Daily Archives: December 5, 2005


                                An International Newsletter
                                     The Latest, Up-To-Date
                In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis, and Commentary

                “Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Business, Religion,
    Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World”

Mr. E. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor
Washington, D.C., & Kyiv, Ukraine, MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2005
                        ——–INDEX OF ARTICLES——–
                “Major International News Headlines and Articles”

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, 1 December 2005

Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, Dec 03, 2005

By Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times

London, UK, Sunday, December 4 2005

Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream
Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, Dec 04, 2005

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, November 29, 2005

                      ROMANIA, UKRAINE AND BELGIUM
       Rice’s Trip To Highlight Importance of Trans-Atlantic Relations
USINFO.STATE.GOV, Washington, D.C., Saturday, Dec 3, 2005

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, December 1, 2005

                       Customs officials tax humanitarian equipment
By Himaya Quasem, SundayMail.co.uk
Glasgow, UK, Sunday, December 4, 2005

Alexander Nicholson, AP Worldstream
Moscow, Russia, Friday, Dec 02, 2005

                Ukraine must be astute in its ties with Kazakhstan
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Volodymyr Kravchenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 27 Nov 05; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, Dec 03, 2005

                          UKRAINE INTO A ‘HOTSPOT'”
  Peaceful end to Orange Revolution was priority: Ukrainian commander
INTERVIEW: With General Serhiy Popkov
Ukrainian Commander of Internal Troops
Iryna Havrylova, Kiyevskiy Telegraf, Kiev, in Russian 25 Nov 05, p 1,2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sunday, Dec 04, 2005

           Split between Ukraine’s leaders damages election prospects
ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Serhiy Rakhmanin
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 26 Nov 05; pp 1,2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Friday, Dec 02, 2005

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, 1 December 2005

KYIV – The leaders of the European Union and Ukraine met in Kyiv today
for the EU-Ukraine Summit, the first such meeting since the election of
President Yushchenko. Leaders welcomed the fact that commitment to
democracy and reform had opened new prospects for Ukraine and EU-
Ukraine relations.

Leaders welcomed that EU-Ukraine relations were now deeper and stronger
through the significant progress achieved in implementation of the
EU-Ukraine Action Plan, signed by the two parties on 21 February 2005.

The EU welcomed Ukraine’s firm commitment to shared values of democracy,
rule of law and respect for human rights; and recognised the progress made
in promoting economic reforms. Leaders also stressed the need to continue
the reform process.

EU leaders expressed confidence that the March 2006 parliamentary elections
would be conducted in accordance with international standards and
welcomed the Ukrainian President’s invitation to OSCE/ODIHR and the
Council of Europe to send an observation mission.

EU leaders confirmed their commitment to initiate early consultations on a
new enhanced agreement between EU and Ukraine to replace the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement as soon as the political priorities of the Action
Plan have been addressed.

Leaders welcomed the increasingly close co-operation in the area of foreign
and security policy, in particular as regards issues of regional stability
and crisis management.

They noted with satisfaction the alignment of Ukrainian and EU positions
on regional and international issues, as well as the signature of two
agreements this year – on co-operation in EU-led Crisis Management
Operations and on procedures for the Exchange of Classified Information.

Leaders also noted the recent adoption of an EU decision to support
Ukraine’s efforts to destroy its stockpiles of Small Arms and Light

Weapons and their ammunition.

EU leaders welcomed the ratification by the Ukrainian parliament on 16
November of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement with the IAEA for the
application of safeguards in connection with the Non Proliferation Treaty.

EU leaders welcomed the active and constructive role of Ukraine, and of
President Yushchenko in particular, in helping to reopen the negotiation
process aimed at the settlement of the Transnistria conflict. In the context
of intensified joint efforts to solve this conflict, leaders also welcomed
the launch on 30 November of the EU Border Mission on the border between
Ukraine and Moldova, including on the Transnistrian segment.  Leaders
confirmed their commitment and full support for the operation of the Border
Mission Leaders also discussed relations with Russia and Belarus.

Ukraine and the EU welcomed the launch of visa facilitation negotiations
back to back with negotiations on a readmission agreement. The parties noted
the progress made in the negotiations, [EU compromised proposal: delete and
looked forward to an early and parallel conclusion of both  agreements].

EU leaders welcomed the decision by the Ukrainian government to continue
visa-free travel for EU citizens, thereby contributing to the promotion of
closer ties. Ukraine and the EU stressed the importance of strengthening
people-to-people contacts.

[UA: In this context, Ukraine underlined the importance of the introduction
of a visa free regime between the EU and Ukraine as a long term goal] EU
leaders confirmed that substantial further fund would be available to
Ukraine to support projects concerning migration management, under the
AENEAS Regulation.

Ukraine and the EU noted the existing good bilateral co-operation on Justice
and Home Affairs issues. They stressed the importance of reviewing the

2001JHA Action Plan  early next year, based on an expert mission.

On trade and economic relations, leaders welcomed the European
Commission’s assessment that Ukraine has met the technical criteria for the
granting of Market Economy Status (MES) for trade defence, and welcomed
EU Member States’ support for the granting of MES to Ukraine on that basis.

EU leaders reconfirmed the goal of promoting deep economic integration
between the EU and Ukraine and, in order to achieve this, looked forward to
an early start of negotiations of a Free Trade Area once Ukraine has joined
the WTO. EU leaders noted good progress made on the feasibility study on
a Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine .

EU leaders underlined strong support for Ukraine’s early accession to the
WTO, and stressed their commitment to continue to offer assistance in
meeting the necessary requirements.

Leaders of the EU and Ukraine signed agreements on Civil Satellite
Navigation (Galileo) and Aviation, and a Memorandum of Understanding

on co-operation in the field of energy.  On energy, they stressed the
importance of rapid implementation of this memorandum aiming at a
progressive integration of the Ukrainian energy market to the EU as well
as enhancing energy security.

On transport, leaders welcomed the preparations for the extension of the
European Trans European Network Transport corridors.
Ukraine reiterated its strategic goal to be fully integrated into the EU. EU
leaders welcomed Ukraine’s European choice, stressing that Ukraine’s
commitment to democracy and reform opens new prospects for a
considerable enhancement of the level and quality of EU-Ukraine relations.

The Summit was hosted by Ukrainian President Viktor YUSHCHENKO.

The European Delegation was led by Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Tony BLAIR
MP, in his capacity as President of the European Council, assisted by the
Secretary-General/High Representative, Dr Javier  SOLANA; and by the
President of the Commission, Mr José Manuel DURAO BARROSO.

The President of the Commission was accompanied by Commissioners, Dr
Benita FERRERO-WALDNER and Mr Peter MANDELSON. Ukrainian Prime
Minister Mr Yuri YEKHANUROV and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Boris
TARASYUK also participated in the event.  -30-

[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
Associated Press, Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, Dec 03, 2005

KIEV – Nine presidents from Baltic and Black Sea nations pledged Dec.

2 to strengthen democracy in a region traditionally considered Russia’s
Russia did not participate in the forum of the Community of Democratic
Choice, but leaders insisted that their endeavor should not be seen as a
challenge to the Kremlin.

“We gathered to unite, not to divide,” said Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko, who hosted the forum bringing together officials from 23

The gathering was the brainchild of Yushchenko and Georgian President
Mikhail Saakshvili, both of whom came to power amid mass protests against
former regimes and have since pursued a pro-Western course.

The presidents of three ex-Soviet Baltic republics attended, together with
the presidents of Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Romania. Senior officials
from the European Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe also participated.

Notably missing were Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko, who is criticized by the United States and
the European Union as Europe’s last dictator.

“We’ve made our democratic choice and now we have only to unite to

protect this choice,” Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin said.

The meeting ended leaders agreeing to create a permanent regional forum
which will essentially act as an occasional round-table gathering.

“We hope that this farsighted mission … will unite all countries of the
region in joint efforts to strengthen our regional cooperation, promote
democracy and protect human rights,” the leaders said in a declaration.

