushchenko Our Ukraine, the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc,
the Socialist Party, and several smaller “Orange” parties that stand little
chance of clearing the 3-per-cent barrier.

For some time, Our Ukraine has been taking second place ahead of the
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc in polls conducted by authorative pollsters, though
the gap has appeared to be closing in recent weeks.

Meanwhile, a number of polls by less well-known organizations began
appearing that put the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc in second place. This
situation led to acrimonious accusations among pollsters and politicians,
who have questioned the integrity of various polling organizations.

The ratings of smaller parties vary significantly from poll to poll, and it
is not clear how many of them will overcome the 3-per-cent barrier.

Pollsters will no longer be allowed to publish their data after 10 March.
The following are the latest opinion poll figures by leading Ukrainian
pollsters:

[7-1] Oleksandr Yaremenko – Ukrainian Institute for Social
Studies/Social Monitoring, 2-7 March:
Party of Regions – 31.5 per cent;
Our Ukraine bloc – 17.4 per cent;
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc – 15.3 per cent;
Socialist Party – 6.5 per cent;
Communist Party – 6.1 per cent;
People’s Bloc of Lytvyn – 5.3 per cent;
People’s Opposition Bloc of Vitrenko – 3.3 per cent;
Ukrainian People’s Bloc of Kostenko and Plyushch – 3.3 per cent;
Pora-Reforms and Order – 3.0 per cent;
Ne Tak Opposition Bloc – 2.5 per cent.

[7-2] Democratic Initiatives, 26 February-6 March:
Party of Regions – 30.4 per cent of those intending to vote;
Our Ukraine – 17.1 per cent;
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc – 16.9 per cent;
Socialist Party of Ukraine – 5.4 per cent;
Communist Party – 3.7 per cent;
People’s Bloc of Lytvyn – 3.4 per cent;
Pora-Reforms and Order – 2.3 per cent;
People’s Opposition of Vitrenko – 1.8 per cent;
Viche – 1.7 per cent;
undecided – 8.1 per cent.

[7-3] Kiev International Institute of Sociology, 25 Feb-5 Mar:
Party of Regions – 36.2 per cent;
Our Ukraine bloc – 20.9 per cent;
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc – 14.3 per cent;
Socialist Party – 6.4 per cent;
Communist Party – 3.9 per cent;
People’s Bloc of Lytvyn – 2.5 per cent;
Pora-Reforms and Order – 2.2 per cent.
———————————————————————————————
NOTE: Several sub-headings, minor-edits and formatting have
been inserted editorially by The Action Ukraine Report (AUR).
———————————————————————————————
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
2.PORA: MUCH-NEEDED YOUNG BLOOD IN UKRAINE’S POLITICS

OP-ED: By Volodymyr Hrytsutenko, Associate Professor
English and History, Lviv Franko National University
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 2
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

The last two turbulent years in Ukraine saw the emergence and strengthening
of a new political force – the PORA civic party ( www.pora.org.ua), as it
calls itself due to the predominant focus on building up a civic society in
Ukraine, defending human rights and curbing corruption.

Its forerunners were revolutionary student organizations that sprang up in
the dark Kuchma era. With so short track-record, few could have anticipated
that PORA would pick up so much political clout so quickly.

PORA is translated as It’s Time. With all its adverts and campaign leaflets
invariably beginning with these words, it’s like the sound of a bell waking
up Ukrainians and announcing that the time for action has come.

PORA treats the wallowing in kickbacks Ukrainian politicos with its gloves
off, and this is both a sign of disrespect, an indication of their own
belief that things must be run differently in this country as well as a
manifestation of the buccaneering spirit of the young. For its
uncompromising stand and megawatt determination, PORA definitely
outshines the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc.

Bullies? Yes and NO. Their strongly-worded declarations may look like
ultimatums, but who told you that things in Ukraine, struggling to breakaway
from its communist past, should be done using suave persuasion?

The PORA leader, Vladyslav Kaskiv, has rallied a team of aspiring
politicians. They are well-educated, many of them on distant shores, and
well-versed in democratic ways and procedures. Although PORA’s support
base is students, it enjoys rather wide appeal among other age groups.
Issuing PORA membership to a 91-year old woman made headlines in Kyiv.

Joining forces with veteran PRP ahead of the parliamentary elections came
as a surprise. But PRP has always stood out as a lonely player in the Our
Ukraine bloc to which it belonged at the time of the Orange revolution.

It has a charismatic leader, Viktor Pynzenyk; it is seemingly not corrupt
and there are no fraud-marred tycoons on its list. After all, the
combination of experience and youth may bear a good fruit.

Does PORA have a proper outreach? Is its policy in line with what ordinary
Ukrainians want? Yes. Take the issue of recreating the former orange
coalition, a dire demand of all Orange revolution supporters.

PORA has played it in its classical manner: by spurring and talking rough
and tough to partners, setting rigid deadlines, openly exposing the
hypocrisy of their seniors and even picketing their headquarters when the
coalition talks stalled!

So far PORA has stuck to its principles. One may argue that it’s still a
fledgling party and time will teach PORA leaders diplomacy and
maneuvering. Let’s wait and see.

Due to its uncompromising public stand, PORA is a watchdog in politics.
Watchdogs are good in any business, much so in uncivilized Ukrainian
politics. PORA’s widely publicized black lists, a challenge to Ukraine’s
politicos’ notorious corporate cover-up tactics, has put many corrupt
politicians and officials in the public eye.

I find such openness appealing, no matter what some may think about
undiplomatic ways of PORA. Ukraine is at the cross-roads and there is
little room for suave tactics. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
CONTACT: Volodymyr Hrytsutenko, Associate Professor, English
and History, Lviv Franko National University. vhryts@lviv.farlep
———————————————————————————————
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
3. ORANGE COALITION BUILDING DURING THE RADA
ELECTIONS AND BEYOND: POLITICS AS THE SYSTEMATIC
ORGANIZATION OF HATREDS

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Markian Bilynskyj [1]
The U.S-Ukraine Foundation, Kyiv, Ukraine
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 3
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

All happy families are alike, but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own
fashion. – Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina

It’s no secret that all is not well with the Orange household in the run-up
to this month’s Verkhovna Rada elections. A coalition forged out of a common
disgust with the Kuchma regime was never going to survive unscathed the
transition from opposition to power. That personal ambitions and credibility
would suffer should have been expected.

What has been remarkable, however, has been the degree to which mutual
distrust between the principal senior members of the Orange family – the
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and Nasha Ukraina – has deteriorated into open
loathing. Increasingly resembling an act of self- destruction, the Orange
family’s “unhappiness” has affected the dynamics of the campaign to such an
extent that it could even have the decisive impact on how the new Rada will
look and operate.

The joint heads of the family have clearly been unable to reconcile their
personal differences for the sake of what they have often claimed should be
the overriding interests of the Majdan. Rather than communicate directly,
our estranged couple – both nursing a deep conviction that each has been
betrayed by the other – has preferred instead to delegate to their favorite
but mutually suspicious siblings the responsibility of trying to patch
together some kind of modus vivendi.

Last December’s commemoration of the first anniversary of the Majdan was
supposed to have witnessed a public gesture of reconciliation between the
principals. Instead, the expectant gathering was treated to a tepid and
fleeting gesture of mutual recognition verging on parody.

That moment underscored the conviction that the organizing principle of
the Majdan – presenting an alternative set of values and visions to those
represented by Mr. Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions – was no longer
the dominant factor in relations between BYuT and Nasha Ukraina.

ORANGE CAMP MADE SEVERAL KEY ERRORS
Almost from the inception, the Orange camp made several key errors,
the consequences of which continue to reverberate.

FIRST, it clearly underestimated the scope and nature of its unenviable
inheritance from the previous regime.

SECOND, in selecting a team to address these problems the Orange leadership
placed at the head of functionally conflicting government entities
individuals who already had well publicized differences. Cronyism and the
imperatives of the Majdan meant that a government was put together in the
naïve hope that a sense of higher obligation would ameliorate personal
tensions.

THIRD, when it became clear that these differences had become exacerbated
to the point of rendering them unmanageable, President Yushchenko’s
reluctant concession to reality reached its denouement with the messy dismissal
of the Tymoshenko government and the ungainly courting of the “criminal”
Yanukovych camp to secure the appointment of her successor. Little or no
attention was paid, it seems, to the question of how to justify these
remarkable maneuvers to an understandably confused public.

Winston Churchill once observed that “a good politician should have the
ability to foretell what is going to happen next week, next month and next
year – and afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen.” By this measure, in
failing to articulate a coherent and manageable set of policy priorities for
implementing the mandate of the Majdan, the Yushchenko Administration failed
with respect to the first part of Churchill’s observation. The nature of the
separation with Prime Minister Tymoshenko meant that it also failed with
respect to the second.

No number of public declarations on the need to rediscover the spirit of the
Majdan has been able to disguise the fact that BYuT and Nasha Ukraina are
locked in a barren courtship. Neither side wants to be perceived to be less
enthusiastic than the other in its desire for recreating the unity of a year
ago, but each side then presents conditions designed, it seems, to be
unacceptable to the other. To date, the inevitable outcome has been a cycle
of very public, internecine recriminations.

THE PRIZE: A NEW GOVERNMENT WILL NEED TO BE FORMED
The reason for this state of affairs is that under the constitutional
reforms that began to be introduced at the beginning of the year, the Rada
majority will be responsible for forming a new government run by a prime
minister with enhanced authority. (Indeed, one of the Tymoshenko’s campaign
refrains has been that the voters will be choosing not a new Rada but a new
government.)

Given the prize, neither side appears willing to enter into any firm
commitments believing that the elections will confirm them as the preeminent
Orange force in the new Rada. (Who offered and rejected what and when has
borne an interesting correlation to the changing relative fortunes of the
two principal Orange players in the polls.)

Within a very short timeframe, then, the aim of negotiations has descended
from the ambitious goal of forming a joint election bloc, to a more modest
one of running separate but coordinated campaigns, to today’s sterile
discussions on the conditions and terms for forming a majority in the new
Rada.

THREE SCENARIOS FOR FORMING A MAJORITY IN NEW RADA
What, then, of events after March 26? Extrapolating from today’s dynamics,
three scenarios present themselves.

PRO-PRESIDENTIAL ORANGE MAJORITY
[1] The first is a pro-presidential Orange majority in the new Rada
consisting of Nasha Ukraina, BYuT, PORA/Reforms and Order, and the
Kostenko- Pliushch bloc. Since there is a question mark over whether the
latter two will negotiate the 3% threshold into the Rada the hue of this
coalition might be altered with the addition of the Socialists and,
possibly, current Rada chairman Volodymyr Lytvyn’s bloc.

But, clearly, the viability of any exclusively or predominantly Orange
formation will be determined by the nature of the relationship between
BYuT and Nasha Ukraina.

Given the extent to which their relations have deteriorated, the prospects
for the creation of a majority capable of forming a government will depend
on one of the Orange groups clearly ‘defeating’ the other at the polls, with
the ‘junior’ side forced to submit, no matter how reluctantly, to a solution
imposed by the electorate. Any Orange coalition is likely to be brittle, and
will more often than not resemble a situational one.

The spirit of the Majdan is dead. But that does not mean that the Orange
family cannot still live under one roof and choose on a selective basis
whether to dine and entertain guests together. However, it is increasingly
clear that the electorate will have to be the catalyst that brings the
Orange forces to their senses.

ORANGE COALITION AND THE PARTY OF REGIONS
[2] A second scenario involves some sort of Orange coalition with the Party
of Regions. To date, such an option appears to exist more in the minds of
experts and observers than in the plans of the prospective Orange
participants. Moreover, the discussion has focused almost exclusively on the
pluses and minuses for the Orange camp without asking how palatable such a
move would be for the Party of the Regions.

The Party of the Regions is widely expected to secure a plurality in the new
Rada but one well short of allowing it to easily put together a majority.
Any Orange-Blue coalition would likely involve one, not both, of the Orange
blocs for the simple reason that it would be considered only if the
differences within the Orange camp were to prove irreconcilable.

BYuT has consistently declared the inadmissibility of such an accommodation,
preferring even the dismissal of the Rada to this option. This leaves Nasha
Ukraina, presumably on the grounds that last year’s courtship with the Party
of the Regions suggests that anything can happen. (Plus, Nasha Ukraina has
still to categorically reject the possibility.) But such a hybrid would be
even less stable than the Orange majority cobbled together under the first
scenario.

Anyone doubting this would do well to recall the fate of last autumn’s
memorandum of cooperation between Messrs. Yushchenko and Yanukovych
and the events that brought about its annulment by the President. Clearly,
cooperation in the new Rada between any or all of the Orange forces and the
Party of the Regions is possible on an issue-specific basis. However,
creating a majority and coalition government consisting of these forces as
the necessary first step for getting to that stage is very difficult to
imagine.

The Orange Revolution revealed that Ukrainians have largely rejected the
value-neutral politics that the advocates of an Orange-Blue coalition are
asking them to accept. While any formal accommodation would undoubtedly
be presented as a grand gesture of reconciliation for the national good, it
would actually be nothing less than an unambiguous expression of the
participating Orange side’s political bankruptcy.