Voronin also suggested creating a regional assembly, though no action

was taken on his proposal.

“It’s a way to find a worthy variant in case our countries joining the
European-Atlantic structures will be postponed,” Voronin said.

Despite strong denials that the gathering was aimed against Russia, many
observers saw it as an attempt to weaken Moscow’s influence in the
post-Soviet region.

“Its aim is to create a barrier to Russia and to push aside Russia’s
influence in these countries,” said Vadim Karasyov, head of the Institute

on Global Strategies.

One speaker after another addressed the crowd in English or their native
languages, avoiding Russian even though it is the lingua franca for many

of the countries represented.

“I would like to especially emphasize that our initiative is not directed
against third countries or institutions,” Yushchenko said in opening the
forum. “Instead, I see our community as an open dialogue between friends

and supporters of the ideals of democracy and the rule of law.” -30-
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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By Tom Warner in Kiev, Financial Times
London, UK, Sunday, December 4 2005

KIEV – Ukraine on Sunday began combating what appeared to be the

biggest outbreak yet in Europe of the deadly strain of bird flu, after more
than 2,000 domestic birds died in a remote region of the Crimean peninsula.

President Viktor Yushchenko declared a state of emergency in five villages
on Saturday after the agriculture ministry said it had identified the H5
subtype of bird flu virus. Officials enforced a quarantine and began culling
and burning the villages’ birds on Sunday.

But the government’s failure to notice the outbreak earlier is likely to
heighten concerns across Europe about Ukraine’s ability to deal with the
bird flu problem. Ukrainian villagers who keep birds in their gardens are at
particular risk, because they regularly handle birds that may have come into
contact with the migratory wild birds that spread the virus.

Confirmation that the outbreak was caused by the H5N1 strain that can kill
humans was awaiting the results of tests in Britain and Italy. But officials
left little doubt that they were dealing with the same deadly strain that
has shown up in Romania and other parts of south-east Europe.

Olexander Baranivsky, agriculture minister, told a press conference he was
alerted on Friday after the villages saw up to 20 per cent of their birds
die overnight. “Birds are dying from [the virus] in no more than two to
eight hours,” he said.

Mr Baranivsky’s ministry has insisted it is keeping careful guard against
bird flu by regularly testing wild and domestic birds around the country and
making sure the issue gets ample coverage in national and local media.

But villagers told television reporters they were mystified by the disease
that had been killing their birds for more than a month. Their stories
indicated the disease had started spreading around the same time as the
first known outbreak of bird flu in Europe, in Romania’s Danube delta region
in October.

The villagers said they had been eating healthy birds and throwing diseased
ones on the village dump, where the carcasses were scavenged by stray dogs.

The affected villages are near Lake Sivash, a vast, marshy lagoon next to
the Azov Sea where migratory birds stop over each spring and autumn on

their way between Russia and Africa or the Middle East.

Romania said at the weekend it was dealing with what appeared to be a new
H5N1 outbreak in the country’s south-east, its first outside the Danube

So far no people in Europe have contracted the H5N1 virus, but it has killed
69 in Asia, including one in Indonesia confirmed on Sunday. Health officials
believe people generally are not at risk unless they handle birds, but
experts worry that a mutation could enable the virus to spread from human

to human and thus cause a worldwide epidemic.  -30-
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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Natasha Lisova, AP Worldstream
Kyiv, Ukraine, Sunday, Dec 04, 2005

KIEV – Authorities were culling and burning fowl Sunday in three Crimean
regions where Ukraine’s first bird flu outbreak was recorded, an emergency
official said.

“We seize birds, slaughter them and then burn them at special places,” said
Ihor Krol, spokesman for the Emergency Situations Ministry.

More than 2,000 birds had already died of the virus in six villages of the
Sovetskiy, Nizhnegirsky and Dzhankoysky regions, he said. “People under-

stand all our measures and are doing their utmost to help emergency workers,”
he said.

Officials on Saturday said that the dead birds tested positive for the H5
subtype of avian influenza, prompting President Viktor Yushchenko to

declare a state of emergency in affected villages.

Samples were sent to laboratories in Italy and Britain to determine whether
the disease could be the deadly H5N1 strain, which is being monitored for
fear it could mutate into a form that is easily transferable among humans.
Results are expected by Thursday.

The emergency order bars people from entering or leaving the quarantined
area, and experts will visit every home to inform residents and to count
flocks. All birds – even if healthy – will be slaughtered and their
carcasses burned.

Krol said residents will be compensated as much as 15 hryvna (about US$2;
A1.70) for each culled hen, 24 hryvna (about US$6; A4) for geese and 90
hryvna (about US$18; A15) for turkeys.

Bird flu had already been detected in neighboring Romania nearly two months
ago, and Ukrainian officials scrambled to reassure this nation of 47 million
that they were well-prepared.

Worldwide attention is focused on the H5N1 strain. That outbreak began in
2003 in Asia, where it has devastated flocks and infected humans, killing at
least 69 people.  -30-

[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Tuesday, November 29, 2005

KYIV – Victor Yushchenko took part in the Second Economist Roundtable
organized by the Economist Conferences Company.
In his speech, the Head of State spelled out his short-term priorities to
ensure economic growth and to stabilize and modernize our market.

The President noted that our country had “inherited” many problems from

the previous regime, and they hampered many processes. However, he is
convinced that by implementing proper policy and by establishing active
dialogue between government and business we can overcome all obstacles
to successfully build Ukraine’s competitive economy.

Yushchenko dwelled on his government’s plans for 2006, which should be “a
year of reforms.” They are going to reform the energy sector, education, the
coal industry, the judicial system, the medical sector, and the pension

Speaking about the problem of corruption, the President reiterated that
courts and law enforcement agencies should work efficiently.

“This is a huge problem that can only be solved after judicial reforms and
deep changes within the system of law enforcement agencies,” he said, adding
that his order to re-organize law enforcement agencies was the first stage
of this reform.

The second stage, he said, is to re-organize the Security Service, the
Prosecutor General’s Office and other bodies so that they should “meet
modern demands.”

Speaking about privatization, he said in 2006 Ukraine would “transparently
and publicly” sell several strategic state enterprises such as the
Ukrtelecom, the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant, and the Odessa Port Plant.

Commenting on next year’s macroeconomic indices, the Head of State said

the inflation rate would probably be about 8.4%. Then he pledged to make
investment grow.

Yushchenko noted: “I am sure the government has coped with challenges of the
past months, and now the economy is stable and investment is coming back.”
The President also informed those present that the government intended to
invest in rocket-building, aircraft-building, and ship-building.

About 150 chief executive officers and top managers from Ukraine, Russia,
Europe and the United States took part in the roundtable. -30-

[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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                       ROMANIA, UKRAINE AND BELGIUM
          Rice’s Trip To Highlight Importance of Trans-Atlantic Relations

USINFO.STATE.GOV, Washington, D.C., Saturday, Dec 3, 2005

WASHINGTON – Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s upcoming trip to
Europe will highlight the enduring importance of trans-Atlantic relations
U.S. efforts to partner with Europe to address common challenges around the
globe, U.S. officials say. Rice plans to travel to Germany, Romania, Ukraine
and Belgium on December 5-9.

In Germany, during her first meeting with new German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, the secretary expects to talk about Iran, Afghanistan, U.S.-European
relations and U.S.-German relations, according to State Department spokesman
Sean McCormack.

She also expects to talk with Merkel about how to spread democracy to such
countries as Belarus and about how the United States and Europe can help the
Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian government consolidate the democratic
gains they have realized from last year’s Orange Revolution.

Rice “will be ready to talk to the Chancellor” about the issue of secretly
transported terrorist suspects if it comes up, McCormack said, just as she
did with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmaier during his recent
visit to the State Department.

During their meeting November 29, Rice assured Steinmaier “that United
States activities comply with all U.S. laws and the Constitution and that we
comply with our international obligations,” according to McCormack.