It strains credibility, as well as the Majdan’s self-imposed code of what
constitutes political decency, to believe that President Yushchenko – or
even those other significant Majdan actors, the Socialists, who would be
critical to the creation of a Regions dominated majority – would sanction
the idea of Renat Akhmetov as prime minister.

Indeed, that this coalition scenario is even being discussed (and advocated)
testifies to possibly the Orange camp’s single biggest failure since coming
to power: the failure, not least because of the debilitating internal split,
to develop a strategy for reaching out to the Yanukovych electorate in a
concerted effort to separate it from the “criminal” elite that claims to
represent it and to integrate this electorate into a clear vision of
Ukraine’s
future.

Calls by leading experts notwithstanding, the possibility of a formal
Orange-Blue coalition is likely to be rejected – though later rather than
sooner – by all of the Orange forces. Unanimity on this issue, however,
should not be confused with a willingness to unite; which brings us to the
third scenario.

PRESIDENT CAN EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO DISMISS THE RADA
[3] This sees none of the three principal forces in the new Rada able to
form a majority. Should this situation persist for a month after the new
Rada convenes, the president can exercise his newly acquired right to
dismiss the Rada. Moreover, should a majority be formed but be unable
to agree on the composition of a new government within sixty days of its
predecessor’s dismissal, then the president can also choose to dismiss
the Rada. (It should be stressed: this is a presidential right not an
obligation.)

Critics of this scenario argue that too many people will have invested too
much money in securing a deputy’s mandate for this scenario to transpire.
Others point out that the budget simply cannot afford another election.
Certainly, the prospect of a presidential ‘hangman’s noose’ could serve to
concentrate the Rada’s collective mind and might yet place at the head of
the government a relative outsider as a “technical” prime minister.

However, those very real and to date irreconcilable differences discussed
above, as well as the ever- lurking law of unintended consequences, create a
very powerful dynamic pointing to the new Rada’s early dismissal. Moreover,
the financial argument seems to imply that a poor country has no choice but
to learn to live with an equally ‘poor’ democracy.

If the current batch of parliamentary pretenders proves incapable of coming
to agreement and squanders scarce budgetary funds in the process, the public
might welcome the immediate opportunity to cut its losses and exercise its
right and responsibility to then choose a viable Rada.

If anything, the Orange Revolution showed Ukrainians understand that
democracy comes at a price (both figuratively and literally) but one,
nevertheless, worth paying.

Although any future Rada might not be an improvement, the one formed after
March 26 will stand or fall not by comparison with a hypothetical successor
but purely on its own merits. And its prospects will in no small measure
depend on BYut and Nasha Ukraina beginning to behave as though they reject
Henry Adams’ sadly all too often vindicated observation that “politics, as a
practice, whatever its professions, has always been the systematic
organization of hatreds.” -30-
————————————————————————————————-
[1] Markian Bilynskyj is the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation’s Vice President and
Director of Field Operations in Ukraine. The views expressed by Mr.
Bilynskyj are his own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S.-
Ukraine Foundation. Mr. Bilynskyj may be reached at mib@usukraine.kiev.ua.
—————————————————————————————————
NOTE: Subheadings have been inserted editorially by The Action
Ukraine Report (AUR).
——————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
4. UKRAINE VOTE MAY UNITE FOES
Weakened Yushchenko Weighs Coalition With Pro-Russian Faction

By Alan Cullison, The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York, Monday, March 13, 2006; Page A4

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections this month could mark an unexpected turn
for the country’s fledgling democracy, which the West had hoped would
inspire democratic movements in other former Soviet states — and in Russia
itself.

With his own supporters weak and divided before the crucial vote, Ukrainian
President Viktor Yushchenko is considering what was unthinkable a year ago:
a coalition government with the pro-Russian factions that opposed him during
the 2004 presidential elections.

Mr. Yushchenko is faced with the choice after a severe come-down in his
popularity since the protests that overturned the flawed election and put
him in power. His problems stem partly from the country’s sagging economy
and bitter disputes with onetime allies.

The March 26 vote is the first electoral test of the political promises Mr.
Yushchenko made during the “Orange Revolution.” In a bitter turnaround,
the top vote-getter is expected to be the party of Viktor Yanukovych, the
Moscow-backed presidential candidate who almost became president by
alleged ballot stuffing in 2004.

RANKLING RUSSIA
Ukraine’s rapid integration with the West has rankled Russia, which accuses
the U.S. and Europe of bankrolling the Orange Revolution to tug Ukraine out
of its orbit. Observers say Russian President Vladimir Putin has used the
events in Ukraine — as well as upheavals that toppled governments in the
former Soviet states of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan — to crack down on dissent
at home.

Whether Mr. Yushchenko makes peace with his embittered former allies could
determine how rapidly Ukraine can end its culture of corruption and turn
around its economy, which has lately stagnated.

Recent constitutional changes in Ukraine mean its Parliament will have new
powers to fire and hire the president’s cabinet and prime minister. A
deadlocked Parliament could stall the economic overhauls needed to move
Ukraine toward a Western-style economy and could derail more-divisive
political matters, such as whether to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

No single party is likely to dominate the new 450-seat Parliament, however,
and Mr. Yushchenko may yet rally enough onetime allies from the Orange
Revolution to form a government. That may help galvanize the estimated 20%
of Ukraine’s undecided voters, many of whom are disillusioned with the
infighting of Orange Revolutionaries and plan to stay home on election day.

“We need to agree on some kind of coalition before these elections,” said
Dmitry Sennychenko, head of the executive office of the PORA political
party, which supported Mr. Yushchenko in 2004. “If we succeed, then a lot
of our parties will do better on election day.”

Hopes, however, are fading. Talks last month between Orange Revolution
allies collapsed amid demands by some parties over specific cabinet posts.
Mr. Sennychenko said they are unlikely to resume before the vote.

EFFECTIVE TEAM
Many of Mr. Yushchenko’s political problems arise from a bitter falling-out
with his former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who in 2004 helped lead
demonstrations that reversed the tainted presidential vote. During that
tumultuous time, their radically divergent styles made them an effective
team: Ms. Tymoshenko was emotional, telegenic and articulate, and Mr.
Yushchenko was authoritative and measured.

The two quickly tangled in government, however. Last fall, Mr. Yushchenko
fired Ms. Tymoshenko from her prime minister’s post and blamed her for
contributing to the slowdown in economic growth that has undermined his
popularity. He replaced her with Yuri Yekhanurov, a technocrat and former
university professor.