In the Ukraine, Rice “is going to be talking about the importance of the
Ukrainian Government following through on the spirit of the Orange
Revolution and that is to build truly democratic institutions that engage in
good governance, that serve the Ukrainian people, in essence, consolidating
all those gains that they have realized,” McCormack said.

The secretary also plans to talk with the Ukrainian leadership about ways
the United States can support the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian
government in those efforts, he added.

In Romania, McCormack said, Rice will sign a defense, security and
cooperation agreement with the Romanian government, as well as continue
the dialogue on a broad range of issues with this important NATO ally.

In Brussels, Belgium, in addition to participating in a meeting of NATO
foreign ministers December 8, Rice plans to hold bilateral meetings with a
number of her European counterparts. A NATO-Ukraine meeting and a
NATO-Russia meeting are scheduled as well.

“I expect that they are going to talk about the whole host of alliance
issues, emphasizing the importance of all NATO countries allocating the
assets in their budgets so that they can meet their NATO commitments,”
McCormack said. “I expect they’ll talk about Afghanistan; the issue of
deployment of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan as part of ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force] mission.”

The secretary will be prepared to discuss recent reports that the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) secretly transported terrorist suspects to
locations in Central and Eastern Europe for interrogation via European
airports, according to State Department spokesman Sean McCormack.
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]

Press office of President Victor Yushchenko of Ukraine
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, December 1, 2005

KYIV – Kateryna Yushchenko, Head of the Supervisory Council of the
Ukraine 3000 Foundation, met with representatives of medical and public
organizations. The delegation was headed by U.S. Congressman Lincoln
Diaz-Balart and Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Democracy
and Global Affairs.

The First Lady and members of the delegation discussed cooperation in the
framework of the Hospital to Hospital program and other Ukraine 3000
projects on child protection. They also spoke about ways to improve our
network of medical and rehabilitation facilities for children.

Ms. Dobriansky and Mr. Diaz-Balart stressed that American doctors were
eager to help Ukraine reform its public health system.

John Herbst, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine; Dianne Kube, Chief Administrator
Officer of the Community Oncology Alliance;  Stephen Lipshultz, Head of the
Pediatrics Department; Bob Philippone, Federal Director of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America; Zenon and Nadia
Matkiwsky, Presidents of the Children of Chornobyl Relief and Development
Fund; Silvia Iriondo, Head of the Mothers Against Repressions Group;
Svitlana Donska, Chief Children’s Hematologist of Ukraine; and Grygoriy
Klymnyuk, Chief Oncologist of Ukraine, took part in the meeting. -30-

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                     Customs officials tax humanitarian equipment

By Himaya Quasem, SundayMail.co.uk
Glasgow, UK, Sunday, December 4, 2005

GLASGOW – A CHARITY worker who bought an incubator for
Ukrainian babies has been told to stump up £320 before customs will
release it to the hospital.

Dad-of-two Jim Gillies, 64, raised £500 to buy the refurbished machinery
so he could donate it to the maternity ward of a hospital in Kiev, in the

It would have been the first incubator in the hospital and could have saved
the lives of hundreds of premature babies. But customs officials have
impounded it and claim Jim must pay a further £320 before it can be
handed over.

Mr Gillies, an electrician of Cumbernauld, had already paid £300 to a
courier firm to make sure the equipment left Scotland and reached the
Ukraine in one piece.

He said: “The incubator is to save children in Ukraine, yet their own
officials are refusing to let it go.  “Premature babies face an hour and a
half journey to the next hospital which does have the right equipment. “For
a delicate baby, that trip can mean the difference between life and death.

[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
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Alexander Nicholson, AP Worldstream
Moscow, Russia, Friday, Dec 02, 2005

MOSCOW – Russia is in negotiations to raise the price of the enriched
uranium it supplies to Ukrainian power plants, an industry official close to
the talks told The Associated Press on Friday, confirming Russian news

The talks come as Russia seeks to more than triple the cost of natural gas
it supplies to Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics. Observers have
suggested the price hikes are a means of dealing with countries, such as
Ukraine, where pro-Western leaders have come to power who have worked
to distance their countries from Russia.

The source, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity
of the continuing talks, said that Russia currently buys raw uranium at
market prices in Ukraine, but sells it back after enrichment at a discount _
costing the Russian industry some US$150 million (A128 million) per year.

“Russia’s TVEL (nuclear fuel company) buys raw material in Ukraine at world
prices but supplies fuel at favorable prices,” a representative of Russia’s
Federal Agency for Atomic Energy was quoted by the RIA-Novosti agency as

“We are ready to consider several schemes for cooperating with our Ukrainian
partners so that, from 2007, prices for Ukrainian raw materials and Russian
fuel are either balanced or both processes are united into one business
plan.”   -30-
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
                    Ukraine must be astute in its ties with Kazakhstan

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Volodymyr Kravchenko
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 27 Nov 05; p 4
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sat, Dec 03, 2005

Ukraine must be careful in the way it builds its relationship with
Kazakhstan, an intellectual weekly has written, analysing the recent state
visit of the Kazakhstan president to Ukraine. The author said that
Kazakhstan is a stable state with a growing economy, but added Kiev must
remember this stability is based on an “autocratic” regime.

At the same time, Ukraine must take advantage of Nazarbayev’s offers which
have substance for Ukraine, including Kazakh interest in becoming a
fully-fledged participant of the Odessa-Brody pipeline. This means Kiev’s
position on Kazakhstan must be carefully thought out and flexible, it

The following is the text of the article by Volodymyr Kravchenko, entitled
“The charm of the country of organized democracy”, published in the
Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli on 27 November; subheadings have been
inserted editorially:

Official Kiev has another example to follow – Kazakhstan. [Kazakh President]
Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was in Kiev last week on an official visit, was
able to present his country in such a way during negotiations that several
Ukrainian politicians and bureaucrats, entranced by the sweet eloquence of
the east, could not hide their envy of the effectiveness of state management
carried out by the Kazakhstan government.

And [Ukrainian President] Viktor Yushchenko himself, commenting during the
post-event news conference on Kazakhstan’s domestic and foreign policy over
the last year, could not refrain from saying: “That is the policy of
success”. In the opinion of the Ukrainian president those changes which have
taken place in the Kazakhstan economy “should have been carried out in
Ukraine eight years ago”.


Kazakhstan really does have something to be proud of: Nursultan Nazarbayev
was able to push through effective economic reforms. As a result, 90 per
cent of Kazakhstan’s economy is in private hands. Electricity stations and
agricultural lands are private property. Only oil and gas pipelines and main
electricity lines and the oil and gas complex and military enterprises are
in state hands.

Over the last few years, annual economic growth has been 9-10 per cent. The
problem of unemployment is gradually being solved and the macro-economic
policies of the government make it possible to keep inflation at a low level
of about seven per cent a year. The economic and political stability of this
central Asian country attracts investors.

According to Kazakh data, foreign direct investment since independence has
been 40bn dollars. (In Ukraine by the way, according to data in October
2005, this figure was only 9.5bn dollars.)

Here we point out that Kazakhstan was the first country on the post-Soviet
landscape to receive the status of market economy from the United States and
the European Union. The following example demonstrates how well this is
deserved: while the Ukrainian army is only getting to the point of meal
services for troops being provided on a contract basis by private companies,
Kazakhstan has already been practising this for a long time.

According to data of the World Economic Forum, Kazakhstan rates 61st in
competitiveness, ahead of all those in the Commonwealth [of Independent
States]. This is due not least of all to Nazarbayev’s trying to fight
corruption. In particular, civil servants in the country get large salaries.

Today Kazakhstan is a fairly stable country. But apologists for the Kazakh
path of development should remember that Kazakhstan’s stability is the
stability of an authoritarian government where much is decided by clan ties
and the president. As one analyst jokingly noted, “there really is private
property in Kazakhstan. But it is the property of only a few families.”

One must also not forget that Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed over and over
again in his speech in parliament that he is guided in his policy by the
formula: “first economic reform, and then political reform”. And such a
concept of state development which envisions organized democracy does not
suit a country whose leaders declare support for democratic processes on the
post-Soviet landscape.

By the way, Nazarbayev’s visit to Ukraine shows that Nazarbayev fully
controls events in the country. The democratic revolutions which have rolled
across the post-Soviet landscape, and which were provoked by falsified
election results, demand elevated attention and care from the presidents of
countries in this region. And so Nursultan Nazarbayev’s visit to Ukraine is
more than simply noteworthy: it took place two weeks before the presidential
election in Kazakhstan.

It is clear that in the context of looming events, the Kazakhstan
president’s nostalgic visit to technical college number 22 in
Dnipropetrovsk, where he studied in his youth, and his signing the
Ukraine-Kazakhstan Action Plan 2005 with Viktor Yushchenko in Kiev is the
background against which Nazarbayev is demonstrating, foremost to the
Kazakhstan opposition, his confidence in his own strength.

But that is one, campaign, side of Nazarbayev’s visit. The second goal of
his trip to our country was negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership on
trade and economic issues.

                                    TALK WITH SUBSTANCE

And the Kazakhstan president was ready for specific talk with substance and
not only of the needs of representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora. At any
rate, as Zerkalo Nedeli was told, when Viktor Yushchenko suggested during
the negotiations to have a “Year of Ukraine in Kazakhstan”, Nazarbayev
answered in the spirit of there being no point to it if it meant dancing and
singing, but if it meant specific projects, then that was another matter.

Indicating members of his delegation, among whom there were many
businessmen, he told the Ukrainian president, this one is ready to invest a
million in such and such a Ukrainian enterprise, and this one in another.

And what was the result? Clear prospects in the sphere of energy cooperation
between Ukraine and Kazakhstan. And that is the main result of Nursultan
Nazarbayev’s two-day visit to Ukraine. That is, despite close political
relations with Moscow, Astana is fairly pragmatic in approaching the issue
of diversifying ways of transporting its energy resources to the European

It is quite clear that Kazakhstan’s leadership takes note of the fact that
the Russian monopoly on energy resource transport can no longer be
strengthened or Kazakhstan will become vulnerable. Gazprom has already
monopolized transit routes for pumping Kazakh gas: several weeks ago the
Russians signed a package of documents with Kazmunaygas subsidiary Intergaz
Tsentralnaya Aziya [Central Asia Intergas] covering 2006-2010 for
transporting gas across Kazakhstan.

For Ukraine, the signing of these documents means that our country has
effectively lost the chance to buy gas directly from Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan without Gazprom serving as middleman. But
Kazakhstan interests Kiev not only due to the former’s gas reserves.

According to experts, in the coming years, Kazakhstan will become one of the
world’s 10 leading oil exporters: by 2015 it plans to reach a level of
extraction of 150m tonnes per annum. And Astana sees its main market for oil
in the countries of Western Europe.

In light of statements by representatives of the Azerbaijani State Oil
Company that the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline will not be free for Kazakh
volumes until 2010, the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline takes on special
meaning for Kazakhstan.

Such interest from the Kazakhs is music to the ears of those who favour the
forward use of the Odessa-Brody pipeline. But those in Kiev should remember
that the Ukrainian route is not the only one the Kazakhs are working on in
trying to resolve the problem of diversifying shipments of their oil to the
European market.

Astana is not only actively working to join the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, but is also working on the Iranian direction for shipping
Kazakhstan’s black gold. And Kazakh oil also flows through the pipes of the
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).

The Kazakhs are also interested in shipping black gold through Russian pipes
to the Mazeikiu Nafta plant in Lithuania. By the way, that arose in part due
to the tariff policies of the [Ukrainian] Pivdennyy oil terminal…[ellipsis
as published]


And so the prospects of Ukrainian-Kazakhstan energy cooperation demand that
Kiev work out a very careful and flexible policy on relations with
Kazakhstan. We mean more than supporting Astana’s intention to chair the
OSCE in 2009. Or on carrying out a more flexible tariff policy regarding the
transit of Kazakh oil, which should increase the attractiveness of our

Today, it is also important to have a true position in evaluating the
looming presidential election, which there is no doubt Nursultan Nazarbayev
will win. It is clear that in light of prospects in the sphere of energy
cooperation, Kiev should take a milder position than even its evaluation of
the Azerbaijani parliamentary election. While in Azerbaijan this meant using
that country to transport energy resources, in the case of Kazakhstan, it
means its own oil and gas.

Judging from the mood on [Kiev’s] Bankova Street [where presidential
secretariat is located, it looks like official Kiev is ready to take milder
position. In any case, one can certainly say that Ukraine will not rush to
join possibly sharp reactions from Western European democratic and

political institutes on the processes taking place in Kazakhstan.

But the future relations of the two countries depend not only on the
Ukrainian side’s evaluations of the presidential election. Official Kiev
should be more attentive in its approach to organizing the visits of
delegations from this central Asian country, where people carefully follow
the nuances of protocol. And there were plenty of mistakes during this

For example, moving the meeting of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Ukraine
from the morning of Friday to the evening meant [Ukrainian parliamentary
speaker] Volodymyr Lytvyn was forced to talk to Nazarbayev for two hours
about “the development of Ukrainian-Kazakh relations and their parliamentary

At the same time, the Ukrainian side, getting caught up in its meeting with
the first person, forgot to feed the members of the Kazakhstan delegation:
their lunch began only at the end of the working day…[ellipsis as

Fortunately, these organizational errors did not influence the general
atmosphere of Nazarbayev’s visit or its results. Since matters were not
limited to the Kazakhstan president’s intent to buy seven An-148 aircraft or
Astana’s interest in stepping up cooperation in the field of space through
joint projects at the Baykonur space launch pad.

For Kiev, Kazakhstan’s desire to become a full-fledged member of the
Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline was more important. “There will be no
problem with deliveries or volumes of oil”, Nazarbayev said during the news
conference when answering journalists’ questions on where Kazakhstan
intended to get oil to pump through the corridor.

Of course, these are only statements, ones which need to be brought into the
practical plane – the signing of agreements and contracts. (To be fair, we
point out that much depends here on the higher echelons of the Ukrainian
authorities.) But one must also not forget that of the 59m tonnes of oil
extracted in Kazakhstan in 2004, only 8m belong to the state; the rest
belongs to private companies.

But the Kazakhs are actively working on fixing this state of affairs by
changing their own laws and buying up the assets of foreign companies for
the state. And in this situation Astana’s interest in Ukrainian transit
routes is guaranteed by the Kazakh side actively taking part in the setting
up of a joint venture with Ukraine to construct a 52-kilometre shunt which
will unite the Pivdennyy oil terminal and the Prydniprovskyy branch oil
pipelines…[ellipsis as published]  -30-
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
                          UKRAINE INTO A ‘HOTSPOT'”
  Peaceful end to Orange Revolution was priority: Ukrainian commander

INTERVIEW: With General Serhiy Popkov
Ukrainian Commander of Internal Troops
Iryna Havrylova, Kiyevskiy Telegraf, Kiev, in Russian 25 Nov 05, p 1,2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Sunday, Dec 04, 2005

The commander of the Internal Troops, Gen Serhiy Popkov, who was
controversially involved in bringing troops into Kiev during the Orange
Revolution, has told a Ukrainian newspaper that he acted in the interests of
the country and the people.

Popkov explained why he ordered troops to hold a practice alert, saying that
he was trying to remind both sides of the possible price of their ambitions.
The main thing was to prevent the loss of life, he said.