Ms. Tymoshenko has turned into a spirited opponent and even teamed up with
the pro-Moscow forces in Parliament to pass a vote of no-confidence in Mr.
Yushchenko’s new prime minister and cabinet.

Hryhoriy Nemyri, a top adviser to Ms. Tymoshenko, says she and Mr.
Yushchenko have some deep differences over how far to prosecute the crimes
of the old regime after Mr. Yushchenko was swept to power.

Ms. Tymoshenko’s group “says that in order to move ahead we need to clean
the stables,” Mr. Nemyri said. “And there is the other side that wants to
make a broad-based deal with the former regime without cleaning the
stables.”

Ms. Tymoshenko is making no secret of her ambitions: She wants her party to
win more seats in Parliament than Mr. Yushchenko’s party, making her the
chief representative of the supporters of the Orange Revolution and forcing
Mr. Yushchenko to form a coalition with her and name her prime minister
again.

The latest polls show she isn’t too far behind: One taken this month showed
Mr. Yanukovych’s party collecting 28% of the vote, with Mr. Yushchenko
trailing with 16% and Ms. Tymoshenko with 12%. Following her are a clutch
of parties, including communists, socialists and Orange Revolutionaries that
have been both supportive and hostile to Mr. Yushchenko.

For now, Mr. Yushchenko is betting that Ukrainians are more interested in
jobs than the revolutionary rhetoric that they associate with Ms.
Tymoshenko. Last week his government got a boost from the U.S., when
Congress voted to establish permanent normal trade relations with Ukraine
by revoking a Cold War provision tying Kiev’s trade status to the rights of
Jews to emigrate.

Earlier in the week the U.S . also signed with Ukraine a bilateral-trade
protocol that is a major step toward Kiev’s joining the World Trade
Organization.
MAKING A COALITION POSSIBLE
Mr. Yushchenko’s practical interest in economic growth may indeed make it
possible for him to form a coalition with Mr. Yanukovych’s party, which is
dominated by oligarchs and economic-clan leaders from Ukraine’s
Russia-dominated east.

Besides Mr. Yanukovych, a major leader in the party is Rinat Akhmetov,
Ukraine’s richest man, who resided outside Ukraine for most of last year
when rumors were rife that police were planning to arrest him. He returned
to Ukraine after Mr. Yushchenko fired Ms. Tymoshenko as prime minister.

Katya Malofeeva, an analyst at Renaissance Capital brokerage firm in Moscow,
said the Kremlin as well as the pro-Russian politicians in eastern Ukraine
may be learning there is no point in strident opposition to Mr. Yushchenko.
While many dislike Mr. Yushchenko, Ms. Tymoshenko is feared for her
revolutionary rhetoric.

“People understand that Yushchenko is easier to deal with,” said Ms.
Malofeeva. For that reason, she expects Mr. Yushchenko to form a coalition
with his old foes in eastern Ukraine, and leave Ms. Tymoshenko as an
oppositionist. -30-
———————————————————————————————–
Write to Alan Cullison at alan.cullison@wsj.com
——————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
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5. UKRAINE’S PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO ON OFFENSIVE AHEAD
OF CRITICAL PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

By Olena Horodetska, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Tue Mar 14, 2006

KIEV – Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko said on Tuesday opposition
parties offered no credible alternative as he attempted to claw back support
before March 26 polls.

Yushchenko was brought to power on a wave of mass protests in the 2004
“Orange Revolution,” but is now viewed with indifference by many voters
disillusioned by splits in his camp.

“The opposition has no program which can stand up in intellectual terms with
that of the government,” Yushchenko said during a two-hour news conference
broadcast live on television.

The pro-Russian Regions Party of Viktor Yanukovich, defeated in the
turbulent 2004 presidential race, leads in opinion polls.
The Our Ukraine party, loyal to the president, lies a distant second among
more than 40 parties and pro-Western Yushchenko acknowledged his allies
would have to form a coalition to stay in government.

Under new constitutional arrangements, the president will have greatly
reduced powers and the prime minister will be chosen by the party or
coalition with a majority in parliament.

Yushchenko, and his prime minister who heads the Our Ukraine party list,
have stressed Ukraine’s improved ties with the West along with improved
public sector wages, pensions and benefits.

ECONOMIC WOES
Ukraine has in the past year won coveted “market economy” status from the
European Union and the United States, overseen a record privatization of a
big steel mill and moved closer to membership of the

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
But heady talk when Yushchenko came to power about moving quickly
toward EU membership has been quietly forgotten.

Economic growth has ground to a virtual standstill and inflation is rising.
Relations with Russia have soured and prices for Russian natural gas have
nearly doubled.

With Our Ukraine in second place — and facing a challenge from Yulia
Tymoshenko, his former Orange Revolution ally turned rival — the president
was prepared for post-election talks.

“It is in the interests of our country, our nation, to hold negotiations
that will lead to a consolidation of political forces,” Yushchenko said.

Yushchenko hoped groups that underpinned the Orange Revolution could
join forces. He said: “other forces that were not participants can also take
part.”

But he declined comment for now on suggestions of a “grand coalition”
with Yanukovich, whom he fought so bitterly in 2004.

Opinion polls show no single party will be strong enough to govern alone.
The prospect of instability has made investors uneasy and the central bank
routinely intervenes to prop the hryvnia currency.

Tymoshenko’s dismissal as prime minister last September after months of
infighting between two government camps — each accusing the other of
corruption — left many supporters of the revolution deeply disillusioned
with liberal reformers. -30-
——————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
6. KIEV EXPECTS AN INVITATION TO JOIN NATO BY LATE SPRING
Election campaign turning into a race for American encouragement prizes
Official Kiev is obsessed with becoming a NATO member

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Tatiana Ivzhenko
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, Russia, Tuesday, March 14, 2006

[Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk returned from Washington
over the weekend, and announced that the United States will
formulate its official position on Ukraine’s membership in NATO
(dates and terms included) as soon as the Rada election is over.]

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk returned from
Washington over the weekend, and announced that the United States
will formulate its official position on Ukraine’s membership in NATO
(dates and terms included) as soon as the Rada election is over. “In
general, the US Administration is quite benevolent when asked
questions concerning the possibility of transition of our relations
to the format of the Membership Action Plan,” the Ukrainian diplomat
said.

Adaptation of the Ukrainian General Staff to NATO standards
initiated the other day is an indirect indication that unofficially
at least, the matter is as good as settled. “Structure of the
General Staff will be aligned with structures of headquarters of the
advanced countries including NATO members,” Defense Minister
Anatoly Gritsenko explained. According to Gritsenko, the General
Staff rearrangement will complete establishment of Ukrainian army
strategic command bodies. “It will enable us to speed up
integrationist processes in the Ukrainian army without endangering
its combat capacity or mobilizational readiness,” Gritsenko added.

According to Gritsenko, in the nearest future already Ukraine
will begin work on a new multifunctional missile complex needed to
replace outmoded tactical missiles. The complex will be manufactured
in Dnepropetrovsk (Yuzhmash factory), and the project will take 6 to
8 years. Gritsenko made it a point that manufacture of strategic
missiles is not what Kiev is after. “Ukraine is surrounded by the
states that do not pose a threat of an all-out war,” he said to Delo
newspaper. “I don’t therefore view as a pressing matter the task of
restoration of strategic missile (much less nuclear) complex.”

In the meantime, membership in the Alliance becomes the talk of
the day for all of the Ukrainian political establishment. Even
President Viktor Yushchenko who has avoided the subject altogether
for some time already promises that “nobody is going to join NATO or
the European Union without a nationwide referendum.” It is common
knowledge in the meantime that almost 60% of the Ukrainians do not
want to be in NATO while about 50% want membership in the European
Union. As far as the president is concerned, this is the matter of
old stereotypes and cliches.

Yushchenko ordered establishment of a special structure earlier
this year. It was ordered to pool efforts with other state
structures in designing a propagandistic campaign on what NATO was
for the Ukrainians. The opposition in the meantime began working on
a referendum concerning membership in the European Union, NATO,
and United Economic Zone. Official Kiev objected to the referendum
knowing that it essentially boils down to the choice of the
population between foreign policies oriented on Russia (the
Commonwealth) and the United States (NATO).

Kiev formulated its stand on the matter when Tarasyuk returned
from Washington. There will be no choice offered to the Ukrainians,
and the referendum on membership in NATO will take place at exactly
the moment the issue is being decided on, not any earlier or later.
“This is a wrong moment for debates over membership in NATO,”
Yushchenko said.

Tarasyuk backed his president. “The opinion of the population
ought to be taken into account of course. The referendum should take
place. But it is not the referendum some political outsiders would
dearly like to force on the country on the eve of the election.
After all, more than 60% of the Ukrainians feel the need for more
information on NATO. They have to be given sufficient information
before they will be asked to make the choice.”

State structures rally against the opposition with the
electoral campaign drawing to its end. Yushchenko maintains that all
his plans will be carried out because “revenge-mongers cannot hope
for more than 30-35%.” As far as the president is concerned,
“finding the formula of consolidation of the forces we call
democratic” is task number one for the regime.

Practically all Orange Revolution leaders proclaim readiness to
unite in the new Rada. This readiness may have been prompted by the
West and specifically the United States. Where the coveted
membership in NATO is concerned, Washington makes it plain that
Kiev may count on encouragement prizes if it retains the pro-Western
orientation when the election is over. (Translated by A. Ignatkin)
——————————————————————————————–
[ return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
7. YUSCHENKO: NEITHER MY TEAM NOR I WISH RUSSIA ILL
The arrangement of forces will change somewhat

INTERVIEW: With President of Ukraine Viktor Yuschenko
Interview: By Yanina Vaskovskaya
Novaya Gazeta No 16 (1138)
Moscow, Russia, Monday, March 6-8, 2006

Question: Will life in Ukraine change after the upcoming election?

Viktor Yuschenko: Do you mean politics? No. There will be no
revenge or anything. The arrangement of forces will change
somewhat but not radically. I mean that it is not going to be
something that will change the course of the country or
dramatically rearrange the team.

It will be a major test, I believe, because it is going to be the first
democratic election absolutely devoid of the so called administrative
resource. All political forces are permitted to promote themselves
equally in all media outlets. It will be a more intellectual election than
ever before.

I do not harbor any illusions, but it is the election that follows a dialogue
between political forces and society. I would dearly like society to
experience what it has not experienced for decades – its own responsibility
for whoever it is electing. Nobody is going to be telling anyone who to
cast his or her vote for, you know.

Question: Does it mean that it will be for the best to have the so-called
Donetsk clan to win the election? Let voters see with their own eyes who
and what they really are.

Viktor Yuschenko: If voters think so, then it is their position. It is having
the election without any tampering with its outcome that counts. Besides,
I do not believe that the Donetsk clan will win.

There won’t be any unquestionable leadership, you know. Whoever
comes in first, second, or third will be aware of the necessity of a
coalition and dialogue. That’s very important. Attempts to divide
Ukraine into west and east lasted years.

“Culture” of non-communication was fostered, discord over the
language, NATO, and so on was deliberately played on. Flaws of
this political approach are undeniable. Artificial difference
between west and east was maintained. As a matter of fact, there
is practically no difference. Histories differed but
insignificantly – Polish empire in one case and Russian in the
other.

It is the here and now that counts, and we are a sovereign
nation now. That’s what counts. That’s the major value. A great
deal of feelings and traits have to be bred yet. Say, the feeling
of self-sufficiency, for example, that has always been regarded as
something of secondary importance. The nation should mature and
raise to its feet, bit by bit. It should feel itself free and
responsible for the processes taking place in the country.

Question: Will the gas war continue this year?

Viktor Yuschenko: No. Besides, it is not even a war. There is the gas
price, which will never amount to $230 but depends on the market.
Making it politics is the height of stupidity.

Question: What if someone is bent on this stupidity?

Viktor Yuschenko: Only if this someone is bent on hurting
Russia and Russians.

Question: You and Vladimir Putin keep in touch. Do you feel
any personal animosity on his part? I mean, has he perhaps taken
offense? There is the widespread opinion that he took triumph of
the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as a personal insult.

Viktor Yuschenko: I do not think that this period is gone
without a trace but I do not feel anything like what you are
talking about. We communicate once every fortnight, sometimes
twice a week. I value it. Even the problems that crop up in
bilateral relations…

That’s probably great that the two presidents communicate normally,
that they are men of one and the same generation. They may be
perceiving some problems differently, but that’s the sovereign right
of every country. We are neighbors, and that’s the only thing that
really counts. As neighbors, we have to be friends. All else is stupidity.
Smart politicians are not supposed to be fighters, much less to take
pride in it.

Question: And yet, the bilateral relations soured after the Orange
Revolution. There is the widespread opinion that Ukraine is
turning its back on Russia.

Viktor Yuschenko: I know that there are hawks who will always… No,
not always. They exist, however, and they perceive Ukraine and its
future differently. They will not be allowed to have their way. This
is the first time in centuries that we have gained freedom, and it cost
us. I’m convinced that freedom and democracy are pillars of
development.