The following is the text of the interview with Iryna Havrylova entitled
“Officer Serhiy Popkov: I had no right to turn Ukraine into a ‘hotspot'” by
the Ukrainian newspaper Kiyevskiy Telegraf on 25 November; subheadings have
been inserted editorially:

A year after the Orange Revolution everyone has got down to judging the
events of November 2004. What was it? Whose victory was it? Who were the
heroes? One of my colleagues is making a film, trying to restore second by
second the clips that chronicle the revolution on film. [The film] “Lenin in
October” can take a break\ [ellipsis as published]

Students from the Interior Ministry academy are being filmed in the crowd
scene; the director and the script writer are being advised by security
service officers. The Russian special forces are playing themselves.
Everything is as close to reality as possible, and that is the way it should

This is because Maydan [Independence Square, site of protests that led to
the Orange Revolution], which “gave birth to” free journalists, field
commanders, [former Prime Minister] Yuliya [Tymoshenko] and a new president
did not only give hope and pride to the ordinary Ukrainians standing in the
snow and cold on the country’s main square; it also created a myth about the
events of that orange autumn.

The leaders of the National Salvation Committee [which backed current
President Viktor Yushchenko] have been canonized and the enemies of the
coloured Ukrainian revolution have been demonized. They have often included
people in uniform.

At the end of 2004 the threat of civil war in Ukraine was quite real. A lot
depended on the officers, who had sworn an oath of loyalty to Ukraine: it is
no secret that the position of the Interior Troops played a decisive role in
the last days of November in defining the progress of the Orange Revolution.

Any careless action, either on the part of the authorities or from the
protesters, could have turned to tragedy. Nevertheless, not a single drop of
blood was shed on Maydan.

The leaders of the orange team now attribute this to themselves: the
peaceful transition from the [Leonid] Kuchma era to Yushchenko’s time was
supposedly possible solely thanks to some fine work with the officers of the
Main Intelligence Directorate and Security Service of Ukraine, who
sympathized with the revolutionaries.

This is a beautiful “orange” legend, spiced up with PR work by the “heroic
rescuers”, but the truth is somewhat different.

It was the decisiveness of one man – Gen Serhiy Popkov – that made it
possible to avoid a clash between the Interior Troops and the demonstrators.
His troops were the forces which could easily have swept both the tents and
the protesters off Maydan.

An order was given to hold a practice alert and [in Ukrainian] had been
distributed. Why? To cool some hot heads. A demonstration of the readiness
of the military was the only thing that could clearly show the orange and
the white and blue field commanders and the politicians: human lives were
hostage to their ambitions.

All the same, the Interior Troops were the sole line of defence of the
former authorities, the only structure capable of carrying out an order.

After 28 November, thanks partly to the public nature of the decision-making
and to the attention of the international community, it became impossible to
use the Interior Troops against the people.

A decision had to be taken within minutes, after weighing up the situation
correctly. This could be done by a man who was not just a professional
soldier but who had a clear civilian position as well – in “military field
conditions” everything depended on the personality of the commander.

Both then and now Gen Popkov does not regret his action; he is proud that
thanks to his actions Ukraine did not become a hotspot like Yugoslavia or

                            TROOPS SERVING THE PEOPLE

[Havrylova] Gen Popkov, what was the role of the commander-in-chief on 28
and 29 November? After all, the power-wielding departments are under the
control of the president of Ukraine\ [ellipsis as published] Were there
orders on how the Interior Ministry’s Interior Troops should act in the
explosive period after the second round [of the presidential election]?

[Popkov] The Interior Troops are a structure which carries out the tasks
allotted to it by the constitution (safeguarding public order, guarding
state facilities of particular significance). The presidential
administration, the government and parliament are state institutions, and
the Interior Troops, irrespective of their political sympathies or
antipathies, must do their job properly – safeguarding public order and
guarding state buildings.

It was largely clear that it was necessary to stay within some temporary
limitations, because the opposing sides had begun to work out mechanisms to
start applying political pressure in one way or another.

We clearly understood that some time would have to pass (the rounds of the
election, the court hearing, the Central Electoral Commission ruling) during
which we should not do anything to upset the balance of the peaceful
standoff between the troops and the picketers.

There were students, young girls and elderly people on Maydan, and
incidentally the parents of some of the soldiers who were guarding it were
also there. On the other side were the 18-year-old kids who had sworn the
oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. That meant loyalty to those who
had gone out onto the country’s main square to defend their choice.

There were no colour distinctions for these kids: they were troops under the
“yellow and blue [in Ukrainian]” flag, the flag of Ukraine. At a time when
many people were dashing about from one camp to another, trying to predict
the outcome of events and not lose the moment to do well for themselves, we
were just doing the job we had been given.

[Havrylova] To what extent did the non-violent turn of events in the first
days after the announcement of the results of the second round of the
elections depend on the power-wielding forces?

[Popkov] Our job was to safeguard public order and carry out our service in
guarding state facilities. It is better to take precautions than to try to
put irredeemable mistakes right later. I had particular aims before me
during those days: I did not have the right to make mistakes in
decision-making or in using my powers.

Just imagine: the military-tactical reserves on duty at the presidential
administration changed every two days. The troops did duty with a military
shift system of two hours on four hours off. This is a totally autonomous
structure with its own field kitchens and its own management which has to
provide normal conditions for the troops to serve in.

Soldiers from the Interior Troops subunits were mixing with the protesters
and there was a time when the picketers ended up behind our troops, showing
that they were sort of protecting the Interior Troops of Ukraine.

It was simply impossible to imagine the picketers turning into a crowd that
would go through the narrow streets of Kiev and start storming buildings. It
was absolutely essential to prevent that turn of events. We had to hold out
to the end, not allowing any acts of provocation.

[Havrylova] How do you feel about some of the heads of the Security Service
of Ukraine presenting the role of the Security Service in the revolution as
basically internal resistance to the Kuchma regime and open assistance to
the future president, Yushchenko?

What is behind this: the desire to emerge unblemished, showing their own
loyalty and desire to cooperate with the new authorities? Is this down to
the pragmatism of the power-wielders?

[Popkov] I do not consider it possible for me to judge the work of the
Security Service of Ukraine, but as a normal citizen I will say that the
people, the astute management by the leaders of the then opposition and the
proper behaviour and tolerance of the organizers of the mass protest should
all be given their due.

By the way, the calls from the Security Service of Ukraine started after the
command to retreat, and I only found out about their dealings with the
embassies from the press.


[Havrylova] What were your personal motives in the situation on 28 and 29
November? What was the position that you had thought out and what were your
arguments against the use of force?

[Popkov] That day was no different from the preceding ones: I looked at the
reports on the Security Council session on the news; I got information about
its work. After a certain time, around 2200 [local time], I talked to
opposition leaders by telephone. I was asked to meet them and talk. However,
since no-one foresaw that events would take a radical turn, I agreed to meet
them a bit later.

Afterwards, when the situation did turn radical, I personally phoned those
who I had recently been talking to from the opposition camp and said that we
needed to discuss the latest developments urgently, since matters were
starting to take an undesirable turn.

A few weeks later in an interview with a weekly a parliamentary deputy
described the plan of action on that evening in great detail: 4,000-5,000
people would go to the presidential administration, girls sitting on the
shoulders of the boys were to distract the attention of the special forces
and behind their backs men using wooden planks as a ladder were to break
through the military formations onto the territory that was being guarded.
It is easy to talk about it now\ [ellipsis as published]

At that moment it was necessary to take urgent measures to quash the
conflict that was flaring up at the outset and prevent any act of
provocation. No political ambition is worth the lives and health of those
standing on Maydan nor of those who were doing their military duty. The
command to hold a practice alert came by mobile phone, and of course I
realized that after it had been fully heard out and examined there would be
a rapid reaction.

That is what happened: in literally 10-15 minutes there were calls from
members of the opposition, and I was expecting guests at headquarters.
Meanwhile, in line with my command to hold a practice alert, the subunits I
have mentioned were brought to a state of readiness: weapons, live
cartridges and Cheremukha [irritant gas] cylinders which are part of the
special equipment of any police officer on patrol or point duty were

(Incidentally, falsehoods about tear gas are nothing more than the product
of watching Western action movies too much. There was nothing of the sort.)
The troops were equipped, put in special transport and the vehicles were
lined up in marching order. However, no-one left the sites they were
stationed at: only the supreme commander-in-chief – the president – can
launch the procedure of using force.

[ellipsis as published] At that time I was having a meeting in my office
with members of the opposition, including people I had long known and know
well, whatever their political affiliation. I was told that there would be
no move by the demonstrators towards the presidential administration. After
hearing reports from the subunit commanders about the state of readiness of
the troops and whether the equipment was in working order, I gave the order
to retreat.

[Havrylova] Many people view your action as a message to the opposition and
the authorities or as a bluff to win time\ [ellipsis as published]

[Popkov] It was, to some extent, because I wanted to let those hot heads
cool down by doing that, on the other side too. It is one thing to talk and
to call for specific actions and quite another to understand and see what
you are pushing people into. It is better to take pictures of yourself
against a background of troops in formation than to try and destroy the
monolith of a well-organized special structure and use it against the

[Havrylova] How do you rate your role in these events?

[Popkov] It is the power-wielding structures who are not able to conceal
their desire to be part of the president’s team who are assessing my work.
What springs to mind is the saying about how if you cannot crush a
revolution you need to try and lead it.

This is where the main difference between those power-wielding structures we
are talking about in the context of the Orange Revolution and the Interior
Troops lies. The Interior Troops carry out the functions set out for them in
the Ukrainian constitution, irrespective of who is president at a given

The Interior Troops cannot allow themselves to get mixed up in politics and
be a weapon in the hands of either the authorities or the opposition. I did
not consider it possible to put my actions down to heroics.

I acted as the commander of the Interior Troops and as a person who bears
responsibility for the lives and health of the troops, and as an officer who
answers to the state for carrying out the duties he is invested with. I
consider that I acted as an officer.

The main result is the current calm in society and the peaceful solution to
all the political upheavals. Life is a complicated business, but it puts
everything in its place.

[Havrylova] Your son is serving in Kosovo. How did he react to your actions
during the Orange Revolution?

[Popkov] My son is a peace-keeping officer, and he knows like no-one else
the price of civilian lives in the hot spots on the planet. I did not have
the right to make Ukraine into a hotspot.  -30-
[return to index] [The Action Ukraine Report (AUR) Monitoring Service]
           Split between Ukraine’s leaders damages election prospects

ANALYSIS & COMMENTARY: By Serhiy Rakhmanin
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, in Russian 26 Nov 05; pp 1,2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Friday, Dec 02, 2005

The split between orange revolutionaries President Viktor Yushchenko and
Yuliya Tymoshenko, which led to Tymoshenko’s resignation as prime minister,
is working against their prospects of doing well in the 2006 parliamentary
election, an analytical Ukrainian weekly has said.

Blaming the split on personal rivalries, the paper said it was not what the
people of Ukraine wanted. It criticized the leaders’ behaviour at
celebrations of the first anniversary of the Orange Revolution, and assessed
the chances of either of them forming an alliance with erstwhile enemy
Viktor Yanukovych.

The following is the text of the report entitled “The road that does not
lead to Maydan” by Serhiy Rakhmanin published in the Ukrainian Zerkalo
Nedeli newspaper on 26 November; subheadings and ellipsis as published:

It is not possible to go out twice onto the same Maydan [Independence
Square, site of protests that led to the Orange Revolution]. Many people who
went to the country’s main square last Tuesday [22 November to mark the
anniversary of the Orange Revolution] have become convinced of the harsh
justice of this truth.


“Maydan” was different!” said those taking part in the celebrations of the
first Freedom Day, making no concessions.
The same flags but different slogans. The same words but totally different
emotions. The same people but completely different eyes. The orange flags in
the hands of the leaders have ended up scattered with bureaucratic dust.

It was probably simply naive to expect otherwise. The Maydan which was in
the front-line [in bold] (which honourably fulfilled the holy mission of
acting as the country’s main barricade) has long since passed into history.
It is a history which some people are rushing to touch up and others are
hurrying to blacken.

It is not just a thankless task to compare the two Maydans; it is a
senseless one. Actually, you wouldn’t compare birth and a birthday as
equals, would you?

Those who expected to draw on the same courage, feel the same drive and feed
on the same energy most certainly left the celebrations disappointed – but
they needn’t have. It is as unrealistic to return to that Maydan as it is
impossible to return to childhood. The inevitable disappointment which
settles in our hearts and souls should not become cause for shame.

We should be proud, not sad – of our involvement in a real miracle, which
many people (from the vantage point of today) now consider a normal thing.

We need to genuinely sympathise with those who have not experienced anything
like it, those who have not known this joy, those who have still not
understood (either then or now) what really happened in that cold autumn of
2004, those who have not felt the real price of riches in their hands and
have not shared out those riches as they should.

Today’s Maydan which brings up the rear [in bold] is serving other purposes.
It is being given the little-respected role of a square for performances.
[President] Viktor Yushchenko for some reason described Independence Square
as a podium in his speech. His words jarred on some of the veterans of the
“elegant revolution”. They shouldn’t have. This was a healthy Freudian slip.

Incidentally, some of those present at the new political performance were
expecting to see something like an election fashion show to display new

What did the thousands and thousands of people who filled the centre of the
capital on the 22nd actually want?

Let us explain right away that many of those at the celebration were taken
there at the orders of various political forces who once represented a
united team. However, let us risk dividing those present into four

The first is the gawpers, meaning those who were glad of the chance to while
away the evening listening to Okean Elzy [band] and gaping at a real live
president. There were not so many of these, although perceptibly more than
at the time of Maydan-2004, when the “tourists” were the absolute minority.

The second group was the nostalgics. They are those who did not expect any
particular revelations from the politicians but just wanted to immerse
themselves in that atmosphere again, forgetting for a moment that there were
very different auras at the barricades and at the podium.

The third was the usual rent-a-mob, with their scripted shouts,
indifferently bearing placards.

Finally there was the fourth group, which we consider made up the absolute
majority. Let us call them those who are not indifferent. The main reason
bringing this group of people to Maydan was hope – hope that on this very
day, in that very place the generals of the “orange” army who have become
mired in discord would finally convincingly announce the restoration of

There were not much grounds to expect this. However, there was certainly
belief. It was a sincere, somewhat naive and even a tiny bit childish belief
in a miracle.

It is thus, as New Year approaches and looking in melancholy fashion at the
snowless landscape that we believe (despite disheartening predictions) that
at precisely midnight the heavens will definitely reveal the miracle.

Our suggestion is partly confirmed by the reaction to the leaders’ speeches
of the people who had filled Maydan. There was joy, but not crazy joy. The
people did not react too willingly to the leaders’ endeavours to whip up the
crowd with the assistance of speeches about history.

The people had, after all, gone there to listen, not shout. They were more
interested in assessments of the unhappy present and forecasts for the
cloudy future than reminisces of a heroic past.

The people applauded the speakers respectfully, but there was basically just
one single instance of what might be called an ovation. That was when Viktor
Andriyovych [Yushchenko] squeezed out a promise to apply all his efforts to
restore that unity that has been lost. This factor confirms as no other what
exactly the people without whom the year-old triumph would have been simply
impossible wanted to hear.

However, there was no miracle. After 22 November 2005 we can say with a high
degree of probability: Yushchenko and [former Prime Minister] Yuliya
Tymoshenko are quite clearly going separate ways for the election. It is
probably symbolic that the last illusion of the orange romantics died off at
the anniversary of Maydan. A new political era has begun.


It is no secret to anyone how different Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko are:
melting ice and uneven flame; a not very well-armoured tank and a slightly
old anti-tank mine that has been lying in the arsenal. Their political union
was unnatural in many respects. At the same time, it was surprisingly
organic and unusually fruitful. They counterbalanced and complemented each

The average arithmetic of the temperaments of the two leaders of the
People’s Strength coalition was one of the reasons for last year’s success.
We will be forgiven for this audacious theory, but it was largely thanks to
their influence on each other that the young national revolution was not
dismembered at talks at the Mariyinskyy [Palace] nor end in bloodshed during
the storming of Bankova [St where the then presidential administration was

They even each have a different concept of power. For her, the route to
power lies in intrigue. The point of power lies in action, often
ill-considered, at times venturesome. For him, the route to power lies in
discourse. The point of power lies in well-earned tranquility. Most of the
new government’s supporters would probably like to see leaders with a
somewhat different set of political features. However, they are as they are.