Slaves will never come up with an effective system. Respecting individual
will is what I regard as my foremost function. I must make Ukraine a free
country. Bringing Ukraine closer to Europe is my number one task.

Not because we want to prove anything to anyone. We will be in the
deepest possible integration with Russia! But we will also be in
the deepest possible integration with the European Union too. It
is not a matter of either/or, it is the matter of both/and. Russia
is selling 55% of its gross output in Russia and Ukraine only 29%

Why? Why cannot we repeat Russia’s feat? Sure, Russia is selling
gas, but we may sell machinery, chemicals, aircraft, and so on.

Question: Are you saying that the problems of the Ukrainian-
Russian problems are something that will pass?

Viktor Yuschenko: We will maintain economic cooperation with
Russia regardless of all speculations and difficulties. Because it
is what our national interests dictate.

No, our relations with Russia have never been exactly cloudless. Yes,
they are complicated and non-linear. We are not yet accustomed to the
principles of neighborhood and respect of sovereignty. We are not
yet accustomed to looking at each other from the point of view of
different political and economic values. There are the hotheads
yet who would like to organize another Tuzla or bring up the
matter of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. That’s stupid, and that
complicates our relations to some extent.

It is not the best of all possible atmospheres of course but I’m an
optimist and I take things as I find them. Whoever does not understand
these principles in Russia will eventually come to their understanding
sooner or later. Neither my team nor I wish Russia ill. Or anybody
else, for that matter. -30-
——————————————————————————————–
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
Send in a letter-to-the-editor today. Let us hear from you.
========================================================
8 . UKRAINIAN TV CHANNEL ONE PLUS ONE STARTS
BROADCASTING TO USA AND CANADA

One Plus One TV, Kiev, in Ukrainian 1730 gmt 14 Mar 06
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Tuesday, Mar 14, 2006

KIEV – [Presenter] Starting from today, the One Plus One TV channel’s news
and best programmes can be watched not only in Ukraine but also abroad. The
One Plus One International TV channel started broadcasting to the USA and
Canada. It will be transmitted through cable networks there.

Our project is mostly aimed at our fellow countrymen living abroad, which is
why the international version of One Plus One will be broadcast in
Ukrainian. [Passage omitted: One Plus One International’s news presenter
upbeat about the project.]

[Correspondent] One Plus One International will at first be broadcast in the
USA through cable networks 12 hours a day and then round the clock.
The TV channel will use Ukrainian products.

Apart from news bulletins, viewers of One Plus One International will watch
political shows I Challenge You, I Think So, and Election 2006; cultural
projects Document, TV Mania, Own Cinema at Night; talks shows Taboo and
Without Taboo; best author programmes; and Ukrainian documentaries and
serials. [Passage omitted: A One Plus One producer comments on tastes of
Ukrainian Diaspora members.]

[Correspondent] After the launch in the USA, One Plus One International
plans to broadcast to European countries and Israel. -30-
——————————————————————————————-
[ return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
9. “WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO MAKE IT EASIER TO HELP”
Kateryna Yushchenko reports on performance of Ukraine-3000 Foundation

founded by Viktor Yushchenko in 2001

INTERVIEW: With Kateryna Yushchenko
By Nadia Tysiachna, The Day Weekly Digest in English #7
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, March 7, 2006

The Ukraine-3000 Foundation has implemented the medical program “From
Hospital to Hospital,” instituted a medal “For the Development of National
Cinema,” organized the “Dreamland” international ethnic festival and the
Vladimir Horowitz International Young Pianists’ Competition, issued a CD of
ancient lullabies, organized the exhibit “Christmas: the Colors and Melodies
of a Ukrainian Feast.” It also publishes “Ukrayinsky muzei,” a monthly
newspaper for museum employees.

“YESTERDAY” – “TODAY” – “TOMORROW”
This is far from the complete list of projects that have been carried out by
this international charitable foundation. Founded by Viktor Yushchenko in
2001, the foundation is active in three areas: “Yesterday” deals with the
problems of Ukrainian history and culture; “Today” looks at the social needs
of our society; and “Tomorrow” is aimed at identifying new values and
prospects.

The president’s wife, Kateryna Yushchenko, ended her one-year term as
chairwoman of the foundation’s supervisory board at the beginning of this
month. On this occasion, Mrs. Yushchenko granted an interview to The Day
and three other major newspapers, in which she summed up the results of the
past year and outlined plans for 2006.

UKRAINE-3000 FOUNDATION FOUNDED BY VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO
[KATERYNA] “As you know, the Ukraine-3000 Foundation was founded
by my husband Viktor Yushchenko in 2001. Last year I was asked to take
over as chairwoman of the supervisory board, which we have somewhat
reshuffled.

We admitted some new people whom we consider authorities in Ukraine
(Mykhailyna Kotsiubynska, Anatoliy Khostikoyev, Myroslav Popovych,
Vitaliy and Volodymyr Klychko, and Oleh Skrypka – Ed.). The general
direction of our programs has remained the same.

MEDICINE IS NOW ONE OF MY PRIORITIES
I think medicine is now one of my priorities. I saw that I could effect
certain changes in this field together with the state. There are
corporations, organizations, and individuals who want to help us and many
of them have already helped people. We decided to take an integrated
approach to this issue.

I understood this only too well early last year, when I visited the
hematology department of the Ukrainian specialized children’s clinic
‘Okhmadyt’ and saw the horrible conditions in this medical institution: a
leaky roof, fungus, etc.

Parents took me to a ward and said that every day the cleaning woman lifts
some parts of the parquet, mops underneath it, and puts them back. How
can you treat children in such conditions? So the foundation applied for
funds to repair the roof. Then we thought: why should we spend a million
hryvnias on a new roof if everything should be replaced in this building.

“FROM HOSPITAL TO HOSPITAL”
“As part of our program ‘From Hospital to Hospital,’ we are planning to
build a modern medical institution in Kyiv, called the National Mother and
Child Health Center. This project is aimed at improving the treatment of
children from all Ukrainian regions and developing highly specialized types
of pediatric care. This will be a 300-bed, multipurpose children’s clinic
that will have the best material resources and highly effective treatment
and diagnostic techniques.

This hospital will treat children with the most complicated illnesses, such
as tumors, various types of cancer, difficult somatic and surgical cases,
and perinatal lesions. I dream about this center becoming the best one in
Eastern Europe.

We plan to build it in three years with money from Ukrainian and foreign
corporations. We already have several partners. We will also probably be
applying to equipment-designing firms. I talk about this project wherever
I go, particularly with diplomats from various countries.”

[QUESTION] “A few months ago Kyiv’s Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko said
that there is an unfinished construction project in Troyeshchyna, where he
would suggest building a children’s center like this. There is also the huge
complex of the Institute of Pediatrics, Obstetrics, and Gynecology and
‘Okhmadyt.'”

[KATERYNA] “I think Mr. Omelchenko said this after speaking with us.
We saw the unfinished site in Troyeshchyna, which started to be built in the
1980s. The premises are huge but they were not built to modern standards.
It would be several times more expensive to finish and modernize it than to
build a new hospital.

I have visited children’s hospitals in Japan, France, Britain, Austria,
Poland, and the US. There is a very modern institution in Tokyo in which
460 million was invested. It was opened two years ago and is completely
computerized: information about every child (blood pressure, blood counts,
etc.) is stored in a computer data base to which any doctor has access. I
very much like a hospital in Chicago that was built in February 2005. But it
is privately run, so medical treatment there is very expensive.

“It is important that everything is done there with their young patients in
mind. For example, kids come for a checkup and see giraffes and baby
elephants with the equipment hidden inside. The hospital administrators told
me that both the radiological and administrative wings have large doors:
they said that in 20 years’ time, when there will be new radiology
technology, they will shift the administrative unit elsewhere and expand the
radiology wing.

I thought: they are doing their best to ensure that their clinic will be
modern even 20-40 years from now, while we are still hesitating whether to
renovate structures that were built 30 years ago.”

NATIONAL MOTHER AND CHILD HEALTH CENTER
[QUESTION] “Will treatment at the National Mother and Child Health
Center be free of charge?”

[KATERYNA] “Yes, for Ukrainians. We would like to attract not only
government funds. All the foreign medical institutions that we visited
display platinum, silver, and bronze plaques with the names of donors. I
do not think that a hospital can exist without benefactors.

“Two weeks from now the Ukraine-3000 Foundation will hold a three-day
conference to which we have invited doctors from Ukrainian hospitals under
our patronage – we selected one from each region on a competitive basis.

First of all, we intend to find a foreign partner (a foundation,
organization, hospital, or university) to cooperate with us, namely, to
improve the information base, supply equipment, and provide professional
upgrading.

“I applied to many hospitals in Austria, Britain, Switzerland, and the US,
and none of them turned me down. Of course, they all have different
possibilities. At the very minimum they will invite our doctors for
professional upgrading, provided the foundation pays for round-trip tickets.
Others are prepared to furnish specialists.

Our Western partners are also coming to the conference. We will tell the
conference about the National Mother and Child Health Center project and
we’ll bury a commemorative capsule on the territory of Feofania Hospital.
My husband and I think it is unjust that this medical institution only
serves the elite.

Last year I had a mammogram there and asked how many people they get
every day. Four or five patients, they said. Meanwhile, women all over
Ukraine are dying of breast cancer!”

PROJECTS TO AID RURAL WOMEN AND CHILDREN
[QUESTION] “Mrs. Yushchenko, is the foundation going to carry out
projects in aid of rural women and children, since they live in far more
difficult conditions than urban residents?”

[KATERYNA] “As a matter of fact, the regional hospitals that I mentioned
also treat rural children. I discussed the need to establish first-aid and
maternity stations in the countryside with ex-health minister Mykola
Polishchuk and the current minister Yuriy Poliachenko.

We have also received four ambulances from Proctor & Gamble and
donated them to daycare facilities in various regions of Ukraine. They are
specially intended to transport rural children to hospitals in proper
medical conditions.

UKRAINIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
We are now launching a new program. Via the Ukrainian Medical Association
whose membership includes all Ukrainian doctors in the Diaspora, the
Canadians are sending one million dollars to build two modern medical
institutions in the countryside with a complete set of equipment and
emergency, dental, gynecological, obstetric, and pediatric units. Canadian
specialists are ready to come and train our doctors. The other day we
discussed where they will be built.

Ukraine-3000 will hold another competition, and it will be clear why we
chose, say, Sumy or Poltava oblast. We also have another village-oriented
program. A foreign patron, Hryhoriy Malynovsky, has purchased 12,000
copies of the Ukrainian-language book “Mother and Child,” which will be
distributed strictly among young or expectant mothers. Information about
this publication is available at prenatal advisory stations. Obviously, a
lot of letters with requests to send this manual are coming from rural girls.”

THE HOLODMOR OF 1932-1933, GENOCIDAL FAMINE
[QUESTION] “In 2007 at the UN Ukraine is going to raise the question of
recognizing the 1932-1933 manmade famine as an act of genocide against the
Ukrainian people. How are you planning this year to boost the program
‘Lessons of History: the Holodomor of 1932-1933’ in order to raise the level
of awareness among Ukrainians?”

[KATERYNA] “This subject touches every Ukrainian family. My father, who
was raised in Donbas, witnessed this horror, and my mother, who was five
years old at the time, nearly died of starvation. Unfortunately, the world
knows a lot about the Holocaust but very little about the Ukrainian Holodomor.

I remember meeting the American James Mace, one of those who publicly
revealed the truth about this tragedy in the early 1980s (last year our
newspaper published the book Day and Eternity of James Mace to which
Mrs. Yushchenko contributed an article – Ed.).

He came to Washington, where I was the head of the local branch of the
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. In 1983, on the 50th anniversary
of this tragic date, we took part in a large-scale memorial action that
gathered about 30,000 people. I was in contact with him all those years –
from 1983 to 1988.

“In fact, when my husband was establishing the foundation, one of the tasks
of Ukraine-3000 was to spotlight the Holodomor in our country and abroad.
To this end, we launched the first and so far the only Ukrainian-language
Internet site devoted to this topic. In 2003 we organized the ‘Candle in the
Window’ action.

That was when I first heard from Mace that they were going to commemorate
the victims of the Holodomor and political repressions in Ukraine on the
last Saturday of November by placing lighted candles in windows. Last year
the central television channels showed two documentaries made with our
assistance: the two-part Holodomor, Ukraine, 20th Century (this year will
see part three) and Forbidden to Live. We also helped make 25 social video
clips.

This year we are planning to publish a large number of informational
brochures about the famine for schools, libraries, and civic organizations,
and to republish the 1985 US book Holodomor of 1932-1933 by Nadia Diuk.
We are also translating Robert Conquest’s famous works Harvest of Sorrow
and The Great Terror.

HOLODOMOR AND POLITICAL REPRESSIONS RESEARCH
CENTER AND THE HOLODOMOR MUSEUM
“We want to cooperate with the state in this matter and help it set up the
Holodomor and Political Repressions Research Center and the Holodomor
Museum. We will also join the International Conference organization on the
75th anniversary of the tragedy.