The Maydan community rated, respected, loved and at times worshipped them as
they are – hoping that their unity which made it possible to win one
historical victory would be cause for new and no less significant victories.

Regular readers of Zerkalo Nedeli will certainly be familiar with the
results of polls published in the last issue of our newspaper. For those who
are not familiar with them let us cite some figures: 46 per cent of
participants in last year’s actions who were polled said that they went out
onto Maydan as a sign of protest against the last government, and a further
27 per cent put their actions down to a need to protect the right to vote.

This recent poll has confirmed speculation in Zerkalo Nedeli a year ago that
the desire to see Mr Yushchenko as president was not a dominating force, and
still less so was the desire to see Ms Tymoshenko as prime minister. A
significant part of the population were demanding another country and other
leaders. These were the ones who looked the most worthy.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were just the names written on the orange and
blue-and-yellow flags. If they had not been there, the people would have
found some others. They would not have left Maydan, even if (let us imagine
a totally implausible theory) both leaders had after the second round of the
election gone off somewhere deep underground.

Let us suppose that many of those who supported the revolution have noticed
the shortcomings of their leaders, but hoped that they would give strength
to the difficult path towards building democracy.

The misfortune lies in the fact that the contradictions between the two
brightest members of the new team are too deep-rooted. We will cite another
theory we have previously put forward (confirmed by many other people).
Yushchenko does not trust Tymoshenko and he fears her. Tymoshenko does not
trust Yushchenko and she despises him.

Yes, they have different concepts of power. However, they are similar in
their genuine unwillingness to share power with anyone. They were indeed
united, while there was a common enemy. However, when the enemy fell, those
who were yesterday made into allies by circumstances naturally turned into

In the first months of the new government, members of Yushchenko’s
entourage, concealing their deep irritation, spoke of how the fledgling
prime minister was doing a hasty PR job on herself by reporting non-existent
successes and crediting herself with other people’s successes.

Tymoshenko’s allies just as indignantly reported the head of state’s fits of
jealousy as he reacted sensitively to the prime minister’s popularity, and
about his groundless attacks and pointless prohibitions.

The truth probably lay somewhere in between, and it is simply a sad one: the
leaders started to compete with each other on the first day they came to
power. The Ukrainian Olympics was too small for both of them. It is probably
more a misfortune than it is their fault, and a misfortune for the whole

The president did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the ambitions of the
prime minister. Among friends he would say that he had been progressing
towards this power for more than 10 years; he had not only earned it – he
had suffered for it. He did not consider it possible to share it with

He considered any encroachments on his power inadmissible and unfounded.
Yushchenko’s predetermination towards competitiveness made him seek dirty
tricks even in places where there weren’t any, which evidently did not make
for effective team-playing.

It is hard to say whether it was possible to talk of encroachments. But
Tymoshenko’s desire to be first was read very clearly. She is one of those
people who wants everything, and straight away. We can recall how in 2000
this major strategist from the Ukraine Without Kuchma protests hurried her
companions along in the struggle, urging them to take decisive but
ill-considered and at times too risky steps.

She seemed to be rushing to rid the country of Mr Kuchma without thinking
too much about whether the country was ready for it. She thought it was now
or never. Ukraine Without Kuchma did not then become the forerunner of the
revolution, but the revolution still became possible… [ellipsis as

For some time they preferred not to wash their dirty linen in public. The
Our Ukraine People’s Union [OUPU] created at the beginning of the year and
the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc [YTB] were publicly described as fully-fledged
participants in a future election mega-union. Reason forced them to embrace
each other; they realized playing separately would give their opponents a
golden opportunity for revenge.

However, emotions pushed them to split up long before the September
revelations of [former State Secretary] Oleksandr Zinchenko [alleging
corruption in the higher echelons of power]. Back in February the president
had several times expressed doubt among a narrow circle of his allies about
the expediency of forming a united orange bloc.

In January Ms Tymoshenko told the public: “We will unite our forces into a
bloc.” By March the tone had changed. Asked by an Ukrayinska Pravda
correspondent whether the agreement to set up a joint election list remained
in force, Tymoshenko replied most evasively: “I think that closer to the
election we will find a form, a conception, a configuration for our
participation in the election capable of bringing our joint political force
the greatest result… [ellipsis as published]”

They were being pulled to different sides. Tymoshenko’s approval rating was
growing before our eyes, making it possible to look to the future with
optimism. Conquering the level of 20 per cent of the vote seemed a trifling
matter, and some YTB dreamers were aspiring to 35 per cent even in the
summer. A 150-strong faction seemed realistic. Mr Yushchenko was being
regularly sweet-talked more or less the same way.

They convinced themselves and others that by going their separate ways they
would bring great benefit to the common cause. They did so, it seems,
without realizing that there was almost nothing in common left, and
forgetting that the actual fact of their unity was important to the people.

In such a case arithmetic is not the greatest aid, because if they were to
split a group would emerge who would want to vote neither for the OUPU nor
for the YTB. Some of them would see the split as betrayal and react to it by
refusing to go to the polls. If a conflict arose accompanied by mutual
accusations, the number of those who will vote for others as a sign of
protest could grow.

The impression that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were subconsciously looking
for a pretext for a political divorce was being created. Even without
Zinchenko’s news conference, they would have found one anyway. Both would
certainly have survived the September conflict, but it seemed at the same
time that both felt a certain relief – even though Tymoshenko held on to the
post of prime minister to the last.

Subsequent events showed how deep the offence runs. Mutual reproaches, both
veiled and open, have rained down mainly not from the leaders’ lips; their
allies have been drafted in to carry out this mission. However, everything
was clear to everyone.

The escalation of the cold war has struck a painful blow to the approval
ratings of both the leaders and the political forces they head. The result
of this (according to the law of preserving political energy) has been a
rise in the approval rating of [former presidential candidate Viktor]
Yanukovych and the [opposition] Party of Regions.

Now they have taken fright. This is not because they have voluntarily or
involuntarily deceived the expectations of the people. Mr Yushchenko has
taken fright at the fact that he might not hold on to power and Ms
Tymoshenko at the fact that she might not get it.

Not even this scare has made them rise above their offence. Yushchenko is
absolutely convinced that it was with Tymoshenko’s help that the corruption
label was stuck to the representatives of the new power.

Although the president has no convincing proof of that (as far as we know),
he cannot forgive her for it – even though he has forgiven yesterday’s
enemies for everything, strengthening Christian all-forgiveness with
declarations, memorandums, decrees and laws. This has thoroughly boosted his
rivals and essentially weakened him.

Tymoshenko cannot forgive the offence dealt to her during her time as prime
minister. Her wounded pride at one point took precedence even over her
thirst for power.

Whatever Mr Yushchenko and Ms Tymoshenko may have told the press, the
public, their sympathisers and their critics, real talks about possible
unification have not basically been held until recently.

Life forced them into this: the Party of Regions’ approval rating has
climbed sharply in recent months. President Yushchenko and Prime Minister
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko’s entourage and Tymoshenko’s allies have all
played a part in this.

However, even at the Maydan celebrations they ended up looking more like
today’s rivals than yesterday’s allies. Both of them were quite obviously
trying to win Maydan from each other, and as a result neither won, because
the people were hungry for a fraternal draw not a fratricidal contest.

Ms Tymoshenko being borne onto the stage in the arms of her joyful allies
looked a little theatrical; there was probably no sense in letting Mr
Yushchenko’s children suffer for a whole hour while the head of the family
and the state finished his lengthy speech.

The PR shortcomings would hardly have spoilt our impressions, however, had
the leaders taken the step that those who had gathered were expecting. They
responded, though, with words not deeds. What they said and how they said it
is worthy of separate discussion.


Someone who is going to bury the hatchet of war should not carry a stone in
their pocket. It is a shame that two intelligent people upon whom depends
the fate of millions of people, have not grasped this truth, which is as old
as the hills.

Tymoshenko’s speech was too much like an election speech, and Yushchenko’s
was too irritated. There may have been cause for Yushchenko’s rage. His mood
had been spoilt on the 21st, when the head of the YTB failed to turn up at a
meeting of the leaders of the fraternal victorious parties, sending [former
Deputy Prime Minister Mykola] Tomenko in her place.

At least it wasn’t Tymoshenko’s adviser Mykhaylo] Brodskyy; the leader of
the nation also has a clearly-expressed idiosyncratic attitude towards
Tomenko. It is not truly known why Tymoshenko ignored the meeting. According
to some reports, she could not see the point of going, since she had not
received a personal invitation from the head of state.

We can say: if someone is interested in reconciliation and unification (as
Tymoshenko says she is), they could have not paid attention to this custom.
Or it could be put another way: if someone is interested in reconciliation
and unification (as Yushchenko says he is), they could have observed good
manners and called their ally.

We can suppose that Tymoshenko did not lose out, since the discussion about
a possible unification took on quite a strange character. As far as we can
judge, Yushchenko proposed to the allies that they unite not with each other
but around the president. However, we can also suppose that the absence of
the former prime minister could have influenced the thrust and form of the

We have to suppose that Mr Yushchenko was also annoyed by Tomenko’s critical
Maydan speech and the cries of “Yuliya!” with which people tried to
interrupt his speech. A person supposedly inclined towards reconciliation
should certainly not have publicly demonstrated his offence at this.
However, another person also supposedly inclined towards reconciliation
should have done everything to prevent her team from taking provocative

The president must have been stung most of all by Tymoshenko’s speech,
however. It certainly contained some important suggestions and some moments
when she struck the right chord. On that day many spoke in one form or
another of the need for people to straighten their shoulders, but only
Yuliya Tymoshenko sounded sincere.

She quite rightly stressed to the listeners the threat of a backlash and
described restoring the former unity as the only recipe to avoid it.
However, there was not much that was unifying in her speech.

She did not acknowledge any mistakes; she tried to justify herself.
Yushchenko went on to do the very same, but even more clumsily and
unconvincingly. Tymoshenko’s justification looked a little ambiguous: “How
was I supposed to feel when I could not appoint a single official?” Only the
president could have hindered her in that, and a reproach such as this was
probably made at the wrong time and in the wrong place.

The next passage, however, was an even greater mistake: “At the
parliamentary election we will basically be choosing the head of state.”
This could be taken not as an appeal to vote for Tymoshenko; it was a
statement of the real role of the president in the country – a role that
Yushchenko does not want to agree with. After that, all assurances of
friendship and unity with the president were basically devoid of meaning.

The impression was created that Tymoshenko and Yushchenko doubted until the
last moment what they should say at Maydan, although Ms Tymoshenko spoke
without notes, while Mr Yushchenko had prepared a whole speech, which from
time to time he deviated from. That did not work to his advantage – in
places the speech sounded like a TV address to the people, in places like a
good old-fashioned report to the Security Council, and in places like an old
Maydan speech.

He interrupted his boring speech about the trade balance and GDP with
emotional attacks on his former allies. Even some important points about the
authorities’ very specific plans passed without notice. People were hardly
listening to the president, because they immediately realized that he would
not say or do the most important thing.

He did not acknowledge his mistakes nor announce any general rules or joint
responsibility for the fate of the election. He just transparently hinted
that it was not about electing a national prime minister and that the “East
and West – together” slogan was still topical.


Some people in the Tymoshenko camp took these points as a hint that
Yushchenko is planning to agree a coalition with Yanukovych after the

As far as we know, both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko support a link with the
Party of Regions. They both fear being “dropped” by their ally. What sort of
unity is that?

The hawks in the OUPU are trying to convince Yushchenko that the oligarchs
have already come to an agreement amongst themselves behind his back and
that the parliamentary majority will be formed by [tycoons Rinat] Akhmetov,
[Viktor] Pinchuk and [Ihor] Kolomoyskyy, whose interests in the next Supreme
Council [parliament] will be represented by the Party of Regions, the Lytvyn
bloc and the YTB.

The hawks in the YTB are saying that the president will do anything to
prevent Tymoshenko from becoming prime minister.

However, some doves have been found in the OUPU. The comrades who support
purges in the OUPU recently lost the war at the party congress to [OUPU
Deputy Chairman Petro] Poroshenko and [former presidential aide Oleksandr]
Tretyakov [failing to oust them]. Despite the fact that the president agreed
to strike their names from the party list, they remained in the leadership
and on the party register [as members].

Most of the party “outcasts”, it is true, apparently will not receive a seat
among the top 10 [in the party’s election list]. It is not yet known who
will get to the top of the ranking table. It is planned that it will not
feature Yushchenko, Poroshenko, Tretyakov, [former Justice Minister Roman]
Zvarych, [former Transport Minister Yevhen] Chervonenko or [former
Emergencies Minister Davyd] Zhvaniya.

However, [Prime Minister Yuriy] Yekhanurov, [OUPU leader Roman] Bezsmertnyy
and [OUPU parliament faction head Mykola] Martynenko are likely to be there.

The possible presence is being discussed of [head of the OUPU executive
committee Mykola] Katerynchuk, [head of the presidential secretariat Oleh]
Rybachuk and also the leaders of the parties who have agreed to join a bloc
with the OUPU – Anatoliy Kinakh (Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs),
Borys Tarasyuk (People’s Movement of Ukraine), Anatoliy Matviyenko,
([Ukrainian Republican Party] Sobor), [Oleksiy] Ivchenko (Congress of
Ukrainian Nationalists) and [Volodymyr] Stretovych (Christian People’s

It is said that the president has not lost hope of getting [Interior
Minister Yuriy] Lutsenko and [boxing star Vitaly] Klitschko.
The Reforms and Order party is unlikely to join a mega-bloc in Yushchenko’s
name. The party will either unite with the YTB or fall apart, after which
the most famous figures will split up to follow the two “orange” teams. It
is almost sure that it will not be one party, and the only compromise that
the sides could reach is a non-aggression pact.

However, [First Deputy State Secretary] Ivan Vasyunyk and [head of the
presidential secretariat] Oleg Rybachuk – recently empowered by the
president and blessed by Yekhanurov – have held a series of discussions with
Tymoshenko. The “plotting interlocutors” were apparently working out a
compromise: a joint list for the OUPU and the YTB with equal quotas.

However, Ms Tymoshenko had to give up her claims on the premiership. The
post of speaker was apparently promised in return. In extremis, she was to
become one of the candidates for the post of prime minister.

It is not known if this is what happened or not. All that is known is that
the planned meeting between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko did not take place.
Without one, further talks are impossible.

However, Ms Tymoshenko has, according to some reports, met Poroshenko. He
apparently stated that it was he who was controlling the party. He offered
friendship, cooperation, a joint list and a common battle with Yekhanurov.
The dialogue was not successful.

What can we expect in the foreseeable future? Probably the stepping up of
talks with the “Donetsk people” [Yanukovych allies], towards whom both
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko are being pushed by some of their allies. The
“Regionalists” [Yanukovych’s Party of Regions] are agreeable to contacts.

However, as far as is known, they do not actually want a union with any of
the “orange lot” in the new parliament. The injury is too fresh and the hate
too great. Yanukovych, Akhmetov and company are hoping that the approval
ratings of the OUPU and the YTB will fall still further.

They would rather create a coalition with the Lytvyn bloc, the Communists
and the Ukrainian Progressive Socialist Party, whom they plan to actively

What will our heroes do? It is hard to say what path they will choose. We
would very much want it to lead to Maydan. It doesn’t have to be in the
direct sense, but in the sense of its values.  -30-
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