When my husband was prime minister six years ago, he went to Sweden for a
workshop on the Holocaust. He told me that he was amazed by the work of one
Swedish woman. When she conducted a survey and learned that many people in
her country were unaware of the genocide of the Jews, she published a book
and presented a copy to almost every family.

I too would like to see monarchs, presidents, premiers, and ministers coming
to us from all over the world to honor the memory of the innocent Ukrainians
who died in the 1930s. To tell the truth, 1933 has not disappeared into
oblivion, it is still present in us at the psychological level and to some
extent at the physical one.” -30-
————————————————————————————————-
LINK: http://www.day.kiev.ua/158760/
NOTE: Subheadings have been inserted editorially by The Action
Ukraine Report (AUR).
————————————————————————————————-
FOOTNOTE: EMPOWERING PRIVATE, NON-GOVERNMENT
NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

FOOTNOTE: The title of the article above is, “”WE MUST DO OUR
BEST TO MAKE IT EASIER TO HELP.” The Yushchenko administration
and the Parliament could do so much more to make it easier to help. The
presidential administration should have as one of their top priorities
the development of a new set of laws, regulations and tax rules for private
voluntary organizations (PVO’s), non-governmental organizations (NGO’s)
or private not-for-profit organizations or whatever you name them. The
Yushchenko administration should then send their recommendations to
the Parliament and do everything possible to get them adopted.

The present laws and regulations governing private, non-governmental,
not-for-profit, voluntary organizations in Ukraine are not adequate, are
very weak, are outdated, and do not empower these private organizations
with the authorities and tools they need to raise adequate funds, and to
implement effective programs. Ukraine’s present legal and tax structure
severely cripples the very outstanding organizations and much needed
programs supported by the President and the First Lady every week.

Hundreds of millions of dollars in additional support would be available
from Ukraine and around the world for the badly needed programs
supported by the President, First Lady and many other outstanding
citizens if Ukraine would bring their laws, rules and regulations for private,
not-for-profit, non-governmental, voluntary organizations in line with
those adopted by the governments of the strongest democracies, most-
highly developed countries in the world who really believe in and support
this important, vital sector of their society. [AUR EDITOR]
———————————————————————————————-
[ return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================
10. UKRAINIAN MUSEUM OF STAMFORD IN CONNECTICUT
New website launched for museum and library

Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) #674, Article 10
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 15, 2006

WASHINGTON – Lubow Wolynetz, curator of the Ukrainian Museum
and Library of Stamford located in Stamford, Connecticut has informed
me the institution has launched a new website: http://www.umlsct.org.

Lubow has done an outstanding job maintaining and expanding the
Museum and Library for many years. Lubow is also very active in the
work of the Ukrainian Museum in New York City and is the curator of
their latest exhibition, “The Tree of Life, the Sun, the Goddess: Symbolic
Motifs in Ukrainian Folk Art,”

The Ukrainian Museum and Library of Stamford is the oldest cultural
institution established by Ukrainians in North America. It is dedicated to
the collection, documentation, preservation and exhibition of artifacts and
publications dealing with Ukrainian culture and heritage.

By making its resources available for study and research, it is instrumental
in the dissemination and advancement of knowledge about Ukraine and the
Ukrainian ethnic community in the United States.

The Museum and Library holdings include more than 7,000 folk artifacts,
nearly 3,000 paintings and sculptures, over 60,000 books and periodicals,
extensive archives, including photographic and numismatic, philatelic and
audio recording collections.

The resources of the Library are available on OCLC (Online Computer
Library Catalogue) for research and inter-library loans. Holdings of the
Museum and Library are continuously and systematically supplemented
and augmented through purchases, gifts and bequests.

The foundation for the Ukrainian Museum and Library of Stamford was
laid by Bishop Constantine Bohachevsky in 1933 with the purchase of the
Quintard estate and the immediate announcement of plans to establish a
cultural institution on the premises.

During this organizational and preparatory work continuous efforts were
made to engage and broaden interest in this project within the Ukrainian
communities in the United States and to develop awareness in the need to
establish a museum and library.

The Museum and Library opened its doors in 1935 and the official opening
and dedication took place in September 1937. For the first four decades,
museum exhibitions were held in two great rooms of the mansion. Since the
1980s, the museum exhibition space has expanded to two floors of the
mansion, and the library and archives were moved to their own building,
the former St. Basil Preparatory School.

In February of 2000, the Ukrainian Museum and Library of Stamford was
incorporated in the State of Connecticut as a not-for-profit cultural
institution whose purpose is to educate the public as to the artistic,
historical, and literary aspects of Ukrainian life and culture. -30-
——————————————————————————————
MEMBERSHIP: Become a member of the Ukrainian Museum and
Library of Stamford, http://www.umlsct.org/membership.htm.
——————————————————————————————
Curator – Lubow Wolynetz; Library Director – Msgr. John M. Terlecky
Contact: ukrmulrec@optonline.net; Link: http://www.umlsct.org.
——————————————————————————————-
[ return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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and The Bleyzer Foundation offers a comprehensive collection of documents,
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All publications are grouped by categories: Marketing; Economic Country
Reports; Presentations; Ukrainian Equity Guide; Monthly Macroeconomic
Situation Reports (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine).
LINK: http://www.sigmableyzer.com/index.php?action=publications

You can be on an e-mail distribution list to receive automatically, on a
monthly basis, any or all of the Macroeconomic Situation Reports (Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine) by sending an e-mail to mwilliams@SigmaBleyzer.com.
“UKRAINE – A COUNTRY OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES”
========================================================

UKRAINE INFORMATION WEBSITE: http://www.ArtUkraine.com
========================================================
“THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT- AUR” – SPONSORS
“Working to Secure & Enhance Ukraine’s Democratic Future”

The list of AUR sponsors will be published again later this week.
========================================================
TO BE ON OR OFF THE FREE AUR DISTRIBUTION LIST
If you would like to read THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT- AUR,
around five times a week, please send your name, country of residence,

and e-mail contact information to morganw@patriot.net. Information about
your occupation and your interest in Ukraine is also appreciated. If you do
not wish to read THE ACTION UKRAINE REPORT please contact us
immediately by e-mail to morganw@patriot.net. If you are receiving more
than one copy please let us know so this can be corrected.
========================================================
PUBLISHER AND EDITOR – AUR
Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Director, Government Affairs
Washington Office, SigmaBleyzer
Emerging Markets Private Equity Investment Group
P.O. Box 2607, Washington, D.C. 20013, Tel: 202 437 4707
Mobile in Kyiv: 8 050 689 2874
mwilliams@SigmaBleyzer.com; www.SigmaBleyzer.com
========================================================
Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely.
========================================================
return to index [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
========================================================

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